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Abstract
Courts have been regarded as stable, unwavering organizations in a rapidly-
changing world, resistant to improvements and difficult to change. Recently,
however, it has been argued that civil justice systems around the western world
are in crisis and facing serious pressures to change. The implementation of new
civil justice arrangements has been considered a fundamental modification of
and sea-change in the justice system, on the one hand, but as procedural
tinkering and cosmetic faddishness, on the other.
The focus of the present work is on the change in and development of court
practices in Finnish district courts. My study revolves around the implementa-
tion of the procedural reform in civil matters that was enforced in Finland in
1993, and examines how the reformed procedures are actualized in everyday
court proceedings. The essential question concerning the court reform is
whether the change constitutes a fundamental transformation, or whether it is
something more gradual and stepwise. Drawing on cultural-historical activity
theory, the study is theoretically attuned to the presupposition that fundamen-
tal change in work requires qualitative change and expansion in the object of
the activity, which in this case would mean a shift in the ways in which court
cases and clients are worked with. The empirical chapters, devoted to micro-anal-
yses of courtroom interaction, shed light on the nature of the ongoing
transition in Finnish courts.
The study is longitudinal and based on comparisons between court proceed-
ings observed before and after the court reform. The data consist mainly of
videotaped court hearings and interviews with those involved.
On the basis of my findings, the implementation of the procedural reform
appears to be an incremental process in which the new rules are given mean-
ing, shaped and enriched in authentic use in practice by the practitioners them-
selves. This finding challenges traditional views on implementation as either
top-down or bottom-up determined execution, and presents an alternative view
on implementation as a learning process with significant potential for expansion
in court work.
The major expansive potential lies within the small and gradual changes and
novel solutions which may appear trivial but incorporate the potential for deep-
seated transformation. The new, informal and actively controlled courtroom
discourse, the clients’ contributions to establishing their case and their expand-
ing initiatives in particular, as well as attempts to reach a settlement instead of
giving a verdict, are the spearheads of the future that may direct developments
in courts most radically. At the same time, they constitute the concrete learning
challenges to be worked out by legal practitioners.
Keywords: activity theory, change, civil procedure, courtroom interaction,
court reform, implementation, learning
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1 Introduction
1.1 Unfolding Landscape of Change in Courts
The procedural code in civil proceedings is a set of norms that regulates how civil
matters – disputes between people – are to be handled in courts of law. This
definition easily evokes an image of precise statutes and judges who robotically
follow them when conducting the proceedings in trials. If the statutes change
following a court reform, for example, the judges change their working patterns
accordingly. Procedures in courts resemble a highly judicial exercise, hardly
interesting for a researcher oriented to work and work-related learning.
Interestingly enough, procedural rules may sometimes hide a seed of change.
In this study, I will argue that the implementation of a court reform is a far cry
from the mechanistic execution of top-down ordered laws. I will suggest that,
rather than the mere adoption of pre-given rules, or alternatively, the adjustment
of the reform to local needs, implementation could be successfully studied as a
learning process, in which the new rules are given meaning, shaped and enriched
when used in practice by the practitioners themselves. More importantly, I will
identify the implementation of a court reform as a learning process with a sig-
nificant potential for qualitative transformation and expansion in court work, a
topic highly relevant as an object of study on change and learning in organi-
zational settings.
The interest of this work lies in the change and development of court work.
It opens several windows onto the changes that emerge in the civil proceedings
in Finnish district courts following the implementation of a court reform.
Situated practices of courtroom interaction are studied in order to shed light on
the dynamics of change and the developmental potential in court work. As a
result, the court reform itself unfolds as the overture of a change process that
can alter our understanding of courts and justice.
2Courts and the Pressure for Change
Courts of law have traditionally been highly trusted in Finnish society. For a long
while, they exerted their judicial power over their subjects in an incontestable
way. In the relatively folksy proceedings, people resigned themselves to the
trials and decisions as they arouse, and kept from criticizing the respected
judicial system. Courts represented the last fortresses of formal authority and
legitimization through formal hearings.
Court clients and their expectations have, however, changed. People are now
more demanding, and also more willing to and capable of weighing up the
decisions given by the courts. They are sensitive in assessing whether the courts’
decisions conform to or confront their own sense of justice and fairness.
Given the fact that the cases themselves and the legislation have become more
and more complex, and that the mechanical application of laws is ever more dif-
ficult, the legal authority as the solid ground of trust has been fractured, and the
source of experiences of trust is more convoluted.
Tyler (1997, p. 893) pointed out that greater attention needs to be paid to the
clear distinction between formal legal proceedings and the psychology of fair-
ness, and that courts should be more supportive of people’s procedural concerns.
He argued that citizens have a very different perspective on the legal system than
lawyers and judges. In particular, citizens want different things from the system
than they are typically given.
Hence, there is a substantial gap between desirable treatment as described by the
clients of the legal system (i.e., people who come to the court with problems) and as
represented in the formal structure of the law and enacted by legal authorities. (Ibid.,
p. 894)
In a rapidly changing world, the courts have been considered stable and
unwavering organizations experiencing almost no external pressure for change.
They have been widely regarded as resistant to improvements and difficult to
change, if not unchangeable (Eisenstein et al., 1988; Feeley, 1983; Provine &
Seron, 1988–89). Now it seems that court work is in turmoil. One signal of the
pressure to change is the recognition of the crisis in civil justice systems around
the western world (Zuckerman, 1999). Courts are facing criticism against the
civil justice arrangements that have largely led to delay, high costs and alleged
decline in the quality of the result. Storm clouds have been recognized by Davies
(1999, p. 203), for example, who warns, ”If courts do not provide quicker and
cheaper dispute resolution they will cease to be used and will consequently lose
both their authority and their status”, and by Chiarloni (1999, p. 279) who
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declares, “Among judges, there is a growing consciousness that public unease
could turn into hostility, threatening the courts’ independence and their power
within society.”
In Finland, competitors with state-run dispute resolution, such as the private
system organized by the Finnish Bar Association, have started to emerge. Courts
and their decisions are criticized more easily. Trust in courts has been said to be
on the decrease. For the first time, courts have ended up in a situation in which
they have to seriously consider whether they should adhere to their traditional
role, or metamorphose and develop their service to fill the gap and fit clients’
needs better (see Arponen, 1999; Tontti, 1999). All this signals a transition in
court work.
The Finnish Procedural Reform of 1993 under Scrutiny
Finland is a civil law country in which the justice system in civil and criminal
matters consists of the district courts as the courts of first instance (lower courts),
courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court.
During the 1990s, the Finnish court system faced a series of procedural
reforms. The procedure in the lower courts concerning civil matters was revised
in 1993, and concerning criminal matters in 1997. The procedure in the courts
of appeal was reformed in 1998.
Focused on change in the work of courts, the present study revolves around
the procedural reform in civil matters, enforced in December, 1993. The extreme-
ly textual proceedings based on briefs and minutes were replaced with proceed-
ings that relied mainly on oral presentations. The aim was to replace the pro-
longed proceedings with their slow tempo and several adjournments with a more
condensed process comprising preliminary proceedings and a main hearing. The
passive role of the judge was abandoned in favor of a more active role in which
he or she works in direct contact with the parties. One particularly new task was
the obligation not only to encourage the parties to settle, but also to make pro-
posals for compromise.
The Finnish public debate related to the court system, largely activated by the
court reforms in the 1990s, has focused primarily on legal costs and delay. Sharp
tones have been used in evaluating the new civil procedure and the resulting
increase in legal costs and weakened access to justice.
Without downplaying these important concerns, I have chosen not to
evaluate the success or failure of the reform, but rather to look into how the
reformed procedures are actualized in everyday court proceedings, what kind of
4developmental potential exists in current work practices, and what elements of
a qualitatively new court activity are to be found.
The essential question concerning the court reform is whether the change is
a fundamental transformation, described in the literature as a sea-change of civil
justice arrangements (Palmer & Roberts, 1998), metamorphosis and recalibra-
tion of the role of civil litigation (Marcus, 1999), or something more incremental
and cosmetic, referred to as procedural tinkering (Marcus, 1999; Saks, 1982).
Drawing on cultural-historical activity theory, this study is theoretically
attuned to the presupposition that fundamental changes in work require qual-
itative change – also characterized as expansion – in the object of work activity
(Engeström, 1987). In this case, such an expansion of the object would mean a
qualitative change in how court cases are constructed and how clients are worked
with. The empirical chapters of the study, devoted to micro-analyses of court-
room interaction, will shed light on this issue and construct piece by piece an
understanding of the nature of the ongoing transformation in Finnish courts.
In studying the change, I will not restrict my examination to how the judges
and attorneys implement the new rules in carrying out their daily work on the
cases. The clients and their contributions in the hearings are also put under scru-
tiny in order to highlight the user perspective on courts and to offer a broader
basis for considering the learning challenges and developmental potentials.
1.2 Structure of the Study
The study is comprised of eleven chapters. The chapter at hand, Chapter 1,
introduces the research interest and the main themes: courts, the implementa-
tion of a court reform, and change and learning in organizations. The remain-
ing section (1.3) gives an overview of the field of studies on court work and
positions my study within it.
In Chapter 2, I will use judicial and socio-legal literature to draw a picture
of court work in transition. The viewpoint is that of the court system. First I will
introduce the Finnish court reform and then examine its dynamics in detail by
taking three particular perspectives on its content: (1) interaction and commu-
nication in courts, (2) procedural justice, citizens’ trust and the position of the
client in the court system, and (3) rationalizing dispute resolution through pro-
moting settlement.
The focus in Chapter 3 shifts from the particular system in Finnish courts
and court reform to the broader questions of change, possibilities of change and
the implementation of intended change. The recognition of the potential for new
and emergent work practices in the implementation presupposes the recons
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ideration of the connection between issues of learning and issues of change and
implementation.
Chapter 4 goes further into the themes of organizational change and learn-
ing, and formulates a working hypothesis on them. Empirical and theoretical
research questions for the study are set.
Chapter 5 begins with an introduction of the theoretical approach and
methodology used for studying changes in court work. I also introduce my
research site and its history, as well as the data gathered and the practical con-
duct of the fieldwork.
Chapters 6 to 9 include the empirical findings. Chapter 6 is an exploratory
attempt to chart and conceptualize the research terrain opened up in the study.
By comparing two court trials, one conducted before the reform and one after
it, I focus on how the interaction and communication in the hearings have
changed with the implementation of the new civil process.
Chapter 7 continues the elaboration of changes in court work. My approach
to the local construction of court proceedings is through the notion of a script.
I focus on how the participants produce the script in situ, and how possible
deviations from it are managed. Again, I compare and contrast an old and a new
court case.
Chapter 8 presents a new perspective on court work by focusing on the
clients and their contributions in constructing a court case. This chapter intro-
duces a method called initiative analysis to examine clients’ initiatives in the
hearings and their effects on the proceedings.
Practices of reaching a settlement are in focus in Chapter 9. I introduce my
working hypothesis concerning the possible shift in the motive that drives the
dispute resolution, and analyze episodes of courtroom interaction related to
settlement in this light.
Chapter 10 contains the conclusions. The findings concerning the empirical
research questions are summarized. Spearheads of development are formulat-
ed and discussed in order to identify the developmental potential pointing
toward future possibilities of court work. The transformation of expertise and
the nature of the implementation of a court reform as change and learning are
discussed.
Finally, Chapter 11 reflects upon the research process, and considers the con-
tributions of this study to relevant research fields and for court practitioners.
61.3 How Has the Work of Courts Been Studied?
There is little research on the activity of courts, the work of judges, court pro-
ceedings and court clients in Finland. The country lacks a socio-legal tradition,
especially the empirical examination of court activity, and the majority of legal
studies are focused on legal dogmatics. The weak tradition of Finnish empirical
studies on “law in action” implies, that no apparent point of comparison or
reinforcement for this study can be invoked.
Recent Finnish studies on the court system are – with few exceptions –
historical inquiries, if the purely judicial examinations are excluded. Letto-Van-
amo (1989) studied the advocate system and its development. Nousiainen (1985;
1993) examined disputes and their solutions in Finland. Her studies offer
information on the lower courts and their evolvement in the context of societal
development and modernization. Kemppinen (1992) studied the activity and
structure of the Supreme Court in the land in his cultural-historical disserta-
tion, his key themes being legal culture and legal mentality.
Finnish empirical studies focusing on current court practices can be count-
ed on one hand. The set of studies conducted by Ervasti (e.g. 1997a; 1997b)
represents the first study in Finland that was based on wide empirical data about
court proceedings. This research produces basic data and evaluates how the aims
of the reform have materialized, as well as the unpredictable effects of or prob-
lems with the proceedings. Ervasti evaluates the implementation of the lower-
court reform in the light of statistics, court documents and questionnaires.
Välikoski’s (1996) study concerns courtroom communication in criminal cases
from the viewpoint of forensic communication. Judges’ moves in controlling the
courtroom interaction have been observed and judges’ conceptions about court-
room communication have been defined through interviews. Being the first
attempt to study courtroom communication in Finland, and building on
written notes on judges’ turns in interaction, the study has aimed at describing
on a general level, and hence, assigns the vivid and dynamic aspects of the
actual interaction. Still, the findings of the study on the formal and monologi-
cal characteristics of the legal communication correspond largely with and give
valuable support to my own findings concerning the courtroom interaction
before the procedural reform.
Contrary to the Finnish research tradition, western studies on court practice
are numerous. They include analysis of individual court cases, clients’ accounts,
court narratives, courtroom discourse, procedural law, access to justice, models
of courtroom control and decision making, and comparative studies on legal
systems, all of which offer a different empirical perspective on the work of courts.
To position my own research and give an overview of the field of studies, a four-
square matrix is presented (Figure 1.1), in which one dimension concerns wheth-
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er the study aims at a static glimpse of the prevailing court work or at the cap-
turing of developmental dynamics in court work. The other dimension
determines whether the study focuses on global, macro-level phenomena or on
the local, micro level. The review is limited to studies, in which the focus is con-
cretely on the lower courts, and more specifically on the court proceedings and
the work of the courts. As a consequence, general theories of law and the evo-
lution of law are excluded.
Figure 1.1 Studies on Court Work
Macro-level studies focusing on some prevailing features of the court system
form the major field of legal studies (Quadrant 1). Traditionally, these studies
are surveys based on large numbers of questionnaires or interviews, and the sta-
tistical interpretation of data. Similarly, studies based on data gathered from
court dockets are typical. Many of the surveys are from the 1980s, when quan-
titative research settings became popular as computing methods advanced rap-
idly. The study by Van Koppen and Ten Kate (1984) on individual differences
in judicial behavior, the research made by McEwen, Mather and Maiman (1994)
on divorce lawyers’ accounts about mediation, Hogarth’s study (1971) on judi-
cial attitudes and sentencing behavior, as well as Tyler’s study (1984) on citizens’
perceived injustice and courtroom experiences, serve as examples of work in
which the focus was on static analysis of a particular phenomenon as it appeared
at the moment of gathering the data.
3. Local studies on 
prevailing features of 
work in courts, 
e.g. studies on 
courtroom  interaction 
and  ethnographic 
studies on courts 
LOCAL/ 
MICRO-LEVEL  
2. Macro-level studies 
on historical 
developments 
in the court system
1. Macro-level studies 
on prevailing features 
in the court system, 
e.g. surveys
MACRO-LEVEL
DYNAMICSTATIC
4. Local studies on 
developmental 
dynamics
8Some of the surveys, such as Tyler’s Chicago Study on citizens’ legal experi-
ences, attitudes and behavior (1990), rest on two measurements which facilitate
both cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis. As Tyler describes it, cross-
sectional analysis looks at the relationship between attitudes and behavior
measured at one point in time, while longitudinal analysis uses the data collected
at both points in time to examine the changes in attitudes and behavior as well
as in their relationship (Tyler, 1990, p. 8). What is expected to possibly change
are the attitudes and behavior, not the legal system itself. Thus this view of the
court system is more static than dynamic.
The studies depicted in Quadrant 2 take the dynamic, changing nature of the
court system as their starting point. Change-oriented and macro-level studies
on courts concentrate on analyzing the historical changes or structural trans-
formations of court systems, usually within a long period of time and on a highly
general level. For instance, Heydebrand and Seron (1990) examined the histor-
ical transformation of court organization as a long process of rationalization,
during which the changes in society have had an impact on the case load and
case mix in the courts, which in turn has resulted in new ways of organizing court
services. The analysis is based on large and diverse statistical data from differ-
ent points of time.
One field of research, in which the changing nature of the court system is
taken as a matter of course, comprises studies on court reforms. For example,
Feeley’s “Court Reform on Trial” (1983) is a classic assessment of four reforms
in criminal justice, driven by an attempt to understand the process of change.
Most of this research consists of evaluation studies in which the intended
or implemented reforms are assessed. The process-oriented view is rather
implicitly embedded in the setting, where the problems preceding the reform are
outlined, and its outcomes or effectiveness assessed. Following this format, Lariv-
ière (1997) from France, Varano (1997) from Italy and Gottwald (1997) from
Germany, for example, evaluate the court reforms implemented in their respec-
tive countries. Recent developmental trends in court management, as well as
procedural and organizational reforms, are also discussed in articles by
Provine and Seron (1988–89), Ferrarese (1988–89) and Plotnikoff (1988–89).
What is problematic in these studies is that the empirical grounds for the
evaluation appear relatively weak, as they seem to lack careful empirical data on
the actual changes in the reformed court practices. Only seldom are they based
on careful before-and-after settings in their assessments, thus being more like
static evaluations after the implemented reforms. Their undoubted value is that
they foreground the multi-layered characteristics of change: new practices are
adopted at the same time as old practices and resistance prevail.
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Studies focusing on the work of courts as it appears at a certain moment on
the local level are divided into two groups here: those deriving from micro-
level analysis of courtroom interaction, and those comprising ethnographic
analysis of local institutions of law (Quadrant 3 in Figure 1.1). Courtroom
interaction has offered an interesting institutional setting for numerous studies
on conversation analysis, discourse analysis and linguistics, since the verbal in-
teraction has context-specific features of their own. The classic book of Atkin-
son and Drew, “Order in Court”, from 1979, was one of the first of a bulk of stud-
ies that appeared at the intersection of law and language. According to Conley
and O’Barr (1998, pp. 9–14), the area of scholarship called Law and Language
has contributed to our understanding of how law actually works in everyday con-
texts such as the courtroom, and how broader questions of justice play them-
selves out linguistically. The main interest in some of these studies seems to be
in the language itself, the courtroom offering an interesting and versatile
resource (e.g. Drew, 1992 and Atkinson, 1992). Some other studies have focused
more on language as the most important medium through which the courts
accomplish their work. Studies by Aronsson & al. (1987) on the accommodation
strategies of both defendants and professionals, by Adelswärd & al. (1987) on
dominance in courtroom interaction, by Conley and O’Barr (1990) on the way
in which litigants formulate their problems to the court and on the judges’ ju-
dicial approaches to decision making, by Komter (1998) on institutional rules
that promote dilemmas during criminal court proceedings, and finally by
Philips (1998) on how judges practice law and courtroom control, are all exam-
ples of research aimed at showing how speakers create the reality of the court-
room through their use of language. All of these studies take as their starting
point the local occurrence of linguistic practices, viewed as they occur at the
moment of study.
Another sub-group within local, static studies is those investigating the
different aspects of local law, depending in most cases on ethnographic data. The
set of large comparative studies of American criminal courts conducted by Eisen-
stein, Flemming and Nardulli took as their starting point the fact that the courts
vary and that the law does not adequately explain why these differences occur.
Rejecting the traditional metaphor of “Law”, they provide an alternative meta-
phor of courts as communities, and argue that this provides a superior tool for
trying to understand how courts work (Eisenstein, Flemming & Nardulli, 1988;
Nardulli, Eisenstein & Flemming, 1988; Flemming, Nardulli & Eisenstein, 1992).
Sally Engle Merry’s (1990) study on what people think about their legal prob-
lems and the ways in which the courts work with them paints an
ethnographic picture of how local law contextualizes peoples’ legal conscious-
ness and use of courts in two New England towns and their respective courts.
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Furthermore, the study conducted by Yngvesson (1994) examines the interac-
tion in complaint hearings between criminal justice officials and local citizens
in one district court. She shows how the court clerks handling the complaints
both keep the ”non legal” cases out of courts, and control the behavior of local
people by acting as peacemakers. The court clerk is understood as a transition-
al figure linking the legal and non-legal, the court and the community.
Previous empirical studies focusing on court work fall into three distinct
groups. The first consists of the surveys, which take a static look at the macro-
level phenomena of work in courts. The second comprises studies aimed at un-
derstanding the macro-level change and development in court work, and the
third group is made up of studies aimed at understanding current work in courts
on the local level of actual court practice. What seem to be missing are studies
focusing on change and development in the work of courts, conducted on the local
level of actual court practice. The main interest in my study is to examine the
change and transformation of the work in Finnish courts during the last decade
of the 1990s. I use the classical setting of a before-and-after study, as the data
for my research was gathered both before and after the Finnish court reform of
1993. In this study, possible changes are looked for by means of analyzing court-
room practices at a very local level, as they appear in actual courtroom interac-
tion and in the accounts of those involved in the hearings. In this sense, my study
contributes to the local understanding of macro-level development. The meth-
odological choice was made in order to capture both aspects of change: it is both
controlled and governed “from above” and shaped and modified “from below”
at the same time. The changes brought about by the reformed procedural law
are not seen only as ready-made or pre-given, but also as constructed by the
participants themselves in the daily encounters between legal professionals and
their clients.
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2 Court Work in Transition: Three Central
Themes
2.1 Finnish Court Practices before the Procedural Reform: Basic Problems
and Contradictions
Before the procedural reform of 1993, Finnish judicial proceedings in civil mat-
ters were guided by a loose procedural law, its main parts originating from the
procedural law of 17341. It was established practice that the phasing of the pro-
ceedings was fairly indefinite: the causes of actions were discussed along the way
and witnesses could be called during almost any phase. Thus, the trial in a civil
matter was a prolonged process with several adjournments, and no distinct
phases or order could be found. It was also an extremely textual process, based
on briefs written by attorneys and minutes written by judges. One specific
feature was that the attorneys dominated the course of the proceedings, while
the judge concentrated on the minutes during the hearing and on the decision
after it. The division of labor followed a model, in which the attorneys were ac-
tive in forwarding the case during the proceedings, whereas the judge was ac-
tive in the final decision-making phase.
The lack of the principles of orality and immediacy in the procedure result-
ed in proceedings that were mainly written, in which cases were adjourned
repeatedly, and in which even the composition of the court could change sever-
al times. Judges eventually founded their decisions on everything that was
presented in the briefs written by the attorneys and in their own minutes.
1
 Some important, although partial procedural reforms were carried out during the 20
th
 centu-
ry, such as the implementation of the principle of free evaluation of the evidence in 1948, and
summary-payment-order proceedings in 1954.
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Furthermore, no preparatory measures were conducted and no efforts to reach
a settlement were made2.
In the reality of intensively growing caseloads and more complex cases, this
process resulted in prolonged proceedings with several postponements, ineffi-
cient handling of the cases and high legal costs. Somewhat surprisingly, its defi-
ciencies and limitations were not publicly criticized. The interruptions and prob-
lems in individual proceedings were repeated in case after case. Despite their
recurring nature, they were understood as everyday occurrences in the work of
individual judges, not as a terminal problem in the court system. The everyday
happenings of the district courts were surrounded by public silence. Even the
clients – both professional advocates and lay persons – drew a veil over the pro-
ceedings and avoided open criticism.
Inside the district courts, the deficiencies of the drawn-out procedure were
perceived differently in different units. According to the analysis conducted by
our research group, the two district courts participating in our developmental
project faced different kinds of tensions in their daily work. The main problems
of the judges in Lahti District Court included the need for equal distribution of
work and the long-established division of labor, according to which the tasks in
the proceedings were assigned on the basis of seniority. Critical problems or
pressure for change in the proceedings as such were not articulated – some even
thought that the system worked as it should3.
In Vantaa District Court, a contradiction between the growing number of
more complex cases and the traditional procedural rules was evident: with a hard
case load and work pressure the old procedural rules caused extra work and were
an unsatisfactory basis on which to decide the cases correctly and in a decent
time. The discrepancy between the new ideas for the active conducting of the
proceedings and the current passive practice was also recognized and experienced
as a source of stress among the personnel in Vantaa. Regardless of the fact that
the problems were recognized, there was no strong pressure to change the
current way of working and thus the established practices went on. (Engeström,
Haavisto & Pihlaja, 1992, pp. 123 –124, 153 –159.)
2
 Proceedings based on writing and postponing represent a relatively young phenomenon along
the historical continuum of Finnish lower-court practices. It seems to have been a particularly
urban practice that developed in the final two or three decades of the 20
th
 century. Court hear-
ings in the countryside in the 1970s were typically conducted by the judge with an air of stern
and distant authority, but definitely in direct communication with the parties. Paternal repri-
mands of the clients were also sometimes given (Hatakka & Nirkko, 2000).
3
 Identical satisfaction with the existing system among the judiciary was recognized by
Davies (1999) in the context of Australian courts.
2 Court Work in Transition: Three Central Themes 13
In situations in which the judges were either satisfied with the proceedings
or were unsatisfied but unable to make changes, the clients expressed their
criticism of the courts. The criticism was strong, but it was kept from the pub-
lic and expressed only on private occasions. It was openly expressed in the
interviews connected to the observation of a number of proceedings, conduct-
ed by our research group. The most severe criticism concerned the courtroom
interaction, and the way in which the clients’ cases were handled during the
trials:
A case dealing with construction defects, Vantaa 1990
Plaintiff: I’m always astonished by the extreme rigidity of the trials. It’s not
a discussion, but when I ask something, you answer only that specific ques-
tion and this cutting short means you can construct a totally different view
of the whole.
Interviewer: Do you mean that the trial does not resemble a conversation?
Plaintiff: It is not a conversation, I mean an open conversation as it should
be. It’s legal jargon, which I as a lay person experience as extremely humili-
ating and tiring and exhausting.
Later in the interview:
Plaintiff: This is all based on a few piles of paper… I think it’s totally crazy
that, especially when there are principals present in the hearing, they can-
not be asked. Then we could get the total picture.
Interviewer: Would you have liked the judge to ask you something?
Plaintiff: Yes I would. Especially about our personal opinion. Our attorney
successfully identified these “impediments for living” and such things, but
somehow it was such theoretical legal gobbledygook that a lay person, and I
am a lay person, can’t check it out. I was a total bystander sitting there in
the hearing.
A case dealing with the cancellation of an employment contract,
Vantaa 1990
Plaintiff: I only have negative experiences with judicial bodies, especially
because of the boring and long-drawn-out way of working with the cases.
At least it’s an extremely unpleasant place for those whose cases are being
dealt with there.
Later in the interview:
Plaintiff: Of course the decision making is influenced by the volume of the
case. These people may be in a hurry to get to their summer cottages or
they may have a flight to the Mediterranean today at 9 pm. ‘Hang it, let’s
just slam something down here, it’ll do anyway, we can just let it go to the
court of appeal.’ Maybe the idea is that the district courts are happy to
make kind of  ‘middle-of-the-road’ decisions, which are then given to the
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court of appeal. They know that this case will proceed to a higher authori-
ty; it won’t remain as such. The district court is just like an errand boy, go-
ing round taking a look at places before the manager comes and buys. It’s
as if we should always do business with the courts of appeal. Why give these
darned lower courts the runaround, as their decisions don’t hold. It’s
frustrating and pathetic.
On the threshold of the court reform, civil proceedings continued with no signs
of potential crisis. The clients found them unsatisfactory, but open criticism was
repressed by the system, the only channel being through the court of appeal.
Some of the judges were unhappy, too, but had neither the motivation nor the
power to change established practice. It was assumed that the forthcoming pro-
cedural reform would resolve some of the recognized problems, but it was un-
clear how it would resolve the simmering contradiction between the cliental
needs and procedural rules, that was lying beneath the surface.
In order to understand whether the procedural reform answered to the
deficiencies of the current practices, it is important to remember, that a) the
legislative work for the procedural reform was done mainly by officials of the
Ministry of Justice and reflected their views on the main defects in the proce-
dure, and b) it was planned and drafted over several decades, during which the
different problems within jurisdiction had been addressed4. The long history of
legislative work has resulted in various layers in the procedural rules repres
enting various attempts to improve court practices. The law drafting cannot
be described as a univocal, unilinear and homogeneous process aimed at
resolving the latest problems, but rather as a multi-layered, multi-voiced,
heterogeneous process with historically evolving, often implicit interest (see also
Tala, 2001).
2.2 Finnish Court Reform and Its Cultural Dynamics
The judicial proceedings in the courts of first instance were substantially
reformed in December, 1993 (Code of Judicial Procedure 1052/1991). The
underlying themes were the due process of law and the rational allocation of
resources. The reform was intended to increase litigants’ chances of obtaining
correct, well-founded decisions by streamlining the procedures and making
changes in the organizational structure of the courts. The reform comprised two
4
 In this sense, the drafting of the new procedural law did not follow the standard phases of a
reform – diagnosis, initiation, implementation, routinization and evaluation – as they are de-
scribed e.g. by Feeley, 1983)
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simultaneous stages: the unifying of the courts of first instance and reform of
the civil procedure.
The old distinction between the circuit courts that operated in rural areas and
certain cities and the city courts was abolished in the first stage. The composi-
tion of the courts was also renewed. The city courts had traditionally
comprised of three members, at least two of whom were professional judges,
while one could be a “semi-professional”, a lay member holding a permanent po-
sition. The circuit courts had a professional judge and a board of seven lay mem-
bers. More flexible compositions were introduced in both courts: one judge, one
judge with three lay members with an individual right to vote, or three judges.
Thus the composition varied according to the nature of the case. This flexibili-
ty was meant to guarantee optimal handling in each case. The new
arrangements presented learning challenges to all judges: those coming from the
former city courts had to learn to work with lay members, and those from the
former circuit courts had to learn how to collaborate with colleagues. Working
alone with complicated cases was a challenge for all of them.
What was essentially new in the procedural reform was introduction of pre-
liminary proceedings in civil matters before the actual court hearing. Thus, the
proceedings are divided into written preliminary proceedings, a preliminary
hearing and the main hearing. This procedure was concerned with the most com-
plicated cases. The plaintiffs are compelled to reveal in their complaints wheth-
er the case is disputed or not and to write their applications for a summons on
that basis. The majority of cases, however, are already decided at the written pre-
liminary stage by the judge, court trainees or office personnel. The procedural
system has been described as a filter system, where the principal aim is decide
on the cases as soon as they are clear, implying an attempt to rationalize the pro-
ceedings (Ervo, 1995, p. 60). A normative model of the reformed civil proceed-
ings in district courts is introduced in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 The Normative Model of Proceedings in a Civil Case (Ervasti, 1997a,
p. 25, English translation by V.H.)
An application for a summons
THE WRITTEN PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
THE MAIN HEARING
A disputed matter
 an extended application
for a summons
An uncontested claim
 a restricted application
for a summons
The defendant does 
not respond to the claim
The defendant 
contests the claim
The defendant 
admits the claim
Default judgment Sentence
The matter 
remains disputed
The parties settle 
their dispute
The withdrawal 
of the case
The court affirms 
the settlement
The immediate 
main hearing
The separate 
main hearing
Negotiations for a settlement
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The key principles of trials are orality, immediacy and concentration. Apply-
ing these principles is assumed to produce an ideal result of the proceedings: fast,
secure and at low cost. The following description of the principles is based on
the definitions given by Virolainen (1991, pp. 67–80).
Orality refers to the principle according to which principals, their attorneys,
witnesses, experts and all others being heard in the process have to present all
their statements orally before the court. There is a ban on written statements in
the preliminary hearing and in the main hearing.
The principle of immediacy calls for three conditions. Firstly, it requires that
when making the decision, the court does not consider indirect material through
written documents. The presenting and receiving of court material must be oral.
Secondly, the decision can be based only on material presented in the main hear-
ing. This implies that the material is presented directly and constantly to the
decision maker(s). Thirdly, the principle of immediacy presumes that the com-
position of the court must not change during the proceedings.
According to the principle of concentration, the handling of a case is
centralized in one uninterrupted hearing. The proceedings cannot be split into
several sessions, and the material must be presented and discussed on one
occasion.
The principles of immediacy and concentration in particular necessitate a
preparatory stage before the final hearing, demanding careful preparation by all
participants. The predominant idea was that the pre-trial procedure to expedite
the proceedings should be informal and conversational in its nature. The exclu-
sively oral hearings emphasize the active role of the judge in conducting the pro-
ceedings. The dialogue between the participants in the preliminary hearing and
the active conducting of the proceedings were both new elements in the
Finnish civil courts. What was particularly new was the obligation on the judge
not only to encourage the parties to settle, but also to make a proposal for a com-
promise. This immediate dialogue with the parties and the active role in the set-
tlement were probably the most demanding learning challenges for the
district court judges.
Even though the main principles behind the procedural reform were judi-
cial, the reform was not only legal and administrative, but also and mainly
cultural.  The fact that the courts vary in many different ways and that law does
not sufficiently explain these differences has been established in empirical
research focusing on local legal cultures. For example, Eisenstein, Flemming and
Nardulli (1988) sought to explain the differences in court work, not as a
result of behavioral differences between individual judges and lawyers, but as a
product of particular courthouse culture within each community. Merry (1990)
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also studied plaintiffs and court proceedings in the context of the cultural and
social history of the local communities.
Chase (1997, pp. 862–863) stated that procedural systems are hardly immune
from the particular local realities they are part of, neither are they immune from
global developments. On the one hand, it has been argued that legal institutions
are mirrors of societies: civil procedures include a political and social side as well
as a legal one, and changes in the moral, political or social environment are re-
flected in it. This view also emphasizes the cultural differences between local
practices. On the other hand, legal institutions could be seen as distinct enclaves
in society, independent and controlled by legal elites. The primary way in which
legal systems change is through transportation from one system to another, as
the interests of legal elites more easily transcends the boundaries of countries
than the borders of legal institutions. (Chase, 1997, pp. 862–863.)
These two alternative types of procedural development – change as effected
by the environment and change as transportation from a system to another –
could be considered as simultaneous, intertwined processes, where one does not
necessarily eliminate the other.  The reform cannot be understood solely as a
Finnish phenomenon. It should be rather looked at as part of the development
in western court systems, whether or not this connection is explicated in the
legislative drafts. Several western countries are experiencing a rich debate on
alternative means of renovating and intensifying judicial institutions (see e.g.
Palmer & Roberts, 1998; Zuckerman, 1999; The special issue of The American
Journal of Comparative Law, 1997, Vol. 45(4)).
The new Finnish Code of Judicial Procedure developed in parallel with the
process of general modernization that started with the French revolution and
led to structural changes in most European procedural codes in the 1800s and
at the beginning of the 1900s (Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 1998, p. 61). This development
equals the breakthrough of the liberalist view in civil proceedings. What is
special to the Finnish procedural code is its late modernization – there was a
remarkable delay in renewing the procedural acts, compared with developments
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in other legal systems5. With its principles of orality, immediacy and concentra-
tion, the new procedural act introduced features that have long been self-evi-
dent in many other legal systems (Nousiainen, 1993; Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 1998).
The logic behind the reform can neither be interpreted merely as legislative
effort, since there is a risk of covering up the cultural connections and tensions
involved. For example, discussion on the features of court reforms often follows
the viewpoint of administrative effectiveness vs. due process, where the client
of the court as a communicating partner remains on the sidelines. To overcome
this limitation, the approach of procedural justice and studies on courtroom
discourse are also examined here. In order to avoid the purely domestic, or tech-
nical and legal-administrative view of the Finnish reform, at least three main
types of discourse should be taken into account:
1. Interaction and communication in the courts
As a result of the oral proceedings, interaction and communication in the
courts has increased remarkably. The shift towards orality stimulates ques-
tions concerning the possibilities and constraints, advantages and risks in-
volved in the increasing interaction. Finland lacks the tradition of studying
courtroom discourse. In many other countries, studies of institutional dis-
course have produced important information on the interaction between
the judge and the parties, as well as between the legal professionals and the
lay participants.
5
 The reasons for the late modernization of the Finnish proceedings – also compared to Swe-
den, which reformed its procedural code in 1948 – are not easy to find. The specific features of
Finnish history during the 20
th
 century – the bloody civil war and the fate of the country in the
second World War – have been recognized as potential reasons for the late execution of many
changes (Kekkonen, 1998, p. 42). Nousiainen (1993) refers to the facts that Finland was a rela-
tively poor, sparsely inhabited country, run by agriculture, and sees these points as the main
factors diminishing the economical and political preconditions of modern legal systems. In
this connection, the specific features of Finnish legal culture are also worth mentioning. Jus-
tice has always been “down-to-earth”, with no extravagant ceremonies, no special attire and
not even any special premises: the court went to where the people were and proceedings were
arranged in community halls, town halls, fire-brigade premises and farmhouses, for example
(Letto-Vanamo, 2000). The bar was largely non-existent. The chief justices were highly
respected and prestigious, and exerted strict, paternal authority over their judicial subjects.
The Finnish people, in turn, relied strongly on the legitimacy of the legal officials and on their
search for material truth in their decisions (Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 1998). These features prevailed
until the 1970s, when work practices and culture changed remarkably: in 1972, the state start-
ed to run the courts which were previously the enfeoffments (or enterprises in modern terms)
of the chief justices in the countryside, and organs of the cities in urban areas. The position of
district court judges was established and the administrative role of the Ministry of Justice was
strengthened (Letto-Vanamo, 2000). Becoming a part of everyday life, or the democratization
of the justice system took place gradually during the 1970s. This was also the starting point of
the rigorous attempts to reform and modernize the procedural acts.
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2. Procedural justice, citizens’ trust, and the position of the client in
the court system
Citizens’ trust in the legal institutions is one of the basic issues in evaluat-
ing the justice system and legal reforms. One of the most promising recent
approaches is that of procedural justice as paradigm examining the impor-
tance of procedures to client satisfaction, compliance and trust. This
approach has focused on the client and his or her role as a participant in
the proceedings, as well as on the factors that contribute to client discon-
tent or satisfaction. The Finnish reform, with its emphasis on oral proceed-
ings, made the presence of the client in the proceedings desirable rather
than obligatory. If client presence in the hearings increases, the possibilities
for and constraints on active participation become interesting.
3. Rationalizing dispute resolution through promoting settlement
In recent decades, several cultures of dispute management in the western
world have been subject to re-examination in terms of established judicial
systems. One distinctive feature of this development has been the growing
interest shown by governments in sponsoring settlement and other forms
of alternative dispute resolution. In most countries, the main impetus for
promoting settlement has been saving money through effective case
management. The rise of new case-management techniques and settling
practices highlights the importance of understanding the benefits and dis-
advantages of settlements.
It seems impossible to find one causal or explanatory model to fully explain
the background and objectives of the Finnish procedural reform. Instead, the
above-mentioned three different perspectives are considered in order to under-
stand its cultural aspects and complex entity. Within each theme, the preceding
domestic debate among scholars and legal practitioners is commented upon.
Thereafter, corresponding issues are highlighted in the international discussion.
2.3 Interaction and Communication in the Hearings
Finnish procedural law originated from the year 1734, after which parts and
details were revised on several occasions. Attempts to conduct a total reform
rather than partial revisions started a hundred years ago, in 1892, when the first
committee was set up to prepare a proposal for reorganizing the court and jus-
tice systems. During the first half of the twentieth century, several committees
submitted proposals for a total reform, but the actions were interrupted by the
global recession during the 1930s and the two world wars. Interestingly enough,
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all of the proposals in question suggested the implementation of preliminary
proceedings in civil matters, and an oral, immediate and concentrated main hear-
ing.
In the Finnish debate of the 1980s, the introduction of preliminary proceed-
ings was largely approved by practitioners and scholars as a necessary way to
expedite the matters. Whether such proceedings should be oral or written was,
however, a contested issue. For example, Halila (1989) and Huttunen (1989)
argued for the right to use written statements and advised the decision makers
to avoid the failings of Swedish procedural law, which was commonly seen as a
model for the Finnish reform (see e.g., Laukkanen, 1999, p. 247; Niemi-Kiesiläi-
nen, 1998, p. 62). According to Huttunen (1989), orality and immediacy are of
little worth in preliminary proceedings, which could mainly be in written form.
If settlement is not on the horizon, oral proceedings are only of limited use.
The Government Bill (15/1990, pp. 24–26) put forward orality as the central
principle of the preliminary proceedings, with clear advantages over written
proceedings in most cases, excluding simple, non-disputed cases. However,
neither the Government Bill nor the eventual law gave any indication of how the
actual preliminary hearing should be organized. Jyrki Virolainen and Juha Lap-
palainen gave some guidelines for interpreting the principle of orality in their
handbooks, Virolainen stating that the content of the preliminary hearing was
regulated in terms of the order in which the parties should plead their case (Vi-
rolainen, 1991, p. 147). Otherwise, it could be an informal conversation between
the parties, conducted by the judge, where the atmosphere and procedure need
not be as formal as in the main hearing. This suggests that the preliminary hear-
ings could be arranged in places other than traditional courtrooms. Lappalai-
nen (1991, p. 75) interpreted the principle of orality as genuine verbal commu-
nication, which could not be replaced by reading briefs aloud. The preliminary
hearing was thus a gathering round the same table, where the parties could
immediately specify their arguments and respond to the opposing party (Lap-
palainen, 1991, p. 71).
It is clear that there were few concrete ideas about the preliminary hearings
before the reform. “More informal than formal”, “genuine verbal communica-
tion” and “gathering round the same table” were the guidelines that could be
drawn from the debate. Among the practitioners, the principle of orality was
received with reservation. At first, it was easy to see it as a technical principle.
In practical terms, Swedish civil proceedings offered a natural, Scandinavian
model for the Finns. However, it was considered as exceptionally unofficial with
its informal communication and interaction between the parties, and was thus,
rejected as unnaturally casual in the Finnish legal culture.
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The following excerpt from the planning seminar for all court personnel
during our developmental project6 in 1991 illustrates how unresolved the
central questions were among the practitioners just before the procedural
reform.
Excerpt 2.1: The planning seminar in 1991
District Court Judge 1: To what extent is the preliminary hearing a discus-
sion, round a round table, maybe with a cup of coffee, or to what extent is
it like the situation in this room, with the judge right there on his dais, and
others here below? This is an important question, as it influences the dura-
tion of the preliminary hearing, and the taking of the minutes. And the
model that is used in Sweden is not necessarily the only one. It was intro-
duced there for some historical reason, but in other countries the hearings
may be very, very different.
District Court Judge 2: Sweden has its own cultural background and tradi-
tions, and even though Sweden and Finland have much in common in their
history, the model does not necessarily suit us. And then there’s the ques-
tion of the premises. If the preliminary hearings are held in Hall 1, for
example, the discussion is inevitably more formal, with me sitting here, and
the others there. The place is one constraint. But where do we get smaller
rooms for this purpose?
District Court Judge 1 [addressing his words to an attorney who was partici-
pating in the seminar]: How about you, Timo Arvonen, you’re here as a
kind of representative of the parties. What do you think, what should the
preliminary hearings be like?
Attorney Arvonen: I have years of experience of labor courts, and the pre-
liminary hearings there are very similar to the hearings in the civil cases
here in the district courts. The atmosphere and the discussion are much the
same, it is not free discussion there either. But I think that the ethos of the
new law is different, especially in that we should even try to reach settle-
ment. At least, it doesn’t promote settlement if everybody presents their
own views in turn. I think that we should try to arrange a round-table dis-
cussion, where people could discuss rather freely and informally.
6
 In 1990–1992, I worked as a member of a research group at the University of Helsinki that
was conducting a research project in Vantaa District Court. The project was funded by the
Ministry of Justice. Based on an educational research paradigm called Developmental Work
Research, it aimed at studying court work while also trying to develop it in collaboration with
the organization under scrutiny. The purpose of the study was to analyze the limitations of the
existing work practices and to help the court personnel to make plans and preparations for the
implementation of the impending court reform.
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The attorney refers to the fluid and elusive concept of the ethos of the law.
Simply reading the law and its preambles does not give a clear picture of the
ethos of the new law, due to its mainly judicial-technical perspective. The judi-
ciary, including officials in law drafting and administration, is relatively small
in Finland, and thus it may well be that much of the ethos of the law was trans-
mitted through personal contacts between those involved in the drafting and
those in the field. Moreover, the massive training program organized by the
Ministry of Justice just prior to the reform incorporated matters of ethos.
The Swedish proceedings also had a strong influence on the development of
preliminary hearings in Finland.  It was through the training program organized
and the numerous visits by Finnish court personnel to Swedish courts that the
Swedish way of organizing preliminary hearings gave ideas to the Finns. Many
Finnish district courts started to modernize their premises and to construct new
meeting rooms with a cozy atmosphere for the preliminary hearings, and, thus
offered physical conditions for the hearings to be oral and communicative.
It is clear that the principle of orality, and especially its implications for com-
munication and interaction in the hearings, were problematic, and even poorly
understood at the time when the new procedural law was drafted and imple-
mented. There were no self-evident cultural models of how the judges, lawyers
and principals should act as interacting partners. Where communicative inter-
action in the hearings leads to is a question to which Finnish research tradition
does not give any answer7. There have been numerous studies on legal discourse
and courtroom interaction in other western countries, and especially in the USA.
Such studies have highlighted several risks and problems of communication in
legal encounters.
From the beginning of the 1970s, studies on the intersection of law and lan-
guage started to shift the focus from written legal language to everyday contexts,
where the law operates in daily practice: courtrooms, lawyers’ offices, mediation
centers, for example. One of the major interests in studies on language and law
has been connected to the broad themes of power, dominance and asymmetri-
cal interaction in courtroom hearings, or more generally, between legal profes-
sionals and lay people in their various legal encounters. One of the pioneering
studies in this respect was Cicourel’s (1968) study on juvenile courts.
7
 In Finnish legal philosophy, the communicative aspects of legal decision making were point-
ed out by e.g. Tuori (1988) in his ponderings on communicative rationality, and by Aarnio
(1977) in his writings connected to the concept of auditorium. A gap between legal philosophy
and the reform attempts was evident: the philosophical concepts of communication were not
referred to in the procedural handbooks. One empirical study on courtroom communication
was published after the reform by Välikoski (1996). As a pioneering study in this field, howev-
er, it focused on communication in proceedings prior to the procedural reform.
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A substantial part of the research on courtroom interaction has concentrat-
ed on constraints restricting or prohibiting the contributions of defendants and
witnesses. Since courtroom discourse has traditionally consisted of questions and
answers, several studies have tackled the issue of how different kinds of ques-
tions constrain answers (for example, Harris, 1984; Philips, 1984; 1987 and Da-
net & Bogoch, 1980). Turn taking, topic controlling, the distribution of inter-
active space and argumentation (for example, Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Adelswärd
& al., 1987; Bogoch & Danet, 1984), as well as clients’ story-telling techniques
and linguistic styles (for example, Conley & O’ Barr, 1990; O’Barr & Conley,
1985) have also been studied.
The main finding in the studies has been that many linguistic features
characteristic of courtroom discourse - such as questions posed by the judge or
the lawyers, answers given by defendants or witnesses, the turn-taking system
controlled by the judge – are the means through which the court conducts the
tasks given to it. At the same time, they are the very linguistic means through
which legal professionals’ power over their clients is realized in everyday prac-
tice (Conley & O’ Barr, 1998). In their analysis of a book by Matoesian (1993)
about rape trials, Conley and O’Barr (1998, pp. 24–27) describe how the form
of the question is used to restrict the examinee’s possibilities to answer, and how
lawyers direct the topics in the direction they want. The examinees’ have little
chance of resisting domination and any possible resistance is short-lived. “The
linguistic resources available to the lawyer are simply too many and those avail-
able to the witness too few” (Conley & O’Barr, 1998, p. 27).
This image is supported by studies on other legal situations outside court-
room hearings. In their study on divorce lawyers and their clients, Sarat and
Felstiner (1995, pp. 19–20) state that the predominant image of the lawyer-
client relationship is one of professional dominance and lay passivity. The law-
yers govern their interaction with their clients, silencing and subordinating them,
and consider their few active clients hostile and problematic.
The central finding of studies on the client’s position in various types of
legal practice seems to be one of client suppression and exploitation by legal pro-
fessionals. This is alarming and contradictory, especially from the perspective of
procedural justice, which is discussed in the next section.
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2.4 Procedural Justice, Citizens’ Trust, and the Position of the Client in
the Court System
The most salient debate in Finland concerning clients of the courts has focused
on trust. The first opinion poll (Blom 1970) was conducted in 1970, and a wide
and heated discussion started on the functioning of the justice system, empha-
sizing the democratic control of courts and judges. At that time, the asymme-
try between social backgrounds and political views of judges and their clients
was considered the main reason for the citizens’ distrust. This debate served to
re-start the plans to carry out a total reform in the courts.
Two successive opinion polls were conducted quite recently after a break of
approximately 30 years (Lappi-Seppälä & al., 1999 and Niskanen, Ahonen &
Laitinen, 2000). Both of these studies indicated that citizens’ trust in the courts
has somewhat decreased since the 1970s, but is still relatively high: approximately
two Finns out of three see them as trustworthy. The problem with studies on
trust in the context of the client’s position in the court system, however, is the
tendency to understand trust as an experience as such, isolated from the real
client’s actual experiences in his or her own proceedings and hearings.
When the new procedural law was drafted and the proposals evaluated, the
client’s perspective was mostly missing, and if presented, only indirectly.  In its
official statement on the proposed reform, the Finnish Bar Association foresaw
that the likelihood of clients being able to conduct their own cases without
legal aid would decrease due to the complicated nature of the reform. This would
make the proceedings more expensive for the clients. On the other hand, it was
suggested that any inequality between the parties could be balanced through the
active conducting of the proceedings by the judge, ensuring real rather than
formal equality between the parties (e.g. Möller, 1989a, p. 270). In general, the
legal security of the clients was not considered to be so dependent on the pro-
cedure. Instead, it was most often seen to be threatened in the reform because
of the composition of the decision makers. The new court compositions, namely
with one judge, and with one or two judges and lay members with the individ-
ual right to vote, were largely resisted among the practitioners (Bruun & al., 1984,
p. 36; Rintala, 1986, pp. 1032–1033; Halila, 1986; Virolainen, 1986, pp.1006–
1015). To sum up, the client perspective in evaluating the reform appeared as
general values representing the good of the client, such as legal security or legal
costs.
The lack of a client perspective in the reform was also evident in the minor
concern for the principal’s own activity in the hearing and in the handling of
the case. This was partly because the principal’s personal presence in the hear-
ing was not necessarily expected. For example, when evaluating the Government
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Bill, the parliamentary legal committee suggested that the norms generally
requiring the personal presence of principals at the preliminary hearing should
be relaxed. Virolainen (1991, p. 234) opposed this view and suggested that the
principals should be present almost without exception. Lappalainen (1991, p. 74)
also believed that the principal’s presence at the preliminary hearing would be
needed relatively often.
In its simplest form, the role of the parties was defined as a judicial obliga-
tion to contribute to establishing the case through the duty to be present
and deliver briefs to the court. Characteristic of this kind of definition is the
reference to the parties as judicial actors, not as actual principals. It rests on the
assumption that the parties are mostly represented by their lawyers. The
Finnish Bar Association took the viewpoint of the client and argued that the
client’s own activity in the hearing was ignored in the proposal, although it is
important that the client can argue decisively. The predominant way to under-
stand the role of the client, however, was to consider him or her as a source of
information. For example, Hirvonen (1989, p. 163) defined the principal as an
informant offering important knowledge to the court. The specific characteris-
tic of the client as the only possessor of case-specific information was also
emphasized. In these definitions, the viewpoint was more that of the courts than
of the clients: the client was the source of information to serve the court in
making its decision.
International studies of recent decades have introduced two especially im-
portant approaches to the user perspective on the court system: access to jus-
tice and procedural justice8. The access-to-justice movement, originating from
the USA in the 1960s and 1970s, concerned the substantive availability of jus-
tice and the problems of costs, delays and general inaccessibility of adjudication
in the prevailing systems. In its early phases, the approach concentrated on clear-
ing the economic barriers that barred the disadvantaged from legal services. Later
the movement tried to overcome the organizational barriers met by those with
diffused interests (for instance, consumers) in conducting their cases, and pro-
moted group action. In its latest phase, the movement has focused on procedural
barriers in access to justice (Cappelletti & Garth, 1981; Ervasti, 1999, p. 641).
8
 Additionally, the studies on lay expectations and clients’ accounts of proceedings have been
crucial in promoting the user’s perspective on law (see e.g. O’Barr & Conley, 1988 and Lind &
al., 1990).
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However, the original interest was not in procedures as such, but in the actual
possibilities for people to receive justice9.
The procedural justice approach was the first to make the connection
between clients’ experiences and the qualities of the procedures. Stemming from
social-psychological studies, it took the procedures as the main determinants of
clients’ experiences of compliance and trust. It produced interesting findings,
which suggested that the client’s own activity in the hearing may also be highly
significant in terms of his or her satisfaction and compliance after the proceed-
ings.
Röhl and Machura (1998, p. ix) recognized the philosopher Rawls’s (1971)
suggestion of an ideal procedure to comply with the principles of a fair society
as an important starting point of the approach. “Since then, the topic of ‘proce-
dural justice’ has made a remarkable scientific career”, write Röhl and Machu-
ra, and pointed to the extensive empirical research on procedural justice.
Traditionally, social sciences have been occupied with problems of outcome fair-
ness. The central assumption in social psychology, and in the behavioral and
social sciences more generally, is that people evaluate social relations, experiences
and institutions on the basis of the outcomes they receive. People’s
attitudes and behavior are explained by their outcome-based judgments.
Taking the classical study of Thibaut and Walker (1975) as they starting point,
Lind and Tyler (1988) brought a new perspective into social psychology, pro-
jecting a different image of the person. They viewed people as more interested
in issues of process than issues of outcome, and suggested that their evaluations
of social relations and experiences were influenced by the form of social inter-
action (Lind & Tyler, 1988, p. 1).
Unlike distributive justice, which focuses on the fairness of the final outcome,
procedural justice concerns the processes through which the outcomes – rewards
and punishments, benefits and constraints – are produced and distributed. Lind
and Tyler distinguished between objective and subjective procedural justice. The
former concerns the capacity of the procedure to make either the decisions or
the decision-making process more fair. The latter deals with the capacity of each
procedure to be experienced as fair by those who encounter them (Lind & Tyler,
1988, pp. 3–4). These two modes of procedural justice may be in contradiction
9
 Both “Access to Justice” and “Procedural Justice”, as well as “Alternative Dispute Resolution”
and “Law and Society” were originally American approaches and movements, and are largely
intertwined. According to Ervasti’s (1999, p. 641) characterization, they are scientific approaches
and partly also social and ideological movements, which comprise a network with cross-cut-
ting interests. Within the common interests there are differentiating starting points, paradigms
and focuses. Yet, the differences between the approaches are sometimes hard to distinguish.
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in the everyday court trials. People feel fairly treated when they have an oppor-
tunity to express their own viewpoints about their case. The parties would like
to tell their story, taking as much time as they feel they need. Judges, however,
usually limit their opportunities to speak because of concerns with efficiency and
judicial relevance and propriety. In these situations, maximizing one aspect may
lead to compromising the other (pp. 4–5).
Some of the most interesting findings in the context of procedural justice
concern experienced fairness (subjective procedural justice) in different legal
institutions and in different types of procedures. The basic finding – that dis-
advantageous decisions are more likely to be accepted if they are arrived at by
means of a fair procedure – has been confirmed repeatedly (e.g. Lind & Tyler,
1988; Casper, Tyler & Fischer, 1988; Tyler, 1990; 1997; Rennig, 1997; Messmer,
1997). A small group of researchers have gone as far as to argue that the proce-
dures matter even more than the outcomes (e.g. Tyler, 1984). The main variables
influencing experiences of fairness have been found to be decision control (the
parties’ possibilities to influence the decision), process control (especially the
opportunity to present evidence) and voice10 (possibilities to participate and have
one’s opinion heard) (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Rennig, 1997).
One of the open questions has concerned why procedural fairness and the
clients’ possibility to control the process seem to be so important. Two differ-
ent explanations have been given in response: clients value process control
either because it is a way to control and influence the outcome, or because it
enables self-expression. Tyler defines these two aspects as the instrumental and
the normative view of procedural justice (Tyler, 1990, pp. 115–118). In accor-
dance with the instrumental view, process control is valued only to the extent
that it affects the outcomes and decisions. According to the normative view, pro-
cess control has an importance that is not linked directly to decision control, and
people value participation and being heard as such. As Tyler sees it, there is
evidence that a non-instrumental effect generally occurs, but it is not yet very
clear in what circumstances it occurs (Tyler, 1990, pp. 117).
Tyler (1997) has recently suggested that the client’s voice and participation
is one of the core elements in fairness judgments, mattering as much or more
than the favorability of the decision reached. Following the normative view of
procedural justice, he has found that people value the opportunity to express
their views to decision makers in and of itself (p. 887). Contrary to the expec-
tations of judges and lawyers, people are not interested in sharing control over
10
 Tyler uses the concept of voice as a synonym for participation in the process. Voice refers to
the clients’ possibility to be heard in the hearings.
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the final decisions. They are rather primarily interested in sharing the discus-
sion on the case, not controlling the decisions. Allowing each side to state their
case means that the opposite sides hear the whole story. This has important ad-
ditional benefits, especially in negotiations of settlement, where hearing the other
side of the case is a crucial precondition for successful compromise. The high
value of the client’s own participation explains, for example, why people are eas-
ily dissatisfied with settlements negotiated between lawyers, or with proceedings
in which their own presence is not allowed, and why they tend to be more satis-
fied with informal processes where they can more freely express their own stand-
points (pp. 888–889).
As Tyler has stated, the lack of public confidence in the legal system creates
serious problems (1997, pp. 872–873). It is particularly important to obtain
voluntary compliance with any legal system. Although some coercion is possi-
ble, the system relies heavily on voluntary cooperation between the system and
its clients, and a crucial aspect of this is that the proceedings are experienced as
fair. Similarly, compliance through procedures seen as fair has economic and
cost-effective significance in the avoidance of re-hearings and appeals (En-
geström, Haavisto & Pihlaja, 1992, pp. 230–231).
2.5 Rationalizing Dispute Resolution through Promoting Settlement
The rules concerning settlement are set out in one paragraph in the new Proce-
dural Code:
In a case amenable to out-of-court settlement the court shall endeavor to
persuade the parties to settle the case and, under its own discretion, present
its suggestions for an amiable resolution of the case in order to further the
settlement. (Procedural Code Ch. 5, section 26)
Settlement is mentioned on two occasions in the General Grounds of the
Government Bill. Under the old Procedural Code of 1734, judges were supposed
to advice the parties to settle, but this rule had remained a dead letter. The like-
lihood of reaching a settlement was said to increase remarkably in the oral hear-
ing, as the parties became acquainted with the opposite party’s arguments and
with the evidence in the case (Government Bill 15/1990, p. 25). The section
“Reaching a settlement in a pending case” referred to the preliminary hearing
as an ideal time and place to freely discuss settlement. This phase of the proceed-
ings is when the parties can consider their chances of success at trial, and
perhaps accept a settlement.  According to the rules governing the preliminary
hearing, one of the objectives is to determine the prerequisites for a settlement,
and consider possible suggestions. Finally, it is stressed that settling a case should
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not endanger the court’s impartiality, and that any suggestion offered by the
court should follow the substantive law.
What is interesting is that the issue of settlement found its way into the civil
procedure following such short and restricted comments, without special expla-
nation or evaluation. The Bill did not consider the preconditions for settlement
in different cases, or the extent of the court’s attempts to further it (Liljenfeldt
& Liljenfeldt, 1993, pp. 196–197). Neither did it disclose why settlement was
desired and promoted, or how it corresponded to the other aims of the proce-
dural reform (Ervasti & Tala, 1998, p. 315).
The origins of the idea of settling rather than adjudicating disputes can partly
be traced back to the first committees planning a total reform of the court
system a hundred years ago. According to Kevät Nousiainen, who has studied the
history of Finnish disputing, a committee headed by Wrede submitted a report
in 1900 in which they considered setting up special institutions for settling
disputes in order to diminish people’s willingness to litigate. However, it ended
up rejecting such institutions because of the lack of competent mediators (Nou-
siainen, 1985, p. 107). Granfelt’s committee, on the other hand, suggested in 1923
that settlement proceedings could be organized in separate municipal
conciliation boards. This proposal emphasized the reasonableness of the reso-
lution, not the correctness according to the substantive law: the aim of the board
would have been fair resolution, which would have satisfied the parties. The com-
mittee of chief justices, which was set up to evaluate the Granfelt committee’s
proposal, rejected the idea of conciliation boards. According to Nousiai-nen, it
felt that even a settlement should validate what was right in each case
according to substantive law, and in that case having boards with lay concilia-
tors would be in vain (Nousiainen, 1985, pp. 116–117).
According to these early committee reports, the conciliation proceedings were
mainly connected to distinct conciliation boards, not to the court proceedings
as such. In this sense, these reports do not fully clarify the objective of the 1993
reformed procedural law to promote settlement as an alternative outcome. It
should also be noted that both disputes and clients have changed a lot in courts
during the last hundred years, and the issue of settlement is now far more com-
plicated. The focus can be shifted to the legislative drafts of the implemented
reform of 1993 and to the debate in the Finnish legal journals prior to the
implementation.
Articles and texts describing or commenting on the preliminary hearings
generally failed to mention settlement. One exception was made by Rintala
(1986, pp. 1028–1030). When assessing the legislative work prior to the reform,
he criticized the drafts for not focusing enough on the position and tasks of the
courts. He felt that the legislative work did not sufficiently reflect the changes
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in the whole society, or the effects of those changes on the court system. Impor-
tant questions included the kind of role or position that should be given to the
courts and what the courts and judges could offer citizens in the future. By way
of response, he wrote: “It may also be the case, that citizens expect the courts to
support them in making a reasonable settlement, rather than giving a traditional,
rigid judicial decision.” (Rintala, 1986, p. 1030, translation V.H.).
Another exception was Möller (1989a), who dedicated an entire section of
his article11 to discussing the preliminary hearing as a means of promoting
settlement. In his view, preparatory proceedings could often be seen as a con-
tinuation of the parties’ earlier negotiations, and could facilitate settlement.
Moreover, settlement may well result from the promotive activity of the judge
(Möller, 1989a, p. 271). Despite his positive attitude towards the judge’s role as
peacemaker, Möller (p. 271) recognized the dangers. Firstly, the judge may
indirectly put pressure on the parties in his attempts to reach a settlement.
Secondly, while the settlement should follow the substantive law, this law could
be ignored in favor of whatever settlement could be sold to the parties. Thirdly,
helping the weaker party to develop the case may be neglected in the rush to
settle. Fourthly, it may well happen that a settlement is motivated by the judge’s
wish to reduce his personal workload rather than by the desire to find a peace-
ful resolution.
Evidently, settlement was only of minor interest in the discussion. The uni-
fying of the city and rural courts, the revised court compositions, the role of the
lay members in the decision making, and finally the preliminary hearing itself
as a new form of proceeding, dominated the debate. As Letto-Vanamo (2000, p.
1075), for example, stated, the origins of several components of the court reform
lie in the 1970s: the changes in the composition of the court and the individual
right to vote for the lay members were central issues in those days. Democratic
control and judicial relief were emphasized in the politically-heated atmosphere
of the 1970s, whereas in the 1990s it was the effectiveness of the system that was
stressed. The long period of preparation clearly conflicted with the aims of the
reform (Letto-Vanamo, 2000; also Ervasti, 1997a).
The debate in the 1980s and at the beginning of 1990s, just before the
implementation of the reform, continued along the same lines as in the 1970s,
and did not extend to the issue of settlement. It could be said that its role in
transforming court practices and legal culture was not realized until the first
settlements were put into practice, when a lively discussion arouse as they started
to shake traditional understanding of adjudication (see e.g., the special issue of
Oikeus, 1999, Vol. 28(3) on alternative dispute resolution, and Pohjonen, 2001).
11
 Möller’s (1989a) article is one of the few texts describing the Finnish procedural reform in
English; another is Ervo’s (1995).
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One feature of Finnish writing touching upon settlement was that it only
seldom referred to the international literature on settlement. Extensive debate
on alternative dispute resolution (ADR), originating from the 1970s, was going
on in other western countries, especially the USA.
According to the insightful analysis of Palmer and Roberts (1998), the his-
tory of promoting settlement in courts can be traced to several phases in the
evolution of ADR. The very first attempts to re-examine the dominance of state-
sponsored adjudication and the privileged status of litigation as the approved
mode of dispute resolution comprised two discussions: one about the availabil-
ity of adjudication, or access to justice, and the other about the merits of settle-
ment (Palmer & Roberts, 1998, p. 25). The first one problematized the general
inaccessibility of judgments, the other the adjudication itself, pointing to the
advantages of settlement. These discussions also evoked strong criticism of in-
formalism: the informal approaches directed at settlement were seen as neutral-
izing the conflict and leaving disadvantaged people without the rights they would
have in traditional adjudication (pp. 29–44). In the 1970s, a new debate began
to develop that went beyond the merits of settlement to more general discus-
sion on complementary and alternative forms of dispute resolution, within and
outside of the courts. This view coincided with a new understanding of conflicts
and disputes as social and cultural phenomena. ADR grew into a movement with
multiple perspectives and focuses, representing the continuing criticism of liti-
gation and the adjudication process in recent decades (pp. 44–48.). As its devel-
opment interestingly demonstrates, the movement has its origins in client-
oriented demands for appropriate legal services.
Since the 1980s, many western countries have faced similar problems of cost
and delay in civil processes. Zuckerman (1999) states that a sense of crisis in the
administration of civil justice is by no means universal, but many countries have
difficulties in the operation of their system of civil justice.  Measuring the
success of procedures is complex. It is not enough to ask whether the system pro-
duces correct judgements; it is also a question of how timely judgements are and
how much they cost. The problem with civil justice usually involves one or a
combination of the following: the rectitude of the decision, the cost and the delay
(Zuckerman, 1999, pp. 3–12).
Provine and Seron (1988–89, pp. 158–159) wrote that there was “a pervasive
sense that jurisdiction and procedure are too complex, that decision-making
processes are not well suited to the tasks at hand, and that the whole civil jus-
tice system is too slow, too cumbersome, too expensive, and out of date.” Many
countries undertook reforms designed to reduce the costs of and delays in civil
litigation, and to render judges more accountable and efficient. Provine and
Seron (1988–89, pp. 159) continue, that “the broad trend appears to be toward
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ever greater concern with speed, cost and accessibility in the processing of
disputes. These managerially focused concepts have become significant elements
in contemporary concepts of due process and fairness. The challenge for courts
is to balance this new management ethos with the political responsibilities
assigned to legal institutions in a democratic nation. The way this challenge is
posed and met varies from country to country, of course.” (For a review of the
problems of civil procedure and international evaluations of reforms, see the
special issues of the Justice System Journal, Vol. 13(2) from 1988–89, and The
American Journal of Contemporary Law, Vol. 45(4) from 1997.)
Again, Palmer and Roberts state that “across jurisdictions with widely differ-
ent histories, entrenched cultures of dispute management are subject to re-
examination and challenge” (Palmer & Roberts, 1998, p. 1). Agencies offering
mediation have sprung up, and the promotion of ADR and case management
has gained momentum. Three features have been seen as distinctive of this
change: 1. mediation in its various forms has become institutionalized at high
speed, 2. lawyers have responded to these competitive forms of dispute resolu-
tion with novel client-management devices, with the development of neutral
advisory and consultancy roles, and with attempts to adopt mediation as part
of legal practice, and 3. the readiness of governments to approve the promotion
and control of settlement through case management as new practices in courts
(ibid., pp. 2–3).
By the 1990s the courts in many western countries had largely approved the
ideas of ADR and manifested interest in sponsoring settlement. The principles
of this originally revolutionary movement had now been co-opted by states
and institutionalized by legal professionals. The motive for settlement was no
longer in the client-oriented critique of adjudication, but in the need for the state
to cut costs and save money. The extensive interest in efficient court processing
has supplemented the traditional due-process model by producing a new effi-
ciency model of dispute resolution, oriented to problem solving under the con-
trol and case-management techniques of the courts (Ferrarese, 1988–89). The
present situation in many western jurisdictions has been described as a sea-
change in civil justice arrangements – a transforming relationship between
adjudication and other forms of decision making, which gradually forces us to
reconsider what a court is (Palmer & Roberts, 1998, pp. 345–350).
Against this western background, Finnish attempts to sponsor alternative
dispute resolution still look relatively modest12. At the moment it covers the duty
12
 Chiarloni (1999, p. 289) wrote that in Italy, as in many other European countries, the devel-
opment of “informal justice” has been much slower than in the USA. As restraining factors he
mentions 1. the weight of a long tradition of ritual justice, 2. the myth of jurisdictional unity,
which generates suspicion of any attempts to lessen judges’ dominance, and 3. the fact that the
costs of  average proceedings are still much less than in the common law system.
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to promote settlements within civil proceedings, the private settlement services
organized by the Finnish Bar Association, summary proceedings in courts in
certain types of civil cases, courts of arbitration and boards dealing with
consumers’ complaints, for example (for a review of alternative dispute resolu-
tion in Finland, see Pohjonen, 2001). Yet, the western developmental trend
towards efficient case management and the promotion of settlements can also
be traced in Finland. Recent attempts to sponsor settlements within courts
instead of and besides traditional adjudication are themselves revolutionary
(Haavisto, 1999; 2001).
Interestingly, the discussion on the inefficiency of courts and court reforms
practically bypasses the users of the legal services, the clients. It seems that, in
its efforts to promote administrative efficiency, the establishment has adopted
the idea of settlement from the originally revolutionary movement, but not the
focus on the clients and their needs. The client perspective comes in through the
back door in discussions other than the debate on court reforms. It is more
apparent in the procedural-justice approach, in studies on trust in the court
system, and in studies on courtroom discourse. Still, its position in current
literature is mostly a stable one, presenting the client as a passive receiver of
legal services, not as an active collaborator in producing them.
2.6 Conclusions
The aim of Chapter 2 was to examine what was the “starting post”, the context
from which the practitioners begin to implement the new procedural law. In
order to understand how the new rules were implemented, it seemed important
to understand what kind of “ingredients” the new law itself offered for the prac-
titioners to create new models for their everyday practices. Similarly, there was
a need to understand what kinds of new models began to be constructed in the
professional discussion among legal scholars and practitioners prior to the
reform.
The examination shows that the grounds for the new procedural code and
the discussion on it were relatively technical and procedurally oriented in a nar-
row sense. Furthermore, there was a strong emphasis on the rationalized stream-
lining of proceedings. The law itself and the way it was interpreted in the
debate among the professionals did not provide particularly concrete models for
facing the parties and collaborating with them in the new types of hearing.
Furthermore, they did not supply the practitioners with accurate models for
applying the completely new and unknown practice of making settlements.
Restricted to technical interpretation and implementation, as well as to the
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rationalizing the proceedings, they largely omitted the more social aspects
involved in developing the court system as a whole. I refer to Leubsdorf (1999,
p. 67) who has criticized the often limited understanding of procedural reform:
“The most firmly implanted myth of procedural reform may be that we can talk
usefully about it as simply an effort to increase judicial efficiency, without talk-
ing about our visions of procedural and social justice.”
The conclusions of Chapter 2 suggest that the way in which the procedural
law was written and then, interpreted in the discussions prior to the reform,
provided neither concrete working models nor broader social aspects of justice
for the practitioners. This, however, does not imply that the reform had been
sealed and fixed in the form it was given before the implementation. Instead of
looking at the intended reform as such and at what could be anticipated before-
hand, we will, in Chapter 3, turn to the more general issues of implementing a
reform and discuss more generally how the intended reform is interpreted and
modified while in the process of being implemented by the practitioners. The
implementation will be viewed as a learning process, in which the practitioners
adhere to the ideas expressed in the reform agenda, but also go beyond them.
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3 Implementation of Change as a Learning
Challenge
In the preceding chapter, transition in the work of courts was examined from
the internal perspective of the court system. Three themes – interaction and
communication in courts, the position of the client in the court system, and
settlement as a means of rationalizing court work – were recognized as central
to the content of Finnish court reform, and also as a part of the extensive de-
bate in international research on socio-legal developments. To broaden the view
from intending changes to implementing them, the focus in the present chap-
ter is shifted from the particular system in Finnish courts and court reform to
the broader questions of change, possibilities of change and the implementation
of intended change. Later in the study, I will argue that implementation cannot
be understood adequately as the execution of pre-given models, but that it is
rather a process in which the potential for new and emergent models and prac-
tices is included. Recognition of this potential as a particular form of learning
presupposes a connection between issues of learning and issues of change and
implementation. Direct communication between courts and their clients, espe-
cially in negotiating settlements, will, in the future, set the major learning chal-
lenge for court practitioners in terms of expertise. This hypothesis requires
reconsideration of the concepts of learning and expertise.
3.1 Difficult Transition: Intention vs. Implementation in Changing the
Courts
“Why simple solutions fail” is the sub-title of a book authored by Malcolm
Feeley (1983). Feeley begins by referring to the severe critique presented against
American criminal courts. The courts have been widely reported to be in a state
of crisis and most efforts to change them have been seen to fail. The fact that
they resist change and easily thwart reforms, or at least carry out the intended
changes to a limited extent, has been observed by several scholars (Casper &
Bereton, 1984; Eisenstein & al., 1988; Flemming & al., 1980; Nimmer, 1978; more
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recently Leubsdorf, 1999 and Marcus, 1999). Provine and Seron (1988–89, p.
165) pointed out that American courts tend especially to blunt the
impact of externally imposed changes: legislative change may be slow and
sporadic, and the attempted institutional changes do not always occur. Feeley
goes a step further in considering the overall systemic resistance to change in
American courts. According to him, “The central obstacle to change in courts is
not the resistance to reform, but is, more fundamentally, the lack of interest in
even thinking about change” (Feeley, 1983, p. 192).  The same profound
resistance to change in the legal system is noted by Strier, who cites Alexis de
Tocqueville describing lawyers as “united in their common interest and intent
to maintain status quo at all times” (Strier, 1994, p. 229). In the Finnish con-
text, the difficulties in promoting change in the legal system have been particu-
larly connected to the legal culture and the mentality of judges: judges have been
criticized for being conservative, passive and rigid in their legal thinking (Kemp-
pinen, 1990; Yrttiaho, 1996).
Observations on the difficulties in accomplishing changes in the court sys-
tem are well in line with the first findings of research on policy implementation,
which showed that the likelihood of achieving intended changes was marginal.
The message of many studies on policy implementation was that changes – new
laws or policies – often fail, or at least are not completed as intended by the
legislators (Palumbo & Calista, 1990). The titles of the classic implementation
studies highlight the discontinuity between legislative intent and bureaucratic
action: “The implementation game – what happens after a bill becomes a law”
by Eugene Bardach (1977), and “Implementation – how great expectations in
Washington are dashed in Oakland” by Jeffrey Pressman & Aaron Wildavsky
(1973).
All this draws a picture of the problematic nature of change. The difficulties
in achieving changes in the way they are expected does not necessarily mean that
changes do not occur – it may also mean that we should re-examine the way in
which change is understood. The difficulties in promoting change – the reluc-
tance of organizations to approve intended changes and adopt new practices, as
well as failings of or alteration to planned changes – raise the question whether
change can be understood as big, radical and once-for-all by its nature, or
alternatively as something more modest, gradual, incomplete and comprised of
series of small improvements. Can the locus of change be comprehended as
something independent, or is it embodied in current practices and daily rou-
tines? More importantly, is change something that can be adopted from above,
or does it have to be generated from within?
3 Implementation of Change as a Learning Challenge 39
3.2 Differing Considerations of Change
Studies in the field of organizational change have acknowledged the profound
changes in organizations and in the practice of management, indicating a peri-
od of great business turmoil. The accelerated pace of change is agreed upon, but
the ways in which it takes place and could be promoted are not. In their recent
publication, Michael Beer and Nitin Nohria (2000) distinguished two opposing
approaches to organizational change, two archetypes, through which they at-
tempt to pinpoint the main theoretical differences. The two contrasting ap-
proaches are called Theory E and Theory O of change.
The starting point of Theory E is the maximization of economic value (Beer
& Nohria, 2000, pp. 3–12). Change efforts focus on strategies, formal structures
and systems, and they are conducted from the top down. Top-down leadership,
excluding the participation of teams and employees, emphasizes the strategic
decisions first made by the leader. Change is planned and programmatic: finan-
cial goals and programs to achieve them that are planned and controlled from
the top, dominate the agenda.
Theory O addresses the development of the organization’s capabilities to
identify and solve work-related problems (ibid., pp. 12–19). It focuses on the de-
velopment of a high-commitment culture, where employees’ tacit knowledge
about problems is taken into account. Participation and collaboration, rather
than top-down orders, are seen as vital to ensure long-term performance im-
provements. Change is emergent, less planned, and occurs without pre-given
blueprints.
These two theories of organizational change tackle the very same questions
to do with the nature of change presented earlier in this study: does change come
from the top down or the bottom up, is it once-and-for-all or a series of small
improvements, and most interestingly, is it planned or emergent?
Alongside the more conventional model of goal-directed organizations per-
forming systematic changes according to pre-set objectives (see e.g. Ghoshal &
Bartlett, 2000) is an alternative view of organizations as constantly evolving.
Weick (2000) has opposed the overestimation of the centrality of managerial
planning and the promises of fresh starts that are so common in the business
of organizational change, and has argued in favor of the value of innovative
sense-making on the front line, the wider applicability of small experiments and
the continuous nature of change (Weick, 2000, p. 223). Looking for real-world
examples to highlight the nature of emergent change, he found a recurring sto-
ry of learning from both failure and success, strategy implementation that is
replaced by strategy making, the appearance of initiatives and innovations that
are unplanned, unforeseen and unexpected, and small actions that have surpris-
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ingly large consequences (ibid., p. 225). In accordance with Weick’s definition
of change as emergent, ongoing, continuous and cumulative, Orlikowski (1996)
provides an insightful understanding of change as locally produced, consisting
of small steps and alterations.
“Each variation of a given form is not an abrupt or discrete event; neither is it, by
itself, discontinuous. Rather, through a series of ongoing and situated accommoda-
tions, adaptations and alterations (that draw on previous variations and mediate
future ones), sufficient modifications may be enacted over time that fundamental
changes are achieved. There is no deliberate orchestration of change here, no tech-
nological inevitability, no dramatic discontinuity, just recurrent and reciprocal vari-
ations in practice over time. Each shift in practice creates the conditions for further
breakdowns, unanticipated outcomes, and innovations, which in turn are met with
more variations. Such variations are ongoing; there is no beginning or end point in
this change process.” (Orlikowski, 1996, p. 66.)
As people meet breakdowns, exceptions, opportunities and contingencies in
accomplishing their everyday routines, they improvise, produce ongoing varia-
tions and thus enact emergent changes at the micro-level. Emergent change
consists of ongoing accommodations, adaptations and alterations that produce
fundamental change without a priori intentions (Weick, 2000, p. 237). Weick (p.
226) equates fundamental organizational changes with the idea of emergent
strategies, and refers to the work of, for instance, Eden and Ackermann on
strategy maps (1998), Minzberg & al. on strategy formation as an emergent
process (1998), and Czarniawska and Joerges on the travelling of ideas (1996).
Accordingly, Robert Cole (1999) referred to American organizations’ adop-
tion of the Japanese quality movement as an evolving series of “minifads” spread
over time, forming the building blocks for broader development.   The build-
ing-block vision of organizational change did not include the survival of each
and every initiative as long as some pieces of these prior initiatives were embod-
ied in its successors. Many firms in Cole’s study abandoned the trendy terms of
the quality movement and “with less fanfare, they simply added new skills and
routines to the organization” (Cole, 1999, pp. 235–236). The strategy of small
wins anchored in existing practices can be seen as the opposite of fostering
dramatic revolutionary transformations, much more favored in business think-
ing. Nevertheless, Cole lists several advantages of the small-win strategy: small
wins can occur in both parallel and serial form, resulting in large change; they
pave the way for large changes; many revolutionary changes have been found,
on scrutiny, to be based on a series of small wins; being anchored in current prac-
tices, small wins allow for learning rooted in daily routines (Cole, 1999, p. 237).
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Attempts have been made to understand the gradual and overlapping
character of change within activity-theoretical studies on organizational change
and learning. According to this approach, the evolution of work and organiza-
tions is understood in terms of developmental cycles. Global cultural changes
in the organization of work are fundamental transitions from one historical
phase to another, for example from the craftsman’s work to rationalized work
and again to mass-customization. The concrete, local developmental cycles of
reorganizing work have been the main focus of research and intervention in
many activity-theoretical studies. The theory of expansive learning has been thus
far applied mainly to large-scale transformations in activity systems, where the
developmental cycle has taken several years (Engeström, 1999a).
Large-scale expansive cycles of local organizational transformation always
consist of small cycles or mini-cycles of innovative learning. The traditional scale
of analysis has been radically changed, the focus having shifted increasingly to
these smaller steps or mini-cycles that push the development forward on the
curve of the local cycle (Engeström, 1999a). The mini-cycles – phases or
moments – of innovative learning can be regarded as potentially expansive. The
emergence of small-scale cycles of innovative learning does not necessarily guar-
antee that a larger expansive cycle persists. Small cycles may remain iso-
lated events, and the overall development may become stagnant or regressive,
or fall apart. For this reason, the mini-cycles of innovative learning have to be
examined in the framework of the larger expansive learning cycle. Nevertheless,
the small cycles appear to be a promising focus of analysis, since they expose the
local discursive construction of social practices and knowledge creation in which
innovative learning is also embedded.
Engeström (2001) recently endeavored to make sense of the often unremark-
able, piecemeal textures beneath articulated innovations by studying the
“undergrowth” of change as cognitive trails.  Cognitive trails – the concept
originally employed by Adrian Cussins (1992) – are used to catch and analyze
expansion in terms of mundane actions and small traces. Expansive learning pro-
cesses are increasingly taking shape as reorganization and renegotiation of col-
laborative practices between and within activity systems. Concept formation is
an important aspect of horizontal movement and boundary crossing where
multiple competing ideas collide and emerge as potential new concepts.
A concrete analysis of boundary-crossing actions in the course of a develop-
mental intervention in medical care showed that several boundary-crossing and
stabilization actions with expansive potential did emerge, but that the partici-
pants failed to stabilize a mutually accepted idea and commitment. However,
even relatively short and fragile cognitive trails, which once are acknowledged
in the discourse between the representatives of different activity systems, may
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be more persistent than they look. Such trails may gradually compose “the in-
visible underlife of learning”, an emerging texture of landmarks that will make
them easier to navigate in the future and provide a fertile ground for the cre-
ation of more explicit shared instruments (Engeström, 2001).
Among the studies on court reforms, Feeley (1983) promoted an understand-
ing of changes emerging from slow, partial efforts. What he considered
typical of the American criminal-court system, however, was that change is
often initiated by dramatic events and offered as a magnificent solution. It is
mostly seen in terms of bold campaigns against enemies – most preferably non-
reactive ones, such as the caseload or crowding – rather than as working quietly
to implement incremental changes in existing institutions. Predominant
thoughts do not give rise to serious thinking or realistic expectations (ibid., p.
192).
Recent findings and attempts to re-examine the concept of change seem to
encourage the laying aside of the idea of change as merely vigorous break-
throughs dictated from above, and the recognition that it is also gradual, often
consisting of small but interconnected alterations and adjustments from below.
Then, what becomes interesting is the evolving texture of these gradual
changes. When conflating, the gradual and small alterations may contribute to
a radical sea-change.
3.3 Implementation in the Context of Courts
The interest in this study in the change in Finnish court practices after proce-
dural reform inevitably connects the study to research on policy implementa-
tion. The implementation of a court reform brings a unique perspective to the
study of organizational change, flavored by the fact that in national court
reforms, objectives and orders are always – at least to some extent – set in
advance by people other than the implementors themselves. How do ideas of top-
down managed, planned change and alternatively, ideas of emergent change and
small alterations, resemble the dynamics of implementation?
The concept of implementation refers to how something – a law, reform,
policy, program or innovation – is put into effect. Traditionally, studies on
planned change have dealt with how policies and legislative drafts are planned,
not with what happens once those policies and norms are adopted (Feeley, 1983,
p. 35). Since the mid 1970s, interest in studying policy implementation as a dis-
tinct phenomenon in the creation of policy outputs has arisen. Early implemen-
tation studies stressed two discoveries: the significance of implementation for
public policy had not been noted previously, and implementation had an inde-
pendent effect on policy outcomes (Palumbo & Calista, 1990). As a result of the
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special emphasis placed on implementation, the realization of actual reforms
became interesting.  The puzzling findings of the case analysis were that many
socially important programs and reforms seem to fail (Bardach, 1980; Pressman
& Wildavsky, 1984).
Implementation research focused on the gap between legislative intent and
bureaucratic action. Researchers tried to make sense of why the serious intents
of legislature did not materialize when put into practice. The analysis proceed-
ed from the conventional assumption that the bureaucracy should serve as an
implementor of the policies drafted and established by authoritative policy-
making institutions (Brodkin, 1990, p. 109). The problem addressed in the
analysis was to understand why implementation differed from the expressed pur-
poses of the policies. Detailed case work concentrated on the obstacles to
implementation, and revealed long lists of multiple impediments (Brodkin, 1990;
Goggin & al., 1990).  According to the critics, asking “why the objectives were
not achieved” was bound to lead to pessimistic conclusions (Winter, 1990, p. 23).
The metaphor of a gap between intent and outcome13 has its roots in an
approach that could be called a top-down model of implementation (e.g. Maz-
manian & Sabatier, 1981; 1983). The top-down approach considers implemen-
tation to be the simple, purely technical execution of the policymaker’s inten-
tion, and implies that the rules are implemented as they are intended – if they
are not, the problem lies with the implementors. This approach is exceptionally
clear in the command and control model, which is a hierarchical model that em-
phasizes the mandates set out in the legislature and local compliance with them
(e.g. Goggin & al., 1990, p. 183; Tala, 2001, p. 22). Tala (2001) presented a mod-
el that simplifies how legal rules are assumed to take effect in general
(Figure 3.1). The model presupposes that the given rules and orders are followed
and executed in a uniform and predictable way.
13
 The gap observed in implementation studies is closely related to the gap between the law in
books and the law in action, which is regarded as one of the major questions within the field of
law and society studies.
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Figure 3.1 The Command and Control Model: How a Legal Reform Should Take
Effect (Tala, 2001, p. 22, translated and simplified by V.H.)
The picture of the effects of a legal rule drawn in the command and control
model appears relatively straightforward and oversimplified. Nevertheless, as Tala
(2001, p. 23) points out, it still has some advantages: Firstly, it sums up some
deeply-rooted assumptions about laws and their impact, which may have an
undertow effect in the legislative process. The same undertow is apparent in pub-
lic debates, when attempts are made to redress wrongs through new legislation.
The model also emphasizes the fact that legal rules in general imply authority
and control over individuals, exercised by an outside institution. This
control is intensified by the possibility of the use of coercion and force by
governmental officials. In this sense, the command and control model represents
the elementary ruling mechanism in society.
In the Finnish context, the way in which procedural reform has been under-
stood largely follows the command and control model described above. Unlike
the large amount of Anglo-American research on legal institutions and their role
in implementing legal rules, Finnish research has been confined to the right or
most justified content of the rules, not to how they can be carried out in prac-
tice (Tala, 2001, p. 225). Interest has been limited to what could be considered
the judicially correct reading of the new rules, trying to capture the intention
of the legislator. This presumes that the rules are implemented as they are in-
tended.
The dominance of the command and control model was also detectable
during the legislative process, during the time just before the new procedural
rules were implemented when the basic lines of the forthcoming legislation had
already been fixed. Some of the chief justices in the Finnish district courts were
A legal rule, X, is approved and ratified to come into effect later
Rule X is announced appropriately
The rule comes into effect at a certain point in time
The authorities, courts of justice, individuals, and communities obey rule X.
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ready to update their proceedings and practices to follow the prospective pro-
cedure more closely before the new rules were legally in force. They realized that
promoting the ideas of oral and centralized proceedings was already possible –
and feasible – under the old procedural rules. Following rules that some doubted
were exactly according to the established law raised resistance among other judg-
es, which led to complaints to the parliamentary ombudsman (on this debate,
see Halila, 1989; Möller, 1989b; Virolainen, 1989). This episode in the history
of the procedural reform highlights the confidence among the Finnish legal
authorities in the power of established legislation in directing legal practices. As
Virolainen (1989, pp. 571–572) insightfully stated, it also touches upon the larger
question of how far an individual court can develop its procedures and practic-
es through its own measures, that is, without a dedicated procedural reform14.
One of the fundamental problems of implementation (see Browne & Wil-
davsky, 1983a, pp. 217–218; Tala, 2001, pp. 138–142, 266–273) was touched upon
in the Finnish debate before the reform: how strictly the law should be
 enacted in order to reach unified and unvarying implementation (Legal Com-
mittee report 16/1990; Lindholm, 1989). This also gives an indication about the
reliance on the top-down perspective, in that the implementors adjust their prac-
tices according to the intentions of the legislators.
Failure to impose top-down changes led to criticism of top-down thinking.
Eisenstein & al. (1988, p. 293) directed their critique towards the reforms that
legislators sought to impose from above, and argued that changes in court prac-
tices, for instance in sentencing, could not be achieved merely by passing a new
law. Questioning the command and control model by implication, Eisenstein &
al. state (1988, p. 296) that reformers often assume “that we have a hierarchic,
centralized, obedient system of courts that will automatically and faithfully
adhere to new rules.”  Arguing against the top-down approach, they suggest that
reforms do not operate in the “vacuum of Law”, as the mechanistic execution
of legislative intentions. If changes occur, they must take place in the real world
of complex legal communities and their everyday routines, which vary from
court to court. As a result, reform from above is always imperfect.
Thus, a reverse perspective on implementation began to emerge alongside the
top-down approach. Implementation was seen as a series of change efforts that
emerge from within the agency or community, thereby drawing on local knowl-
14
 In terms of the attempts of the judiciary to develop court practices by itself and on its own
initiative, Finnish legal culture clearly differs in its passivity from the American one at least.
Leubsdorf (1999, p. 63) stated that often “procedural reform simply put the seal of legislation
on changes that many judges are already implementing”. Similarly, Marcus (1999, pp.102-103)
gives an example of bottom-up development, where the stimulus for amendments to the na-
tional rules came from judges spurred on their own experiences of developing proceedings
through case management.
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edge and lived experience. The bottom-up implementation was seen as more
successful because, if compared with the top-down imposed changes, it would
be less foreign to the local setting. According to the bottom-up perspective,
implementation is not a purely technical exercise to carry out the directives of
the legislators, but rather a continuous process in which the reform itself is
altered and modified by the practitioners themselves (e.g. Hjern & Porter, 1981;
Hull & Hjern, 1987; Elmore, 1982).
As Winter (1990, p. 19) noted, the dichotomization of the major implemen-
tation approaches into two – top-down and bottom-up – is probably too rough
to do justice to the many perspectives involved. Here, I will focus on three basic
types of findings, presented in several implementation studies within the bot-
tom-up approach, that are especially relevant with regard to my interest in
change in this particular study. These are: (1) the local construction of imple-
mentation, (2) the importance of local actors in implementation, and (3) the
evolving nature of implementation.  These three areas are overlapping and close-
ly interconnected, but for clarity, I will endeavor to keep them analytically
separate when introducing them.
Whereas studies within the top-down approach concentrate on the gap
between legislative intent and actual implementation, those with the bottom-
up perspective focus on the discretion employed by the implementors. As Tala
(2001) has pointed out, the relation between the content of the legal rules and
individual discretion in interpreting them is the main focus in implementation
studies. One of the main findings has been that the control exercised by central
government is inevitably deficient. From the perspective of central government,
this deficiency indicates problems with or limitations in the ability to direct other
agencies as intended. From the perspective of those directed by central govern-
ment, it implies making the necessary room for their own discretion (Tala, 2001,
pp. 227–228).
The same problematic relation between the content of legal rules and indi-
vidual discretion is recognized by Browne and Wildavsky (1983a).  According
to them, policy formulators cannot foresee all the difficulties with implemen-
tation, and hence are confronted by a coding dilemma. Should they prospectively
employ explicit, controlled implementation directions or use unspecified,
implicit, discretionary implementation coding (ibid., p. 218)? From the bottom-
up perspective, they suggest that, during policy formulation, the implementabil-
ity of a policy decision can never be comprehensively considered. As there will
always be uncharted territory in the implementation process, the implementors
are pioneers of a kind, forging new links in unpredicted environments. The
authors emphasize the role of local organizations through which the local-level
implementation of federal programs takes place, and point to the tendency
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toward divergence during implementation. “As a federal policy mandate is
expressed downward toward local delivery in the implementing hierarchy, its
local programs, with the same directives, are translated differently in dissimilar
environments” (Browne & Wildavsky, 1983a, p. 226).
Implementation has been found to be a field of many voices and divergent
objectives by several researchers. The variation in implementation outcomes
among countries, local settings, policy arenas and even across different sub-
elements of the same program has been widely recognized (Winter, 1990, p. 23).
Local variation as an inevitable starting point determined by the nature of the
policy process is explained by Palumbo and Calista (1990, pp. 12–13):
“Federal programs seldom are carried out exactly as specified in the legislation.
The gap occurs because legislation often has broad and vague mandates and
because local jurisdictions will adapt the legislation to fit their needs and there
is little federal government can do to force them to do otherwise”.
Eisenstein and his co-authors (1988, pp. 298–299) also make an important
contribution to the further understanding of implementation as principally a
local exercise. The variation in implementing state-wide reforms is explained
culturally through the character of courts as complex communities with
qualities of their own: degrees of implementation and its effects vary substan-
tially due to the differences in courts and the communities they serve. State-wide
conformity is an illusion, and identical changes throughout a state can never be
achieved.
Locally determined implementation is closely connected to the finding that
frontline actors hold a key position in policy implementation. Studies taking the
bottom-up perspective have revealed that local actors – street-level bureaucrats
– actively shape public policy through their own contribution during the im-
plementation process. The legal regulation is bound to be unclear and incom-
plete by nature, as different agents will always endow the rules with their own
objectives, expectations and beliefs. The policy outcomes are not only shaped
by the implementation process itself, but in some instances, they are actually de-
termined by it (Palumbo & Calista, 1990).
The top-down view on implementation was most radically challenged by
Lipsky (1980), who regarded the street-level bureaucrats as the factual policy-
makers: laws are just statements with no social existence until they are translat-
ed into action by the implementors when they make their decisions. According
to the bottom-up approach, law formulation is only a small part of policy mak-
ing, and much of the policy is made during implementation itself. The imple-
mentors always exercise discretion that cannot be completely controlled: there
are no precise standards that would specify exactly how judges or other street-
level bureaucrats should perform their job. “In sum, policy formulation occurs
48
during implementation by bureaucrats developing routines and shortcuts for
coping with their everyday jobs” (Palumbo & Calista, 1990, p. 11). The bottom-
up perspective is summed up by Palumbo and Calista: “Implementors are in-
volved in every stage of the policy cycle, from design to redesign. Implementors
not only help define issues and solutions at the agenda-setting stage; they help
to create policy during formulation. Most significantly, they shape policy because
of the enormous and irreducible discretion they have, particularly at the street
level” (Ibid., p. 15).
The evolving nature of implementation means that policies are changed
through political and organizational conditioning and given more specific
content as the implementation proceeds. As Majone and Wildavsky (1984, p. 197)
suggest, “When we act to implement a policy, we change it”. That this
happens does not connote policy failure from the bottom-up perspective
(Palumbo & Calista, 1990, p. 6).
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) view adaptation as an evolutionary charac-
teristic of implementation which occurs when a policy evolves in response to its
environment, as each modifies the other. Mutual adaptation – defined as a prod-
uct of environmental response to the policy intent – is unavoidable, and unan-
ticipated consequences must be expected in any process. Mutual adaptation
includes the evolution of both the content of the policy to be implemented and
those implementing it. “As programs are altered by their environments and
organizations are affected by their programs, mutual adaptation changes both
the context and content of what is implemented” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984,
p. xvii).
3.4 Towards a New Perspective on the Implementation of Court Reform
The findings of the implementation studies – especially those taking the bot-
tom-up perspective – support the idea of change as consisting of small devel-
opments embodied in practices at the local level. The discretion of the local ac-
tors in giving their own meaning and shape to top-down reform, as well as the
evolution of the reform as it proceeds, both point to the idea that changes are
best understood as locally produced small alterations, not only from the top
down, but also and especially from the bottom up, embodied in the implemen-
tors’ practices. From this viewpoint, the bottom-up perspective on policy im-
plementation could serve as the starting point in my study. Limited largely to
the factors or processes promoting or inhibiting the effective execution of rules,
implementation studies have nevertheless set the detailed examination of the
local implementation process and the requisite learning to one side. The need
to consider the viewpoint of the implementors – not only when they just
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implement the rules, but also when they address the problems they encounter
from a broader perspective and use the law as one potential tool – has been
recognized (e.g. Tala, 2001). Yet, methodologically, studies thus far have been
unable to capture the situational aspect of implementation, which appears when
the legal rules are tried out in the actual practices of the implementors.  In terms
of situational understanding, I would argue, that despite frequent attempts to
open it up, implementation has remained a closed book (see Palumbo & Calis-
ta, 1990). What are the dynamics of implementation when the reformed rules
are put into practice in interactive encounters between courts and their clients?
Moreover, what kind of learning and expertise is needed in that process? To
answer thesequestions requires further development of the top-down and bot-
tom-up approaches.
The acknowledged fruitlessness of treating the top-down and bottom-up
approaches as two opposing schools was among the first warning signs of a
possible deadlock in implementation studies (Palumbo & Calista, 1990;
Brodkin, 1990, p. 107; Goggin, 1990, p. 183). Combining the two approaches in
one and the same study was suggested as one way forward, but theoretical and
methodological difficulties were soon distinguished (Fox, 1990, pp. 203–206;
Palumbo & Calista, 1990, p. 13). The need for accumulation in implementation
theory and the desire for a general theory or major paradigm (Winter, 1990, p.
20; Schreirer & Griffith, 1990, pp. 174, 178) were also indicative of the
dissatisfaction with how the studies were progressing15.
Recently, Tala suggested that implementation could be fruitfully examined
as a variable (Tala, 2001, p. 264). This means that when the implementation of
a particular rule is under scrutiny, the starting point is that the implementation
is directed and defined according to several factors. From the viewpoint of the
legislators, viewing it as a variable means that it may be evaluated on a scale, at
one end of which may be implementation fully as intended and at the other end
it is only symbolic, totally the reverse of what was intended (ibid., p. 264).
Examining implementation as a variable excludes the evaluation that is
typical of legal thinking, in which all performance is reduced to the according-
to-the-rules or against-the-rules dichotomy. Although this dichotomy may be
central when legal rules are implemented, it gives too narrow and one-dimen-
sional a picture of the non-regulated interaction that occurs. If, as Tala argues,
implementation is considered a variable, it could be analyzed along dimensions
such as more or less implemented, effectively or deficiently implemented,
15
 Following a fruitless search for alternatives to the division between the two schools (see the
edited volume of Palumbo & Calista, 1990), implementation research has typically moved
into other fields, such as evaluation studies, policy analysis and law enforcement (Tala, 2001, p.
223).
50
completely or partly implemented and well or less well implemented (ibid., p.
265).
Tala’s suggestion is valuable as an attempt to broaden the simplistic and one-
dimensional examination of implementation, but it seems confined to determin-
ing the extent to which some attributes define the implementation process. The
concept of the variable has traditionally been associated with measuring quan-
tities of different phenomena. Yet, it seems plausible that qualitative
questions irreducible to quantity may be more interesting in implementation is-
sues. To support this point, I will briefly refer to my data in order to give some
examples.
In in-depth interviews conducted three to four years after the procedural
reform, district court judges were asked to describe and explain their work prac-
tices during the proceedings and in the hearings. One of the questions was about
the settlements: how the judges considered settlements and how they promot-
ed them in their daily practice. Seven judges out of the eight interviewed dis-
cussed this issue, and as a researcher I summarized their originally long and de-
tailed answers as follows:
Judge 1: I take up the issue of settlements, refer to the advantages and ask
the parties to negotiate by themselves, maybe leaving the parties alone to
negotiate after the preliminary hearing. I do not actively promote settle-
ment. I would not negotiate with one party at a time without the presence
of the other.
Judge 2: I offer time to the parties for negotiation. I inform them of the
pros and coins. I once made my own suggestions for a settlement.
Judge 3: I leave the parties alone to negotiate. If needed, I could suggest a
scale for a feasible settlement.
Judge 4: I do not especially work towards a settlement, but rather, see if
some individual facts or demands within a case could be settled. I do not
actively inform the parties about the possibility to settle.
Judge 5: I always take up the issue and advise the parties to settle, but I do
not contribute more than that.
Judge 6: In the beginning, I was resistant to the idea of settling disputes.
Now I suggest that the parties negotiate and I may leave them to discuss
matters by themselves. I hesitate to make proposals.
Judge 7: I try to obtain settlements in disputes with small financial interest,
and may even exert some pressure. In uncertain cases, a settlement is always
best. If the range is known, I push hard for settlement.
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Another question concerned determining in the preliminary hearing the
themes that the witnesses were supposed to cover in the main hearings: what
kind of practices the judges followed in the preliminary hearings when negoti-
ating with the parties about the issues that the witnesses were going to talk about.
This issue was discussed with six judges out of eight, and the responses were
again condensed as follows.
Judge 1: The themes are nominated, but the actual witnessing in the main
hearing can go beyond them.
Judge 2: First the disputed issues are examined, and then the themes are de-
termined. The themes are formulated in the joint discussion.
Judge 3: I do not require firmly restricted themes, more like headings. The
starting point is the dispute and the end is to clear it up. Policing the
themes in the main hearing does not serve any purpose.
Judge 4: At first I did not pay any attention to the themes, now I do. If the
parties are lay people, I may be almost compelled to define the themes my-
self.
Judge 5: The themes may well be loose. I do not discard cases even if the
parties talk about something that the themes do not cover.
Judge 6: First I make a list of the disputed details, and then I require firmly
condensed themes. If the theme does not sound logical, we will be discuss
it together. Very often the discussion ends by relinquishing the theme.
Even a superficial comparison of the interviews reveals that there is variation
in the way that the new procedural rules are implemented within one district
court, and that the variation consists of qualitative differences. Qualitative
differences in how the judges give meaning to the new rules, as well as in their
practices in conducting the cases, becomes most interesting. According to the
new rules, the judges are obliged to promote a settlement, and when needed, also
to make their own suggestions. Although the content of the rule is relatively
explicit, it is hard to say which of the responses conforms to it most. What is the
aim of the rule, and how hard should the judges work in order to reach a settle-
ment? Is it the intention of the law that judges should encourage the parties to
negotiate, or that they should take an active part in the negotiations themselves?
The content of a rule is hardly ever explicit enough for an evaluative judgement
of this kind to be made.
The new procedural law requires that one of things that has to established
in the preliminary hearing is “what evidence the parties are going to present, and
what is going to be proved with each piece of evidence” (Procedural Code, Chap-
ter 5 19§). When the law says that certain issues have to be established, it does
not refer to commands ordered by a judge, nor to explanations given by the
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parties, but to the collaboration and interaction between the judge and the
parties (Laukkanen, 1995, p. 195). The models for this interaction are not pre-
given in procedural law; instead, they comprise the gray area where discretion
is to be used. Some evaluators may suspect intentional negligence of the proce-
dural rules in some of the judges’ responses concerning the themes of witness-
es’ testimonies. Instead of examining these as evidence of partial or bad imple-
mentation, it is more promising to focus on questions such as how judges
interpret and carry out the new procedural rules, or why they choose to follow,
bend or bypass them.
One step this direction is taken by Dvora Yanow (1990), who suggests an
interpretive logic in studying implementation. The study of the “implementa-
tion problem” – that the outcomes do not match the intent – could be ap-
proached through four analytically distinguishable lenses: 1. the human-relations
lens looking at the behavior of individuals, 2. the political lens examining the
dynamics within and between groups, 3. the structural lens focusing on the
organization itself as a set of rules, and 4. the systems lens targeting organiza-
tions as they relate to each other in an environment (ibid., pp. 214–215). Each
lens embodies an idea of what is important in studying implementation, and uses
particular concepts and terminology of its own. Essential to all of them is a
common logic of inquiry, which Yanow (1990, p. 220) calls “ontological
logic”. It holds that implementation is an activity with factual characteristics in
the real world, and because they exist as objective facts, they can be discovered.
According to Yanow (1990, p. 218), the four-lenses idea was developed from
several shared assumptions about the nature of the “implementation problem”,
many of them echoing the early view of implementation as the simple execu-
tion of policy formulations. Firstly, since implementation has been understood
to begin at the conclusion of the policy-making phase, its problems have been
assumed to lie in the post-policy-making realm. The second assumption is that
the implementors’ point of departure is the written language of their policy man-
date, and particularly its literal meaning. Implementors are expected to
restrict themselves to the literal meanings of the policy language, which are
expressions of legislative intentions. The third shared assumption is that imple-
mentors begin with an intention to implement the policy as it is written, and
any problems are the result of something interfering with that intent.
As Yanow (1990, p. 219) points out, these assumptions give only a restricted
view on implementation and organizational behavior: “We do not have evidence
to support an assumption that implementors are isolated from the general
historical and value context of the policy they are implementing, nor that they
are blind to the multiple meanings of policy language that carry those contex-
tual values.” The counter-assumptions suggest a logic of inquiry, which Yanow
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calls “interpretative”. It treats implementation as a set of activities in which mul-
tiple meanings are expected. The central questions within this logic include
“What meanings did agency chiefs, legislators, front-line workers and clients
make of this policy?” “How did these meanings shape the policy’s implementa-
tion?” (ibid., p. 221). The task of the researcher using interpretive logic is to
investigate the coexisting multiple meanings and multiple interpretations
given by the different actors, and to analyze the effects of those meanings and
interpretations on implementation efforts. Departing from ontological logic, the
interpretive approach emphasizes individual interpretations and shared,
compatible and conflicting meanings; interaction in meaning making and the
role of negotiation in the creation and destruction of shared meanings; and the
ongoing reinterpretation of implementation activities (ibid., p. 221).
The interpretive approach suggested by Yanow has several implications for
implementation research (ibid., pp. 223-226). As far as the research design is
concerned, it requires a longer time perspective and larger setting than most
studies to enable the historical development and vertical and horizontal varia-
tions to be traced. For the research agenda, it implies that implementing activi-
ties are understood as interpretations of policy statements, and that goals are
seen as cultural creations subject to multiple interpretations. A further impli-
cation is that the gap metaphor changes its nature. It is no longer something to
be explained away, but something to be explained. From the interpretive point
of view, the gap is expected, since we are encouraged to anticipate interpreta-
tions that change over time and exist in multiple versions simultaneously.
In her article, Yanow interestingly opens up the interpretative approach to
implementation and puts forward good suggestions for re-evaluating our un-
derstanding its nature. The multiple, even conflicting interpretations of imple-
mentation as a process involving interaction and negotiation on shared mean-
ings, the enlarged scope of the potential actors and its evolving and iterative
nature, are insightful standpoints generating a new understanding.
What remain untackled in Yanow’s article are the origins and sources of the
interpretation itself. According to her, top-down policies are interpreted and
given meaning – understood, explained, and also altered – from the bottom-up
by the implementors. Where do these interpretations derive from? One answer
is given by Yanow herself, who refers to the accumulation of values and beliefs
embedded in a policy culture as a source of the implementors’ interpretations
(ibid., p. 219). The inherited models of policy culture are an important source
of interpretation, but not the only one. There is also the questioning of current
cultural models and the production of novel local solutions, which have no
pattern in the prevailing culture. This potential for new and emergent pro-
cesses urges us to connect the issues of learning with implementation.
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3.5 Learning in Implementation: From Adaptation to Deutero-Learning
Learning has been mainly referred to in the literature as an unquestioned
necessity for successful implementation, if it has been mentioned at all. Inter-
estingly enough, in the large collection of articles on implementation edited by
Palumbo and Calista in 1990, the concept of learning is not included in the sub-
ject index. Recently, the importance of implementation and evaluation
research as a means of accumulating knowledge on law drafting and of gener-
ally advancing joint learning about regulation has been recognized (Tala, 2001,
p. 11).
In studies with a top-down perspective in which implementation is under-
stood as the literal execution of written mandates, learning could best be
described as adopting the new rules. Implicitly associated with the command-
and-control model, learning includes the adoption of the content and the em-
bracing of the idea of the new policy. It is seen as a non-problematic result of
“pouring” the necessary information into those who are to implement it. Even
though the gap between the outcomes and the intent was the central focus of
top-down research, it was not discussed in terms of learning.
The bottom-up perspective brought in the concept of discretion, rather than
command and control. Discretion implies that the implementors always have
several options from which to choose, ranging from the decision whether to act
at all, to deciding on alternatives of active operation (Tala, 2001, p. 266). As a
result, local and individual applications within a particular implementation are
possible, and the implementors have more influence. Consequently, the imple-
mentation process is subject to constant modification and adjustments in goals
and strategies. Thus viewed as evolution and mutual adaptation of both the pol-
icy and the implementing organization it already incorporates the concept of
learning. According to this view, learning is understood as a continuous process
of adaptation, where the implementors learn to fit and adjust the policy to local
needs, and to make their practices conform to the new policy (on the notion of
adaptation, see Hutchins, 1995).
The most thorough contribution to the notion of implementation as adap-
tation, and the most promising attempt to incorporate learning into implemen-
tation, was made by Angela Browne and Aaron Wildavsky in their two articles
(1983a and 1983b), included in the third expanded edition of Pressman’s and
Wildavsky’s well-known book on implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky,
1984). Browne and Wildavsky define adaptation as occurring when a policy
evolves in response to its environment, each bringing about change in the oth-
er, thus describing implementation as an evolutionary process.
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“Our view is based on the premise that a policy evolves during its implementation
by adaptation. Words on paper, mandated by an executive or administrative order,
a statute, or a court ruling are translated into actual operations in a real environ-
ment. The process of adaptive translation subjects a policy to the most fundamen-
tal evolutionary test, that of its viability within the environment.” (Browne & Wil-
davsky, 1983a, p. 227)
Browne and Wildavsky draw a parallel between implementation and the
organizing forces of other evolutionary processes, since “all living things imple-
ment, evaluate, learn to adapt and evolve” (Browne & Wildavsky, 1983a, p. 226).
The dynamics of implementation are compared to the flight of a bat, which finds
its bearings by means of echolocation.  It adjusts its flight according to the feed-
back it generates and receives from its environment. Accordingly, if implemen-
tation is the flight, evaluation should serve as echolocation on the wing (ibid.,
pp. 226–227).
However, humans are not born with policy-evaluative abilities. As a society,
we have to learn them. Policy implementation is a far more complicated pro-
cess than the flight of a bat, and requires greater effort and consideration.
“More than chemical osmosis or sonar echolocation, policy evaluation is a conscious
attempt to generate and learn from policy-relevant feedback. At this we are novic-
es. Our ideal is that of increasing the effective utilization of information; evalua-
tion during implementation should engender not a summary but a continuous
learning process.” (ibid., p. 227)
Browne and Wildavsky (1983b, pp. 238–239) ground their concept of learn-
ing on the classification developed by Gregory Bateson (see Bateson, 1972). His
theoretical model of different levels of learning was based on the idea that a
change takes place each time something is learned, the lowest level of learning
being Learning zero, the mere receiving of a signal with no evaluation of the
experience. As the same error is indefinitely repeated and there is no change in
response to a continuing stimulus, Learning zero is, in essence, non-learning. The
next level of learning, Learning I or simple learning, incorporates feedback from
the event into the organism’s memory. The classical example is a child who, af-
ter touching a hot iron, has learned something if he does not touch the hot iron
again. Finally, the higher level of learning is “learning to learn”, or “deutero-learn-
ing”. On this Learning II level, the one-to-one correlation between a stimulus
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and a change in behavior is superseded and instead, information concerning the
process of change is recognized and purposively selected16.
Re-conceptualizing implementation as an evolutionary learning process
shakes the traditional idea of achieving mandated objectives from solid ground.
If self-designing and problem-defining organization is the ideal, what happens
to the original objectives that were supposed to be implemented? In their
response to this, Browne and Wildavsky (ibid., pp. 239-241) stress the role of
evaluation as essential to the learning process, especially learning to redesign:
when both objectives and policies are changing, implementation is determined
not only by looking back, so as to assess the fit between objectives and accom-
plishments, but also by looking forward to new, more informed relationships
between ends and means. Learning includes learning about how to achieve
objectives as well as about whether and to what extent they are worth achiev-
ing. Evaluation facilitates such change-generating learning.
Still, the question of what to learn remains and puzzles the authors: is learn-
ing to implement a policy learning how to achieve predetermined goals, learn-
ing how to alter the mix of objectives and the given resources, or learning how
to change the whole system that is producing the policies? Here the authors are
not concerned with what learning processes in implementation actually look like,
but rather with what they ought to look like. They refer to the philosophical dis-
agreements on what sort of learning there ought to be:  programmatic, policy-
oriented or systemic (p. 245).
Finally, Browne and Wildavsky re-conceptualize the role of an implementor
as a purposive evaluator – that is, as a learner – and as an explorer testing a hy-
pothesis (ibid., pp. 255-256). A learning organization should not evaluate the
implementation against the pre-given objectives alone, but also in light of all the
discoveries made throughout the process. They suggest that evaluation that is
insensitive to the problems of transforming the policy makers’ ideas into prac-
tice leaves the best bits unexamined. They call evaluators who simply assess the
accomplished transactions or services that are in line with the expected mere
accountants, and call for the appreciation for evaluation as continuous learn-
ing. In fact, they turn around the conventional idea of comparing outcomes with
objectives, and point out that the rate at which the original objectives are
redefined along the way actually represents the amount of learning during
16
 Bateson’s famous model has inspired numerous later scholars. In the context of organiza-
tional learning, the work done by Argyris and Schön (1978; 1996) is among the best known. In
their theory, a non-learning organization repeats the same error endlessly, whereas in a sim-
ple-learning organization the error is detected, its sources discovered and strategies for its
correction devised. In the case of deutero-learning, on-going self-evaluation and development
becomes a goal, and the organization learns to interpret and evaluate new signals. It defines
problems and generates new solutions, but also redesigns their solution-generating processes.
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implementation. Evaluation that facilitates learning includes implementors as
active in shaping policies and promotes a view on implementation as an explor-
atory process.
3.6 Expansive Learning as Creating New Forms of Activity
By integrating implementation and learning through the concept of adaptation,
Browne and Wildavsky make a valuable contribution to understanding policy
implementation as a process of individual and collaborative learning. In taking
Bateson’s concept of learning as change as their starting point, they ensure
solid theoretical grounds for their own elaboration. From Bateson’s classifica-
tion of different levels of learning, they concentrate on Learning II, which seems
to resemble the pertinent issues of implementation.
Learning II, or “learning to learn” is a corrective change in the set of alter-
natives from which choice is made. Following this definition, Browne and Wil-
davsky seem to put great emphasis on the preferring and choosing of objectives
as a significant element in learning: “Obviously, learning includes learning about
how to realize objectives as well as about whether and to what extent they are
worth achieving” (1983b, p. 241), and “Learning is not only a matter of means
– how to achieve pre-fixed objectives – but also of ends, i.e., learning to edu-
cate our preferences” (1983a, p. 223). Their statements indicate that their inter-
est is mainly restricted to the solution of discrete, given problems – here in val-
uing and choosing between pre-determined objectives, or in its most transfor-
mative form, redefining the objectives as the implementation proceeds. The same
idea of the given structure as one determinant setting limits in which
development can occur, is also explicated as follows:
“The original genetic coding sets a range within which the organism can develop;
the original policy mandate delineates the range of program development. But that
is all it can do. The characteristics of the program are determined by the interac-
tion of its inherited structure with its social environment.” (Browne & Wildavsky,
1983a, p. 228.)
One aspect of their interest in Learning II is the strong emphasis on the
effective utilization of evaluative information as the main source of the contin-
uous learning process (Browne & Wildavsky, 1983b, p. 240). Constant, success-
ful evaluation is important to learning and the other way round: learning is based
on effective evaluation along the implementation process.
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Unfortunately, Browne and Wildavsky limit their examination to the three
lowest levels in Bateson’s categorization (zero, I and II), and exclude the higher
ones. Learning IV is the theoretical level since, according to Bateson (1972, p.
293), it probably does not occur in any living organism on this earth. Learning
III, on the other hand, seems the most promising as far as implementation as a
learning process is concerned.
Applying the activity-theoretical framework, Engeström (1987) reinterprets
Bateson’s theory and, in particular, furthers the understanding of Learning III.
The distinctive feature of human activity is that it is the continuous creation of
new instruments, which in turn complicate and qualitatively change the struc-
ture of the activity itself. New instruments also produce new objects of the
activity.
In Learning I, both the object (or outcome) of the activity and the instru-
ment are given. Learning means repetitive correction in the way the subject uses
the instrument upon the object. As in the learning within the command and
control model of implementation, there is a fixed, correct way in which to
operate. Engeström distinguishes two aspects in Learning II: the reproductive
and the productive. The object is seen as a problem, demanding efforts to solve
it. Reproductive learning demands that the object is given and the solution is
found through trial and error, while in productive learning, the object is also
given, but the solution is invented through experimentation (Engeström, 1987,
pp. 144–149). This productive aspect of Learning II corresponds well with
Browne and Wildavsky’s idea of learning in implementation as evolution and
re-design on the basis of evaluation.
From the viewpoint of local, agent-driven and evolving implementation,
Learning II is nevertheless inevitably restricted to the solving of pre-determined
problems, where the set of alternatives may be altered. If evaluation is the main
source of the learning, the actual instruments for problem solving are left open.
Even though the problem-solving instruments within Learning II may be po-
tentially expansive, this does not automatically imply that the context of the giv-
en problem is broken and expanded (Engeström, 1987, p. 149).
Learning III is defined in Bateson’s original classification as change in the
process of Learning II – a corrective change in the system of set of alternatives
from which the choice is made. It is a rare event, produced by the inner contra-
dictions of Learning II. Engeström (1987, p. 150) describes the development
from Learning II to Learning III using Bateson’s (1972, p. 208) example of a
double bind17: if you call a stick real, you will get hit with it – if you say it is not
17
 The double bind is a concept used by Bateson (1972, pp. 208; 271-278) to refer to situations
in which all alternatives appear equally impossible. An individual receives at least two com-
mands or messages which contradict each other and seem to leave no room for adequate per-
formance.
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real, you will get hit again. If you say nothing, you will get hit as well. In Learn-
ing III the subject receives contradictory messages, but is able to rise above the
constraints of the context and break them: he or she may reach up and take the
stick away from its holder. The essential difference between Learning II and
Learning III is that, whereas in the former the subject tries to solve a presented
problem, in the latter the problem itself must be created (Engeström, 1987, p.
150).
Learning II always involves a phase in which the acquired instrument is
applied to real-life conditions of societal practice – be the instrument a habit, a
model or a new rule, as in the case of law implementation. Engeström’s descrip-
tion of the application of a new instrument is interesting in the context of
implementation: “(W)e shall find out that the newly acquired instrument
never stays exactly the same as it was in the phases of its original individual
acquisition and internalization. It will change and produce surprises, new qual-
ities, in its very integration into the wider context of the social life activity of
its subject. It will be concretized and generalized in practice which is necessari-
ly richer than the abstraction originally acquired” (ibid., pp. 158-159). It is within
this tacit transition from the internalization of the instrument to externaliza-
tion and objectification when it is used, that the transition from Learning II to
Learning III – from individual actions to collective activity also occurs (p. 159).
Bateson’s concept of Learning III has been thoroughly elaborated by En-
geström as learning activity. Engeström’s main argument is that expansive pro-
cesses are becoming integrated into processes of learning, and that a historical-
ly new type of learning with expansive potential is emerging in various social
practices (Engeström, 1987). In this expansive learning, people are not affected
by or required to adopt changes – neither are they compelled to adapt to them.
Instead, they initiate and seek new solutions and actively make sense of the world
they live in (Engeström, Engeström & Vähäaho, 1999). Expansive learning is not
learning to make value preferences or to choose between ready-made alterna-
tives, nor is it re-defining something already known. It essentially involves
learning culturally new forms of activity that are not yet there. Small
actions can grow into an objectively new form of activity. The expansive pro-
cess has been illustrated by comparing it to the consequences of throwing a stone
into the water. Normally, a stone produces a series of circles of waves, which grad-
ually get smaller and finally die out while moving away. In an expansive
process, the “waves grow while they move outward from the impulse, then turn
back to mold the initial source of impulse, and finally create a new, higher-
level structure of stability than the original” (Engeström, 1987, p. 163).
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Activity-theoretical studies have reported on work practices in which there
is a challenge to collectively learn novel ways to conduct the work – something
that does not already exist.  It is necessary for a fundamental change in the work
that the object expands in some significant way. For example, in the reorgani-
zation of medical work, the construction of the patient as an object of the work
began to expand significantly (Engeström, 1999b, p. 90).  An equal object ex-
pansion has been reported by Kärkkäinen (1999) in the context of teacher teams
in an elementary school. “The formation of a new, expanded object is the basis
for the formation of a new motive, which in turn is the foundation for opening
up the developmental dimensions of work and eventually, for achieving sustain-
able transformation” (Engeström, 1999b, p. 91).
When learning is seen as equivalent to the expansive transformation of work
practices, the implication is that it is looked for as being embedded in social prac-
tices. From the perspective of implementation, this means that learning takes
place when the new rules are enriched and given content when used in practice.
This is the process of expansive learning, where “the practice is necessarily richer
than the abstraction originally acquired” (Engeström, 1987). The process of
implementation, in which the law is shaped, determined and sometimes altered
by the actual implementors, was already recognized in the studies of research-
ers with a bottom-up perspective, although they did not consider it learning.  In
this study, the very same process of enriching and shaping is understood as learn-
ing – with a special emphasis on the new solutions that go beyond the pre-set
objectives and pre-given models.
Understanding implementation as learning also means that the principles
given in the legislation have to be concretized through local interpretations and
constructions of the necessary tools, norms and practices. However, the major
expansive potential lies within the small and gradual changes that take place in
court practices during implementation. The idea of small renewals or changes
driving more fundamental transformations is raised by Engeström, Engeström
& Suntio (in press). From this point of view, some of the new practices or new
instruments may appear to be capsules of potential expansion, leading to a
fundamental change in the court work itself. Every time the practices or instru-
ments are used, they make visible the constraints of the court work and ques-
tion its motive. Simultaneously, they offer a possibility for expansion by giving
a chance to move above and beyond the constraints (Engeström, Engeström &
Suntio, in press).
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3.7 Zone of Proximal Development: Towards a New Conceptualization
of Expertise in Courts
The concept of the zone of proximal development is useful in understanding the
expansive potential of implementation – the creation of the new. The concept
was originally defined by Vygotsky (1978, p. 86) as the distance between a child’s
developmental level of independent problem solving and the level of potential
development under the guidance of adults or more capable peers. This defini-
tion determines the buds of an individual’s development that will blossom in
the near future, but are currently in an embryonic state (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 88).
According to Engeström (1987, pp. 170–174), Vygotsky’s concept of the zone
of proximal development, and especially most of the current interpretations and
applications of it, are nevertheless inevitably restricted to the acquisition of the
given and the acquiring of discrete skills and actions. Engeström feels that
interest within the cultural-historical school has largely been in the acquisition,
assimilation and internalization of the tools and sign systems of the culture. Since
human development is not just acquisition of individually new practices, but also
the real production of new societal activity systems, he wanted to shift the fo-
cus from the course of individual development to how the activities themselves,
as societal systemic formations, develop and change (ibid., pp. 172–173).
In an attempt to grasp the expansive and collective nature of development
and to intertwine individual and collective development, Engeström has re-de-
fined the zone of proximal development in the following way: “It is the distance
between the present everyday actions of the individuals and historically new
form of the societal activity that can be collectively generated as a solution to
the double bind potentially embedded in the everyday actions.” (Engeström,
1987, p. 174).
Traditional theories of learning have focused on processes in which an indi-
vidual – or recently also an organization – acquires knowledge or skills so as to
produce observable behavioral changes. The assumption is that the knowledge
or skills themselves are stable and well defined, and that there is someone com-
petent enough to transmit the knowledge to others.
In the implementation of court reform, however, only part of the required
learning meets these standards. When following the new procedure, implemen-
tors also have to learn something that is not defined or even understood. When
new procedural law is implemented, a lot of concrete practices that are not yet
in existence have to be learned. They are literally learned as they are being
created (see Engeström, in press).
In this context, the zone of proximal development of court activity seems to
consist of concrete, challenging situations in court work, in which novel solu-
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tions need to be made. In terms of implementation, it appears as a zone of learn-
ing challenges and possible solutions. Daily encounters between the courts and
their clients constantly bring forth undefined and unexpected situations with de-
velopmental tensions of their own, requiring concrete solutions.
When the zone of learning challenges in courts is recognized as the local pro-
duction of new practices, it means, above all, that judicial expertise is in transi-
tion. Questions that demand answers include who the actors are who work with
a court case, how the collaboration between them emerges and how their exper-
tise is formed and developed.  It seems that direct communication between the
courts and their clients, especially when settlements are negotiated, strongly
questions the persistent tradition of individual expert work, where expertise is
regarded as individuals’ superior knowledge and performance.  It rather suggests
an alternative understanding of expertise as more collaborative accomplishment,
produced in mundane interaction in which the new practices are sought after
and tried.
The Traditional Understanding of Expertise as Individual Property
Traditionally, studies on expertise have looked for the universal cognitive mech-
anisms that supposedly could be found in the minds of individuals considered
experts. Two main streams have been distinguished in studies on expert think-
ing:  the human information-processing approach to expert problem solving and
the characteristics of individual expertise (e.g. Chi, Glaser and Farr, 1988), and
the approach emphasizing intuition and tacit knowledge in expert performance
(e.g. Dreyfuss & Dreyfuss, 1986).
The understanding of expertise as individual property stems from the idea
of expertise as extraordinary performance based on repetitive exercise and / or
extensive formal training and wide reading. Expert knowledge, used in solving
well-constrained problems in the expert’s respective field, appears a relatively
stable and closed field of professional wisdom.
However, as Engeström (in press) points out, in present unstable work con-
ditions, where disruptions and unexpected events are the rule rather than the
exception, experts must face, diagnose and resolve novel situations for which they
have little or no directly applicable knowledge or skills. His main point is that
the individualistic view is intertwined with assumptions of a stable environment,
and hence cannot connect expertise with the creation of new culture as an on-
going collaborative achievement.
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Towards a More Collaborative Understanding of Expertise
In the 1990s, several studies on expert work, learning and cognition contribut-
ed to a new kind of understanding attempting to overcome the limitations of
strictly individualistic notions of expertise. Lave and Wenger (1991) suggested
that the proper unit of analysis of human activity would be a community of prac-
tice, rather than an isolated individual. They argued that skill and competence
reside in local working communities, not in information that could be transmit-
ted through traditional training. Bereiter and Scardamalia (1993) enlarged the
concept of expertise from individuals to teams and noted that, instead of
using familiar routines, experts construct new concepts and methods in their
progressive problem solving. Again, Hutchins (1995) considered expertise as dis-
tributed achievements of human practitioners and their artifacts.
None of the above mentioned studies, however, points to the possibility that
expertise may be located and distributed in fields of multiple interacting com-
munities of practice or activity systems, rather than within one individual or iso-
lated group. Moreover, they concentrated on learning and expertise in fairly sta-
ble settings, leaving aside issues of change, creation and expansion (Engeström,
in press).
The required conception of expertise, Engeström argues, should be based on
the idea of expertise as an increasingly multi-sited phenomenon between mul-
tiple interacting organizations, and on the radical transformations that are
taking place at work. Interestingly, steps in this direction have already been taken
in organizational and management literature, which has shifted its emphasis onto
multi-organizational partnerships and alliances, and has started to investigate
change and transformation at work (e.g. Alter & Hage, 1993; Huxham, 1996; Beer
& Nohria, 2000; Nadler, Shaw & Walton, 1995).
Shifting the interest from stable and constant expert knowledge and perfor-
mance to the facing and shaping of change at work makes it important to
distinguish between the internalization of the culturally given and the external-
ization of novel ideas and models (Engeström, in press). Both belong to exper-
tise when understood as collective activity, not only as the individual mastering
of skill and knowledge. Thus far, most research on expertise has focused entire-
ly on the internalization of given models in achieving and sustaining expert
knowledge. However, as already noted above, mastering qualitative transforma-
tions and reorganization at work – externalizing novel solutions or learning
something that is not yet there – has become the major challenge.
Reorganizing collaborative relations and practices between and within mul-
tiple activity systems is a recent developmental trend in organizational life, which
we know only little about. The idea of individual expertise works poorly when
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work is increasingly being organized in ways that call for horizontal movement
and boundary crossing – interactive and collaborative expertise – between dif-
ferent activity systems.
“In their work, experts operate in and move between multiple parallel activity
contexts. These multiple contexts demand and afford different, complementary, but
also conflicting tools, rules and patterns of social interaction. Criteria of expert
knowledge and skill are different in the various contexts. Experts face the challenge
of negotiating and combining ingredients from different contexts to achieve hybrid
solutions.” (Engeström, Engeström & Kärkkäinen, 1995, p. 320)
In addition to the interest in boundary crossing in expert work, the concept
of knotworking has been another attempt to capture and understand the side-
ways movement and collaboration between various activity systems and actors
involved.  Knotworking refers to “a rapidly pulsating, distributed and partially
improvised orchestration of collaborative performance between otherwise loose-
ly connected actors and activity systems” (Engeström, Engeström & Vähäaho,
1999, p. 346). Knots of collaborative work do not belong to fixed organization-
al entities – although the members of the knots do – and they are not governed
by permanent centers of control. The fact that several actors are connected
together temporarily to solve a specific problem creates potential situations to
produce a new kind of collaborative expertise between parallel activity systems.
One of the multiple interacting activity systems is that of the client who asks
for the expert’s services. A new aspect of collaboration between experts and their
clients is introduced by Bart Victor and Andrew Boynton, who use the notion
of co-configuration to refer to the new, emerging modes of producing goods and
services, in which the client participates as a partner in planning and produc-
tion. The production of a good or service is seen as a long process in which the
user and the producer, in collaboration and mutual dialogue, customize the
product to fit the client’s needs and requirements (Victor & Boynton, 1998).
What kind of expertise, then, can the client convey to the collaboration?
David Tuckett and his colleagues opposed the idea of expertise as universal and
homogeneous and, instead, promoted it as more heterogeneous and multi-
voiced, including the certain kind of expertise that the clients may import. In
their study on doctor-patient interaction in medical consultations (Tuckett &
al., 1985, p. 217), they considered the consultations a meeting between one
person who has, by training and experience, access to specialist knowledge and
another who has, by experience, understanding of his or her past as well as some
ideas about what is best for him or her. Both parties form models of what is
wrong, what the consequences of the problem are, and what should be done. A
successful consultation requires a merger of these viewpoints; a process of
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explicit sharing of the models, so that the patient can take advantage of the ideas
and skills the specialist can offer.
Nevertheless, what Tuckett and his colleagues found out empirically was that,
in the consultations, patients were not treated as competent experts in their own
health care, and their ideas and opinions were devalued as irrelevant or not useful
(Tuckett & al., 1985, p. 211). This implies that, while encounters between pro-
fessionals and lay persons embrace the potential for fruitful and satisfactory col-
laboration, based on sharing different types of expertise, participation of and
contributions by lay persons in expert activity is full of tensions and
restraints.
Expertise in Court Work: Traditions and New Challenges
The work of a judge has represented the most individual and independent
expertise with minimal collaboration. Court trials could be regarded as the
nucleus of judicature and the area in which judicial expertise appears in its
purest form. Judicial expertise manifests in judges and other legal professionals
who master the most essential rules, the rarest exceptions and the latest
details of legislation. Recently, the enormous increase and differentiation of le-
gal norms – the flow of norms as the lawyers call it – has questioned expertise
as an individual’s property and made visible the limits of individual experts’
capacity to endlessly adopt and apply new knowledge in their work.
In a similar vein, the court case has traditionally been regarded as something
ready-made and clear-cut in which the judge will make decisions based only on
his expertise. A detailed examination of trials has shown, however, that a court
case with all its facts is constructed around the proceedings in negotiations
between those involved (e.g. Bennett & Feldman, 1981). As early as in 1949,
Jerome Frank argued – presumably in a revolutionary way – that “facts are
guesses”, and that it is most misleading to talk of trial courts “finding” the facts:
“The trial court’s facts are not ‘data’, not something that is ‘given’; they are not wait-
ing somewhere, ready made, for the court to discover, to ’find’. More accurately, they
are processed by the trial court – are, so to speak, ‘made’ by it, on the basis of its
subjective reactions to the witnesses’ stories.” (Frank, 1949, pp. 23–24).
More recently, Conley and O’Barr (1998) have pointed to disputes as con-
stantly transforming in interaction, rather than isolated, ready-made entities that
are brought before the court. All the contexts in which a dispute is expressed –
including courts – are interactional, and each such context shapes the dispute
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in unique ways.  As the trial moves along, “the product – or more accurately, the
co-product – is an account produced jointly by the litigant and the law” (Con-
ley & O’Barr, 1998, p. 89). Again, these findings seem to make room for regard-
ing expertise more as an interactive and collaborative than individual phenom-
enon.
The Finnish court system has seen the court reform of 1993 concerning pro-
cedures in civil matters and the organization of district courts, and the 1997
reform of the procedure in criminal cases. Other challenging developmental
trends are also evident.
Attempts to increase the power of the courts to master their own work and
workload have been made by applying case management (Hovioikeuden
oikeudenkäyntimenettely, 2000, 18–20). The idea behind case management is
that the active control of individual cases and their flow in the system results in
a rationalized total workload for the court. It has largely been regarded as a way
to rationalize and effect court work by producing standard tracks for different
types of cases, and differentiating the assignments of court personnel accord-
ingly (Heydebrand & Seron, 1990; Palmer & Roberts, 1998). It may also include
the potential for an alternative development in the direction of a qualitatively
new kind of dialogue between courts and their clients, who negotiate together
about how and through which procedures the case could be solved most satis-
factorily.
A completely new area of expertise involves the broader applications of
information technology in courts. The electronic transmission of documents,
multi-lateral conference calls by phone or via the internet, and hearing witnesses
in a video conference are examples of routines enabled by new information tech-
nology that may become more common in the near future.
The pressure to enrich and extend judicial expertise in courts also arises from
several ongoing, globally linked societal and cultural developments. As a result
of the increased number of immigrants and refugees, judges meet clients from
different cultures almost daily. Membership of the European Union binds Fin-
land to the harmonization of judicial codes in the civil proceedings of the mem-
ber countries. The proposals suggest that the trend will be toward less formal
proceedings, and toward collaboration and negotiation between the judge and
the parties in establishing the case (Laukkanen, 1995, p. 99). The Finnish civil-
rights reform has meant that citizens have the right to expect the court to guar-
antee through its active contribution a fair trial for all citizens. This deviates
radically from the old interpretation, according to which the passivity of the
court was sufficient to secure a fair trial and the parties’ formal equality before
the law (Laukkanen, 1995, p. 98).
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Even on the threshold of new and complex pressures on courts, the tradition
of individual expert judges is still powerful in Finland – possibly even with a
strong flavor of legalism as a cultural characteristic. Kemppinen (1992) and En-
geström, Haavisto and Pihlaja (1992) pointed to the myth and also the practice
of judges as lonely and silent decision makers who do not share their cases while
working on them, and do not evaluate them afterwards with other colleagues.
As in many other established professions, professional knowledge in courts has
been regarded as self-competent, self-contained within one individual not need-
ing further refinement by other professionals.  Similarly, the knowledge that a
court client may bring to the interaction is de-contextualized from professional
knowledge as needless and meaningless. The distance of professionals’ from their
clients has been regarded as important in courts and, in fact, a necessary guar-
antee of professional objectivity, neutrality and impartiality.  The idea of indi-
vidual mastery of the work, and of an isolated judge as an impartial arbiter, has
resulted in a culture in which judges have even considered further training as
inappropriate and as interfering in their work.
Barbara Yngvesson (1994) referred to studies in which courts were found to
consist of specialists with knowledge and skills of their own, isolated from their
surroundings.
“Empirical literature provides a familiar portrait of courts as bounded and set apart,
a domain of specialists controlled by an elite, or forums of ‘rough justice’ with their
own subculture and behavioral routines, distant from the practices and values of
those who are judged there.” (Yngvesson, 1994, p. 55).
The question is: can this individual expertise face up to all the demands that
the reform and the new societal trends are bringing into the courts? Do elements
of more distributed or collaborative expertise in courts exist? Furthermore, is
this possible collaborative expertise distributed between legal professionals, or
does it also reach the lay person whose case is being dealt with?
The following main ideas were advocated in the previous sections – (1) that
change is locally produced and gradual, consisting of small steps, but still
potentially expansive, (2) that the concrete contents of the reform and the new
practices are constructed locally and with substantial discretion in the actual
implementation process, in which the implementors hold a key position, and (3)
that implementing a court reform is an on-going learning process with
expansive potential for collaborative re-organization of the work. These ideas
have supported the notion of the zone of proximal development as an area of
challenging, concrete situations and their possible local solutions. It is in this area
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that the judicial expertise will inevitably be transformed. The empirical
research problems concerning the local learning challenges and the theoretical
research problems about change and expertise are presented in the following
chapter. I will also continue with the central themes of change and learning to
formulate a working hypothesis on them.
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4 Research Problems
4.1 Typologies of Organizational Change
Focusing their attention on the changing nature of organizational change, David
Nadler and Michael Tushman created a typology to describe and distinguish
between the different kinds of changes that their own experiences and the liter-
ature on organizational change suggested. On one level, they distinguish between
two types of change. First, there are smaller changes occurring during periods
of equilibrium, and secondly, there are changes that occur during periods of dis-
equilibrium. Even during times of relative equilibrium, however, organizations
constantly implement improvements and modifications, which are aimed at
improving the fit among its components. Each attempt at improvement is built
on the work that has already been accomplished. This type of change is called
incremental change. (Nadler & Tushman, 1995, p. 22.)
The second type of change takes place when a radically-changing environ-
ment requires equally radical changes in the organization. The organization does
not attempt to improve fit, but rather construct a whole new configuration with
new strategies, new organizational arrangements and so forth. As this type of
change involves a complete break with the past, it is called discontinuous change.
(Nadler & Tushman, 1995, p. 22.)
Another dimension to consider is time, again on two levels. On the one hand,
an organization is forced to respond to changes in its environment, which is
referred to as reactive change. On the other hand, rather than being forced to
react to the outside, the organization acts in anticipation of the changes that may
occur later, which is called anticipatory change. (Ibid., pp. 23–24).
Combining these two dimensions – degree of continuity and timing – the
authors end up with a framework that identifies four types of organizational
change, presented in Figure 4.1.
Tuning is when an organization initiates incremental change in anticipation
of environmental events or in search of increased efficiency, but without the
immediate requirement to do so. Adaptation is when incremental changes and
modifications result from environmental conditions that require a response.
Reorientation occurs when the organization has to initiate profound changes in
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order to maintain fit, but this is done before the change imperative has hit.
Finally, re-creation implies the fast and simultaneous change of all the basic
elements of the organizational system as a response to external demands, which
often take the form of a fundamental crisis. To sum up, incremental changes may
be thought of as changes within the frame, as they are made within the frame-
work of the current organization, conserving its values and visions. Discontin-
uous change, on the other hand, aims at changing the organizational frame
itself. In the case of re-orientation, the frame is modified and reshaped gradu-
ally, whereas with re-creation, it is deliberately broken and discarded, and a new
frame is created. (Ibid., pp. 25–30.)
Figure 4.1 Types of Organizational Change (Nadler & Tushman, 1995, p. 24)
Another view on organization development is given by Jean Bartunek and
Michael Moch, who employ the notion of organizational schemata. Schemata
refer to organizing frameworks, which guide human cognition and ways of
understanding events. As schemata generate shared meanings for the members
of an organization, they allow the members to have a common orientation
toward events. Organizational development affects and is affected by organiza-
tional schemata. (Bartunek & Moch, 1987, pp. 483–486.)
Bartunek and Moch (pp. 486–488; 495–496) suggest that organizational
development could be fruitfully understood as three different orders of change
in organizational schemata. First-order change includes changes consistent with
the schemata already present, second-order change includes conscious modifi-
cations of the present schemata themselves, and finally, third-order change
concerns attempts to make the organization’s members aware of their present
DiscontinuousIncremental
Adaptation
Tuning
Reactive
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Re-creation
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schemata and thereby more able to change them when needed. Whereas first-
order changes support the established configurations, second-order changes seek
to change the schemata themselves by replacing the old ones with new ones. The
main distinction between second-order and third-order change rests in defin-
ing the change agent: in second-order change, the outsider interventionist, a con-
sultant or sometimes other organizational members, advocates the direction of
the change and offers alternative schemata, while in third-order change, the con-
sultant establishes mechanisms to enable the organization itself to reflect on the
present and to take a move away if necessary.
Evidently, the theory suggested by Bartunek and Moch has some points in
common with the framework promoted by Nadler & Tushman. It also echoes
Bateson’s theory on different levels of learning and Engeström’s theory of ex-
pansive learning, both of them discussed previously in Chapter 3.
The major point of those changes that either sustain the prevailing schema-
ta / organizational framework or transform it is made by both Nadler and Tush-
man and by Bartunek and Moch. They both acknowledge that second-order or
discontinuous change begins with a perceived crisis and as an answer to outside
pressures, although Nadler and Tushman elaborate this aspect more explicitly.
What distinguishes these two models most clearly is that Bartunek and Moch
more explicitly promote the improvements in the organization’s own capabili-
ty to transform its organizational schemata.
The model offered by Bartunek and Moch takes an important step beyond
the classical model of single-loop and double-loop learning, suggested by
Argyris and Schön (1978), in including a possible third level of change. With its
three levels the model has resemblance to that of three different levels of learn-
ing, developed by Bateson (1972) and discussed in Chapter 3. Both models seem
to point to changes in which the development itself becomes the object of learn-
ing. In this sense, they touch on Engeström’s (1987) theory of expansive learn-
ing, likewise discussed in Chapter 3.
Since the definitions of the first two levels in Bartunek and Moch’s and Bate-
son’s models largely correspond, the main difference between the two is to be
found in the explication of the important third level. For Bartunek and Moch,
this level is only a modification of the second-order changes, when the role of
an outsider change agent has switched from determining the new schemata to
training the organization to determine them by itself. For Bateson and
Engeström, on the other hand, the third level of learning means a specific,
typically human way of learning, in which both the subject and the object trans-
forms fundamentally. The human rises above the constraints of the context and
breaks it, creating completely new solutions. Whereas for Bartunek and Moch
the problem to be solved is given, for Bateson and Engeström the problem it-
self must be created.
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4.2 Finnish Court Reform in the Context of Organizational Change:
A Working Hypothesis
Nadler and Tushman, as well as Bartunek and Moch, offer their frameworks and
concepts as a potential outline for understanding organizational change. The
focus of my study, the Finnish reform of civil proceedings, does not fit the frame-
works in a satisfactory way17. On the basis of the historical perspective given in
Chapter 2, some characteristics of the reform can be addressed. Basically, the
reform and its planning occurred during a period of relative equilibrium. The
problems with civil proceedings were discussed on several occasions during a
period of one hundred years of planning, but it is probably too much to argue
that the reform was a reaction to a crisis, or to paralyzing problems that the
courts would have faced.
Recent international literature has given attention to the outside pressures
that seem to form an important turning point in the development of courts.
References to “crisis in civil justice” (Zuckerman, 1999) and “turbulence which
goes beyond just renovating long-established judicial institutions” (Palmer &
Roberts, 1998) have only recently been articulated, and interestingly enough, not
in Finland. However, what can be said is that it is unclear, and hard to evaluate
afterwards, to what extent the Finnish reform was about reacting to environmen-
tal demands and to what extent it was about anticipating future developments.
In the Finnish debate, some practitioners considered the reform the most
profound change for centuries, which would fundamentally change the frame-
work of Finnish proceedings; others saw it as a more cosmetic change, which
would sustain the currently available framework and allow the old practices to
carry on.  Equally, in the international literature, there are some writers who
think that courts are facing deep and crucial transformation that will force us
to reconsider what a court actually is (Palmer & Roberts, 1998, p. 350); on the
other hand, some have hesitatingly pointed to the difficulties or even impossi-
bility of gaining profound and essential changes in courts, to replace the status
quo (e.g. Leubsdorf, 1999; Marcus, 1999). Again, it has remained open whether
the Finnish reform was originally aimed at incremental alterations and
modifications within the old framework, or at radical and profound transfor-
mation of processes, structures and cultures, using the framework proposed by
Nadler and Tushman; or whether it involved first-order, incremental changes
17
 I am aware of the potential discrepancy in fitting a judicial, governmentally ruled reform of
a public institution into a framework of organizational change oriented more to the markets.
However, I am of the opinion that the comparison can fruitfully bring out important aspects
in studying change.
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within prevailing schemata shared among the members, or second-order changes
modifying the shared schemata, in terms of the categorization suggested by
Bartunek and Moch.
According to Bartunek and Moch, the three orders of change emerge as
alternative forms that seem to be mutually exclusive. For example, either the out-
sider change agent determines the new schemata (second-order change), or the
organization determines them by itself (third-order change). The theory of
change and learning, discussed earlier in Chapter 3 suggested that change should
be understood as stepwise, small improvements, simultaneously including the
potential to develop expansive processes in which learning equals creating
novel solutions and practices that are not yet there. This way of understanding
change presupposes that the different levels or orders of change are not so much
alternative and exclusive, but rather, simultaneous and intertwined. Besides, and
as a part of expansive effort, attempts to improve already existing skills and to
adapt to pre-given models may also take place. The working hypothesis of my study
is that change should be approached as gradual and consisting of small steps, but
still as at least potentially expansive.
Expansive transformation of work was defined in Chapter 3 as a process in
which the object of the work necessarily expands in some important ways. This
hypothesis about change and expansion in work opens up the very question of
the object of that activity and the possible transformation within it.
4.3 Object of Court Work: Implications for Change in Courts
Discussing the changing nature of the court, Palmer and Roberts (1998) sug-
gest that novel procedures, supportative of settlement, represented an enormous
shift when considered in the context of our existing understanding of what
courts are and what they do. Old understandings about what is ‘private’ and what
is ‘public’ in the sphere of dispute management become blurred in these
developments, but as Palmer and Roberts (ibid., p. 349) point out, so far it is
uncertain how we should characterize them.  The authors set important ques-
tions on changes within the courts, reflecting on how we should respond to the
increasing readiness on their part to reach out into what belonged formerly to
the ‘private’ sphere of the parties:
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1. Is the nature of ‘the court’ changing with this assumption of a diagnostic and
managerial role, and its engagement in the active sponsorship of settlement?
2. How do these new ambitions accord with sustaining the capacity to deliver
authoritative third-party determinations? (Palmer & Roberts, 1998, p. 348)
The growing readiness of courts to become involved in the sponsorship of
settlement takes the changes towards a fundamental transformation of the
judicial role. In describing progress as a sea-change in civil-justice arrangements
(p. 345), and as multiple changes of a fundamental kind in prospect (p. 350),
the authors foresee future developments in a way that indicate a potential
expansion of the work of courts.
The extent to which the current changes in courts represent a fundamental
reorganization of civil-justice arrangements is a question to which empirical
research on current court practices can give answers. Similarly, whether the
Finnish court reform will consist of small improvements, radical change, or both,
depends on its actual implementation and content. Analyzing actual court
proceedings and how the object of court work becomes constructed in them
through the interaction between the participants, offers a way to study the
potential for expansive change that exists in the courts.
As in many contexts, the question of the object is complex and fluid in
regards to court work, too. When asked, individual workers in the court system
define the object of their work as decisions, minutes, the conducting of proceed-
ings, single disputes or crimes, the maintenance of public peace or guarantee-
ing legal safety. All the responses draw attention to some aspect of the object,
but generally, it could be postulated that the judges’ traditional way of working
reflects activity, where the object of the work is the single case in the context
of litigation. The expansion of the object would necessitate qualitative and
significant change in the judges’ understanding of the object and in their work-
ing with it.
Alterations within the object of some work that affect the activity system from
the outside – such as a dramatic increase or decrease in the number of clients, a
remarkable shift in the type of object, or forceful reactions from it – sometimes
serve as an important outside impetus for change, and transform the way in
which the object is conceived of and worked with. The court system, however,
has been critically considered as developing slowly, being resistant to change (see
Chapter 3), and as having judges who are conservative, passive, strict in their
legal thinking and protective of their neutrality by isolating themselves from the
criticism and discussion in society (Kemppinen, 1990; Chiarloni, 1999). The
stagnation of this system – the insensitivity to external pressure to change – is
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interpreted in this criticism as a cultural characteristic or mentality, typical of
the court system or of the individuals working for it.
An alternative way to approach court work is to define the clients and their
problems as the object of the activity. This brings out an important feature: the
relationship between the court (the subject) and the parties or clients (the
object) has traditionally been exceptionally one-sided or “one-directional”. The
court has directed its judicial power towards the clients, who give their feedback
as silence or as an appeal to the Court of Appeal. There is interaction between
the court and the parties during the proceedings, but traditionally this interac-
tion has been formal and does not necessarily demand the presence of the prin-
cipals. Because the work does not include direct feedback from the object, the
assessment of appropriateness and effectiveness is based on other criteria. Thus,
the pressure for change in court work does not seem to emerge – at least on a
large scale – from the development of the object. This may, I assume, be one rea-
son why the court system weakly recognizes and experiences outside pressure
for change. On the other hand, the one-sided relation between the court and its
clients means that courts are mainly used to using their power over their clients,
instead of working together and collaborating with them.
Another consequential feature characterizing the object of court work is that
the clients, in most cases, are the attorneys, not necessarily the principals. The
attorneys act as a “damper” between the court and the clients. It is evident that
court cases are sources of income for attorneys, but what importance this finan-
cial mechanism has in their activities is speculative (for different views see
Jaakkola, 1993; Zuckerman, 1999). Nevertheless, it could be assumed that the
special role of attorneys, between the court and the client, is to reduce criticism
and maintain existing practice. Attorneys hesitate to give feedback on the pro-
ceedings, because this could turn against them and their clients in future
cases. Again, this may be one reason why the problems of clients with the court
system have not caused significant pressure for change in the courts. On the
other hand, the mechanism, through which the attorneys are placed in between
the courts and the clients, preserves the clients on the margin: judges are not used
to thinking of clients as people with whom to work and cultivate personal con-
tact (see Chiarloni, 1999, p. 278).
Attorneys work as a damper in court proceedings, but also mediate to an
important degree between the courts and the object of their activity: the prin-
cipals and the cases they bring before the court.  This is also a special character
of the object of court work: court solves the case in the form the attorney pre-
sents it – often without meeting the principal himself or herself.  In civil cases,
the transformation of the conflict from the problems experienced by the client
to a legally modified dispute that can be litigated in court has frequently been
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described (e.g. Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, 1980-81). As a counselor, the legal pro-
fessional molds the experienced problem into a judicial problem, acceptable in
the court system (Sarat & Felstiner, 1995). It is along this borderline between the
every day and the legal, that clients first interpret their problem judicially. The
legal usually “wins” the battle: the counselor acknowledges the concerns of the
client, but also explains them as irrelevant in the court system (Nousiai-
nen, 1992, p. 56). One potential source of tension related to the object of the
work concerns, which of these problems is handled in the court proceedings.
Since, under the procedural reform, the presence of the client in the hearings
was encouraged, albeit not required, some increase in client appearance in court-
rooms may be anticipated. Depending on how the clients are involved by the legal
professionals in establishing the case, this potential tension may either become
more critical or find some release.
The activity of the clients themselves is not especially well known. Accord-
ing to the interviews we conducted in the early 90s, they pay much attention to
the way their case is handled in the court (Engeström, Haavisto & Pihlaja, 1992,
pp. 228–230; see also Chapter 2 in this study). As noted earlier, studies on pro-
cedural justice indicate that client satisfaction is closely connected to the quali-
ty of the process, as experienced by the client (e.g. O’Barr & Conley, 1988; Lind
& al., 1990; Tyler, 1990). So far, issues dealing with how experiences of justice
are produced in the interaction are not widely covered. It would bring a new per-
spective to notion of clients as the objects of court work if they were considered
not as judicial cases, but as subjects who interpret and make sense of their court
experiences in the context of their everyday life, and sometimes try to partici-
pate in and contribute to the handling of their case.
In regard to the new civil proceedings, new elements in the interaction
between the court and its clients were introduced in connection with the new
norms. Among the new forms of activity are the orality of the process and the
personal hearing of the principals. Furthermore, the physical space in which
cases are handled has changed to emphasize the meeting-like character of the
preliminary hearing. The preliminary hearings occur in small meeting rooms,
where all the participants are gathered around the same table, and not in large
courtrooms. As Jordan and Henderson (1995) argue, physical set-ups and space
both encourage and hinder certain kinds of interaction between participants.
Basically, these new elements allow for new perspectives on the object of court
work.
The new perspective on work in civil proceedings is outlined by Laukkanen
(1995) from the viewpoint of legal dogmatics and procedures. Promoting the
idea of what he calls a collaborative principle, he suggests a way of working in
which the judge is active and discusses openly with the parties. The aim is the
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free flow of information from the judges to the parties and the other way round,
so that the duties and attempts of the judge and the parties complement each
other. The different interests materialize as active collaboration and informal
discussions to replace the former passivity. The foundation of an open and com-
municative way of working lies in the rules that govern the division of labor
between the court and the parties. (Laukkanen, 1995, pp. 103–106, 213.)
Laukkanen (ibid., pp. 285–286) conceives of settlement as a natural contin-
uation of the process thinking he has proposed, and regards negotiations on
settlement as an event in which the new objectives and principles actually
materialize. According to him, judges have to create for themselves a way of con-
ducting the proceedings that enables settlements to be made (italics added by
V.H.). The atmosphere favoring settlement stems from a thorough and profound
preparing of the case. Likewise, settlements are advanced if, in the preliminary
hearing, the principals are allowed to present their own viewpoints in discus-
sion in the presence of and under the supervision of an impartial judge.
 Given all this, the obligation under the 1993 law to promote settlement is
interesting: on the one hand, it could mark the beginning of a new tradition and
transition in the tasks of the court system; on the other hand, it could imply that
an element of the conflict-solving tradition is simply being inserted into the old
tradition of litigation. What is particularly interesting is Laukkanen’s exposition,
which emphasizes the local creation of as yet unknown settling practices by the
judges themselves (see the italics above), and hence, the bottom-up construc-
tion of the content of the reform. The empirical study of court practices and the
concrete descriptions of the actual negotiations for settlement will highlight this
dilemma.
New understanding of the object of court work, such as the one outlined by
Laukkanen, reflects the first steps towards potential expansion, in which the seeds
of a new kind of actualization of judicial expertise are also sown. This fresh and
alternative understanding of preparing a case as a communicative and
collaborative effort between the judge and the parties shows expertise to be a
more collaborative accomplishment, produced in the interaction of the partici-
pants.
All the aspects discussed above allow for new and alternative understandings
of the object of court work, and thus make it possible to renew the one-sided
relationship to it. The change in procedural rules seems to incorporate several
possibilities to reorganize the work practices and the dialogue in the hearings.
Ultimately, these speculations touch on the very debate on the fundamental
duties and functions of the court system. In this context, one criticism has been
that people are only spectators at their own trials, and that the right to partici-
pate in the handling of the problem is taken away by the state (e.g. Christie,
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1982). The ideals of client participation in the proceedings, and their capacity
to produce solutions and not only to consume them (Christie, 1982), are still
valid issues in the empowerment of court clients.
4.4 Empirical and Theoretical Research Questions
These considerations suggest focusing the examination on actual court practic-
es and on possible changes in them. The empirical chapters of this dissertation
open different windows on the object of court work and the changes within it:
the aspects of interaction and communication in the hearings, the client’s
position in the hearings and attempts to reach a settlement are taken into
account. Hence, the empirical research questions all revolve around the issue of
how the proceedings and court practices in civil cases have changed in the
process of implementing the procedural reform.
1. How has the interaction and communication in the hearings changed?
2. How has the participation of principals in the hearings changed? What kind of
contributions do the clients make in the hearings and what kind of effects do the
contributions have?
3. How do the judges promote settlement during the proceedings, and what kind of
attempts to reach settlement are made?
The empirical research questions further the three central themes identified
in Chapter 2 as pertinent characteristics of court work in transition. The possi-
bility of a new kind of communication in court hearings, the probability of the
increased presence of clients, and the obligation to try to settle disputes, repre-
sent developments that promote the basic empirical questions set out above. The
lack of attention to these questions in Finnish court-related research and their
relevance in the international context were explained in Chapter 2.
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The findings of the empirical analyses denote some progression in tackling
the issues of change and expansion, which form the theoretical research ques-
tions of the study:
4. What do the findings of the empirical analyses tell us about the zone of proximal
development and its potential expansion in courts? What does this developmental
potential tell us about the transformation of expertise in professional work?
5. How do change and learning appear on the basis of the implementation of a
legal reform? What do the changes in court proceedings and court practices tell us
about organizational change and learning?
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5 Approach and Methods for Studying
Changes in Court Work
5.1 Methodological Starting Points: Activity Theory as the Framework of
the Study
The idea of change and reform as completely top-down, ordered by laws, was
challenged in Chapter 3 and it was argued that to transfer a new rule into real
practice requires constant interpretation and construction by the practitioners
in the field, in order to give it living content. Those who employ the new legis-
lation do not just adapt to new rules, but they also look for and find new solu-
tions and interpretations. Expansion as a process in which the content and
organization of work change qualitatively was referred to as a potential result
of the implementation.
What kind of methodology is, then, required to study developmental dynam-
ics and reveal the developmental potential in work? Analyzing actual empirical
data on courtroom interaction in order to understand change and development
in court work requires a theoretical unit of analysis and a historical perspective,
which connect the seemingly random events to their contexts.
I have approached dispute resolution in district courts as activity, following
the methodological starting points of cultural-historical activity theory. Accord-
ing to this theory, the concept of activity refers to human activity as object-
oriented, collective and historically constructed (Leont’ev, 1978; Engeström,
1987; Cole & Engeström, 1993; Engeström, Miettinen & Punamäki, 1998). What
is theoretically significant is the distinction between activity and situated actions:
activity is realized in situated actions, but is itself always historically oriented to
specific objects, which gives meaning to individual actions. Activity refers to
systems that produce events and actions and evolve over lengthy periods of
socio-historical time, while actions are more short-lived and have temporally
clear-cut beginnings and ends. The concept of activity forms the theoretical unit
of analysis for my study.
Three generations have been recognized in the development of the activity
theory itself (Engeström 1996; in press). The first generation centered around
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Vygotsky’s (1978) idea of the cultural mediation of actions. Individual actions
were viewed as a triad of subject, object and mediating artifact, rather than as
direct responses to a given stimulus. The inevitable limitation of this first
generation, the merely individual focus, was overcome in the second generation.
Leont’ev (1978) explicated the crucial difference between an individual action
and a collective activity.  Vygotsky’s model of individual action was developed
by Engeström (1987) into a model of a collective activity system (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1 The Model of an Activity System
In this model, the subject refers to the individual or sub-group whose point
of view is being adopted in the analysis. The object is to be understood as a project
from the raw material to the transformed outcome. This “molding process” is
carried on with the help of mediating instruments, including physical and sym-
bolic tools. The model contains the community of people who share the same gen-
eral object. The division of labor refers to how the members of the community
divide the work both horizontally and vertically. The rules include the explicit
and implicit regulations, norms and conventions that rule actions and interac-
tions within the activity system.
The emerging third generation of activity theory expands the model to
include the interplay of several activity systems in constructing a collectively
meaningful object, which is at least potentially shared between the different
agencies. In its current form, activity theory could be introduced in terms of five
principles (Engeström, 1996; in press).
TOOLS
SUBJECT
RULES
OBJECT
COMMUNITY DIVISION OF LABOR
OUTCOME
5  Approach and Methods for Studying Changes in Court Work 83
The first principle is that the prime unit of analysis is a collective, object-
oriented and artifact-mediated activity system, seen in its networked relations to
other activity systems. Goal-directed individual and group actions are interpret-
ed against the background of entire activity systems.
The second principle is multi-voicedness. An activity system is always a multi-
voiced community with multiple points of view, interests and traditions. The
artifacts, rules and division of labor carry multiple conventions, brought into
the system by the diverse histories of the individuals and the multiple historical
layers of the system itself.
The third principle is historicity. Knowing how the activity systems have
taken shape and have been transformed over long periods of time makes possi-
ble to understand their current problems and potential.
The fourth principle is the importance of contradictions as sources of change
and development. Contradictions18 refer here to historically accumulating struc-
tural tensions within and between activity systems, rather than to problems or
conflicts. They do not represent anything temporary or deviant, as activity
systems are constantly working through tensions and contradictions.
The fifth principle proclaims the possibility of expansive transformation in
activity systems. Expansive transformation requires that the object is re-concep-
tualized in a significantly different and qualitatively new way. It is necessarily a
collective accomplishment, in which individual attempts to question established
practices escalate into collaborative envisioning and change effort.
The methodological question set earlier in this chapter – concerning the kind
of methodology that is required to study developmental dynamics and reveal
developmental potential in work – and the answer given to it – a methodology
with a theoretical unit of analysis and a historical perspective – are now further
defined on the basis of activity theory. The following addresses the historical
perspective and the methodology of studying change and development in court
work through analyzing the situated practices of court proceedings. Later in my
work, at the beginning of each empirical chapter, I will return to some aspects
of activity theory that have a particular significance for my analysis.  In the same
connection, I will offer a description of the methods created and used in the
chapter in question.
18
 The primary contradiction is that between the use value and exchange value of commodities
(Engeström, 1987). A secondary contradiction occurs when a new element adopted by the
activity system from outside collides with some of the old elements. A tertiary contradiction
appears between the motive and object of the dominant form of activity and the motive and
object of a culturally more advanced form. A quaternary contradiction is what emerges be-
tween the central activity and the neighbouring activity in the interaction.
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The historical perspective on court work applied in this study follows the
activity-theoretical framework for studying current court proceedings and their
developmental challenges as historically constructed. In order to grasp the
underlying historical layers within the current practices, ethnographic data col-
lection should be supported by historical data analysis. Therefore, analyses of
history and the developmental phases of the court work were provided in order
to interpret observable, ongoing practices. In this study, the historical perspec-
tive involves the theory-historical19 analysis of the cultural models and concepts
in the procedural reform of 1993 (Chapters 2.3–2.5), a description of the
tensions in court work in the years prior to the reform (Chapter 2.1), as well as
a summary of the earlier developmental phases in the history of my research site
in particular (originally published in Engeström, Haavisto & Pihlaja, 1992), pre-
sented later in this chapter.
In my study of dispute resolution in courts as a specific event, I will focus
on the concrete actions through which the trial is constructed by the participants.
Hence, my interest is focused on dispute resolution in courts as a culturally and
historically evolving process, which I will study by analyzing the concrete actions
through which the individual disputes are established. Methodologically, it is a
question of the relation between social activity and situated actions that emerge
in interaction (Engeström R., 1999, p. 27–32). In a sense, the activity – which is
a historically evolving process with a socially important motive (such as dispute
resolution in court) – and the concrete actions – which take place in the actual
interaction between people (for example, the specific actions in conducting a
trial in an individual case) – are different sides of the same coin. Each trial is
constructed in a unique way with specific situational characteristics of its own,
but still every trial serves the motive of and accomplishes the activity of dispute
resolution in society.
The situational actions through which the dispute resolution is conducted are
mainly linguistic. As Conley and O’Barr (1998, p. 129) state, “Most of the time,
law is talk”. Physical actions are of little importance in court work, unlike in
medical work, for example, where physical examination is intertwined with solv-
ing the patient’s problem through speech (Engeström, 1999c, p. 171). The cen-
19
 According to Engeström (1987, p. 326), theory-historical analysis is motivated by the idea
that an activity system utilizes a set of shared artifacts, such as concepts and models. These
cultural artifacts are embodied e.g. in handbooks, working instructions and fixed procedures,
and function as general conceptual instruments of the practical activity. A civil procedure is a
shared cultural artifact imported into the activity system of the court from outside.  Theory-
historical analysis seeks the roots and earlier forms of these cultural models, or may simply
aim to identify the shared cultural models behind current practices.
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tral importance of talk means that the main focus in studying the court proceed-
ings will be put on the communication and interaction through which the cli-
ent’s problem is handled. My aim is not to study the talk or the language
itself, but the activity which is accomplished by that talk (see Engeström R., 1999,
p. 44).
The research field of language and law has produced several studies at the
intersection of sociolinguistics and studies on law and society. Conley and O’Barr
(1998) concluded that, despite the success of the research programs in both
sociolinguistics and law and society, each of these fields has, in isolation, failed
to address fundamental issues. Study after study in sociolinguistics has supported
the finding of socially patterned variation in language. What the field has failed
to do is to connect the variation it has documented with broader social issues.
Research on law and society scholarship, on the other hand, has aimed at explain-
ing the significant social questions of power and inequality, for example, but has
been less successful in displaying the concrete mechanisms that produce these
inequalities (Conley & O’Barr, 1998, p. 12).
What Conley and O’Barr favor is, of course, the merging of the strengths of
these two approaches. Interested especially in how the power of law actually
operates in everyday legal settings, they look for the linguistic mechanisms
through which power is realized. Their conclusion is that language is not mere-
ly the vehicle through which power operates, but in many respects, it is power.
Power is, at the same time, both the cause and the effect of linguistic interac-
tions in the legal system; it is both determinative of and determined by the lin-
guistic details of court practices. (Conley and O’Barr, 1998, p. 14.)
I aim to overcome the above-mentioned restrictions in law and language
research in the present study. The concept of activity offers a fruitful link
between the microsociology of legal discourse and the macro-level analysis of
change in court work.
The premise that work does not consist of top-down ordered constraints, but
that workers also make active efforts to affect these constraints, is one starting
point in activity theory. This supports the study of work practices and their
development using methods that enable the discovery of various ways of work-
ing and the developmental potential within them. Recently, in social sciences,
differing qualitative research paradigms have been celebrated for offering
research methods that can produce knowledge that is theoretically founded, con-
textual and powerful in historical explanation (Silverman, 1993). Qualitative
research is usually concentrated on the intensive and systematic analysis of
relatively few research objects. The more recent and unexplored the phenome-
non, the more vital is the need for qualitative data.  Before a new phenomenon
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can be examined statistically, we need qualitative data to understand what kind
of a phenomenon it is.
My methodological approach is to explore the micro-processes and interac-
tions in selected court cases, and to look at them in the context of changing court
work with a particular history and evolving future directions. The method in-
cludes audio- and videotaping and transcribing the actual hearings as well as the
accounts given by the participants. It brings out the different perspectives that
the multiple participants have on the proceedings, and enables the voice of the
client, largely suppressed thus far in Finnish legal studies, to be heard. Thus, my
study conforms to a long-established international tradition in which moder-
ately small amounts of data are used for in-depth examination of legal discourse
and participants’ accounts (e.g., Conley & O’Barr, 1990; Komter, 1998; Philips,
1998). In the context of Finnish judicial studies, which are mostly oriented
towards legal dogmatics and theoretical pondering on judicial issues, my study
introduces an alternative approach to court proceedings and development. The
lack of empirical studies in this area has led to the recognition of the need for
non-traditional and interdisciplinary approaches (e.g., Ervasti, 1998; Nousiainen,
1997).
5.2 Research Site and Its History
The Selection of the Research Site and My Own Position during the Research
Process
The reasons for selecting the District Court of Vantaa for the research site were
historical. The developmental research project conducted in Vantaa District
Court in 1990–1992 provided a large and coherent database in a number of civil
cases, as well as knowledge about the history of court work and a remarkable
amount of ethnographic observation and interviews. The data already gathered
provided excellent grounds for enlarging the database and encouraged me to
build on what had already been gathered. Already familiar with this profession-
al field with its special characteristics, I was interested in the possible changes
in court work and had existing contacts with the management and personnel
of the Vantaa District Court. All this made it easy to suggest to the employees
there, that I could collect a corresponding database on the civil proceedings
after the reform. The management and personnel were willing to take part in
the research, partly – I assume – because they were already familiar with me and
my research strategies, and partly because they needed to get some information
on how the reform had been implemented in their own unit, and on the kinds
of problems that may occur.
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My own position in relation to my research site has altered during our col-
laboration. As a member of our research group during the developmental
research project, my role was to plan and conduct interventions as well as to con-
duct the fieldwork. My role in the second round of research after the procedur-
al reform was more that of a data collector than of an interventionist. The con-
text-specific findings, however, were directly relevant to the organization stud-
ied, and offered a natural starting point for a reflective dialogue between the or-
ganization and the researcher. In a similar vein, the interviews I conducted,
served as an impetus for self-reflection for those interviewed. Most important-
ly, the reflective dialogue between me and my research site materialized in the
training seminars, or “discussion days”, that I arranged together with the court
representatives. These seminars, based on selected extracts from my data and on
my preliminary interpretations of the findings, were important forums for
shared evaluation and developmental attempts at the Vantaa District Court.
A Short Ethnography of Vantaa District Court
The courthouse is located in Tikkurila, which is the administrative center of the
city of Vantaa. In outward appearance it is a modern-looking, dark blue and
white building, not like a traditional office block. It was built in 1988, and a
renovation and enlargement were finished in 1995. The courthouse includes four
courtrooms and four meeting rooms for the preliminary hearings. The court-
rooms were used earlier for all court sessions, but now they are only used for
the main hearings. These rooms, as well as the waiting area for the clients and
the waiting rooms for the attorneys, are on the second floor of the building,
which also houses the office of the summoners. The courthouse gives a modern
and stylish impression with its color-coordinated furniture and interiors and
rooms decorated with houseplants and modern art.
The offices for the personnel and for dealing with clients are on the first floor.
The offices of the personnel are also cozy and nicely furnished, while retaining
an office-like appearance. The first floor of the courthouse is divided into a pub-
lic area, in which the client service desks are located, and a private area for the
staff, accessible only with an electronic key.
Vantaa District Court is one of the biggest lower courts in Finland.  The
total number of permanent personnel was 61 in the spring 1997. This
included thirteen judges, one senior secretary, seven court trainees, thirty office
workers, and ten summoners. There were also two temporary judges and four
half-time office workers. The office personnel work normal office hours, but the
judges have no fixed working time.
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The district courts serve as general courts of first instance in which the civil
matters, criminal matters and petitionary matters, such as divorces, adoptions
and establishment of paternity, are decided. One relatively new area of activity
concerns the debt recovery. District court judgments are subject to appeal to a
court of appeal, and the decisions of the courts of appeal, in turn, are subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court. The leave to appeal is granted by the Supreme
Court itself.
The total number of decided cases in Vantaa District Court slightly exceed-
ed 20 000 cases per year in the preceding five years. The total case numbers in
some of the main case types were at the time of the second round of data
collecting in 1997, as follows: total number of decided cases 20,605, of which
crimes accounted for 1,517, large-scale disputes 286, disputes with summary
procedure 4,670, petitions including divorces 2,596, and debt recovery for
private people 473, and for companies 15. The total number has been on the
increase since then, being 23,459 in 2000, while the number of large-scale
disputes decreased to 210.
Historical Phases in the Development of Vantaa District Court
In our research (Engeström, Haavisto & Pihlaja, 1992) we analyzed the local his-
tory of Vantaa District Court from the time before World War II up to the
beginning of the 1990s. We combined locally specific information on the chang-
ing conditions there, based on interviews and historical documents, with our
knowledge of the history of the former circuit courts in general. To give some
local context to the implementation of the reform in my research site, a sum-
mary of the main historical contradictions and developmental phases in Van-
taa District Court is offered in the following.
After the second world war, and especially during the 1970s, 80s and 90s, the
city of Vantaa, located in the capital area, grew rapidly: first, the population
increased heavily when the extensive suburbs became inhabited, an then the
companies moved in. Characteristic of the history of Vantaa District Court, the
general court of this growing metropolis has been the constant increase in
caseloads. The problems caused by excessive amounts of work have been solved
in different ways over the years.
In the first developmental phase, which took place from World War II to the
end of the 1950s, the solution to the unbearable workload was to split the geo-
graphical area that the court was responsible for into two. In 1959, this was
the only possible solution because of a regulation stating that the number of
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judges in one court could be no more than one. This rule also set the supple-
mentary income of the judges, allocated on the basis of seniority. As a result of
this split, Vantaa District Court was allocated the region that it still serves
today.
In the second phase, during 1959–1972, the growing caseload was thought
to be threatening legal security, because the one allowable judge could not
handle all the cases. More than two out of three cases were therefore dealt with
by a court trainee. The problem was solved in 1972 with the introduction of a
nation-wide regulation revoking the old rules about one judge in one court, and
about supplementary incomes. The new solution was a new kind of organiza-
tion with several personnel groups. The new courts were totally maintained by
the state, whereas in the old system the head of the court was in charge of its
maintenance, like an entrepreneur. This was the starting point for the develop-
ment of work allocation and collaboration in Vantaa District Court. In more
general terms, it was a period of rapidly growing litigation in most European
countries, and consequently also a period procedures were routinized whenev-
er possible (Blankenburg, 1991, pp. 12–13). For example, simplifying divorce
procedures and summary penal judgment for traffic misdemeanors were law
reforms introduced in the 1980s in order to rationalize court work.
When our research group first visited Vantaa District Court, the court seemed
to be facing a new developmental phase, again struggling with a growing case-
load. This time the resulting problems showed themselves as stress and burn-
out experienced by the personnel. The basic contradictions in the work in 1990
are described in Figure 5.2.
We found two basic work contradictions at he beginning of the 90s. In line
with the social and economic developments, the object of the court activity –
the cases – had also changed. There was a polarization of court cases: both the
numbers of simple routine cases, as well as the numbers of more complicated
cases, increased and overshadowed the “ordinary cases”. The growing number
of cases connected to business life meant more demanding and complicated is-
sues. The judges also told in their interviews of pressures to make fast decisions
and to produce more grounded justifications for their judgments.
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Figure 5.2 Contradictions in the Work of Vantaa District Court in 1990
(Engeström, Haavisto & Pihlaja, 1992, p. 154)
Despite this transformation in the object of the court, the rules guiding the
proceedings remained the same. The contradiction between the rules and the
object was expressed in prolonged court processes, where numerous postpone-
ments compelled the judge to return to each case several times. This fragmen-
tation diminished the judges’ possibilities to master the proceeding, and com-
promised the decision making. This mechanism produced the workload and
stress experienced by the judges. The rules were also internally contradictory:
alongside the chains of the old established practice were pressures to take into
account the new norms of the new legislation, especially the active roles taken
in the court room (Engeström, Haavisto & Pihlaja, 1992).
Another basic contradiction in the court activity appeared between the
changing object of the work and the rigidly segmented division of labor. The
judges were located in their departments, the office personnel in their offices,
and the court trainees, who still provided an important labor resource, were scat-
tered around different departments and offices. The potential for collaboration
among different personnel groups was not efficiently exploited. The long-estab-
lished historical tradition of a judge working alone was evident: the judges in
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Vantaa District Court appeared to be individual judges working alone on cases
allocated to them.
5.3 Data and the Practical Conducting of the Fieldwork
Case Selection and Description
The case types on which to focus were negotiated with the judges at the begin-
ning of our research project in 1990. At that time, the judges considered certain
complicated civil cases “critical cases”, which were not necessarily difficult in a
judicial sense, but which caused a lot of friction in the flow of work. Following
their suggestions as to what were typical case types that caused friction, we
selected a construction dispute (Case 1), the cancellation of an employment con-
tract (Case 2), and the contesting of the partition of property between former
spouses (Case 3).
After the reform, I decided to focus my attention on cases which resembled
as much as possible in their setting those collected before the reform. I decided
on a construction dispute (Case 4), compensation for damage (Case 5), and the
contesting of the partition of property between former spouses (Case 6). Due
to the decrease in the number of civil cases in the last half of the 1990s, a genu-
ine case concerning the cancellation of an employment contract (the equivalent
of Case 2) would have taken too long to materialize, so a case in which a moth-
er claimed compensation for the delay in arranging day care for her children
(Case 5) was selected instead. Basically, the case resembles disputes on employ-
ment contracts in the sense that they are both about the right to receive com-
pensation for damage. Moreover, Case 5 represents an emerging case type, which
involves the courts more closely in the social and political issues of society. A
description of the key features of each case follows. The main data and cases used
in the respective analyses are described toward the beginning of the respective
empirical chapter (Chapters 6 to 9).
Case 1 concerned the residents of a condominium complex, who were not
satisfied with the performance of the builder in repairing the defects and
faults of the construction. There were also some dampness damages in the
basement that were, according to the residents, due to insufficient and
faulty construction. According to the builder, they were due to the wrong
tilling of soil made by the residents themselves. The builder, as a plaintiff,
demanded the final part of the contract price, which the residents had re-
tained. In their counterclaim, the residents claimed for a reduction in the
purchase price and for compensation for the expenses that resulted from
finishing the construction with the help of other companies.
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 The proceedings took 18 months from the serving of the summons to the
declaring of the verdict, and included seven hearings. Both the plaintiff and
the defendants had an attorney representing them. Nevertheless, the plain-
tiff attended three of the seven sessions. Similarly, two of the residents of
the condominium complex were present in three sessions. The residents of
the condominium complex were not satisfied with the district court’s deci-
sion and complained to the court of appeal.
Case 2 concerned the cancellation of an employment contract of the plain-
tiff. According to the plaintiff, the cancellation was illegal and unsubstanti-
ated. His employer, on the other hand, claimed that the plaintiff had
neglected his duties in such a way as to make the cancellation of the
employment contract necessary. The defendant was a small real-estate
agency with new owners, who had inherited the case when buying the firm.
The new management was unaware of the actual events that had resulted in
the cancellation of the plaintiff ’s contract.
The proceedings took six months from the serving of the summons to the
decision. Three hearings were conducted, in which the plaintiff and the
defendant were represented by their attorneys. Both parties appealed to the
court of appeal.
Case 3 concerned the contesting of the partition of joint property. After the
divorce of the plaintiff (the ex-husband) and the defendant (the ex-wife),
the property was divided between them. The ex-husband was not satisfied
with the partition and applied to the district court for it to be changed.
When summoned to the court, the ex-wife made a counter-claim, in which
she also demanded that it should be changed.
The proceedings took eight months from the serving of the summons to
the verdict, and consisted of four hearings.  Both parties had an attorney
representing them. The ex-wife was present in two hearings out of the four,
the ex-husband in one hearing. The ex-wife appealed against the decision.
Case 4 was a construction dispute, referred to in the court files as the can-
cellation of trade in movables. It was about construction defects and mil-
dew problems in an apartment. Mr. Aho (the secondary defendant) had
sold his apartment in a condominium complex to Mr. And Mrs. Laakso
(the defendants), who in turn sold it to Mr. and Mrs. Vuori (the plaintiffs).
The Vuoris found the apartment full of construction defects, and as a result
of these defects, it also had severe mildew problems. They wanted either to
revoke their purchase of the apartment, or to receive substantial compensa-
tion. The defendants took out a claim against the secondary defendant, Mr.
Aho, and made the same demands.
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The case became pending when the application for a summons arrived at
the court and ended with a settlement, taking 20 months altogether. One
two-day preliminary hearing and an extended preliminary were arranged.
The parties were represented in the hearings by their attorneys. The plain-
tiff, however, was present on the first day of the preliminary hearing.
Case 5 concerned a mother who claimed compensation because the city
had failed to arrange day care for her children on the day she needed it. She
had to stay away from work, and lost her salary for those days. This case
was a matter of principle to a large extent. In Finland, every child has the
subjective right to receive day care until he or she is seven years old, and
accordingly, the cities and municipalities are obliged to arrange the day
care. The city in which the plaintiff and her family lived had difficulties in
fulfilling its obligation and in organizing the day-care services. With her
claim, the mother wanted to test the legal validity of the obligation given to
the cities.
The proceedings took eight months from becoming pending to the deci-
sion. The plaintiff was represented by an attorney, but was also present in
every hearing. The city was represented by one of its lawyers. The plaintiff
appealed against the decision to the court of appeal, and after that, the
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Case 6, again, was about a previously married couple who contested the
partition of their joint property following their divorce. The ex-husband
wanted a higher evaluation of a few specific items. The ex-wife claimed for
restoration of specific items given in the partition into her possession, but
which she had never received.
The proceedings took 10 months from becoming pending to the verdict,
and consisted of a preliminary hearing, and an extended preliminary hear-
ing followed immediately by the main hearing. Additionally, at the begin-
ning of the proceedings, the judge arranged a voluntary, informal hearing
in order to get the case settled. The ex-husband was present in all of the
hearings,the ex-wife in the extended preliminary hearing and the main
hearing. The ex-husband appealed against the decision.
Data and Data Collection
The main data in the study comprises the proceedings in six civil cases: three
cases were dealt with in 1990–1991, before the procedural reform, and the
other three cases in 1997–1998, after the reform. The total time-span of my
research was eight years.  The proceedings in each case form a trajectory from
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the plaint left by the plaintiff for the court to the decision given by the court.
The research method used was chosen in an attempt to record this trajectory as
completely as possible. I videotaped (in two cases audio-taped) the court hear-
ings within each case, interviewed all those involved, and collected all the court
material. Hence, the complete set around each trajectory comprises videotaped
hearings, audiotaped interviews with the participants, and official court docu-
ments. A total of 11 hearings were observed in the old proceedings, and all of
the ones arranged in the new:  three preliminary hearings, three extended pre-
liminary hearings and two main hearings. The hearings in the first three cases
took from 40 minutes to two hours, and in the second three from two to eleven
hours (divided into two days). The total number of interviews was 42 in the old
and 36 in the new proceedings. Table 5.1 gives the main information about the
data in the court cases observed before the reform, and Table 5.2 in the cases
observed after the reform. The abbreviations used in the tables are the follow-
ing: J – judge, CC – court clerk, CT – court trainee, LJ – lay judge, P – plaintiff,
D – defendant, PA – plaintiff ’s attorney, DA – defendant’s attorney.
The number of observed cases was relatively small, but the total amount of
data was still extensive. Since the purpose was to look for possible changes
throughout the whole trajectory in each case, the number of cases was deter-
mined so that it was possible for one researcher to cope with it.
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Table 5.1 Data Collected before the Reform
CASE 1. CONSTRUCTION 
DISPUTE 
2. CANCELLATION OF 
AN EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT 
3. CONTESTING OF 
THE  PARTITION OF 
JOINT PROPERTY 
HEARINGS 1. January1990,  
not observed 
1. March 1990,  
not observed  
1. February 1990 
notes 
 2. April 1990,  
not observed  
2. May 1990, 
videotape 
2. April 1990,  
notes  
 3. June 1990, 
videotape 
3. August1990, 
audiotape 
3. June 1990, 
audiotape 
 4. September 1990, 
videotape 
 4. August 1990, 
audiotape 
 5. November 1990, 
videotape  
  
 6. March 1991, 
videotape  
  
 7. April 1991, 
videotape 
 
  
INTERVIEWS After the 3rd hearing: After the 2nd hearing: After the 1st hearing: 
 J, CC, PA, DA J, CC, PA, DA J, PA, DA 
 After the 4th hearing: After the 3rd hearing / 
decision: 
After the 2nd hearing: 
 J, P, D J, CC, P, D, PA, DA J, P, D, PA  
 After the 5th hearing:  After the 3rd hearing: 
 J, CC, PA, DA  J, CC 
 After the 6th hearing:  After the 4th hearing / 
decision: 
 J  J, PA, DA, CC 
 After the 7th hearing / 
decision: 
  
 J, CT, L J, P, D, PA, DA   
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Table 5.2 Data Collected after the Reform
Permission to record the hearings on my own tapes was given to me by the
individual judges whose cases I considered suitable. Before that, the general
guidelines for allowing me to conduct a study requiring videotaping were agreed
upon by the local project committee20 planning the developmental research
project. Before the second round of data gathering began, permission to carry
out research by recording the hearings was given to me by the chief justice. How-
ever, as each judge exercises ultimate power in his or her own courtroom, the
final permission was always granted or withheld by the particular judges.
Videotaping Court Hearings
CASE 4. CONSTRUCTION 
DISPUTE 
5. COMPENSATION 
FOR DAMAGE (THE 
DAY-CARE CASE) 
6. CONTESTING OF 
THE PARTITION OF 
JOINT PROPERTY 
HEARINGS   November 1997, 
informal preliminary 
hearing, not observed  
 Two days in January 
1997, preliminary 
hearing, audio- and 
videotape  
December 1997, 
preliminary hearing, 
audio- and videotape 
February 1998, 
preliminary hearing, 
audiotape  
 May 1997, extended 
preliminary hearing, 
audio- and videotape  
December 1997, 
extended preliminary 
hearing, audio- and 
videotape 
April 1998, extended 
preliminary hearing 
and main hearing, 
audiotape  
 
INTERVIEWS Before the preliminary 
hearing:  
J, CC 
Before the preliminary 
hearing:  
J 
Before the preliminary 
hearing:  
J 
 After the preliminary 
hearing:  
J, D, DA, D2, D2A 
After the preliminary 
hearing: 
J, P, PA, DA 
After the preliminary 
hearing: 
J, CC, P, D, DA 
 After the extended 
hearing:  
J, CC 
After the main 
hearing:  
J 
After the main 
hearing:  
J, CC, PA, P  
 
 After the settlement: 
J, D, PA 
After the decision: 
J (twice), CC, P, DA 
 
After the decision: 
P, D, DA  
20
 The project committee consisted of our research group, the Chief Justice, three Circuit Court
Judges and three representatives of the office personnel of Vantaa District Court, as well as one
representative each of local attorneys, prosecutors and the members of the lay board.
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Hearings in Finnish district courts have not traditionally been recorded or tran-
scribed within the system itself. After the 1980s, however when technical record-
ing equipment improved, it became common to record the testimonies of
witnesses. The recordings were transcribed by office workers. Following the pro-
cedural reform, the testimonies are audiotaped, but not transcribed in court.
Hence, the only way to document the interaction was to make the recordings
myself.
Using videotaping for the documentation appeared a natural choice, as the
task was to analyze complex interaction between several participants. Moreover,
my endeavor also to grasp the fragile indications of possible change in court-
room interaction favored videotaping. I recorded the hearings using one
camera placed in the corner of the courtroom or meeting room in which the pre-
liminary hearings were held21. I installed the camera so that I did not have to
attend to it during the hearing, except for changing tape. An external microphone
was installed closer to the speakers to ensure the correct volume. As I was always
present in the hearings22, I also observed the interaction on the spot. Video-
taping showed its advantages in the later analysis, when I was free to rewind the
tape and could thus afterwards observe details that passed me by in the actual
interaction (for a detailed analysis of the advantages of videotaping, see Jordan
and Henderson, 1995).
One issue to ponder is whether people change their behavior when the
interaction is videotaped. Jordan and Henderson suggest that this question can-
not be answered in general, but should be addressed as an empirical issue in each
particular study. They state, however, that people usually seem to become
familiar with the videotaping without problems, especially when their attention
is directed to something else (Jordan & Henderson, 1995). My experience in this
study was that the participants soon forgot the video camera when the hearing
started. The seriousness of the ongoing activity – the fact that the participants
were in the real situation of dealing with people’s legal problems and con-
tributing to a decision with tangible implications – made it impossible to
21
 In Case 6, the plaintiff was suspicious and against videotaping the hearings. After discussion
with him and careful consideration I decided to take the case, but record it only on audiotape.
I was present in the hearing and made more detailed field notes than usual and wrote down
observations concerning physical actions, gestures and looks.
22 
All hearings in district courts are open to the public, if it is not especially decided other-
wise by the court. After the reform, situations in which a settlement is negotiated are in the
gray zone in terms of public access. There are no other rules governing those occasions, ex-
cept those that direct the proceedings in district courts in general. The judges have to con-
sider issues of public access themselves, if there appears a need for it. Usually I was the only
outsider in the hearings, excluding Case 5, where representatives of the press were also
present.
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concentrate on the video-taping rather than on the issue in question. Interviewed
after the proceedings had ended, one attorney described her experience with the
videotaping in a way that verifies this assumption.
Interviewer: What do you think, did the videotaping have an effect on the
hearing?
Attorney 1: I don’t think so. I mean, you forgot the videotaping immediate-
ly when the hearing began.
Interviewer: You mean that was your own experience?
Attorney 1: Yes. There were so many details in the case you had to bear in
mind all the time, so the external factors just didn’t have any effect. It’s just
the same if there’s an audience in the courtroom. When you enter the
room, you notice that OK, here are some folk following the hearing, but
you don’t remember that for long.
My impression was that, in interaction between several participants, the com-
plexity involved left no room for maneuver. In one case, however, the
defendant’s attorneys felt that some features of the hearings resulted from the
judge changing his normal habits because of the videotaping. She considered
some of his actions more like a theatrical performance in front of the camera.
The issue popped up twice during the interview.
Interviewer: Could you now evaluate this preliminary hearing? In what way
was it successful and what problems did you see?
Attorney 2: I have been in several cases chaired by this particular judge and
I have to say that he would have handled it totally differently if your camer-
as hadn’t been there.
Later in the interview:
Interviewer: A kind of planning of the process took place at the beginning
of the preliminary hearing. I mean the discussion about how the case was
to proceed and how the witnesses would be heard and things like that.
Attorney 2: That was connected to this videotaping. Usually that doesn’t
happen and there’s no need for that kind of discussion if you are experi-
enced enough with this kind of case. Of course, the fact that the principal
was present in the hearing may also have had some effect. But most impor-
tantly, I think, he was concerned about you videotaping the proceedings.
After hearing these accounts, I asked the attorney on the opposing side about
her views on the issue23.
23
 This very issue was not addressed in the interview with the judge.
5  Approach and Methods for Studying Changes in Court Work 99
Interviewer: How about the judge, did the videotaping have some effect on
his working?
Attorney 1: Well well. I think I saw a clear effect. I think he was performing.
He explained many things to us in detail. That was perhaps part of the per-
formance, that he explained to us this new civil procedure so thoroughly.
But I don’t know, I don’t have anything to compare.
Interviewing Those Involved in the Hearings
In each case, I interviewed the judges who chaired the proceedings, the attor-
neys of the parties and the parties themselves. If court clerks or court trainees
were involved, I also interviewed them. The interviews took from 30 minutes to
two hours.
The chairs of the cases were interviewed most frequently: at least twice
during the proceedings, but in most cases several times in different phases. They
were easy to contact which often resulted in “on-the-spot” interviews with
elements of immediacy and accuracy. I sometimes interviewed the judges
immediately following the hearing, sometimes a day of two after. The judges were
very open, reflective and ready to share their ideas and experiences in the
immediate interviews, as they were still somewhat involved in the events of the
hearing. I often conducted short interviews with the judges before the hearings
too, asking them to reflect on their plans. Each of them was interviewed in his
or her own chamber, which provided a peaceful, undisturbed room with no in-
truders. On the whole, most of them were easy to interview, as they seemed to
be interested in sharing ideas and reflecting on their own work. The interviews
took place in a relaxed and collegial atmosphere. As I was a representative of the
university staff, the judges seemed to regard me as a colleague and an equal in
an academic sense. Since I have my background in adult education, I was not
able to evaluate or rank them according to their professional performance as
legal experts. They probably saw me as an easy-going and harmless person to
talk with. Every now and then, the judges also asked me for my opinion and
seemed to be pleased if I could somehow reflect on the events in the courtroom.
One reason for the successful interviews was evidently that the judges knew me
beforehand because of my intensive frequenting of the courthouse. They already
knew that I was using ethnographic research methods that were open and sen-
sitive to their own concerns and ideas. I think I also managed to convince them
that correct answers do not exist, and they followed my advice to reflect aloud
in the interview on the possible and impossible ways of thinking.
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The attorneys were usually interviewed twice during the proceedings, in the
middle of the process, and after the case was closed. They were sometimes
interviewed in the courthouse, but mostly I visited them in their offices. They
all gave me permission to interview them.
The attorneys differed in their attitudes towards my interviews. Some of them
expressed their interest in the non-judicial approach of my study. Usually they
soon realized that I was not interested in the judicial substance of the case, and
openly discussed the proceedings. However, some of them seemed to find it
difficult to find a balance between protecting their principals’ interests and
answering my questions. They were relatively open about evaluating the proceed-
ings, but tight-lipped when dealing with case-related questions. That they were
competent and accomplished speakers was both good and bad. On the one hand,
they were easy to interview and could formulate their responses in an organized
way. On the other hand, they were also trained in hiding their thoughts and
turned out to be the interviewees from which open and reflective responses were
the most difficult to elicit.
The clients were interviewed twice in most cases: first during the proceed-
ings and then after the court had decided on their case. This strategy was to guar-
antee that the parties would first evaluate the proceedings as such, without know-
ing the final outcome, and then evaluate the entire case, including the decision.
The interviews were held in different places: some in my office at the universi-
ty, some in the courthouse, but most took place in the client’s home or work-
place. One client (the plaintiff in Case 4) refused my request for an interview.
Interviewing the parties first required making contact with them, because I
could not necessarily talk them in the hearings. The ways of making contact
differed after the reform. In all the cases observed before the reform, the clients
were absent when we made our first recordings. Having obtained the permis-
sion to videotape the hearings, we informed the attorneys of our presence
before we went into the courtroom. Most of the attorneys probably informed
their clients of our research, but we also contacted the clients personally: we met
them in the later hearings or we contacted them by phone in order to arrange a
time for the interview. This changed after the reform. The number of civil cases
had radically dropped by the second round of data collection, and it was more
laborious to find cases for the research. I wanted to ensure, in advance, the com-
mitment of both clients and attorneys and avoid missing potential cases because
of possible on-the-spot refusals. Due to the changes in the civil procedure which
included the detailed plaint and the defendant’s response to it, all the persons
involved in the case were known to me already before the first hearing, and it
was now possible to contact them before meeting them at the courthouse.
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In my view, conducting research and getting successful interviews in a court
setting requires conscious efforts at inspiring confidence among the interviewees.
Already facing disruption in their lives clients in particular may feel suspicious
of an outsider who is gathering information about their case. During the first
contact, and also later when necessary, I tried to build up their confidence in me
and my research by explaining to them that I was mostly interested in the work
of the courts and in how they could better serve their clients, not in the substance
of their particular case. I told them how important it was for me to elicit their
opinions on the handling of their case, and not just to listen to the judges. I also
explained how I was going to use the data I had collected, and how I would
guarantee their anonymity.
I started all the interviews with the clients with the same question: “What is
this case all about?” Most often, this simple question inspired a flood of words
and I could use my responses to assure the clients of my sincere interest in hear-
ing their views. Only seldom did the interaction remain formal and the client
maintain a reluctance to share his or her ideas with me. The willingness of most
of them to reveal their personal concerns about delicate issues, such as failure
in marriage or in house purchasing, and share them with me in the interview
seemed to imply trust.
The interviews with the clients were most rewarding in their sincerity, but
still most draining for me as a researcher and as a person. Becoming involved
in people’s problems – which at times were serious problems – sometimes made
a mockery of the academic nature of the case and required me to balance my
responses as a researcher and as a person (about the personal meaning of an
interview for a researcher and the contradictory roles in the field, see Emerson
& Pollner, 2001; Kondo, 2001; Oakley, 1981).
Method of Interview
The interview method was always the same, a simplified version of the so-called
stimulated-recall interview. The stimulated-recall method, described by Ritva
Engeström (1999, pp. 127–130) would have required the interviewer and the
interviewee to look together at a videotaped court session and to discussing it.
The videotaped interaction then would have stimulated the respondent to give
situation-specific accounts. This was tried, but was found impossible in prac-
tice, due to the long duration of the hearings. Instead, we devised a method in
which the researcher used his or her own questions to stimulate the interviewee
to reflect on the concrete actions and events that had taken place in the
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hearings. I used my field notes24 to quickly reconstruct for each interview a
separate, context-specific question list (an example of a question list construct-
ed for a client’s interview is in Appendix 1). Some of the questions were ones
which I had planned in advance and were common to all of the interviews.
Others were case-specific, requiring concrete recall of the events and discussion
in the hearing: “Do you remember, that the judge asked you to inform her about
the witnesses. Why did she do that?” These questions were not necessarily for-
mulated in a question form, but were more like invitations to continue on the
topic I introduced:  “I remember you asking the opposing party to visit the apart-
ment.” Sometimes I even offered an interpretation of my own, or a challenge to
the idea of an anonymous respondent to provoke accounts on an area in which
Iwas interested: “Somebody argued in his interview that the parties should not
be allowed to participate in the preliminary hearings. What do you think about
that?”
An interview in which the interviewee “thinks aloud” and makes sense of
what happened in the hearings requires both the researcher and the respondent
to be active. For the researcher, being active means that he or she cannot mere-
ly read ready-made questions from the paper. Instead, the researcher has to
motivate the interviewee by making the questions appear as important, inter-
esting and problematic. He or she has to convince the interviewee that the
interviewer is not after the so-called right answers. For the interviewees, the
requirement for active participation means surrendering to the hard intellectu-
al work of explicating the invisible self-evidences in their own work practices.
On the whole, the interview method used in my study is suggestive of the
method Holstein and Gubrium (1997) call active interviewing. The active
interviewer does not search for the best or the most autenthic response, but
rather tries to activate the respondent to think aloud about the possible responses
and ways of thinking.
24
 During the hearings, I made detailed notes about the flow of the interaction including intu-
itive remarks on turns or events that I considered important. “The chair is giving lessons on
procedural law” or “The plaintiff is anxious to get the floor” are some examples of those re-
marks.  I highlighted particularly intense episodes and interesting turns by adding exclama-
tion marks. Most often those marks indicated the client’s activity in the hearing or the com-
munication between the client and his or her attorney, which I found interesting already in the
phase of data collection.  I also made a note of the time every five or ten minutes. Comparing
the hand written time in my notes to the clock shown on the videotape minimized search time
by helping to find certain episodes, registered in my notes, from the tapes.
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Transcription of the Data
The videotaped court hearings and audiotaped interviews were transcribed.
Transcribing the videotapes proved to be technically inconvenient and labori-
ous, and so a parallel audiorecording was made in the second round of data col-
lecting after the reform. In two of the three observed cases, an extra recording
was made by the court clerks on the equipment installed in the meeting rooms.
This served as a back-up copy and was also used in the transcribing.
In transcriptions, I followed simplified conventions as suggested, by Conley
and O’Barr (1998, p. xv), for example. Both Conley and O’Barr (1998, p. 139),
as well as Jordan & Henderson (1995, p. 12), point out that the detailed tran-
scription conventions created within the tradition of conversation analysis (CA),
which aim at full reproduction of the original sound patterns, are still not
comprehensive and exclude some salient features. Every set of conventions
inevitably involves a number of interpretations and choices made by the tran-
scriber.
Jordan and Henderson (1995, 12) stressed that the transcribing conventions
used in each study should depend on the aim and purpose of the analysis. In my
study, I have emphasized the content of the speech and my interest was in what
the speakers said. Since the main focus is on the actions that were accomplished
through the use of language, there seemed to be no need for complicated
elaboration of the linguistic aspects of the speech. Also, as translating the
Finnish talk into English undeniably loses some of the nuances, I have chosen
to simplify the speech structure to some extent so that it will stay accessible to
the reader. The following notes are included in the transcriptions: the special
emphasizing of words, interruptions and overlapping speech, especially long
pauses, inaudible words, and clarifying editorial comments when appropriate.
The transcription conventions used in the study are listed in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3  Transcription Conventions
word word(s) with special emphasis
(—) unclear word
word… turn remains unfinished
## turn starts as overlapping with the another speaker’s turn
…word turn continues from the same speaker’s previous turn
(…) short pause (less than a few seconds)
[word] researchers comments e.g. about gestures, addressivity and
especially long pauses in the interaction
(//) whole sentences are cut out
The same conventions were used in transcribing the interviews, but the
structure of the speech was simplified even further. For example, all minimal
responses by the interviewer were cut out, as were the repetition of words and
faltering by the respondent. This may result in some tones being missed, but
greater comprehensibility is gained.
Additional Data Supporting the Analyses
The research is supported and enriched with other types of data in addition to
the main data described above. Detailed, in-depth interviews were conducted
with the judges and office personnel at the beginning and end of the develop-
mental project. After the reform I repeated the in-depth interviews with the
judges, emphasizing the procedural issues and questions of the division of
labor and collaboration. The traditional semi-structured format was followed
in the interviews, in which the questions are determined beforehand, but their
order and specifications vary according to the interviewee’s responses. In the
interviews conducted after the reform, excerpts in which clients evaluated the
court proceedings were presented to the respondents in order to provoke
accounts concerning collaboration with the clients.
Selected excerpts from the in-depth interviews are presented in the study, but
their main contribution was in giving indirect knowledge about the practices of
those whose way of working in hearings was not recorded. These accounts of the
work practices of several judges has offered a valuable framework for inter-
preting my observations in courtrooms and for understanding the tensions
involved in judging at the present time.
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In addition to the case-related database and the in-depth interviews, large-
scale ethnographic data was gathered. This data mainly originates from the first
period of research devoted to the developmental project in 1990–1992, but also
includes some from the second period of research in 1996–1998. My work was
more focused at that point, so I also restricted my involvement the most rele-
vant observations. The ethnographic data includes:
· preliminary interviews with key persons conducted at the beginning of
the fieldwork
·  historical interviews targeted at gathering information about the previous
developmental phases in the history of the Vantaa District Court
· field notes and/or tape-recordings of several established types of meetings
in court, such as the judges’ meetings, departmental meetings, and meet-
ings of the executive group and so-called planning groups, organized dur-
ing the developmental project in order to plan the work of the future dis-
trict court
· field notes and/or tape-recordings of several occasional meetings inside
the organization and together with key collaborators, for example, prosecu-
tors, local attorneys and representatives of the Ministry of Justice
· field notes and video- or audiorecordings of seminars and training days
held for the court personnel
Again, selected excerpts from the ethnographic data are presented through-
out the study when appropriate, but its main function is to give perspectives on
and grounds for the researcher’s interpretations.
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6 Changes in Courtroom Interaction:
From Monologue to Dialogue
6.1 Introduction: Differing Aspects of Change in Courts
This chapter is an introduction to the possible changes taking place in court-
room interaction following the implementation of the procedural reform. The
chapter focuses on the most salient features and alterations in courtroom dis-
course that seem to signal a potential shift in the object of court work. I will
extend the analysis in the following chapters by opening more detailed perspec-
tives on the different angles, but first I will briefly return to the debate concerning
the change in and development of the justice system as a whole.
Challenges to judicial administration have been encountered in Western
Europe and the United States since the 1980s. These include problems related
to maintaining procedural fairness at the intersection of rising caseloads and
declining resources, determining the optimal role of the judge in the control of
litigation, and balancing due process with case-processing efficiency. In fact,
many countries have recently undertaken judicial reforms designed to reduce the
costs of and delay in civil litigation and to render judges more accountable and
efficient (Blankenburg, 1991; Provine and Seron, 1988–89; Zuckerman, 1999).
Heydebrand and Seron (1990) argue that there is a quiet revolution taking
place in American courts: a slow but cumulative process of rationalization in
their organization and thus also in the actual work practices. This development
has its origins in the contradiction between declining resources and increasing
demands for judicial services. According to the authors, the rationalizing of
justice implies that traditional adjudication is moving toward technocratic
judicial administration. In this technocratic model of justice they include 1. the
expansion of the judicial apparatus, including new judgeships, but also the
reorganization of the work and authority structure of courts (for example,
the use of magistrates, teams and court work groups), 2. technical innovations
and new technology that change the nature of the work (for example, data pro-
cessing, video technology and the statistical measurement of outputs) 3. the
introduction of informal techniques including case management, settlement
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conferences and negotiation, 4. alternative forms of dispute resolution outside
the court, 5. the expansion of research and training functions and of the appa-
ratus of the central administration in training judges and other personnel, and
6. systemic solutions where courts become part of a larger system involving law
enforcement, jails and probation and the private bar (including systemic cost-
benefit analysis of the justice system as a whole, rather than just of courts and
judges) (Heydebrand and Seron, 1990, pp. 211–212).
Similar developmental trends are visible in the Finnish justice system. Case
management entered the Finnish procedure through some of the main renova-
tions promoted in the procedural reform of 1993: the general emphasis on the
active role of the judge in the proceedings and in promoting settlement, through
the meeting-like character of the preliminary hearing, and through the possi-
bility of more informal communication and coordination with the parties. The
rationalization was also evident in the new division of labor in the decision
making: the judges were to concentrate mostly on complex civil cases, while the
other personnel could decide the simple routine cases. However, it could be
assumed that the rationalization process in the Finnish court system is still very
vague compared to the American system (for a more detailed discussion, see
Chapter 2).
As Provine and Seron (1988–89, p. 158) describe it, the new litigation prac-
tices – especially the judge’s active and aggressive involvement in the settlements
– have raised conflicting arguments. There are those who interpret this growth
of non-adjudicatory solutions as diminishing justice and as the end of the
adversarial system and the concomitant legal protections. On the other hand,
others welcome the development and consider it a new understanding of what
justice means in the context of civil litigation. Interestingly, this new legal cul-
ture including informal negotiation and settlements has been accepted with only
slight suspicion by Finnish district court judges. The reform has been justified
in Finnish judicial discourse and in the causes of the new civil-process law by
the improvement in orality, immediacy and centralization, resulting in turn in
an increase in legal safety (Government Bill 15/1990). In this connection, judg-
es are not especially willing to question the tradition of adjudication, but pre-
fer to implement the settlement and informality in the old context.  This mani-
fests itself in the Finnish judges’ cautious way of encouraging the parties to set-
tle, in their hesitation to give exact suggestions for settlement, and in their con-
cern about losing their objectivity and neutrality if their suggestion is rejected.
Zald makes a critical point in his foreword to the book of Heydebrand and
Seron (1990, p. xviii). While the authors are worried that the court rationaliza-
tion will diminish justice, Zald states that it is not clear whether the participants
or the wider public believe that justice is poorly served by these new mechanisms.
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Similarly, I find it doubtful that the new legal proceedings are best interpreted
as the rationalization of traditional adjudication. My interest is in finding out
empirically whether they also include elements and dimensions that could be
considered not as mere rationalization, but possibly as embryonic forms of a
qualitatively new type of court work. One potential development in this new type
of court work involves the team and network-based solutions according to which
the work is organized on the basis of increasing flexibility and collectivity (for
future alternatives for organizing court work, see Engeström & al., 1992, pp. 171–
174.)
With their model of the technocratic rationalization of justice, Heydebrand
and Seron make an interesting contribution to macro-level research on the court
system. The main advantage of their model is that it describes qualitatively new
forms of organizing court work and trial proceedings although with a certain
ambivalence. On the one hand, they consider technocratic administration the
dominating, although temporary, form of organization in court work, to the
exclusion of other forms of administration. They also see it as a threat to tradi-
tional adjudication and the basic values of justice. On the other hand, they also
see the technocratic model as having potential in that it lowers barriers to change
and development in general (p. 218), and especially because – due to its tem-
porary character – it may generate fruitful conditions for a new kind of demo-
cratic justice (p. 213).  Interpreting the technocratic model as temporary is prob-
lematic, however. One could assume that it is no more temporary, or permanent,
than any other historical phase in the evolution of the court system.
The question remains whether the procedural reform of 1993 will lead to a
fundamental change in the everyday practices of the Finnish district courts or
whether it will merely signify a change in the external form of the process. The
reforms have been implemented gradually, in several stages during the 1980s and
1990s following the drafting of legislation that started as early as at the end of
the 19th century (the civil procedural reform of 1993 was one of those). This long
history indicates resistance to fundamental changes in legal practice (for a dis-
cussion on such resistance, see Provine & Seron, 1988–89, p. 165). Recent
Finnish follow-up studies of the implementation of the civil process reform in-
dicate that the present system involves fewer hearings, and that most cases –
excluding complex civil cases – are decided during written preparatory proceed-
ings. The studies also indicate an increase in the overall duration of proceed-
ings and in trial costs (Ervasti, 1997a; 1997b). These outcomes could be inter-
preted as support for the hypothesis that the reform may slightly rationalize tri-
als, yet the actual practices remain the same. On the other hand, Ervasti’s study
(1997a) reveals that a greater proportion of cases are settled in the present sys-
tem than before. Findings such as this could be interpreted as supporting the
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alternative hypothesis that we are witnessing a crucial interactional change in
courtroom practice and discourse.
So far, the implementation of the reform has been studied quantitatively,
using statistical survey data (Ervasti 1997a; 1997b). Aiming at an understand-
ing of the possible qualitative changes in the Finnish court system, I will focus
in this chapter on research problem 1, presented in Chapter 4, and on how the
interaction and communication in the hearings has changed with the implemen-
tation of the new civil process. I will approach this general question through
several more specific questions. How has courtroom discourse changed? How
has the construction of a case changed? How has the production of minutes
evolved? How has the use of language and terminology changed?
This chapter is thus an exploratory attempt to chart and conceptualize the
research terrain opened up by the questions listed above. I will report and
discuss findings from a case study comparing two court trials, one conducted
before the reform and the other one after it. Particular episodes in the hearings
have been selected from the proceedings in the two cases and, through close read-
ing of the discourse, possible differences between the earlier and current dis-
course are identified.
6.2 Has the Object of Court Work Changed?
Studies in the socio-legal field commonly involve analyses that are conducted
either from the point of view of individual agents or from the perspective of
impersonal societal and economic structures. This study, derived from
cultural-historical activity theory, focuses on collective and culturally-mediat-
ed human activity as the middle ground where agency and structure come
together. The activity system (see Chapter 5) as a unit of analysis offers the pos-
sibility to study the actual work processes – how the work is done by individual
actors or groups in the specific situations of each court case- in the context of
larger social activity, here court activity. This starting point highlights the mu-
tual interconnection: the individuals are forced to accommodate to the struc-
tures of the environment, yet they are continuously molding it and making an
impact of their own. I believe that by examining the micro-level work practices
and going more deeply into the interpretation with the help of activity-
theoretical notions, I will contribute to the story of the transition in court work.
Activity theory rests on the notion of the object-relatedness of human
activity. According to Leont’ev (1978), activity is fundamentally determined by
the object, and object-relatedness is a constituting characteristic of activity. The
concept of object is implicit in the very concept of activity, since “the expres-
sion ‘objectless activity’ is devoid of any meaning” (Leont’ev, 1978, p. 52).
6  Changes in Courtroom Interaction: From Monologue to Dialogue 111
To understand this definition, it is important to make the distinction between
relatively durable, historically evolving collective activity, driven by a specific
object and motive, and relatively short-term, individual, goal-oriented actions.
Activity is driven by the object, but it is realized in the goal-oriented actions of
individuals and groups.
The activity-theoretical notion of object should not be confused with the
more everyday concept of objective or goal, which refers to the more short-term
achievement of given ends. The object is to be understood as a project under
construction, moving from the raw material to a meaningful outcome. In this
sense, the object of activity is twofold: it is both something given and something
to be projected or anticipated (Leont’ev, 1978).
The objects of basic material activities, such as manual labor, may be simple
to envision, as the process of forming an object from the raw material to the
finished outcome is relatively often clear-cut and visible. Examining work
activities reveals the multi-faceted and slippery character of their objects, which
are more abstract. Yet, it is clear that such activities are oriented toward some-
thing and driven by something larger and more durable than the specific goals
of particular actions and individuals. This something – the object – is constantly
in transition and under construction, and it manifests itself in different forms
for different participants and at different moments of the activity.
When activities and activity systems undergo transition, they may have
to redefine their objects. What is necessary for a fundamental change in the
activity is that the object expands qualitatively in some significant way. The for-
mation of a new, expanded object is the foundation for opening up the devel-
opmental potential in the activity and, finally, for achieving sustainable and sig-
nificant transformation (Engeström, 1999b). If the object is not redefined in a
qualitatively new way, individual and accidental changes in some aspects of the
activity, even the remarkable ones, result in purely incremental change.  Whether
the object of court work has changed during the implementation of the court
reform is hence the key question in understanding the changes that are taking
place in the work of the Finnish district courts.
The object of the activity in the work of courts could generally be described
as a court case. The reform of 1993 changed one essential rule in working with a
court case – the code of judicial procedure in civil proceedings. This change of
rule was accompanied by several other changes in court work. New tools
emerged, such as new kinds of minutes, a new ADP system and new meeting
rooms for the hearings. The transformation triggered by the new rule also
demanded a new kind of division of labor, for example the judge and the court
clerk had to work together in managing the cases. If all this is taken into account,
it could be said that incremental changes, at least, seem to have taken place in
the activity of district courts.
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This special interest in the possible changes in the object of court activity –
the cases – reflects the special interest of this chapter: how a court case is con-
structed by the participants in the court hearings, and what kinds of changes
have possibly emerged in the construction of the case with the implementation
of the reform.
The construction of a case refers to the general picture of how a disagree-
ment between people evolves into a dispute that is judicially defined, manage-
able in the court and, in the end, ready to be concluded (e.g., Conley & O’Barr,
1998; Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, 1980–81). My analysis concerns the phases of this
process that take place after the case has been brought into court.
In the following analysis, I will suggest that an important shift in the
construction of the case is taking place in Finnish civil proceedings, reflecting a
potential qualitative transformation of the object of court work. I will show how,
in the old proceedings, the construction of the case was determined as a com-
pilation of individually prepared contributions: it occurred partly in the
attorneys’ offices in between the hearings while they prepared in advance the
briefs to be read aloud, and partly in the judge’s chambers when he or she was
engaged in decision making. Since the reform, there has been a shift towards the
more shared construction of a case, which I will examine more closely in this
chapter.
I will now turn in my analysis to the level of practical activity in a Finnish
district court. I will approach the transformation in the Finnish civil proceed-
ings by comparing actual civil cases handled in the same district court before
and after the reform. I will examine what form the new procedural rules take in
everyday practice, when the court cases are constructed in the hearings. I have
grounded my analysis ethnographically on certain empirical findings in my data,
and have then proceeded in the interpretations informed by the paradigm of
activity theory.
6.3 Cases
In this analysis, I will compare the handling of two civil cases processed at
different points in the evolution of the Finnish court system. Basically, both cases
are about construction defects in apartments. The first one (Case 1) is a dispute
from 1990, concerning the construction of a condominium complex. The
second one (Case 4) is from 1997, more than three years after the procedural
reform, and it concerns dampness damage and mildew problems in an apart-
ment.
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In the first case, the residents of the condominium complex were not satis-
fied with the performance of the builder in repairing the construction defects
and faults. There was also some dampness damage in the basement that was,
according to the residents, due to deficient and faulty construction. According
to the builder, it was due to the wrong way in which the residents themselves had
turned the soil. The builder, as the plaintiff, demanded the final part of the con-
tract price, which the residents had retained. In their counterclaim, the
residents claimed for a reduction in the purchase price and for compensation
for the expenses that had resulted from finishing the construction with the help
of other companies.
The case was handled in the district court from January 1990 to April 1991.
The proceedings consisted of 7 sessions. The first three hearings were charac-
terized by preliminary discussion and awaiting the presentation of the counter-
claim. The witnesses were heard in the following four sessions. The case was
handled by a judge and seven lay members, who had only a collective right to
vote25.
The judge was assisted by a court trainee. The judge who started the proceed-
ings was replaced by another after the third session. The case was handled in a
large courtroom. Both plaintiff and defendants had an attorney representing
them. Nevertheless, they also attended three of the seven sessions.
The second case, which was dealt with after the procedural reform, was about
dampness damage and mildew problems in the plaintiff ’s apartment. A family
(the Vuoris) had bought the apartment some years previously. Now the family
wanted to cancel the contract or, as a second choice, to receive substantial com-
pensation. They claimed that construction faults in the basement of the block
had resulted in dampness damage appearing in its structure. The dampness dam-
age had allegedly let to a growing number of microbes in the air and health prob-
lems for the family. The sellers of the apartment claimed total unawareness of
any faults in the structure and denied responsibility for any dampness
damage. On the contrary, they accused the plaintiffs of having contributed to
the damage themselves, by neglecting the maintenance of the apartment, and
argued that they had exaggerated the mildew problem.
The case was handled in the district court from October 1995 to June 1997.
The proceedings consisted of written preliminary preparation (from October
25
 The role of the lay members differs from the role of the jury. In the Finnish court system, the
lay members of a district court collaborated with the judge in making the judgment, but they
did not have the individual right to vote as the judge did. The judgment of the judge could be
reversed only when all the lay members together opposed his or her decision. In practice, this
happened very seldom.
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1995 to January 1997), a two-day preliminary hearing, in January 1997, and an
extended preliminary hearing of one day, in May 1997. Three days were reserved
in September for the main hearing, but the case ended in a settlement in June
1997. The settlement was negotiated between the parties, without the direct
influence of the court. The case was handled by a judge assisted by a court clerk.
It was conducted in a meeting room for preliminary hearings. Both the plain-
tiff and the defendant had attorneys representing them. The plaintiff was present
in court for one day, in the course of the preliminary hearing.
6.4 Practice before the Reform
In my analysis of the proceedings according to the old practice, I will use the
third session of the construction dispute. This session consisted of three
phases: 1. a discussion in the beginning about the claims and replies, 2. the hear-
ing of a witness and 3. the closing discussion and postponements. It reflects a
typical feature of the old practice: the script for the court processes was fairly
indefinite and loose. It was based partly on the approximate phasing presented
in the literature, but mainly on established practice: the attorneys dominated the
process while the judge concentrated on the minutes and the decision. One fea-
ture of this script was that the witnesses could be heard in any phase of the pro-
cess, and the reasons for actions were discussed during it. In this case, the hear-
ing of the witness was a surprise to the judge, who was expecting only a
formal proceeding as the defendants had not yet presented a counterclaim.
Excerpt 6.1 The 1990 construction dispute, interview with the judge
after the 3
rd
 session
Judge: I just thought this was only a proceeding where they would ask again
for postponement in order to present the counterclaim. I wasn’t really
prepared at all.
This demonstrates an essential and general feature of the old practice, namely
the passive role of judges in conducting the process. As they said in their inter-
views: “The cases are in the hands of the attorneys.” In other words, the judges
were formally in charge of the process, but the attorneys were actually conduct-
ing it.
Another characteristic to the old practice was the important role of the
minutes in the proceedings. The decision could be based only on the facts that
appeared in the minutes. Thus, it was in the interests of the attorneys to get
every possible statement registered in the minutes. Yet the gatekeeper in
producing them was the judge.
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Generally, the discourse of the old proceedings was rather formal, the read-
ing of the briefs being the dominant form. Conversation in the courtroom
usually took place between the judge and one of the attorneys at a time – only
seldom did the judge and both attorneys discuss issues together. The dialogue
could hardly be called a discussion; it was rather a series of formal statements
and questions26. The judge assigned the turns to the parties by calling them in
the third person as the plaintiff and the defendant: “And what does the plaintiff
wish to say?” or “And then the defendant, please”. This type of talk belongs some-
where between the addressee and the topic. When giving the floor to a particu-
lar party, the judge presupposed that the party had something to state on the
matter at hand.
The discourse in the civil proceedings that took place before the court
reform bears much resemblance to the proceedings in criminal cases as
described by Välikoski (1996). She depicts courtroom communication as
formal: the chairs mainly gave the floor to the attorneys without commenting
on or connecting their contributions. The judges’ responses to the parties were
only minimal responses, such as “Thank you” or “Very well”. Their turns
controlling the courtroom discourse were related to organizing the activity and
sequencing the turns: “Please take your seat”, “Please wait for the decision
outside”, “Let’s hear the charges” or “Prosecutor, please go on” (Välikoski, 1996,
pp. 64, 85). When summarizing her main findings, she draws the following
picture of how the judges conducted the hearings:
“The judges conduct criminal hearings in the same way in different parts of
Finland, and the hearings proceed systematically in sequence. According to the
findings, the chair does not explain or describe the phases of the proceedings to the
parties at the beginning of the hearing, and they have to draw their own
conclusions from how the hearing proceeded. The chair controls the interaction be-
tween the parties by directing the proceedings and by offering the parties the
opportunity to communicate with himself in person and with each other under
supervision. He does not encourage interaction, he only gets it started and termi-
nates it. The chair does not comment on the parties’ turns. The floor is given equally
to each party. The judge’s right to ask questions is used only seldom.” (Välikoski,
1996, p. 141, translation by V.H)
26
 The asymmetric situation, where one person asks the questions or delivers turns and others
answer, has been considered typical of institutional conversations and, basically, as a main
feature that distinguishes institutional conversations from everyday conversations (e.g. Drew
& Heritage, 1992; Drew & Sorjonen, 1996).
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In the particular case I analyzed, the session took 57 minutes. It consisted of
177 turns, including the testimony of one witness. The 25 minutes devoted to
discussion between the judge and the parties comprised 35 turns. One brief was
read by the defendant’s attorney. Compared with everyday conversation or in-
formal institutional interaction, 35 turn in 25 minutes is a relatively small num-
ber of turn and indicates a formal, courtroom-specific character of discourse.
The attorneys’ turns were quite long monologues and the conversation proceed-
ed as a series of questions and the giving of the floor by the judge, and state-
ments and reading aloud by the attorneys. The following excerpt is the only one
that differs from this systematic flow of the judge’s questions and floor-
giving turns, and the attorneys’ pre-prepared statements.
Excerpt 6.2 The 1990 construction dispute, the 3
rd
 session
Defendant’s attorney: Then it will be clear [confirms to the judge that the
counter-claim will be made immediately after the repairs in the apartments
have been done]. And, Your Honor, I believe that one question is still open,
although the plaintiff ’s attorney claims that is not the case. The appointed
inspector has stated, concerning the apartment of Tim Mather
27
, that the
repair of the defects would cost 1500 Finnish marks. The plaintiff states
that he has taken this into account in his claim, but I cannot find it there.
Tim Mather claims a reduction in the purchase price equivalent of 1500
marks, and I would ask on his behalf if this claim is uphold?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: It has been clear from the very beginning that the
repair costs, as inspector Viklund has stated, are upheld. If it is not express-
ly mentioned in that paper, it would already have become clear in connec-
tion with the facts, if the defendant’s attorney had carefully read the plaint.
Defendant’s attorney: Your Honor, I would like to continue, corresponding-
ly, on behalf of Pertti and Jaana Tamminen; it does not appear from the
amount claimed from them that the 3700 marks that Viklund has men-
tioned has already been taken into account. The repairs have not been
done, so I am asking on behalf of Pertti and Jaana Tamminen, whether the
reduction in the purchase price of 3700 marks is upheld? In this same con-
nection and on behalf of Kerttu Grahn, is the sum of 22,650 marks, that
Viklund has mentioned, upheld? Since this amount has not been taken into
consideration in the summons, I cannot avoid pointing it out. I would like
a clear answer: is the claim for reduction upheld?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Your Honor, as I just stated, the defects mentioned in
the inspection report and that have been financially estimated, are basically
admitted. Now I wish to point to the fact that I am not quite certain
whether my principal has carried out any repairs following Viklund’s last
inspection report. On that condition they are admitted.
27
 In the Finnish institutional discourse, people are usually addressed and referred to with
their family name or with their family name and first name.
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Here the defendant’s attorney is basically putting questions to the plaintiff ’s
attorney, but is still addressing them to the judge. He starts his questions with
the form of address “Your Honor”, and speaks in the passive form: “is this claim
upheld?” Moreover, the attorneys do not look at each other, but at the papers
on their desks and occasionally at the judge. It is interesting to note that this
dialogue is in essence between the parties, yet formally addressed to the judge.
Its structure is depicted in Figure 6.1.
According to the findings in the area of conversation analysis (CA), this struc-
ture seems to deviate from the basic rules of addressivity. In a dialogue between
two persons, it is normally evident who is the addressee. When more persons
are present, there are several kinds of listeners. Goffman (1981, p. 133) calls a
person to whom the speaker is directing his visual attention and to whom he is
possibly expecting to give the next turn the “addressed recipient”.
Goodwin (1981) also analyzed conversations focusing on the direction of
gaze. In his analysis, the addressed recipient was mainly the person at whom the
speaker was looking. In the above court example, however, the rules of addressiv-
ity seem to take on a new dimension: the content of the speech is directed to
one person, while visual attention and the expressed utterance are directed to
another. The episode shows that although the judge’s role in the old system was
passive – he did not actively intervene in the flow of the proceedings or hold any
managerial role in the dispute process – the communication in the courtroom
was systematically channeled through him.
Figure 6.1 The Defendants’ Attorney Is Addressing His Speech to the Judge
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6.5 Practice after the Reform
The preliminary hearing has several important functions in the new civil pro-
ceedings: according to the law, the dispute is to be clarified there (Government
Bill 15/1990). The judge must actively find out what matters are in dispute. The
parties also call their witnesses and say what they are going to prove by hearing
them. The centralization of the process of hearing witnesses was one of the main
reform attempts in the new legislation. In the old practice, this occurred in
several sessions, the time between which could be months. The trial materials
were presented to the court sequentially in small packages, which could ruin the
possibility of getting a structured total picture of the situation and also
hampered the conduct of the proceedings. This threatened the basic principles
of the immediacy and centralization of the presentation of evidence.
My analysis draws on examples from the first two days of the preliminary
hearing in the court case I have described above. The judge in the preliminary
hearing was the chairman of the meeting conducting the process. The court clerk
typed the minutes on the computer, following the judge’s guidance. The plain-
tiff ’s attorney presented the plaintiff ’s claims in the case, the defendant’s
attorney the defendant’s responses. The hearing consisted of phases that may be
described as follows: 1. the claims of the plaintiff, 2. the general reasons for the
action, 3. the defendant’s defense, 4. the specific faults and damages that were
said to have emerged, as well as the  defendant’s reply to these statements, 6. the
specific claims of the plaintiff and defendant’s replies, and 7. the documented
evidence and witnesses of both parties. The following excerpt from the hearing
is from the middle of the phase in which the defendant’s attorney started to call
her witnesses.
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Excerpt 6.3 The 1997 construction dispute, preliminary hearing
Defendant’s attorney: Kari Ojala’s testimony will anyway concern the time
of construction of the loft in apartment C.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Or apartment A?
Defendant’s attorney: Sorry, A, yes.
Judge: Yes.
Defendant’s attorney: And then the necessary repairs in the other apart-
ments and the appropriateness of the repairs.
Judge: The repairs and their appropriateness.
Defendant’s attorney: And the usage of  the Vuoris’ apartment (...) for per-
manent living.
Judge: After 12/1/1995
Defendant’s attorney: Yes.
Judge: That seems to be what you are...
Defendant’s attorney: ## That’s right... in dispute
Judge: Yes, then?
Defendant’s attorney: Making a complaint (...) considering the Vuoris’
apartment, to the housing company (...) in 1995 and after that.
Judge: About what?
Defendant’s attorney: About the mistakes that are mentioned in the action.
Judge: What judicial relevance does it have that...?
Defendant’s attorney: Concerning the extent of the damage (...) timing (...)
and due to this, to the amount of the claimed costs.
Judge: [Pausing and looking at the plaintiff ’s attorney] Is there any dis-
agreement about these? When the plaintiff says that they made the com-
plaint to the housing company?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Immediately. Straight away in September.
Judge: -95.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes. And before the notice (...) I mean the housing com-
pany asked Viklund  to make this  examination on March 10. It was an ex-
amination ordered by the housing company, or a preliminary inspection.
Defendant’s attorney: Was it the case, or should it be understood, that the
Vuoris had not noticed any problems in the floor drain, for instance before
that date?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: No, no, there was no evidence of overflowing.
Defendant’s attorney: Quite right. Well yes, there’s no, let’s leave it away, the
date of  making the complaint.
Judge: Yes.
Defendant’s attorney: And then next, was it number four or?
Court clerk: Yes.
Defendant’s attorney: Reijo Kujala, real-estate agent...
Plaintiff ’s attorney: How did I  [whispering to herself]
Defendant’s attorney: The drop in the value of the apartment, or decrease,
permanent decrease after the repairs.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Did I forget to mention on behalf of the plaintiff, the
real-estate agent, I don’t have his name yet, but the real-estate agent to be
identified later, whose testimony will concern the permanent decrease in
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the value of the apartment after the repairs.
Defendant’s attorney: It didn’t come up here.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: No, but that was my intention.
Judge: So now we’ll hear when one real estate agent says something and
another says something entirely different.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: That’s what experts usually do, don’t they. Especially ex-
perts in the construction field.
Defendant’s attorney: And then...
Judge: ## It often happens that when we have three construction experts
here, none of them agrees about the matter. Luckily, we have the court sys-
tem. [participants laugh together]
Defendant’s attorney: I don’t know about this number five [refers to the
numbers given for the witnesses in court documents], the occupation of
number five, what is the exact occupation of this representative of Munters’
[a company investigating the dampness damage]. Well, why don’t we put
‘dampness inspector’ there,  I don’t know his first name, Ekberg.
Judge: Ekberg?
Defendant’s attorney: Ekberg, yes.
Judge: Yes, just put down working for Munters, yes. Comma. Yes, put it down
just like that.
Defendant’s attorney: And the issues being proved are the cause of the
dampness damage (...) the extent of  the damage (...) and (...) when it
occurred (...) in the plaintiff ’s apartment. And then number six
[continues]
The judge conducted actively the process in the preliminary hearing, mostly
by asking questions (lines 18–25). What was definitely new in the hearing was
its orality: the issues were discussed interactively in the session and no briefs were
read. This is opposite to the old system in which reading the briefs was the dom-
inant form of dialogue.
The dialogue in the hearing could be described as reciprocal. The attorneys
were talking not only to the judge, but also to each other. These dialogues often
began with words addressed directly to the opposing party: “Do we have
disagreement about that...?” For example, on the second day of the preliminary
hearing, a dialogue of 14 turns took place in which the defendant’s attorney put
questions to the plaintiff ’s attorney while the judge remained silent.  The above
excerpt gives further examples of new kinds of dialogue between attorneys. Lines
1–4 concern an episode in which the plaintiff ’s attorney corrects a small mis-
take made by the defendant’s attorney. Lines 41–49 comprise a dialogue in which
the plaintiff ’s attorney wonders if she forgot to mention one of her witnesses.
The one who replies “It didn’t come up here,” is the attorney of the opposing
party, although one would expect the judge to answer in that way. I interpret
these episodes as examples of an emerging change in courtroom dialogue.
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An episode consisting of ironic joking about disagreeing experts (lines 50–
57) shows not only the discursive character of the preliminary hearing, but also
a more liberal attitude toward the neutrality and independence of the judge. It
could be presumed that the new orality and discussion will challenge the old idea
of the independent judge and give it new contents. The judge’s joke also raises
the question of the possibility of a single correct decision.
Although more reciprocal than before, this courtroom discourse was still in-
stitutional conversation and, thus, formal. As before, the judge called the par-
ties “the plaintiff ” and “the defendant”. The use of the third person is tradition-
al and obviously necessary in court settings. It has some advantages: it softens
the disagreement between the parties because in a way, it hides the persons be-
hind the role. It also reminds the participants of the fact that the attorneys speak
on behalf of their principals all the time. In the terms of Goffman (1981, pp. 144–
145), the attorney is the animator and the author of the ideas and values of the
principal. The principals are constantly present because of those titles, even if
they are not personally present28. It also helps to avoid a problem with Finnish
language usage, whether to informally call the people present by their forenames
or more politely by their family names.
The first day of the preliminary hearing took 4 hours and 30 minutes,
excluding the lunch break and other breaks. The second day took 3 hours and
30 minutes and a single half-hour discussion, for example, included 170 turns.
Compared to the 35 turns in 25 minutes under the old practice, the quantita-
tive change in the dialogue is remarkable.
From the perspective of addressivity, the discourse in the preliminary hear-
ing was rather complex. Most of the time, the attorneys were looking at the
papers on their desks when making their statements. While doing so, they were
not addressing their speech specifically to anybody. Repeatedly, they detached
their gaze from their papers and looked at the others present. Usually, that
seemed to happen when someone asked a question outside of the expected script.
The discourse appears to be a series of episodes with varying levels of reciproc-
ity. Figure 6.2 illustrates a typical interactive setting in the new proceedings.
28
 Goffman (1981, pp. 144–145) uses the  term “animator” when referring to one who is ex-
pressing the utterance. He uses  the term “principal” to refer to one whose ideas are expressed
and whose position is supported in the utterance.
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Figure 6.2 Interactive Setting in the New Proceedings
6.6 Emerging Changes in Courtroom Discourse
Interactive Relations
The change in the courtroom interaction that began to unfold in the above
excerpts becomes more understandable when we look at the physical setting of
the court hearing together with the observed communication between the
participants. The figures are not descriptive models on a general level, but rather
illustrations based on empirical observations of the physical settings and the
communication in the particular hearings observed.
Communication in the hearings is described here as interactive relations
between those present in the hearing, meaning the turns addressed to one
participant by another. According to this definition, a question-and-answer pair
forms two interactive relations.
In the old practice (Figure 6.3), the judge and a court trainee were sitting on
a long dais, half a meter higher than the other seats in the courtroom. The
attorneys sat opposite the judge behind desks of their own, approximately eight
meters from the judge. The board of laymen sat in a group behind desks, locat-
ed diagonally opposite the others in the courtroom. The interactive relations in
the analyzed hearing took place solely between the judge and the parties, in a
manner in which the judge communicated with one party at a time. Talk that
was substantially directed from one party to another was also channeled formally
through the judge.
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In the new practice after the reform (Figure 6.4), all the participants were
gathered round one table. The judge and the court clerk sat at the head, the
attorneys sat opposite each other at the different sides, and the plaintiff sat
beside her attorney. Several interactive relations between different participants
were observed in the preliminary hearing. The judge and the attorneys addressed
turns directly to everybody else in the room. The court clerk was mainly silent,
but still communicated with the judge and also with the attorneys in short turns.
Similarly, the plaintiff communicated with all the other participants, excluding
the court clerk. Thus, from all the possible interactive relations between the five
participants, only those from the plaintiff to the court clerk and vice versa were
missing.
Between the cases analyzed, the number of interactive relations between the
participants increased more than fourfold, from 4 to 18.  These observations are
in accordance with the previous findings on the more dialogical and informal
character of and the increasing interactivity in the reformed proceedings.
Figure 6.3 The Physical Setting and the Interactive Relations in the 1990
Construction Dispute
Plaintiff's attorney Defendant's attorney
Court trainee Judge
minutes
Laymen
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Figure 6.4 The Physical Setting and the Interactive Relations in the 1997
Construction Dispute
Joint Construction of the Object
In the old proceedings, trials were mostly for presenting formal statements and
reading briefs. Thus, the cases were almost completely constructed in the attor-
neys’ chambers during the intervals between the court sessions. To put it another
way: the main work was done in the attorneys’ offices, and the trials were more
like showpieces. Yet, the final decision was made in the judge’s office. The
important point here is that cases seemed to be individually constructed by
different actors in different phases of the process, which means that almost no
joint construction of a shared object would emerge to push it forward.
In the new process, the object of the activity seems to be more collaboratively
or jointly constructed in the preliminary hearing. Preparing the case to put it
into a presentable form for the main hearing (that is, molding the object) is a
joint activity for all the participants. The object is constructed through negoti-
ation. One example of this kind of  joint construction is the phase in the pro-
ceedings where the parties call their witnesses. The hearing of witnesses is a spe-
cific event that takes place in the main trial. It is planned and constructed jointly
by the participants in the preliminary hearing.
An example of the joint construction of the object is contained in Excerpt
6.3, lines 15–37. I interpret this discussion as a dialogue in which the judge and
the attorneys, in collaboration, construct or create the object, the entity that is
Plaintiff's 
attorney
Defendant's
attorney
Court clerkJudge
Plaintiff
computer
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the hearing of the witnesses. In this situation, they negotiate who will be the
witnesses and what issues they will present. It is essential that this is negotiated
jointly by all parties involved, and not determined individually. This is a far cry
from the old system where attorneys freely and individually brought witnesses
into the trial. There was then, of course, the possibility that the parties rejected
each other’s testimonies, but when this occurred it was in the context of formal
arguments and counter-arguments.
The common construction of the object could also be examined from the
point of view of distributed problem solving (Berg, 1992; Rogalski & Samurcay,
1993; Samurcay & Rogalski, 1991). In court work, substantial problem solving
traditionally takes place individually as the judge reaches a decision alone in his
office. The actual problem solving (the decision) is thus separated from the pro-
cedural problem solving, that is, managing the process of the trial. Does the joint
management of the process mean that also the substantial decision making
comes “down”, or comes closer to the process?
The shift from the individual construction of a case to the more collabora-
tive build-up that appears through the change in courtroom interaction is
evidenced in the interviews with the district court judges. Here is an example,
in which one judge describes in her in-depth interview, how a case is handled
in the preliminary hearing. She clearly criticizes the present system in that it
transfers the work of attorneys to the judge, that is to say, transfers parts of the
work traditionally considered to belong to attorneys to be jointly handled by the
judge and the attorneys in court. Yet, at the same time, she considers the judge
and the court to be necessary in the final solution. All in all, the excerpt shows
how the preliminary hearing can be summarized as “making the case”.
Excerpt 6.4: A district court judge in her in-depth interview in
September 1997
Judge: I was surprised how much the case is wrapped up during the prelim-
inary hearing. The attorneys have not considered it thoroughly in terms of
“I make this claim for this reason and that is something I could negotiate”.
The judge starts to do the work of the attorneys, listens to both parties and
examines the case judicially, its relevance in the decision making. As it is
today, the discourse in the preliminary hearing does not define the claims,
but makes the case! It is interesting that the work seems to be done there
[refers by nodding to the meeting rooms of the courthouse]. Why can’t the
attorneys settle the matter together and yet protect their principals’
interests? Or do we have the same old thing, that a dispute always needs a
mediator, an outsider in the middle? Perhaps the parties need that forum.
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Distributed Production of Minutes
One specific aspect of the analysis of how cases are handled is the addressivity
of speech.  Earlier I mentioned that the speech of attorneys was addressed to the
judge, even if the substance was addressed to the opposing party. On the other
hand, it could also be argued that much of the speech in a courtroom is addressed
to no one in particular, but somehow into the air. In the context of the Finnish
court system, the importance of the minutes is something that always has to be
borne in mind: the participants are talking not only to each other, but also to
the minutes taker.
In the case representing the new proceedings, the judge twice dictated or gave
instructions about the minutes to the clerk (lines 8 and 64–65, written in ital-
ics, in Excerpt 6.3). The responsibility for the minutes is now shared between
the judge and the clerk, whereas earlier it belonged solely to the judge. What is
interesting is that the defendant’s attorney also collaborated in producing the
minutes. She spoke slowly and paused, allowing time for the clerk to record what
she had said (lines 9, 16–17, 21, and 66–68 in Excerpt 6.3). Instead of having one
judge dictating or writing things down as in the old system, here the judge, one
of the attorneys and the clerk were producing the minutes in collaboration. In
a way, this could be called “distributed minutes writing.”  This creates a new model
of speech: the parties are having discussions about issues, but doing it so that
the clerk can write it down. At times this creates the feeling of watching a slow-
motion picture.
The example of the defendant’s attorney dictating the minutes is interesting
from the point of view of addressivity. To whom is the defendant’s attorney
actually speaking? From one perspective, she is speaking to all the participants
since the case is being jointly prepared. This would imply a need for her to look
at the others in the room. From another perspective, she very often presents her
arguments as an answer to the questions posed by the judge. This would imply
a need for her to look at the judge. What occurs, in fact, is that most often the
attorney looks at the computer and the court clerk. This, in turn, indicates that
she is taking an active part in the production of the minutes. Moreover, her
utterance (lines 60–61) “Well, why don’t we put ‘dampness inspector’ there...”
shows that she is addressing her speech specifically to the court clerk. This is
depicted in Figure 6.5.
From the point of view of addressivity and the distributed nature of human
activity, the defense attorney’s utterance on lines 22–22 is particularly interest-
ing. The judge has asked for clarification on her statement. She answers the
judge’s specific question, addresses her speech to the judge by clearly turning
towards him, but still continues her manner of cutting her sentences and
having pauses, as if she were dictating to the clerk.
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Figure 6.5 The Defendant’s Attorney Is Addressing Her Speech to the Court Clerk
and the Computer
These examples demonstrate how the new practice is still evolving and
taking shape. It seems that the participants are constantly looking for ways to
focus their speech. To whom should they talk? Does the construction of the case
mean talking to the judge, does it mean talking to each other, or does it mean
producing the minutes?
The dilemmatic and tentative character of the practice, described here as the
joint construction of the object and distributed minutes-producing, demon-
strates the gray area in courtroom interaction and communication. The elements
deriving from the old practices -such as the importance of detailed minutes –
and the new way of working promoted by the reform – such as negotiation about
the witnesses and the evidence – are intertwined in the interaction, producing
communication with features that were unrecognized until that time.  In the case
used as an example here, the slow-motion effect and the occurrence of atypical
forms of addressivity were exceptionally strong because of the special character
of the case: it was not only the oral contributions and negotiation, but also the
numerous technical and other details that required careful recording into a writ-
ten form. These special characteristics created tension between the rule of oral-
ity and the new, subsidiary role of the minutes in the new proceedings. This, in
turn, set an enormous challenge in terms of creating communicative
practices which could achieve a balance between the need to present everything
orally in the hearing and the need not to allow the minute-taking to dominate
the interaction.
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Using the Form of Address, “Your Honor”
An interesting detail in the proceedings is the use of the form of address, “Your
Honor”.  I will use this here as one example of the emerging changes in court-
room discourse. My aim is to show the interconnection between courtroom
discourse and the handling of the case as different aspects of highlighting the
object of the court work.
In the old practice, the dominant form of discourse involved the attorneys
starting their utterances with the words, “Your Honor” – not every utterance,
but most of them. This was a ritualistic way of using this form of address,
connected to the formal interaction and phraseology in the proceedings. In the
one-hour session, they used this form of address eleven (11) times. The use of
the term may have been even more prevalent than that, given the fact that it was
not used during the 30 minutes devoted to hearing the witness.
The use of this form of address has decreased remarkably in the new
proceedings. The attorneys used “Your Honor” eleven (11) times on the first day
of the preliminary hearing (4.5 hours of active discourse), and only twice on the
second day.
 However, more interesting than the quantitative aspects are the qualitative
aspects. Two different ways of using the term can be distinguished. “Your
Honor” could most often be interpreted as ritualistic or ceremonial in the old
practice: the attorneys started their utterances with it even though the judge had
already given the floor to them, and in a way, sealed the turn as received. Thus,
behind the ritual lies the attorney’s attempt to express respect and formal
politeness, but also to ensure that the judge will consider his or her statement
when taking the minutes. In the new proceedings, the use of the term can
often be seen as more functional or practical. The attorneys were asking for the
floor in situations in which they had to interfere with the planned script of the
proceedings in some way, or interrupt the handling of some matter. This
functional use comes close to the concept of meta-talk, or “talk about talk.” The
main difference between ritualistic and functional use seems to be in the level
of intentionality or purposefulness. The speaker using meta-talk consciously and
intentionally talks about his or her speaking (e.g., “I just want to say”, or “Can
we now discuss this”). I will give some examples of these two ways of using the
form of address, “Your Honor”.
The old proceedings: the 1990 construction dispute, the 3
rd
 session
1) Judge:  I will ask again, is the defendant going to bring that counter-
claim?
Defendant’s attorney: Your Honor, after this session the repairs will be
finished, and then we’ll know the exact price.
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2) Judge: Postponement is requested, then. How about the plaintiff?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes, Your Honor, concerning this apartment, the damp-
proofing was sufficient, and the problems have been caused by the residents
themselves.
The new proceedings: the 1997 construction dispute, the first day of
the preliminary hearing
1) Judge: Is there anything else?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Well, I have also made a list for myself to clarify this
matter. “The situation when the liability of risk passes on to the buyer”.
Will this be of any help?
Defendant’s attorney: Your Honor, one thing that I have totally forgotten
until now. The first claims of the plaintiff...
2) Judge:  If the plaintiff now has something to say about the causes that the
defendant gave, it is possible now. First and foremost, we expect an answer
to the particulars stated by the defendant, about the plaintiffs having
contributed to the damage. Another thing is the defendant’s claim that the
plaintiffs have neglected their duty to investigate.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes.
Defendant’s attorney: Your Honor, concerning the contribution or the
neglect of duties, I still have some additional points.
Judge: Yee-es?
The exact numbers that describe how the attorneys used the form of address
“Your Honor” are given in the following table (Table 6.1). These numbers
reveal not only the remarkable decrease in use, but also the difference in how it
was used in the old and new practices. Ritualistic use was almost twice as com-
mon as functional use in the old practice, while in the new practice, functional
use was about three times as common as ritualistic use. Individual differences
are also apparent, and the defendant’s attorney used the term more often in both
cases.
It could be presumed that the ritualistic speech in the old proceedings was
connected to issues of power and authority29. Yet, I assume that it was also
related to the way the cases were handled, and also to the spatial features of the
courtrooms in which the interaction occurred. The large courtroom and the
physically long distance between the participants contributed to the mental or
psychological distance. Likewise, the physical setting in which the parties were
29
 Collaboration and joint construction do not exclude unequal power and dominance. For
example, Linell and Jönsson (1991) emphasize the issues of power and dominance while
discussing mutuality in actual discourse of social practices.
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sitting not opposite but parallel to each other, and opposite the judge, resulted
in formal interaction and routinized traditions. The spatial setting of the court
trial affirmed the established way of handling cases. The attorneys dominated
the process, and the judge quite passively received the material that the attor-
neys wanted to bring forward. The judge was active only in producing the
minutes and in making the decision.
Table 6.1 The Use of the Form of Address, “Your Honor”
Similarly, the dominance of functional use of the term in the new proceed-
ings also seems to be related to the space in which the interaction takes place,
and to the way of handling the cases. The change in the nature of the interac-
tion, particularly in the use of the form of address “Your Honor”, seems to be
connected to the emerging change in the proceedings, particularly to the move
toward collaborative and anticipatory clarification of the dispute. The same
words, “Your Honor”, have received new meaning in the new context of handling
the case.
 The old proceedings in 1990 
(57 minutes) 
The new proceedings in 1997 
(4.5 hours) 
 Ritualistic  
use 
Functional 
use 
Total Ritualistic 
use 
Functional 
use 
Total 
Plaintiff’s 
attorney 
3 0 3 2 1 3 
Defendant’s 
attorney 
4 4 8 1 7 8 
Total 7 4 11 3 8 11 
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6.7 Conclusions
In sum, it is evident that the change in court activity consists of changes in
several elements of the activity system. Change in the division of labor in the
context of a single case includes that the construction of a case is not solely a
combination of sequential and individually prepared attainments, but also col-
laborative efforts in the interaction of the preliminary hearing. The parties and
the judge collaborate while jointly constructing the case, instead of the pre-
vious, more separated practice. Change in producing the minutes reflects change
not only in the object, but also in the tools due to the dual nature of the
minutes. The division of labor in producing the minutes has also changed in that
it is now distributed between the judge and the clerk, and sometimes also among
the attorneys.
Change in the activity of the court is intertwined with change in courtroom
discourse: in a move from formal, brief-based statements to more informal
conversation. The same words acquire new meanings in the context of reorga-
nized activity. The new meanings emerge in the practice and in the change of
practice. For example, the form of address, “Your Honor” has been given a new
meaning as the actual context of handling the case has been transformed. The
distributed and evolving nature of the preliminary hearing reflects this shaping
and construction of new meanings.
What do these empirical findings concerning courtroom discourse imply?
First, they pertain to the complex question of power and authority in the court
system. In the old practice, communication in the courtroom was channeled
exclusively through the judge, although his or her role was rather passive. This
passivity hid power within it. The power resided largely in the gatekeeper role
of the judge: speech had to be addressed to him, since he had the monopoly over
keeping the minutes that were the sole foundation of the decisions and appeals.
Conversely, in the new practice, the producing of the minutes is distributed
among the judge, the clerk and on some occasions and to some extent, the
parties involved. The attorneys can, in principle, dictate directly to the minute
taker, but the judge still has the final control. In her interview, the court clerk
assisting in the case said: “He’s doing it awfully well. I think you can see it on
the videotape, when he was holding his hand like this [shows an inhibiting
gesture], when I was about to start typing something that wasn’t so relevant.”
In court work, the minutes are a tool for conducting the process, a tool for
participating in the process, a tool in making the decision, and a tool for
making appeals to higher courts. Nevertheless, they are still produced in the
court sessions and themselves become an object in the process. Having these
multiple functions, they are constantly shifting from being a tool to being an
al 
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object, and vice versa30. The new legislation emphasizes the meaning of the
minutes as a tool of the process instead of being an object of it, or an end in it-
self. The question about power and hierarchy in the court emerges not only as
different positions of authority, but also as differences in access to the minutes:
who takes and uses them and to what ends.
Secondly, my analysis raises the question of how a court case is constructed.
Previously, it was constructed in the offices of the attorneys in between the court
sessions. Now, given the dialogue in the preliminary hearing, it seems to have
become more a matter of joint construction. My preliminary interpretation is
that the actual forming of the object is shifting from the sequential contribu-
tions of the parties and the judge to the interaction in the courtroom. The
relatively unpredictable and uncontrolled nature of this new interaction makes
the area of constructing a case “a no-man’s land” in which there are no stable
or generally accepted forms of the interaction and communication.  The old
established traditions and the elements of the new proceedings are intertwined.
Yet, the emergence of such a “no-man’s land” strongly implies that the object of
the court work is evolving and that the court work itself is in transition.
Reflecting the findings of Heydebrand and Seron (1990), I strongly suggest that
the collaborative construction of a case has some elements of rationalization, but
also elements of a qualitatively new kind of court work and justice. As the au-
thors point out, this rationalization is connected to increasing interactivity. Joint
construction inevitably indicates increasing interactivity; new informal forms of
interaction and an increase in the amount of interaction. The evolving, non-
routinized nature of this interaction gives us reason to examine the construc-
tion of the case as the basis for a new kind of court work for the future.
Finally, I would like to return to the evaluative question I posed at the
beginning of this chapter: Will the reform lead to a fundamental change in
everyday court practice, or will it remain merely a change in the external form
of the process?  On the basis of the cases analyzed above, my answer is that the
change is neither fundamental nor purely formal.
The new process clearly maintains the dominance of the judge and reproduc-
es the traditional adjudication. In this respect, the changes I observed can hardly
be characterized as fundamental or radical. The locus and nature of power in
the new process is, however, largely an open question that requires more study.
An important task for further analysis is to answer questions such as who
initiates changes of topic and what happens to the initiatives taken by the
different parties. In particular, the activity-theoretical idea of the central impor-
30
 The same problem of the critical shift between the tool and the object, and the situation in
which an instrument becomes an owerwhelming problem and thus an end in itself, has been
analyzed by Hasu & Engeström (2000).
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tance of the object calls for analysis of the role of the principals in the
interaction. Will there be a shift from the traditional position as an object of the
proceedings toward a more subject-like position?
I also found changes in the construction of the case and in the courtroom
discourse that cannot be dismissed as cosmetic. These changes include the rather
dramatic overall increase in the number of turns, the more reciprocal and dia-
logical character of the discourse, and the change in the use of the term “Your
Honor”. These first findings imply that the change in court practice is at least
potentially more than merely formal. The new complexity of the discourse
implies the emergence and expression of novel perspectives and initiatives. This
cautiously optimistic conclusion could be considered a challenge to continue the
examination of change in court practices that are understood as multi-layered
and multi-dimensional interactional phenomena.
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7 Changes in Scripting the Proceedings:
“How Shall We Proceed?”
7.1 Transformation as Local Construction
First, when the proceedings start in a court case, l ask the chair how the new proce-
dural law is applied in this particular court. The situation is that every court has
its own system. (An attorney interviewed  in August 1997)
The above excerpt describes the situation with respect to the implementation
of the new procedural law in Finland. The lower courts went through an exten-
sive procedural reform in 1993, which set new standards for handling disputes
in district courts. What happened, in fact, was that the actual practices of indi-
vidual judges vary a great deal and the proceedings in individual court cases dif-
fer from each other.
The court system has been criticized for developing slowly and being resis-
tant to change. According to Provine and Seron (1988–89, p. 165), “American
courts are ideally constituted to blunt the impact of externally imposed reforms.”
When the hoped-for institutional changes do not occur, individuals and orga-
nizations committed to reform get frustrated, proving Arthur Vanderbilt’s dic-
tum that “court reform is no sport for the short-winded” (Provine and Seron
1988–89, pp. 165).
In the Finnish context, the institutional resistance to change in the legal sys-
tem has been connected particularly to the mentality of judges: judges have been
criticized for being conservative, passive, rigid in their legal thinking, and for
isolating themselves from criticism and discussion in society (Kemppinen, 1990;
Yrttiaho, 1996). Finnish judges display the same inertia when they state in their
interviews that the adoption and consolidation of the new civil procedure will
take more than an entire generation.
All this illustrates the dilemma of transformation in the court system. On the
one hand, the system seems to be resistant to change. On the other hand, the
national court reform has resulted in heterogeneous practices in the lower courts.
How should one study change and transformation in the court system to clari-
fy this picture?
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Traditionally, administrative rationality dictates that changes occur from the
“top down”, from the plans made by administration to the actual implementa-
tion by the practitioners (for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 3). In this
study, change and transformation are approached from another – almost from
the opposite – perspective. I will put my focus on the initiation of change by
studying the actual work processes. This kind of approach differs from the more
common way of studying changes in the court system and in the adjudication
of disputes by focusing on macro-social and historical issues (e.g., Heydebrand
& Seron, 1990) or, as in the case of Finland, by using statistical survey data on
the implementation of reforms (e.g., Ervasti, 1997a; 1997b). Studying changes
merely at the macro level easily excludes the notion that national changes are
interpreted and constructed in the activity of participants in actual court prac-
tices. Although changes are set forth in the law, they are defined and made visi-
ble by the practitioners themselves. This calls for the studying of the local dis-
cursive construction of the transformation in the Finnish court system.
Every court case can be understood as a thread in an evolving texture of prac-
tice. The threads of single court cases make up a texture of evolving court prac-
tices. Change and development are produced locally, but not independently of
the whole system. The current court practice – or our understanding of the gen-
eral court practice of today – does not exist as such, but only as a result of actu-
al court proceedings in specific cases. In developmental work research, transfor-
mation has traditionally been analyzed in terms of developmental cycles (En-
geström, 1987). The present analysis is one of the recent attempts to study the
small developmental steps in more of a local context; to give a more specific and
concrete shape to development and to study how the new practice actually orig-
inates in the everyday work with individual cases.
7.2 Change in Procedural Legislation and in Court Proceedings
How, then, has the civil procedure changed? Before the procedural reform of
1993, the civil procedure was guided by loose legislation. As Virolainen (1988,
pp. 33–36) pointed out, the procedure is always more or less regulated by the
written law. Equally, judges are obliged, when conducting the proceedings, to
follow the prevailing procedural rules. However, the conducting of the proceed-
ings was only partly regulated by the legislation. The existing rules were not com-
pulsory, or at least they were not regarded as compulsory in practice. The fact
that the legislation contained few detailed rules of procedure undermined the
efficiency of the process-generating practices.
This vague procedural legislation in Finland meant that the established
practice became a more important norm than the written law. It resulted in
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unwritten laws which co-existed with and even outflanked the written law (Taka-
la, Heinonen & Lappalainen, 1985, p. 62). The inadequate legislation was partly
replaced by procedural literature which gave norms and interpretations. Viro-
lainen (1988, p. 3) suggested that, because the insufficient and loose procedural
legislation left too much to individual choice, the conducting of legal processes
was not uniform and had become more passive than the written law intended.
The actions taken within a legal framework to resolve a civil case may be said
to constitute a court process. According to the procedural literature (e.g., Takala,
Heinonen & Lappalainen, 1985, pp. 86–87), the court process prior to the pro-
cedural reform of 1993 was divided into three main phases: 1. the initial discus-
sion (the statement of facts), 2. the presentation of evidence, and 3. the final dis-
cussion. These phases were not separate from each other as sequences in their
own right, but the proceedings were rather a monotonous series of identical ses-
sions. The division of phases was merely theoretical. This situation was criticized
frequently (e.g., Möller, 1988; Lappalainen 1990). Extensive cases needed sev-
eral sessions, which compelled the parties to write briefs in order to manage the
generated material.
The three theoretical phases can be taken as a general starting point in de-
scribing the proceedings in court cases before the procedural reform. Figure 7.1
illustrates the process in an actual court case comprising seven sessions.  The
primary form of presentation – reading a brief – is singled out as an action of
its own. The other two actions involve the presentation of statements – or the
discussion about the case – and the hearing of witnesses. The numbers in the
illustration refer to the sequential numbers of the hearing. Figure 7.1 demon-
strates the disorganized and uncontrolled nature of the proceedings.
Figure 7.1 Proceedings in an Actual Court Case Comprising Seven Sessions before
the Procedural Reform of 1993
reading one or more briefs
presenting statements / discussion
hearing of one or more witnesses
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
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The new civil procedure of 1993 introduced preliminary proceedings, which
are subdivided into a written preliminary phase, a preliminary hearing and a
main trial. The change in the form of the process was evident.  In the applica-
tion for a summons, the plaintiff has to declare, for example, his or her speci-
fied demands, the basis of the demands, and if possible, the evidence he or she
will bring to court and what he or she intends to prove with each piece of evi-
dence. In the written reply, the defendant has to indicate, for example, whether
he or she admits or denies the claim, and if the latter, the grounds for the deni-
al, as well as the evidence he or she intends to bring before the court. After that,
the court may ask the parties for more clarification of specified issues. After the
written preliminary phase, the court calls the parties to a preliminary hearing,
where they have to declare orally 1. their claims and the grounds, 2. what issues
are disputed, 3. what evidence the parties will present to the court and what they
intend to prove with each piece of evidence, and 4. whether a  settlement is pos-
sible.  If the case is neither decided nor settled after the preliminary hearing, it
will be dealt with in the main hearing, when the parties have to explain their
perspectives in greater detail and comment on the grounds put forward by the
opposing party. The court receives the offered evidence and, in the end, the par-
ties give their final statements. (Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 5 2§, 10§,
15§ 19§; Chapter 6 2§) The general model of the proceedings in a civil case is
depicted in Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2 General Model of the Proceedings in a Civil Court Case after the
Procedural Reform
written 
preliminary phase
preliminary hearing main trial
exchange of one or more briefs
presenting statements / discussion
hearing of one or more witnesses
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Today, the written law offers detailed norms for the adjudication of civil
disputes31. Despite the number of such norms, however, the procedural law can-
not cover all the minutiae. The judge still has a lot of freedom to choose how to
proceed in the case and how to chair the proceedings.  If the guiding role of the
legislation is fundamentally and inevitably loose and limited, how, then, are the
court proceedings constructed in actual court cases?
At present, no generally accepted procedure seems to exist – just a variety of
different ways to apply the procedural law. Some of these applications will prob-
ably, in time, become generally accepted universal norms. It follows that the fo-
cus of this analysis is on how the emerging script for the court process is being
constructed in each set of actual proceedings. The current construction of the
emerging script is compared to the construction of the script in the old proceed-
ings before the procedural reform.
Analyzing the local construction of court proceedings draws attention to the
discursive interaction in the courtroom. Handling court cases is fundamentally
a discursive activity. Talk and interaction are central instruments, especially in
the court setting, in which the work of judges and attorneys is based on sym-
bols and abstractions (Danet, 1985). What is achieved in legal proceedings is
produced by using the instruments of talk and interaction.
7.3 Notion of a Script
In the following analysis, I will approach the local production of court proceed-
ings by using the notion of the script as a tool. The notion of a script refers to
the plans, norms or traditions that regulate standard actions in recurring situa-
tions (Engeström, 1992). The script represents the specialized cognitive struc-
ture that retains expectations of how to behave in specific situations and con-
texts (Mangham, 1995).  The classic example was put forward by Abelson (1981),
who described how the clients and waiters in a restaurant follow an implicit
script. The clients expect the waiter to escort them to their table, to hand them
a menu, to take the order, and so on. A person listening a story about going to a
restaurant can easily recall these items of the general script.
31
 The procedural changes have been communicated to the practitioners in different ways. The
most systematic one was the training offered by the Ministry of Justice for all the court em-
ployees before the new law came into force. The attorneys did not participate in this training,
but instead, their own association arranged training sequence for them. The annual meetings
of different professional associations constituted also one forum where the new ideas, often
introduced by those participating in the drafting of the new law, were discussed. Furthermore,
the law journals published several articles in which the renewals were interpreted and debated.
The law schools did not provide any further education for professionals, but of course, were
responsible for teaching the new procedural code for present students.
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Sometimes the script is explicit, when it is in a written form, but more often
it is  implicit and the participants may not be fully aware of the script they are
following (Engeström, 1992, p. 79). Typically, it dictates the sequence of events
from the beginning to the end, and it may also specify the roles of the partici-
pants in a specific situation.
Mangham’s (1995, p. 495) argument is that individuals shift from relatively
improvised behavior in novel or problematic situations to relatively structured
behavior in situations which they take to be routine. When scripts become es-
tablished, they are used without thought or reflection. They may also become
difficult to access and change. After a time, they may well appear natural and
the only possible way of behaving.
The notion of the script has been applied to activities that follow stereotyp-
ical sequences, such as selection interviews and the socialization of new mem-
bers into an organization. Cognitive scientists have used the notion to under-
stand individual cognition. Poole & al. consider the question of how scripts
develop in organizational settings fundamental, usually involving a process in
which the members construct knowledge about appropriate patterns of events
for particular activities (Poole & al., 1990, p. 213).  Engeström (1992, p. 79) also
focuses on the social and cultural aspects of scripts in his investigation into how
scripts emerge and develop in collective activity, and how people jointly follow,
violate, modify and change their scripts.
As far as the legal script is concerned, we can distinguish two levels or aspects.
The first is the general, written legal script, such as procedural legislation, or the
established practices that replace or complement the legislation. The second
aspect is the local, case-related script that is constructed through and in action.
As I argued above, there seems to exist no generally accepted legal script in cur-
rent Finnish legal practice – although it does exist in the written law – only a
variety of different ways of applying the general script. Studying the local
actions involved in scripting the procedure, will help us to capture the practi-
tioners’ interpretations and modifications of the general script.
When we talk about the script for court proceedings, we are talking about
one crucial element in court work. The work of a judge has a dual nature. He
or she is both the one to conduct the proceedings and the one to make the
decision in the case.  In this sense, the object of the judge’s work is also twofold:
both the process (steering the case through the proceedings) and the final deci-
sion (the so-called material truth).  The two main components in this object are
the script for the process and the judicial content of the case. This makes study-
ing the script of the proceedings a central aspect of the work of the court.
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7.4 Cases and the Descriptions of the Proceedings
In the following I will compare the handling of two civil cases processed at dif-
ferent points in the evolution of the Finnish court system. The cases analyzed
in this chapter, Case 1 and Case 4, are the ones presented in Chapter 6. Whereas
Chapter 6 introduced changes in a few features of courtroom discourse that sig-
nal a possible expansion in court work, this chapter concentrates more on how
the proceedings and the procedure are constructed in situ by the participants
themselves. I will start my analysis with a simplified description of the proceed-
ings in the two cases.
Case 1: Proceedings before the Procedural Reform
After the proceedings had started, the judge described the case as follows:
Excerpt 7.1 The old proceedings, Interview with the judge after the
3
rd
 hearing in June 1990
Interviewer: Do you consider these proceedings to be troublesome?
Judge: Well yes, if you consider that in any case there are several owners and
several apartments and several details. So you have quite a lot of material.
But it isn’t very difficult, it can be handled with reasonable effort. It’s just
an excellent example of the inefficiency of the current process. This case
was pending last year and we have not yet even agreed on what the issues
are. This is a fine example of what we should get rid of after the procedural
reform.
The proceedings started with a summons. In the first session, which took
place in January 1990, the defendant’s attorney contested the action in an oral
brief. The plaintiff ’s attorney upheld the repair costs as stated by the appointed
inspector. The plaintiff ’s attorney also accused the defendants of having contrib-
uted to the dampness damage in the apartments.
In the second session, held in April 1990, the plaintiff ’s attorney read a list
of specific claims. The defendant’s attorney explained the delay in presenting the
counter-suit, and stated that the claims were partly unfounded.
In the third session, in June 1990, the defendant’s attorney read a brief and
explained why the counter-suit was still not ready. The plaintiff ’s attorney stat-
ed that they disagreed about the definitions of the inspections carried out in the
apartments, and confirmed the repair costs that the inspector had stated. The
defendant’s witness was heard.
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The fourth session, in September 1990, started with the counter-suit read by
the defendant’s attorney. The plaintiff ’s attorney contested the claims, while
accepting the inspector’s statement regarding the defects. The defendant’s attor-
ney read another brief specifying their action. The plaintiff ’s attorney read a
response to the counter-suit. Two of the plaintiff ’s witnesses were heard. The
attorneys put forward arguments about completing the outdoor repairs, about
retaining security deposits and about the residents’ own impact on the damage.
The plaintiff ’s witness was heard in the fifth session, in November 1990, and
in the sixth session, in March 1991, it was the turn of one of the plaintiff ’s and
one of the defendant’s witnesses. The plaintiff ’s attorney stated that the residents
had been too impatient and paid too much for having the construction work fin-
ished by other companies.
The seventh session, in April 1991, started with the attorneys’ closing state-
ments in which they repeated what they had written in their final briefs. After a
short break, the judge gave his decision, which he had prepared in advance. An
overview of the proceedings is depicted in Figure 7.1 above.
Case 4: Proceedings after the Procedural Reform
The case dealt with after the procedural reform started with the written prelim-
inary proceedings. The application for a summons arrived at the court in
October 1995. The written preliminary proceedings consisted of four briefs,
including the application for a summons, the defendant’s reply, the specified
claims of the plaintiff and the defendant’s reply. The plaintiff asked the court
once, and the defendant five times, to give an extension of time for their replies.
This phase took over a year.
In November 1996, the court set the date for the preliminary hearing in
December. This was canceled, and the date for a two-day preliminary hearing
was rescheduled for January 1997.
The hearing in January consisted of the following phases: 1. scripting the
proceedings, 2. the claims of the plaintiff, 3. the general grounds for the action,
4. the defendant’s defense, 5. the detailed specification of alleged defects and
damage followed by  the defendant’s reply to each of these arguments, 6. the
plaintiff ’s specific claims in detail, and the defendant’s reply to each of these, and
7. the documented evidence and the witnesses of both parties.
The extended preliminary hearing in May 1997 had the following phases: 1.
the plaintiff ’s claims and the defendant’s reply, 2. more precise handling of the
revealed defects in an effort to determine whether they were due to construc-
tion methods in contravention of the building regulations, or caused by mildew,
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3. the repairs that the housing company had carried out and what it was still
going to do,  4. the judge’s summary of the burden of proof, 5. the documented
evidence and the witnesses of both parties.
The judge was interviewed before the preliminary hearing of January 1997,
and described his expectations and plans. He was disappointed with the pro-
longed written preliminary phase and wanted to push the proceedings onwards
in a stricter manner.
Excerpt 7.2 The new proceedings, interview with the judge before the
preliminary hearing
Judge: I have decided not to accept any more briefs at all. I will take the case
into preliminary hearing and see what happens there. This means that I
have acted as the new civil procedure allows me to act if I realize that writ-
ing briefs is not improving the situation. I said “This is it. Next time we’ll
meet in the hearing.” The case will be conducted orally in the hearing, but
I’m afraid it will go wrong.
Interviewer: How can it go wrong?
Judge: I’m afraid they can’t present their claims and the grounds. Orally, I
mean. Well, the claims are not difficult, but the grounds are. When one [re-
fers to the plaintiff ’s attorney] has written 45 pages, can she compress what
the legal grounds are for her claims? On what does she base her claims?
Also, I’m afraid the defendant’s attorney is not as prepared for the hearing
as she should be, which means, being able to present in a compressed, logi-
cal form all the grounds in defense of her client.
Interviewer: What if everything does go wrong?
Judge: There are two alternatives. In any event, the hearing has to be post-
poned. The first alternative is to give the preclusion. This means that, in a
dispositive dispute, you can impose a sanction, a threat, in case they don’t
obey the procedural law. The court, in a way, reminds you that you should
have been able to present everything in the hearing. But if you didn’t, the
court makes the threat so that at least next time you’ll have to do it. This
means that I can, the court can, make this threat, if it sees that the parties
are not prepared properly, if the hearing doesn’t progress, if the grounds
for the claims don’t become clear, if the witnesses can’t be named. Preclu-
sion, then, is one possibility. Another is that we just discuss where we are in
the proceedings. More gentle methods are used instead of threats. I sup-
pose that when it comes to the first hearing, I will use gentle methods. Un-
less it goes totally wrong.
The following section concerns how the script for the court process was con-
structed in the actual, particular proceedings of the two court cases introduced
above.
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7.5 Scripting the Proceedings before the Procedural Reform
The court case of 1990–1991 (hereafter the “old case”) started without an
expressed script. At no point was the script explicitly or jointly discussed. On
the other hand, there was obviously an implicit script.  Given the long tradition
of established practice, all the legal professionals were expected to be acquaint-
ed with the general script. If the script was not explicitly discussed, how did the
participants know how to proceed in this particular matter?
The following excerpt is from the third session. It was planned that the
defendants would present their counter-claim, but it was not ready. In her first
turn, the judge confirmed that both parties were present and gave the floor to
the defendant.
Excerpt 7.3 The old proceedings, the 3
rd
 session:
Judge: Present here are the plaintiff, Talonen Ltd., the advocate and the
defendant. Last time the case was postponed at the defendant’s request. Yes,
please do sit down. What does the defendant wish to say in order to bring
the counter-claim?
Defendant’s attorney: Yes, Your Honor, the counter-claim is not ready
because the plaintiff ’s standpoint was unclear. I have made a short summa-
ry of the defects and a report on the repair costs accumulated thus far. I
have also invited here the expert who was consulted by the residents, Jukka-
Pekka Salonen, who can tell you about these matters himself. Perhaps I’d
better read this summary aloud before he is heard.
Judge: Go ahead please.
The defendant took the brief to the judge and read it aloud. Because the
plaintiff had not seen the brief before, he could not comment on it. In his turn,
he anticipated his next steps in the procedure.
Excerpt 7.4 The old proceedings, the 3
rd
 session:
Plaintiff ’s attorney: As far as the extra costs presented in this brief are con-
cerned, I cannot say anything about them right now. After hearing the wit-
ness I have to ask for postponement in order to respond in detail and also
to present clarification on the other matters involved in the construction.
This is all, for now.
Later in the session, the judge questioned whether the time was right to hear the
witness, Jukka-Pekka Salonen.
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Excerpt 7.5 The old proceedings, the 3
rd
  session:
Judge: I have begun to wonder whether this witness is about to tell us some-
thing that is yet to be claimed in the counter-claim. Is it necessary to hear
him at this stage?
Defendant’s attorney: At any rate, the witness will state that the repairs that
the original claim is based on have not been finished.
Judge: Well, let’s hear him now and then look at the situation again. Let’s
call the witness, Jukka-Pekka Salonen into the courtroom.
The local script of the third session of this proceeding was constructed in
three main sequence. The first sequence (Excerpt 7.3) and, in particular, the
defendant’s attorney’s turn, were most critical in this process.  In his turn, the
defendant’s attorney explicitly declared in what order he was going to proceed
in the matter, beginning with a summary of the defects and repair costs, then
hearing the witness. The attorney seemed to bring his individual influence to
bear on the script (“I’d better read this summary aloud”), and this seemed to
be acceptable. Excerpt 7.4 also clearly shows the same freedom of the advocates
to direct the course of the proceedings.  He outlined the situation as follows when
he was interviewed.
Excerpt 7.6 Interview with the defendant’s attorney after the 3
rd
hearing
Defendant’s attorney: In principle, you can just go to court with your plans,
and the poor judge behind the table knows nothing about what is going to
happen.
This corresponds to the judge’s assessment of the proceedings in this case, after
the fourth session:
Excerpt 7.7 Interview with the judge after the 4
th
 hearing
Judge: Hearing witnesses will continue next time, and everything is happily
upside down. Next time there may be a witness, or they may put the case to
a decision, or they may slip in some final statements and so on and so
forth. It’s hard to say what the next session will be like.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the attorneys were not constructing the
script totally on their own. In Excerpt 7.5, the judge did not automatically
accept the script defined by the defendant’s attorney and questioned the useful-
ness of hearing the witness. Bringing the witness into court before the counter-
suit had been heard was something that stretched the limits of the script, and
particularly this judge’s interpretation of them. But was it the judge who devi-
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ated from the smooth run-through of the implicitly shared script, or did she
actually try to maintain the established script that the defendant’s attorney tried
to stretch more than she could accept?
The episode highlights the fluid and emergent nature of the script. As the
defendant’s attorney stated in his interview when commenting on the judge’s
question (Excerpt 7.8), the general script was not consistent or explicit as far as
the timing of the hearing of witnesses was concerned.
Excerpt 7.8 Interview with the defendant’s attorney after the 3
rd
hearing
Defendant’s attorney: It was a reasonable and proper question to ask,
whether the witness was going to talk about something that was coming up
in the counter-claim. It was only alertness that she showed in this matter.
From my point of view it was entirely positive. But it is difficult to deter-
mine when you’re allowed to bring witnesses into court. There is a rule,
which is not based on any law, that you can’t bring a witness into the first
session. The older judges in the Helsinki District Court in particular go
mad if you bring a witness to the first session.
Interviewed after the third session, the judge explained her question as
follows.
Excerpt 7.9 Interview with the judge after the 3
rd
 hearing
Judge: They indicated that they were going to claim for this and that. I just
wanted to see what he [the defendant’s attorney] would say. I think he was
right: the witness was also heard to reverse the original claim.
Interviewer: Why did he want to hear the witness at that stage?
Judge: It just occurred to me that perhaps his principals had put some pres-
sure on him. Maybe he wanted to show that the case was going ahead, the
witness was heard and now it was the opposing party that asked for post-
ponement.
Established scripts which are not explicated leave the door open for differ-
ing interpretations and competing scripts. In this case, there seemed to also
exist the possibility of alternative interpretations of the script. Nevertheless, it
was not split into two competing scripts, which could have resulted in a never-
ending search and competition between the scripts of different participants (see
Engeström, 1992, pp. 88–91). The construction of the script in this episode was
more a question of defining whose interpretation of it was legitimate.
A new judge chaired the proceedings in the fourth session, replacing the first
one during her leave of absence. The script for this session was constructed in
the first few minutes of it, which are reproduced in Excerpt 7.10.
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Excerpt 7.10 The old proceedings, the 4
th
 session
Judge: Let’s start the handling of the case. First, I presume, we’ll have the
counter-claim
Defendant’s attorney: Yes.
Judge: Let’s start with the original claim. Talonen Ltd. can present their
case, and then we can move on to the other claim.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes, your Honor, I have here a brief that actually con-
tains both a presentation of our more specific action and also a response to
the counter-claim, point by point. This being so, I will only renew our
claims and …
Judge: Are there going to be witnesses?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Two witnesses.
Judge: Two witnesses.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Perhaps it is appropriate that after we have heard the
counter-claim I should read that brief aloud, because it contains overlap-
ping points.
Judge: We will return to that brief later, and please sit down [plaintiff ’s
attorney was standing while talking to the judge]. Then we probably have a
new claim here?
Defendant’s attorney: Yes, your Honor. I have written in the plaint that the
claims will be specified, claim by claim, and I have an additional brief for
specifying, on behalf of every plaintiff, the basis for these claims.
Judge: Does this grouping correspond to your brief?
Defendant’s attorney: Well, I have looked at the brief of Talonen Ltd., and
the grouping corresponds to it.
Plaintiff ’s attorney:  I’m afraid I have not read their brief.
Judge: Okay.  [a pause of 15 seconds] About this claim that I received first,
is this, does it concern, I mean, shall we proceed claim by claim or in what
order? Will the briefs be read separately?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: I have these [takes the brief to the judge].
Judge: [a pause of 20 seconds while the judge takes a look at the brief] So.
We will proceed according to today’s claim and after that you can... and, I
see you have already answered that in your brief.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes.
Defendant’s attorney: Here is the additional brief [takes the brief to the
judge and to the plaintiff ’s attorney]. Shall I read this?
Judge: Why don’t you read just the beginning of the brief. After that we can
go through Tim Mather’s [one of the residents] claims.
Defendant’s attorney: [reads the plaint from beginning to end]. Your Honor,
I have written these specifications on the supplementary brief, which is
more like a specific claim. I could continue immediately with that brief.
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Judge: If I may ask, just preliminarily, what the plaintiff ’s attitude to this
presented claim is, I mean very generally?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Generally, it is contested.
Judge: Perhaps we could now go on to the supplementary brief.
The script for the fourth session was constructed in this episode through the
attorneys’ attempts to influence the proceedings (“Perhaps it is appropriate that
after we have heard the counter-claim I should read that brief aloud “), and by
questions posed by the judge or the attorneys (Judge: “Are there going to be wit-
nesses”, or Defendant’s attorney: “Shall I read this?”). The episode clearly shows
the significant role of the briefs in the old proceedings. The script evolved
according to the kind of briefs that the attorneys had prepared before the ses-
sion, and managing all of them dominated the script construction. This script-
ing episode contained a disturbance that was connected to the question of how
all the briefs that were not familiar beforehand could be managed. I will return
to this disturbance and analyze it more closely in a subsequent section on devi-
ations from the script.
To conclude, the scripting in the old proceedings reveals the passive role of
the judge and the rather important role of the attorneys in moving the proceed-
ings along. To put it more precisely: the attorneys steered the proceedings, while
the judge received the materials and decided on the case. Scripting involved very
little joint reflection on how to proceed, and mainly consisted of individual ef-
forts to influence it. While all the participants, the judge and both attorneys,
treated each other as judicial professionals, they based their way of proceeding
on the generally accepted script, and obviously felt no need to explicate it. The
elasticity of the script having been tested, the judge interfered with her question
at the point when the defendant’s attorney wanted to hear his witness before even
presenting his counter-suit. On another occasion, the judge made an innovative
attempt to define a new, unusual script, but the attorney did not understand this
unexpected way of proceeding.
On the whole, the old proceedings represented uncontrolled discourse: the
participants could freely present their viewpoints and comment on the oppo-
nent’s viewpoints throughout the proceedings.  I have chosen to define the dis-
course as uncontrolled, as the opposite of controlled discourse, in which certain
parts of the argumentation are restricted to defined phases in the proceedings,
and the discourse in general is more controlled by the judge. It could also have
been described as unrestricted – restricted, open – closed, or undisciplined –
disciplined.
The purpose of the written procedural law is to guarantee that justice is
achieved through legitimate court processes. It has been shown that the perti-
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nent legislation provided only general guidance. As the written law was gradu-
ally replaced by established practice, the logic of its legitimacy changed as un-
controlled and unrestricted discourse served to guarantee the legitimacy of the
court processes. The passive judge was thought to be the independent judge.
When the judge remained passive, he or she was merely making room for the
attorneys freely to make their statements and bring materials to court through-
out the proceedings. The legitimate process presupposed that the proceedings
would be open for free argumentation and presentation of evidence and testi-
mony, without strong interference by the court. Uncontrolled discourse was a
guarantee of due process.
7.6 Scripting the Proceedings after the Procedural Reform
As I move on to the court case of 1997 (hereafter the “new case”), my focus is
directed to the preliminary hearing. Preliminary hearings are, in practice, the
phases in which the cases are constructed. The scripts for the whole proceedings
are determined, and the case is worked out into a form in which it can be for-
warded to the main trial - if not decided or settled after the preliminary hear-
ing.
My interpretation is that, in contrast to the old proceedings, the discourse
of the preliminary hearing is controlled. The claims and their grounds, as well
as the replies, among other things, have to be presented in the preliminary hear-
ing, and not after it. The logic of the new proceedings is to restrict parts of the
argumentation to the preliminary hearing. According to this logic, following the
principles of legislation and controlling the discourse during the proceedings will
legitimate the process and achieve justice. This prompts me to analyze in detail
how the local script for the preliminary hearing is constructed.
The preliminary hearing of the new case started with the judge expressing
his plans and ideas about the proceedings. This explicit scripting took eight min-
utes and mainly comprised a monologue by the judge, although there was some
dialogue between the participants. The first part of the judge’s monologue was
addressed to the plaintiff, who was present on the first day of the preliminary
hearing. After this, he addressed his remarks more generally to all of the partic-
ipants. The following excerpt contains some examples of explicit scripting.
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Excerpt 7.11 The new proceedings, preliminary hearing in January
1997
Judge: [addressing the client] In this session, we will try to find out what
the dispute between you is, what the dispute concerns, and then, we’ll try
to chart what kind of evidence we need and what evidence is available. So,
this is not a trial as such and, for example, you will not be heard in this ses-
sion. Why you are present here is, of course, because this is your case and
you are the one who knows best all the details, and because your attorney
may also need you. She may want to ask you something, and the court may
also need to ask you some questions.
Judge: [now addressing all the participants]: Now, it would be best for us to
check on what I have been thinking of how to proceed. As it was stated in
the summons to this meeting, I’ve been thinking that today we would deal
with the demands the Vuoris are making with respect to the Laaksos and,
after that, the grounds for the action. I hope we can finish them today, if
not, we’ll continue tomorrow.  // And, considering the nature of this dis-
pute, it would be appropriate to change some of the wording about how to
proceed today. We have here the primary demands and then the secondary
demands. The basis of both of these demands is the dampness and mildew
damage alleged by the plaintiff, the Vuoris, and also the specific construc-
tional solutions. And then we also have quite a few demands for compensa-
tion for damage. I thought we could first take up the grounds for the pri-
mary demands. You could talk about the defects and their relevance maybe
and that kind of thing. After that, we’ll go separately through the different
instances of dampness and mildew damage that you allege exist in the
apartment and, also separately, the constructional solutions that you allege
are faulty. We’ll go through them all separately, point by point, and find out
what they’re all about.
In his plan for the proceedings the judge determined the order in which the
items were to be taken up. He also expressed his preference as to how the par-
ticipants were to present their material, emphasizing the detailed handling and
point-by-point procedure. In doing so, he set limits on the proceedings. The
script that was established by him at the beginning of the session was like a scaf-
folding framework: the individual actions of the participants were to follow the
explicit script and stay within the framework. The interview with the judge af-
ter the preliminary hearing verifies this analysis. In contrast to the old case in
which the judge was the one “who knows nothing about what is going to hap-
pen”, this indicates a significant qualitative change in the role of the judge.
Excerpt 7.12 Interview with the judge after the preliminary hearing
Judge: I think it should be apparent at what phase we are in the case. I strive
to be clearly in charge of the proceedings. That, of course, requires that the
participants know what kind of proceedings they are joining. I won’t let
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them talk freely about what they want and how they want it. I just tell them
how we are going to proceed. We’ll deal with the demands and then go into
the grounds, and we’ll split the case up into several parts and make it more
accurate. I want to comment, I want to interrupt, I want to ask questions.
In this case, the explicit script was established by the chairing judge in the
first minutes of the proceedings. From the point of view of the attorneys, it
seemed to be dictated by the judge. Were the attorneys able to follow this top-
down script and did they try to change it in some way?
Although the script was explicitly established at the beginning of the session,
it was not yet complete. Time after time throughout the preliminary hearing it
was addressed by the participants, becoming more and more defined. This is
clear from some of the examples of episodes in which it was reflected on and
reconstructed in the course of the actual proceedings.
The first reconstruction occurred immediately after the episode of explicit
script construction. The judge finished establishing the script and proceeded to
questions of substance by asking the plaintiffs to present their demands.
Excerpt 7.13 The new proceedings, preliminary hearing in January 1997
Judge: Now, to the demands. What demands are the Vuoris making with re-
spect to the Laaksos ?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: You mean I should present all the demands here orally
and also...?
Judge: Yes. We’ll take them demand by demand, so that we also get it on
record what they are.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: In other words, the plaintiffs demand primarily that,
firstly...
Judge: So there should be primary and then secondary demands. Yes, num-
ber one.
The script was checked for the second time only a few minutes later.
Excerpt 7.14 The new proceedings, preliminary hearing in January 1997
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Moreover, number three in my written statement...
Judge: Is it unchanged?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: There will be changes to some of the details in number
three.
Judge: Okay.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Should I give only the details that have changed?
Judge: Let’s go through all of them, so that they’ll all be properly dealt with.
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In the sequences presented above, the plaintiff ’s attorney checked whether
she was following the script by asking for confirmation of the way in which she
was proceeding. The judge confirmed the correct procedure. Sometimes the
attorneys tried to exceed the limits of the script. In her first two turns in the next
excerpt, the plaintiff ’s attorney was trying to take up matters that were not yet
in order, according to the script. The judge interrupted and refused to take them
up at that point. In the old case analyzed earlier, the judge allowed the defen-
dant’s attorney to continue reading the whole brief, although it was against the
script the judge had outlined. Thus, the new case indicated a different way of
determining the script.
Excerpt 7.15 The new proceedings, preliminary hearing in January 1997
Plaintiff ’s attorney: We deny that the underdrain could have been con-
structed only after the house had been connected to the communal drain…
Judge: ## We have not yet taken up the defects.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes, all right. Well, yes. Then, on some occasion, the de-
fendants stated that the Vuoris should have understood that the window
upstairs could not be opened. The significance of the window was realized
only when the Vuoris got to know that the second story had not been con-
structed in compliance with the drawings.
Judge: I think we haven’t dealt with that yet.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: No we haven’t, except in writing. Is it the case that the
written statements are not taken into account if they are not restated here
in the preliminary hearing?
Judge: Yes, not re-stated, but presented here. All that matters is what is pre-
sented here orally. We all have to be clear about what the material is that
the court will take into account when making the decision. It is only the
material that is brought up here in the preliminary hearing, not what is
only presented in writing. That’s the way it is. What is presented here is
taken into account.
Defendant’s attorney: Mmm.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: [laughing] Well, that’s why you’re so anxious to present
every possible thing, but it’s making a mess of the whole procedure.
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The reconstruction of the script was enmeshed in the instructional talk by
the judge. As in the previous example, the script construction was often followed
by a phase in which the judge informed the attorneys about the new procedural
law – or rather, about his interpretation of it. As Engeström (1998, pp. 213–217)
points out, instructional talk has been missing from Finnish hearings.  My anal-
ysis refers to the fact that such talk made its appearance in conjunction with the
discursive change after the procedural reform32.
 Sometimes, the testing of the limits resulted in the judge allowing the attor-
neys to exceed the limits of the script, and he did not guide them back to it. Yet,
he noted more or less explicitly when the script was not followed. In the follow-
ing episode, the judge had just informed the parties about what items would be
taken up next when the defendant’s attorney wanted to return to the previous
item. The judge indirectly showed his annoyance by using a certain kind of
intonation in his speech:
Excerpt 7.16 The new proceedings, the preliminary hearing in January
1997
Defendant’s attorney: Your Honor, concerning the contribution or the
neglect of duties, I still have some additional points.
Judge: Yee-es?
Occasionally, the attorneys tested the limits of the script, and the judge was ready
to adjust it according to their suggestions.
Excerpt 7.17 The new proceedings, the preliminary hearing in January
1997
Judge: Have we now progressed so far that we can go on to the alleged con-
struction defects and then to the dampness and mildew damage, and after
that, to all of these different demands that (...)?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: How about the plaintiff ’s reply to the defendant’s
response?
Judge: You mean concerning these items?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes, yes, I do.
32
 The tradition of some former chief justices was to give a moral lecture to the defendants in a
criminal case, and advise them not to enter the courtroom again. With the implementation of
the reform, however, a new type of instructional talk, more oriented to introducing the
procedure to the client and more informative, seems to be emerging.
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Judge: It could, of course, be examined more closely. It is indisputably
something that you have not actually...
Plaintiff ’s attorney: ## Not in detail.
Judge: You have not expressed your opinion in detail. But, on the other
hand, they just reject what you demand. But of course, if there is some-
thing to say, we’ll take care of that at first and then go ahead.
Once, the judge was compelled to twist the script more than he wished, when
it became evident that the preliminary hearing had to be continued later. The
defendants had to gather more evidence by carrying out inspections in the apart-
ment. This was a deviation from the original idea of a single preliminary hear-
ing as set forth in the procedural legislation (see Figure 7.2).
Excerpt 7.18 The new proceedings, the preliminary hearing in January
1997
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Do you mean you intend to wait for the housing com-
pany to finish its inspections?
Defendant’s attorney: I think it’s necessary. You have presented today new
claims for 100,000 marks and the claims are based on the argument that
everything is not right in the apartment.
Judge: Here we go again. It seems we are postponing the case into yonder
future and then we’ll desperately try to remember what this case was all
about. Why didn’t you look at these things earlier?
The judge’s comment in the above excerpt was exceptionally strong, and one
highly unlikely to have been made in the old proceedings. With its element of
“preaching”, it could be described as instructional in the extreme. A similar
example of instructional talk is given by Engeström (1998, p. 215) when he cites
a judge didactically telling a client how to be concrete in defining a date by which
his fine must be paid. An important difference between the cases, however, is that
whereas in Engeström’s example the judge gave her lesson to a client, here the
judge directed his comment to his legal colleagues.
In the new proceedings, the script may be described as a “tube” the design
and dimensions of which the judge determines at the start. The attorneys’
actions inside the tube sometimes stay in line and flow smoothly according the
script, but sometimes they collide with the sides of the tube. After such a colli-
sion, the judge either brings the parties back into line, or alternatively modifies
the tube to fit the additional points in the script. Every such incident calls for
further reflection on the script. Additionally, the script is re-conceptualized
through meta-talk (see Engeström R., 1999a; 1999b) every now and then, so as
to keep the proceedings in line. This is depicted in Figure 7.3.
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Figure 7.3 Scripting the New Proceedings
To conclude, the script for the new proceedings was explicit from the very
beginning, but still required constant reflection and maintenance. Although all
the participants taking an active part in the discussion (the judge and both at-
torneys) were judicial professionals, they did not count on everybody knowing
the script, and thus reconfirmed it frequently. The analysis shows that no gen-
erally accepted procedure exists that all the professionals follow, but rather a local
and case-related script is constructed during the proceedings. In this particular
case, the limits of the script were tested often when the attorneys tried to pro-
ceed differently from what the judge had planned. The tube of the process was
defined quite closely and the judge actively ensured that the script was followed.
The collisions in the tube were situations in which the attorneys attempted
to proceed differently from how the judge had planned it – but not just differ-
ently, also according to the logic of the old proceedings (for example, referring
to the written statements, talking about “re-stating”, wanting to have the prelim-
inary hearing postponed). Being diametrically opposite, the old uncontrolled
discourse and the new controlled discourse collided during the hearing. Inter-
estingly, the moments of collision between the attorneys’ actions and the judge’s
script were also the moments of collision between the old and the new practic-
es.
I showed the tube model and discussed my analysis presented above with the
particular judge who handled the case. My field notes in late May 1998 show how
he agreed with my interpretation, and he started to reflect on the case again.
Actions of the parties
Constructing/reflecting the script
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Field notes, May 1998
“He immediately started to analyze why, in this particular case, there were
so many collisions in the tube. He thought it was because the script was
created only at the beginning of the preliminary hearing, and because it
was not created together. He said that maybe the script for the whole pro-
cess should be produced in advance, long before the actual hearing, by
sending some kind of memo to the parties, for example, or alternatively, at
the beginning of the hearing through joint discussion. He justified the nar-
row and slim tube in this type of case in the following way: the amount of
material on which the decision is based would be enormous and impossible
to handle at the end of a wide tube.”
7.7 Deviations from the Script
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate how the script of the court process
is constructed in actual cases – not primarily to look for deviations from the
written script. Nevertheless, I would now like to examine more closely two
deviations, two disturbances that clearly departed from the judge’s plans. The
“outcomes” were very different, depending on how the disturbance was handled
in the interaction. The two in question are (1) the episode in the old proceed-
ings when the defendant’s attorney read the whole brief despite the expressed
intentions of the judge, and (2) an episode in the new proceedings in which the
defendant’s attorney unexpectedly asked the court to give a proposal for a set-
tlement, after the judge had already finished the proceedings.
The episode in the old proceedings in which the first disturbance occurred
was presented in Excerpt 7.10 above. It concerned the judge and the defendant’s
attorney. The judge intended first to discuss the general part of the claim, and
then, to take up one resident’s claim at a time. His instruction to do so was: “Why
don’t you read just the beginning of the brief. After that, we can go through Tim
Mather’s claims.” What happened was that the defendant’s attorney did not stop
after the general part but read the whole brief aloud.  The judge did not inter-
rupt him, and let him continue to the end. In the interview, the judge commented
on what had occurred.
Excerpt 7.19 Interview with the judge after the 4
th
 hearing
Judge: There was a small mistake, a misunderstanding, neither one of them
realized that the intention was to take up one demand at a time, and then
take the response of the opposing party. Perhaps I mumbled it unclearly
because the defendant’s attorney started to read the whole brief. I saw that
I couldn’t change it any more and I gave up trying.  The whole lot was read,
and I saw in their faces that they were not prepared to correlate individual-
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ly itemized claims and responses to them. That’s why it was such a massive
reading and both the attorneys started to yawn.
This disturbance was the result of the judge’s innovative attempt to conduct
the proceedings more actively and, in fact, to create a qualitatively new script
for the proceedings. Paradoxically, this is probably, at the same time, one rea-
son why the innovative attempt failed: it was outside the familiar, generally ac-
cepted script. The judge explained his intentions in the interview:
Excerpt 7.20 Interview with the judge after the 4
th
 hearing
Judge: Usually the attorneys just throw in their proof and we just receive
the briefs, and next time we get together and respond to them. Anyway,
that wasn’t the original idea. You could immediately ask the opposing party
for their reactions. Do they contest or admit. We could have discussed ev-
ery statement right away. Usually, when we don’t usually proceed in that
way, then the case just becomes a blur. This was my starting point, but the
plan didn’t work because the advocate read the whole brief.
The judge’s innovation attempt was very tentative and fragile. He did not
carry out his plan, and gave it up when the others did not instantly understand
it. He hid his objectives, and by his silence he retained his formal neutrality.
Compared to the judge’s strong comment in the new proceedings (Excerpt 7. 18)
when the attorneys did not follow his idea of the script, the difference is strik-
ing and nicely illustrates one aspect of uncontrolled vs. controlled discourse.
Perhaps the innovation also failed and became a disturbance because the old,
generally accepted script was not explicitly replaced by the new and unusual
script at the beginning of the session. The judge had planned to change it quite
radically but did not explain his plans clearly enough in this case. This may also
explain the origins of the disturbances in the old proceedings more generally.
The disturbances resulted from the participants’ counting on a general script,
and a mutually explicated, case-related, local script could possibly have prevented
them.
The disturbance in the new proceedings was actually a potential one. As can
be seen, the deviation from the presumed script, the potential disturbance, led
to a discussion charting the possibilities for a settlement. This episode occurred
at the very end of the preliminary hearing as the judge was actually finishing the
proceedings.
158
Excerpt 7.21 The new proceedings, the preliminary hearing in May
1997
Judge: Yep. Thank you.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Thank you. [intending to stand up]
Defendant’s attorney: Will the court make a proposal for settlement in this
case?
Judge: That was quite a surprising move! [laughing] I exactly didn’t expect
it!
Defendant’ attorney: I mean, we’ve now gone through it thoroughly from all
angles.
Judge: [becoming serious] Yes, well. You mean a proposal for a settlement
by the court?
Defendant’s attorney: Uh-huh
Judge: Well, we’ve talked a lot about the possibility of a settlement, but
making a proposal is (...) but of course, if the parties ask for a proposal.
Now, one party has asked for it, will the other one also [wipes his knees
with his hand for 3 seconds]. Then, another question is the character of the
case and that sort of thing. I’d think this depends so much on the evidence
you’re going to present, so I won’t make a proposal [looking at the defen-
dant’s attorney and shaking his head]. You know what the evidence will be,
I don’t. Where does it lead? You both know that what is coming [refers to
the main hearing] won’t be free of charge. The plaintiffs take the risk of
having to pay all the trial costs if they lose. Well I don’t know, are you both
insured for  your legal expenses according to the old conditions?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: No.
Defendant’s attorney: Whether old or new, in this kind of case, it doesn’t
help.
Judge:  I see, you mean the maximum limits for compensation are exceeded.
But as I said, I won’t make any proposal in the sense that the law intends. If
you’re willing to discuss it, I can help in several ways. But are there precon-
ditions for that [gestures by turning his palms up and then down again]?
The claims seem to be quite far apart, when everything is contested.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: The principals should definitely be present then.
Judge: But do you yourselves still see any realistic preconditions? As far as I
know, you have tried to settle.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: We have tried and we’re still quite far apart.
Defendant’s attorney: In this new situation, I have difficulties explaining to
my principals why they should pay anything at all.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Uh-huh.
Judge: That is something you both have to consider.
Defendant’s attorney: In principle, both of us as attorneys know how the
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land lies in the purchase of shares, in terms of fault and in what the com-
pensation for a purchase price is and what it requires.
Judge: This remains open and, primarily, the principals are the ones to de-
cide on this, but we could look into this a little [leads to a discussion on the
precedents of the Supreme Court concerning construction disputes].
Judge: Going through this kind of consideration you will get the idea [on
how to proceed], and you are sitting on the evidence. You may have an idea
where this is leading, I don’t. This case depends on the evidence you are go-
ing to present. But if you end up with a settlement, we also welcome that
solution.
Defendant’s attorney: If we can’t draw up a settlement in this kind of case,
we would be very lousy attorneys.
The main difference between these two disturbances is clear when they are
compared. The first one did not surface, but remained hidden as the judge did
not divulge his plans or open up a discussion on the matter. The second one was
only potential, as the judge first admitted being surprised and then started a dis-
cussion about settlement. If not directly contributing to the settlement, the dis-
cussion clarified the participants’ thoughts about it in this case.  In this sense,
this could be called an innovative disturbance, the explicit working out of which
resulted in an expanded sequence of practice.
7.8 Conclusions
Two critical dimensions emerge in this analysis of the general and local scripts
of the old and new court proceedings. First, the discourse appeared as either
uncontrolled / unrestricted or controlled / restricted. In the old case, the proceed-
ings were uncontrolled in the sense that they were controlled not by the court,
but rather by the parties, and unrestricted discourse was relied on in the pur-
suit of justice33. In the new case, the proceedings were actively controlled by the
court and the process was legitimated by the restricted discourse in the prelim-
inary hearing.
33
 Paradoxically, unrestricted discourse was not enough in the pursuit of justice, as the imme-
diacy was missing in the old proceedings. In the case analyzed here, the defendants finally
considered themselves as having lost the case which according to the defendant’s attorney, was
due to the fact that the judge who started the proceedings decided to hear the testimony (see
Excerpts 7.5, 7.8 and 7.9), and the one who finally decided the case could not understand the
importance of the testimony in rejecting the claim. One is tempted to ask whether explicit
reflection on the script, documented in the court files, could have prevented such a discrepan-
cy in the judges’ interpretations.
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Secondly, the discourse of the script construction appeared as either formal
or informal. This dimension is defined on the basis of the key finding concern-
ing the formal and informal characteristics of the discourse first reported in
Chapter 6, and furthered and reinforced when the actions in the construction
of the script were brought to light. The scripting episodes in the old proceed-
ings represented formal discourse with monological features of individually
determined speech turns, and the formality overwhelmed the explicit reflection
on the script. In the new proceedings, on the other hand, such episodes revealed
a more informal and dialogic way of interacting and sharing the script construc-
tion. The informal discourse and personal comments helped to make the script
visible and explicit.
The dimensions of the proceedings are depicted as a matrix in Figure 7.4. The
prototype of the discourse in the old proceedings appears as formal and uncon-
trolled /unrestricted, and in the new proceedings as informal and controlled /
restricted.
A similar kind of conclusion on the differences between the old and the new
procedures was drawn by Niemi-Kiesiläinen (1998, pp. 63–64). She emphasizes
the fact that the ultimate aim of both procedures is to reach the material truth,
but the methods are different. Formerly, the idea was to ensure that all the trial
materials were available to the court. Bringing new material again and again
resulted in series of postponed hearings, but the trial materials were exhaustive.
The material truth is still the main objective in the new proceedings, but the
understanding of how it is reached is radically different: the materially correct
decision is arrived at with the help of oral, immediate and centralized input
(Niemi-Kiesiläinen, 1998, p. 63). In a similar vein, Laukkanen (1995, p. 4)
emphasized the differing ways of achieving legitimacy: whereas formal author-
ity was regarded as the source of legitimacy in the old proceedings, the new ones
rely on careful and rational preparation of the case.
In the old case, for the judge the main source of tension in the actual con-
ducting of the proceedings was the pressure to move from uncontrolled and
unrestricted towards more controlled and restricted discourse. As he said when
he was interviewed, the case was “happily upside down” and out of his hands.
The innovation that became a disturbance, namely the judge’s attempt to con-
trol and organize the discussion and restrict the reading of the claims to one item
at a time (Excerpt 7.10), could be interpreted as his effort to resolve the tension
and move the discourse in a more restricted direction, thus to regain control of
the proceedings (depicted by the shaded arrow on the left on the matrix). Simi-
larly, the judge’s questioning whether the witness should be heard or not
(Excerpt 7.5) was an attempt to move the proceedings in a more controlled and
restricted direction.
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Figure 7.4 Dimensions of the Proceedings and the Emerging Pressures
The tension in the conduct of the new case appeared, paradoxically, as pres-
sure to move from controlled and restricted towards more uncontrolled and
unrestricted discourse. In fact, the actual course of the proceedings in the
observed case – the first preliminary hearing and the extended preliminary hear-
ing three months later – was an expression of this tension. The extended pre-
liminary hearing could be viewed as the actual transition from restricted to more
unrestricted discourse (depicted by a broken line in the matrix). This was a clear
deviation from the general script explicated in the procedural code (see the
model in Figure 7.2) and also from the wishes of the judge (see Excerpt 7.18).
Extended preliminary hearings are held so frequently in Finnish lower court
practices that it is more the rule than the exception. This suggests that in the
actual court processes, for some reason or other, the idea of a single preliminary
hearing does not function as the Procedural Code intended. In practice, there
seems to be pressure to loosen the restricted discourse by arranging continued
preliminary hearings.
The tension in the new proceedings also appeared as concrete attempts to
shift from controlled to uncontrolled processes. The situations in which the
attorneys’ actions tested the limits of the local script were often attempts to get
the case handled in a more uncontrolled and unrestricted way, as it was in the
The old 
proceedings
The new 
proceedings
Formal
Unontrolled/
unrestricted
Informal
Controlled/
restricted
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old procedure. Trying to move on to issues that were not in order, referring to
arguments that had not yet been presented in the hearing  (Excerpt 7.15), and
asking for an adjournment (Excerpt 7.18) were attempts to turn back to more
uncontrolled proceedings (depicted by the shaded arrow on the right of the
matrix).
The controlled and restricted nature of the preliminary hearing in the new
procedure has raised discussion among judicial professionals. On the one hand,
attorneys in particular have seen the rigidity as a threat and as a disadvantage
of the new system over the old one. One attorney, Mr. Ruokonen, said in his
interview, “You cannot correct mistakes once the case has been presented. In
every situation, you have to be more prepared than before. In the old proceed-
ings, if something was forgotten, you could return again to the issue in the next
session” (Ahvenniemi, 1997, p. 17). On the other hand, some others would like
to restrict the discussion even more in the preliminary hearing and alter the sig-
nificance of the different phases in the process in order to make the idea of con-
trolled and restricted discourse work properly. A working group established in
1998 to prepare a suggestion for adjusting the new civil procedure34 stated that,
in the current proceedings, the main deviation from the intended procedure is
that issues are shifted to the preliminary hearing when they should not be dis-
cussed until the main trial. The preliminary hearing has actually become the
“main hearing”. The new proceedings are “front loaded” and thus increasing the
trial expenses (Riita-asiain oikeudenkäyntimenettelyn kehittäminen, 2000).
All this illustrates the dilemma of conducting court processes at the cross-
roads of old and new procedures. As far as the legislation is concerned, the old
procedural script has been completely replaced by the new one. In the actual
cases, however, the court processes are a mixture of old, deep-rooted routines
and new, divergent applications of the written script. This work supports the idea
of studying court processes as scripts, in which the interpretation of the
general script is constructed through and in local action. The local construction
of the general scripts of procedural law also implies that the interpretation and
concrete contents of the procedural reform are, to a great extent, given by the
practitioners in their daily practices, rather than that implementation is merely
adaptation to pre-given models (see Chapter 3).
34
 Problems of cost and delay after the new procedural law led to the establishment of a work-
ing group by the Ministry of Justice to consider whether the problems could be overcome by
making some adjustments and refinements to the Procedural Code.
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The starting point of the analysis was that interaction is essentially and in
all conditions a collaborative accomplishment of the participants. Chapter 7 has
demonstrated an emergent shift in the collaborative nature of litigation. Whereas
the proceedings before the procedural reform were mostly individually deter-
mined as a series of individual contributions with only minimal joint reflection
over the script, those after the reform seemed to rely more on collaboration and
joint negotiation over how to proceed in each case. After the reform, the pro-
cess was clearly controlled by the judge, who used ultimate power in the court-
room, but the script for the proceedings was constructed and maintained more
collaboratively and informally than before in interaction between the judge and
the parties. This finding reinforces my preliminary observations, introduced in
Chapter 6, concerning the more intensive and joint construction of the object
and more dialogic discourse in the courtroom.
It seems that, thus far, there has been some shift in courtroom discourse
rather than a fundamental, observable sea-change in Finnish court proceedings.
This may remain an important but still rather modest change towards a more
dialogical style of litigation, which still sustains the traditional division of labor
between the judge and the parties, and maintains the judges’ long-established
practice in working with clients and cases. At the same time, research findings
indicate an expansive potential for a qualitatively new kind of teamwork, which
invites parties not only to compete with each other, but also to collaborate with
each other and with the judge to maintain the feasible handling of the case. The
potential expansion resides in the new kind of informal communication, which
was brought into the proceedings through the principle of orality (see Chapter
2), and which, at least in principle, enables them to be constructed as a process
of collaborative problem solving, in the spirit of negotiation. In the context of
litigation activity in Finnish district courts, the zone of proximal development
could be considered an open and dialogic way of working, where the most
appropriate ways to proceed are negotiated, where any possible disturbances in
the flow of the process are worked out, and where the conventional antagonism
between the parties is mediated through the encouragement of joint problem
solving.
Chapter 7 has shown that the future expertise in courts will emerge as inter-
action and communication between legal professionals. The construction of the
object and the meta-level discourse concerning how to proceed seem to take
place in communication between professionals. Do the zone of proximal devel-
opment and the expansion in the object of court work only affect the legal pro-
fessionals, or do they involve the clients as well? In Chapter 8, I will focus my
attention on the clients in the cases, and on their position in constructing a court
case.
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8 Client Initiatives and Their Effects on
Courtroom Interaction
8.1 Introduction: Tradition of Marginalizing the Clients in the Hearings
Citizens’ trust in the court system was examined recently in Finland (Niskanen,
Ahonen & Laitinen, 2000). The results of the study showed that people’s trust
in the courts in the 1990s had diminished slightly from the 1980s and from the
end of the 1960s, when the previous surveys were conducted. In 2000, 67.6 per-
cent of the public regarded the activity of courts as successful (ibid., pp. 26–28).
An interesting detail for my study was that the more experiences people had of
having a case in court, the less they trusted in the court system. This means that
those who had no experience of litigation were the most satisfied with the work-
ing of the courts (ibid., pp. 47–48). However, when the clients of one particular
district court were interviewed two weeks after their appearance there, this sys-
tematic pattern was broken: those currently involved in or fresh from a court
case were even more satisfied with the system than those who had never been
involved in a lawsuit. (Niskanen, Ahonen & Laitinen, 2000, pp. 147–149).
The authors of the study do not discuss these contradictory findings. Indeed,
the results are difficult to interpret. Do they mean that the courts are generally
functioning poorly, but well in that one particular district court? Or do they
mean that when people think about courts in general they express dissatisfac-
tion, but when thinking about one case in particular they tend to be more
satisfied. These results also reveal the problems of studying trust as a statistical
phenomenon: Trust is probably not best understood as a general and static
matter of opinion, but rather as something which evolves and becomes produced
in various forms of interaction between clients and courts (see Tyler, 1997).
 The general secularization of authorities in society has also touched the court
system. Trust in courts is no longer based on formal authority, but has to be
constructed case by case through the actual court proceedings and reasoned sen-
tences. The findings on procedural justice (see chapter 2.4) lead us to believe that
experiencing trust is connected to fair and legitimate processes (e.g., Tyler, 1990;
1997). People trust the justice system if they see that court decisions are reached
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by procedures seen as fair. Thus, developing the processes – how the cases are
handled in the courtroom interaction – is vital to increasing people’s trust in the
courts. In this, clients’ opportunities to participate and make their voices heard
in their own trials are likely to be crucial.
However, in a number of studies so far, the position of lay clients in court
hearings has been seen as weak and their chance to influence procedures as min-
imal (see Chapter 2.3).  Referring to studies done in Germany, Messmer (1997,
p. 138) claims that clients’ negotiation position in court is weak and their sta-
tus mostly that of a mere provider of information. Their ability and willingness
to provide complex descriptions of facts also diminishes when their communi-
cation becomes hindered. Messmer (1997, p. 138) argues that lay persons are
prevented from presenting themselves as factually competent speakers. Similarly,
Conley and O’Barr (1998, p. 21) point to the highly unusual rules of courtroom
conversations. Following the principles of Conversation Analysis, they state that
institutional settings such as the courtroom employ the basic rules of everyday
conversation, but modify them in important ways. These courtroom-specific
rules specify, for example, that lawyers ask questions and witnesses answer them,
and that the judge oversees the system of turn-taking, monitors the substance
of what is discussed, and resolves interactional problems when they arise. As the
authors argue, such institutional rules help the court to carry out its assigned
task of trying cases. At the same time, they have the effect of empowering
lawyers linguistically over the witnesses they examine. “From the outset, the
structural arrangements for talking in court do not privilege all speakers in the
same way” (Conley & O’Barr, 1998, p. 21).
The weak position of clients in court is evident in my data on the civil pro-
ceedings from before the procedural reform. In the old proceedings, represent-
ed by Cases 1, 2 and 3, the clients were present in two out of the three cases.  In
Case 1, the plaintiff was present in three hearings out of seven. Similarly, two
representatives of the defendant were present in three hearings. In Case 2,
neither of the principals participated in the hearings.  In the four separate hear-
ings of Case 3, the plaintiff was present once and the defendant twice. What is
important is that, in these hearings before the reform, the clients did not par-
ticipate in the discourse with their own turns of talk, but were totally represented
by their attorneys.
The following excerpts illustrate what kind of reasons the clients gave for their
silence in the hearings:
Excerpt 8.1 Case 3, interview with the defendant after the 2
nd
 hearing
Interviewer: Do you remember, this judge asked you at the end of the hear-
ing whether you would like to say anything?
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Defendant: Well you see, she recognized that I was kind of “arghh”, as I was
so furious when it was prolonged again. She saw in my face that there was
something, and asked just because of that. But I couldn’t comment, because
Pauli [her attorney] had my proxy. I couldn’t say “blast it, give us some
decision”, so that we can end this.
Interviewer: But you didn’t say that?
Defendant: No, no I couldn’t. It would have been a vote of no confidence in
Pauli. He had said that it would serve both parties to postpone the pro-
ceedings, so I couldn’t go against him, he has the proxy. I have to abide by
what he says.
Excerpt 8.2 Case 1, interview with the defendant after the 7
th
 hearing
Interviewer: How about the judge, at the end of the hearing, he asked if you
would…?
Defendant: No, Hallvik [refers to her attorney] just looked at us and said
“no”. I asked him later why he didn’t allow us to speak, and he answered
that he [unclear whether she refers to the attorney or to the judge] would
have fainted. I really don’t know if it’s possible in that kind of situation to
say anything more.
Interviewer: But what if someone asks you if you have anything to say?
Defendant: But you know, thus far we have not been asked, only Hallvik
has.
Interviewer: I think he [the chair] asked if the principals had anything and I
interpreted it that he mentioned you in particular.
Defendant: Or is it again just one of those phrases that you have to respond
to, but it’s not the style that you start to say anything because the verdict is
already there, ready to be announced.
The clients’ accounts reveal that even when the judge offers the floor to them,
it is extremely difficult to take it. As reasons for this, the accounts point to two
important factors: the attorneys act as dampers between the court and the client
(for a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 4), and either in the client’s mind
or in reality, they inhibit the client’s own verbal contributions; on the other hand,
the judges make their offer to the clients at the very end of the hearings when
the substance has actually already been discussed. Välikoski (1996, p. 102)
described how the judges offered each party an equal number of opportunities
to speak, and often just before the judgment asked if the parties had anything
to add. The same idea of “just asking” for the sake of tradition or to be on the
safe side is expressed in the interview with the judge in Case 1.
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Excerpt 8.3 Case 1, interview with the judge after the 7
th
 hearing
Interviewer: Can you remember, at the very end of the hearing, you asked if
these principals had anything to say?
Judge: Well, I just in general, as they were anyway there on the spot. They
have a right to speak, you know, it was just a very general question. They
had been there as silent figures and I just thought they might have had
something.
In Excerpt 8.2, the defendant clearly recognized the formal or ritualistic
character of this offering. Altogether the comments made by the clients showed
that, in the interactional context of everybody else having finished their state-
ments, it is almost impossible for them to the take the floor and start to
develop arguments of their own. The dynamics of courtroom interaction in the
civil proceedings before the reform were described in Chapters 6 and 7. The
result of these dynamics, the marginalized position of the client, is evident in
the following two excerpts which form the developmental story of a client’s ideas
before and after getting to court.
The following episode, related to Case 1, took place in an interview in which
I and the plaintiff were looking at a video, recorded in the 4th hearing, where the
plaintiff himself was not present but two of the defendants were.
Excerpt 8.4 Case 1, interview with the plaintiff after the 4
th
 hearing
Plaintiff: Let’s take a look at the point where Pertti and Kerttu [refers to the
defendants] speak, that’s what interests me now.
Interviewer: I think the situation was that they didn’t say anything there.
Plaintiff: Didn’t they?
Interviewer: No.
Plaintiff: Weren’t they admissible?
Interviewer: It happened that they weren’t asked anything and they didn’t
themselves indicate that they had anything to say.
Plaintiff: I thought that -, but we agreed with Kurki [his attorney] that, I
said that I would come next time, if just that would do. I’d give my own
point of view.
The plaintiff was present in the two hearings that followed, but contrary to
his plans, he did not take the floor. In a telephone interview after the decision
had been given, he gave the following explanation:
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Excerpt 8.5 Case 1, interview with plaintiff after the 7
th
 hearing
Interviewer: Would you have liked to speak there on some occasion or get
your voice heard in some way?
Plaintiff: Well no, but it doesn’t make any diffe-, but, you see, in principle I
can bring up the issues through Kurki [his attorney]. They don’t rate my
statements at all there, so in principle, it’s no use to talk.
The two excerpts from different points of time reveal how the client learned
the system and his own position within it. Excerpt 8.5, however, shows the
dilemma behind his words. In addition to the explicit disappointment, the
frequent use of the word “but” reveals his ambivalence about the events in court.
He uses these conversational tactics in trying to make sense of his contradicto-
ry experiences in court (see Billig & al., 1988).
Findings on procedural justice emphasize the role of the process in the
determination of whether people experience trials as legitimate and fair, and
courts as trustworthy. On the other hand, studies on institutional conversation
and discourse in the courtroom report on one-sided communication and inter-
actional asymmetry, which were also detectable in my own data on the tradi-
tional litigation process in Finland. The implementation of the procedural
reform calls attention to the clients’ participation and collaboration with the
legal professionals when working on a court case. Even though the new proce-
dure requires neither the client’s presence nor his or her participation, the
possibilities for actual participation in the proceedings are more real. In the
following I will examine whether or not the implementation of the reform has
brought about new ways of being a client or new forms of collaboration between
legal and lay participants in civil proceedings. On the basis of my empirical
analysis I will try to determine whether the black and white picture of suppres-
sion and asymmetry in interaction dominate, or whether there are seeds for
development and change to be found.  The absence of client contributions in
the proceedings before the reform explains why the analysis in this chapter is not
based on a comparison between the old and new proceedings. Here the
focus is on the new proceedings and the developmental potential in them.
From an activity-theoretical perspective, what the participants are actually
doing in the proceedings is transforming the object of their activity – trying to
give the problem a form in which it can be solved. In the new procedure, the
problem is solved either traditionally by making the decision or – what is new
– by settling the dispute. This transformation is produced through making claims
in which the experienced “wrong” is conceptualized into a judicially meaning-
ful, often monetarily measurable form, through responding to the other party’s
claims, and through giving evidence to support one’s own statements
and to counteract the other party’s statements. What is considered as relevant
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information in the process of transformation was previously mostly individu-
ally determined by the participants but, after the reform, is negotiated to an
increasing extent collaboratively in the courtroom interaction (see Chapters 6
and 7).
One of my key questions is: What is the task of the client in the negotiation?
In procedural law, the client is mainly defined by his or her judicial role as a
plaintiff or a defendant, through his or her judicial rights and obligations in the
proceedings. From an interactive point of view, he or she is described in the law
as an important informant giving information about the disputed issue (Gov-
ernment Bill 15/1990, pp. 13, 28, 35). The purpose of analyzing client talk in the
courtroom is to give a more detailed picture of the client in the proceedings –
not just in a judicial role, but as somebody taking part in the transformation of
the dispute. He or she may not only give information, but also seek to affect the
way the dispute is being constructed. Here, the initiatives of the client serve as the
key tool for the analysis of his or her attempts to participate in the negotiations.
The research questions addressed in this chapter are:
1. What kind of initiatives do the clients take in the courtroom interaction?
2. What kind of an impact can these initiatives have on the proceedings?
3. Did the procedural reform of 1993 lead to any changes in client
contributions?
8.2 Initiatives
What, then, is an initiative? Different traditions of studying talk and interaction
have approached initiatives from varying viewpoints. Even so, they are rarely
analyzed in studies on institutional discourse, and are mostly understood in con-
versation analysis as topic initiations, thus connected to topics and topic changes
(e.g., Button & Casey, 1985; Maynard, 1980; Vehviläinen, 1999).
Lacoste (1981) studied medical consultations in hospital and drew conclu-
sions on the underlying control systems. Because of the doctor’s medical exper-
tise and intention to work towards the patient’s good, control of the encounter
is entirely in the hands of the doctor, who may interrupt the patient whenever
she or he likes. The patient has the role of a possessor of data. This leads to a
one-directional relationship in which the doctor sets questions in order to guide
the interaction, and the patient responds strictly to these questions. The effect
of this routine is to make the patient a passive partner without initiative (ibid.,
pp. 169–170.)
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The expert’s dominance has its limits, however. Lacoste showed how patients
attempt to counteract the prevailing model of the medical interview, or even try
to influence the outcome of the consultation. She poses the question: “In this
forced and unequal situation whose outcome is not completely known in
advance, how can the patient make his or her needs known?” (p. 170).
Lacoste (ibid., p. 175) looks for an answer in different approaches, one of
them focused on the patient’s initiatives. Her starting point is that if there is
active participation by the patient, it must translate into verbal initiatives. She
suggests the following definition of an initiative: An initiative is a verbal act
which 1) is not a response to the explicit contents of a preceding act nor to an
implicit content accepted by the two participants, 2) calls for a response. She
found that initiatives in medical consultations are surrounded by introductory
metacommunicative phrases and clauses that mitigate the possible violation of
the other participant’s territory.
She found four different interactional functions that the initiatives serve:
1. Contribution of information with a view to cooperating in making the
diagnosis
2. Request for information with a view to achieving personal objectives in
terms of access to the diagnosis
3. Request for information with a view to cooperating in carrying out the
prescribed treatment
4. Contribution of information with a view to contesting a diagnosis or
a prescribed treatment.
Whereas Lacoste defines initiatives in the context of the medical encounter
according to what interactional function they serve, Linell (1998) takes a more
linguistic starting point and emphasizes the dialogic nature of discourse
contributions. He sees all the contributions to dialogue related to their local
contexts (their preceding and following units) in a Janus-like manner where what
is said is always in response to what was said before and in anticipation of what
comes next. While utterances are dependent on prior utterances, they
simultaneously create conditions for next utterances (Linell, 1998, p. 164). Linell
analyzed the dialogical nature of contributions in terms of a response-initiative
structure, meaning that each contribution is defined by its response links – its
relations to the prior contributions in the discourse – and by its initiative links
– its relations to the anticipated continuation in the discourse (pp. 164–166).
Discourse contributions fall into different categories depending on the
strength of the initiatory aspect with respect to the responsive aspect. Some con-
tributions display a rough balance between the responsive and initiatory aspects,
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thus being initiatives that are relevant responses to the other’s preceding turns.
When the responsive aspect dominates, we have responses – at the extreme, min-
imal responses, where the actor answers the question only in terms of what was
asked. When the initiatory aspect dominates, we see “pure” or “free”
initiatives, where the contribution is not tied to the prior discourse and the
actor is free to bring up a new topic (Linell, 1998, p. 169). Initiative-Response
(IR) Analysis (Linell, 1998; Adelswärd & al., 1987) is a coding system where the
discourse contributions are placed in twenty different categories according to the
type of combination of responsive and initiatory links they represent.
One part of Lacoste’s definition is that an initiative calls for a response. Linell
(1998, p. 170) differentiates soliciting initiatives, which are questions and
requests for immediate action, from non-soliciting initiatives, which may invite
but do not oblige continuation by the other. He notes, however, that the distinc-
tion between soliciting and non-soliciting initiatives is a fuzzy one, and when
the initiatives are coded, the distinction must be based on the formal proper-
ties of turns (Linell, 1998, p. 170).
In terms of initiatives, my study draws on both Lacoste’s and Linell’s
studies, but it also has its own starting points and characteristics. Given that my
aim is to examine the client’s attempts to participate in the negotiations, the fo-
cus of the analysis is on the client’s initiatives and on the effects they may have
on the interaction or, more broadly, on the proceedings. The legal profession-
als’ initiatives in the interaction are excluded. Another characteristic is that the
initiatives are studied specifically in relation to the dispute and to how the
dispute is constructed in the interaction. Thus, this analysis puts a strong
emphasis on the object of court work – object here being understood both as
the client of the court and as the dispute that is being negotiated.
8.3 Data
The data analyzed in this chapter consist of three court cases handled after the
court reform. The main data corpus is the court hearings, videotaped and tran-
scribed. This corpus is supplemented by interviews and court documents.
The three cases recorded after the court reform – Cases 4, 5 and 6 – were
introduced in Chapter 5.  Their main characteristics are summarized in Table
8.1.
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Table 8.1 The Cases Analyzed in Chapter 8
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Discursive Features of the Cases
In order to give an overview of the three analyzed court cases, I offer here some
general information and parameters concerning their discursive features. The
parameters are: 1. duration of hearing, 2. total number of each participant’s turns
in the hearing, 3. average length of each participant’s turns in the hearing, and
4. average number of participants in the discussion. Each parameter is first de-
scribed in detail, and then presented in a concluding table.
1. The duration of the hearing gives the duration of each session –
preliminary or main hearing – in hours.
2. The total number of each participant’s turns reveals how much the various
participants use the interactional space in each hearing. Only the preliminary
hearings are included here, because in the main hearings there are also witnesses
whose presence influences the interaction, usually by increasing the turns of the
attorneys as they ask questions and by reducing the turns of the judge while he
listens to the testimony.
3. The average length of each participant’s turn in a trial is an estimated
parameter, based on ten-page samples of each trial transcript. The samples were
chosen discretionarily from similar phases in the trials – the phase of going
through the demands and replies in detail – but randomly within that phase. This
parameter offers the opportunity to see whether the amount of talk differed
between the legal professionals and the lay persons. Inter-case variation in terms
of this parameter also reflects the general interactive type of session.
4. The average number of participants in the discussion is, again, an estimated
parameter, which is hard to define specifically. It is based on the same sample
of ten pages described above, and the number of different speakers per one page
of transcript is counted. The parameter is revealing when compared to the num-
ber of potential active speakers in the situation: For example, let us take con-
sider a hearing in which those present are the judge, the plaintiff, the plaintiff ’s
attorney and the defendant’s attorney, excluding the court clerk or court train-
ee, who are not potential speakers. The number of the potential active speakers
is four. If the average number of actual speakers on ten pages is between 3 and
4, we know that all the potential speakers have actively taken part in the dis-
course, because all the participants have used turns on almost every page of the
transcript. If the number is below three, the discourse does not constantly
involve every participant, and at least one person is out of it at any time.
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The parameters concern interaction in the preliminary or extended prelim-
inary hearings. The interaction in the main hearings takes a special form, for this
hearing consists mostly of the witness’s testimonies. If the extended pre-
liminary hearing can be clearly separated from the main hearing, as it is in Case
6, the parameters are also taken from that section.
In comparison with the civil proceedings before the court reform, Table 8.2
confirms the change in time scale: the case is now handled in two or three half-
day or whole-day meetings instead of several one-hour sessions. Instead of giving
long monologues, all the participants use turns that are more conversation-like
in length. All the judges use turns of almost equal length, except the one in the
preliminary hearing of Case 5, who takes slightly longer turns. There is a small
variation in the attorneys’ turns, which may reflect differences between attorneys,
but may also result from the special kind of discourse prompted by the different
phases of the negotiation. Taken together, the judges’ and the attorneys’ turns
are approximately of the same length.
The length of the clients’ turns varies from 7.3 to 25.1 words. In Case 4, the
result is ambiguous, as there are only two observations – turns with 1 and 24
words respectively- in the sample. However, as these observations show the
extremes of variation in all this client talk, we know that they are quite typical
in the context of this case. Case 5, where the average length of the client’s turns
was relatively high, 25.1 words, and Case 6, where it was rather low, 7.3 words,
reveals two different kinds of client orientation to the discourse. In Case 6, the
client used long turns with extensive explanations, but also constantly inserted
short confirmations (yes, sure, etc.) A high number of one-word utterances
makes the average length of turns relatively short, which in this case implies
dialogic and reciprocal interaction. The client also used long turns in Case 5, but
did not sprinkle in confirming utterances so frequently, and so the average length
of the turns was maintained.
The average number of participants in the discussion gives some hints about
the interactive character of the discourse in each case. In the preliminary hearing
of Case 4, where the average is 2.7 from the 5 potential speakers, the discourse
was mainly carried on between two or three participants. In this case, there was
one exceptional participant, the attorney of the secondary defendant, who was
present at the session only to listen to what was being discussed. The plaintiff
spoke rather seldom. The preliminary hearings in Cases 5 and 6 seem to show
more balanced interaction, since at least three, but quite often all four
participants were active in speech.
Viewing the general discursive features of the hearings suggests some
differences – although quite minor – between the cases. Given the substantial
differences in reality and the different outcomes, the discursive features are
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surprisingly alike and do not reveal much of the possible qualitative differences.
A closer look at parameter 2, the number of each participant’s turns in the
hearing – this time as percentages (Table 8.3) –  yields more information.
Table 8.3 The Percentage of Each Participant’s Turns in the Preliminary Hearings
What arouses interest in Table 8.3 is the difference in the proportions of the
plaintiffs’ turns, which vary from two to twelve percent between the cases. This
closer look at the different participants’ contributions gives some hints of the
quality of the interaction in each case. In Cases 4 and 5, the plaintiffs and their
attorneys counted together speak as much as the defendant’s attorney alone, but
still essentially less than the judge. In Case 6, the defendant’s attorney speaks
clearly less than the plaintiff ’s attorney – and if the plaintiff and his attorney are
taken together, substantially less. Contrary to Cases 4 and 5, the plaintiff and his
attorney counted together use approximately the same number of turns as the
judge. Despite these differences – quite surprisingly – the proportion of the
judge’s turns is approximately the same in every case, a little less than half of all
the turns. This raises the question whether these statistical pointers conceal dif-
ferent ways of interacting and communicating in practice. Do these quantita-
tive differences also suggest differences in quality? Where do the differences arise
from? These questions gave rise to my methodological interest in creating a
method of analysis which could tap the qualitative differences in the court pro-
ceedings under investigation.
 CASE 4 CASE 5 CASE 6 
Judge 45 43 41 
Plaintiff’s attorney 25 21 28 
Defendant’s attorney 28 29 19 
Plaintiff 2 7 12 
Total  100% 100% 100% 
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8.4 Process of Analysis
The data analysis comprises the following steps. First, the court hearings were
divided into phases for the purpose of later analysis. Second, the initiatives of
the clients were defined and separated from other kinds of turns in the data.
Third, initiative categories were constructed from the data, and finally, the dif-
ferent effects of the initiatives were categorized.
1 The Phases of the Hearings
For the purposes of later analysis, the hearings of the cases are divided into
phases (Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6). The grounds for separating one phase from
another rest on three points. Firstly, civil procedural law sets some rules, which
give structure to the hearings. Secondly, court hearings feature extraordinary
discussion in which the participants most often name and articulate the topics
they are following. Thirdly, on some occasions the coherence of the discussion
may indicate the shift from one phase to another. The transformation from one
phase to another sometimes constituted a shifting phase in itself, which reflect-
ed the script of the proceedings. These shifting phases are marked with an as-
terisk (*) between the primary phases in the following tables.
Due to practical needs in the later analyses, the phases were determined only
for the parts of the proceedings in which at least one client was present. The
following tables present the phases of the analyzed cases separately for each case.
Table 8.4 Phases in the Hearing of Case 4
The first day of the preliminary hearing
1. Scripting and negotiating the further proceedings (57 turns)
* (8 turns)
2. The plaintiff’s demands and the defendant’s reply (74 turns)
* (10 turns)
3. The grounds for the demands and for the reply (276 turns)
* (42 turns)
4. The factors having contributed to the damage: the design errors and
    construction defects in the apartment (334 turns)
* (11 turns)
5. The detailed grounds for the demands and the replies (329 turns)
6. Further planning (74 turns)
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Table 8.5 Phases in the Hearings of Case 5
The preliminary hearing (Phases 1-9)
1. Starting the proceedings and looking for a possible settlement (45 turns)
* (1 turn)
2. General presentations (6 turns)
* (18 turns)
3. Reviewing the demands and the reply (32 turns)
4. The grounds for the demands (43 turns)
5. The grounds for the reply (10 turns)
* (1 turn)
6. The judge’s specifying questions: the point in time at which the plaintiff received
the information on the day-care place and the municipality’s efforts in arranging
the day care (179 turns)
* (1 turn)
7. The disputed and undisputed facts: reasonably set expectations for the
municipality, the plaintiff’s contributions to the damage prevention,
the relevance of a previous  decision of the Supreme Court for this case.
(254 turns)
8. Declaring the evidence the parties will bring to court (46 turns)
9. Arranging the date for the main hearing (65 turns)
The extended preliminary hearing and the main hearing (Phases 10-14)
The extended preliminary hearing
10. The proposal for a settlement (76 turns)
11. Correcting the minutes of the preliminary hearing, declaring the evidence,
the judge’s specifying questions (92 turns)
* (9 turns)
The main hearing
* (1 turn)
12. Hearing the plaintiff (73 turns)
13. Hearing the witness (169 turns)
14. The final statements and the claims for legal expenses (18 turns)
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Table 8.6 Phases in the Hearings of Case 6
The preliminary hearing (Phases 1-6)
1. Possible ways to settle the dispute (21 turns)
* (9 turns)
2. The plaintiff’s demands, their grounds, and the defendant’s reply with its
grounds (847 turns)
3. The defendant’s additional demands and the plaintiff’s reply (296 turns)
* (12 turns)
4. Negotiating how the evidence will be declared and the date for the main
hearing (81 turns)
5. The counter-claim: the plaintiff’s demands, their grounds and the defendant’s
reply with its grounds (174 turns)
6. Declaring the evidence and arranging the schedule for the further proceedings
(146 turns)
The extended preliminary hearing and the main hearing (Phases 7-14)
The extended preliminary hearing
7. Beginning the proceedings, the handling and deciding of the application for a
cost-free trial (77 turns)
8. Specifying and correcting the minutes of the preliminary hearing (43 turns)
* (6 turns)
9. The plaintiff’s demands and the defendant’s reply (332 turns)
10. Declaring the evidence and what will be proved with each piece (120 turns)
* (34 turns)
The main hearing
11. Hearing the executor of the partition of the joint property (221 turns)
12. Considering the material brought into the court: looking at the paintings
(64 turns)
13. Hearing the witnesses (562 turns)
* (13 turns)
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2 Identification of Initiatives
The second step was to select the units for analysis by taking a stance over what
an initiative is. Lacoste defined it as something that in itself is not a response,
but which demands a response. The latter part of the definition is problematic:
I found turns in the discourse turns that attempt to initiate something but that
are overlooked by other participants. These turns may still be called initiatives,
although perhaps failed ones. Linell, for his part, stressed the dual nature of each
turn with its responsive and initiatory aspects, and presented a detailed scheme
for analyzing the relative weight of these aspects. Linell’s detailed analysis is too
complicated for my purposes, for the interest of the present study does not lie
in the linguistic relationships, but in the content and the forms of the initiatives
in relation to the dispute.
Empirically, from the point of view of court practices, we know that clients
may answer the questions they are asked, or they may make a contribution to
the discourse without anyone’s asking.  In the historical context of court trials,
the role of the client has merely been to answer the questions, if the attorney
has not answered them on his or her behalf. In this context, all voluntary
contributions from the client are interesting and worth taking a closer look at.
Given the above-mentioned aspects, initiatives are defined here as the
contributions of the client to the courtroom discourse that are not direct and
mere answers to questions posed by others. By their linguistic form, initiatives
can be either contributions (statements, explanations, suggestions, arguments)
or questions and requests. The client’s turns that seem to be purely answers to
questions are excluded in this analysis, where the focus is on the initiatory
attempts. However, Linell’s ideas on the dialogicality of utterances are followed:
when an answer grows from being purely responsive to carrying with it a clear
initiatory aspect, it is interpreted as an initiative. The following excerpts illus-
trate how the responsive and initiatory elements have been interpreted, and
where the borderline between a response and an initiative has been set.
Example 1
Judge: Have you checked by calculation whether this claim is relevant at all?
Plaintiff: Yes, we have checked it, and the end result is different.
Example 1 illustrates an utterance which was interpreted as an answer due
to its relatively weak or missing initiatory aspects, and which was thus excluded
from the close qualitative analysis.
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Example 2
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Now we could ask the plaintiff if he left the apartment
in that condition?
Judge: Well, let’s hear it now, is it correct to say that the apartment was left
like this?
Plaintiff: As I already said, there had been people there emptying all the
closets and shelves on the floor, and here we can see the result [refers to a
photograph]. And they declared themselves that they had taken the closets
and shelves with them, and we have all the offence reports and pre-trial
investigation protocols available, which we can bring along if necessary.
Example 2 represents an utterance which starts as a mere answer to a ques-
tion, but that also contains elements that go beyond just answering what was
asked. Even the first parts of the turn are not exclusively responsive in so far as
the plaintiff does not answer simply yes or no, but volunteers an explanation of
his own. The most initiatory elements, which widen the dispute by suggesting
new evidence, are distinguished from the more responsive ones by being writ-
ten in italics. In this example, the client’s initiatory contribution that is embed-
ded in the answer, converts it into an initiative.
Example 3
Defendant’s attorney: In what capacity do you know this Kimmo Koivu?
[refers to the plaintiff ’s attorney]
Plaintiff: What relevance does that have? [laughing]
Example 3 shows a special way of turning an answer into an initiative. It
occurs when the client dodges the question with a counter-question.
The empirical analysis and interpretation of the data started at the same time
as the conceptual borderline between the initiatives and responses was drawn.
First, all the clients’ turns were marked, and those too incomplete for analysis
were left out. The incomplete turns were the ones interrupted by other partici-
pants, and sometimes also by the speaker him/herself. Secondly, the turns
interpreted as pure answers were extracted from the data and excluded from the
analysis. After these operations, I had a total of 296 client initiatives at hand for
qualitative analysis.
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3 Initiative Categories
The initiative categories were constructed on the basis of data-driven interpre-
tation. When qualitatively distinct categories are specified, it is the content of
the turn – what is being said – that is important. The initiatives differ from each
other in respect of how the client wants to affect the dispute. A basic kind of ini-
tiative, which the procedural law also recognizes, involves giving information.
The client explains, describes and specifies the dispute at hand, and brings
elements of his or her own to the prevailing topic. The data also reveals several
other functions that the initiatives may serve. The following list names and
defines ten initiative categories and gives examples of each one.
1. Expanding initiatives bring into the prevailing discussion a new concept or
a new perspective that gives the participants an opportunity to think about and
work on the dispute in a qualitatively new way. It could be assumed that such
initiatives are often connected to the fundamental questions of what the dispute
is about and what motivated it. One example would be a case in which, instead
of understanding the community of the defendant as an entire unity, the plain-
tiff attempted to understand the defendant’s activity as a contradictory organ
of several actors. A client’s fundamental suggestion to try to settle the dispute
instead of adjudicating it would embody an expanding initiative, which could
offer a new approach to its handling. Bringing new issues or elements into the
dispute does not make it expansive, but expansion seems to require a new and
alternative principle or concept through which to perceive it.
2. Extending, enlarging initiatives bring a new issue or item into the dispute,
or otherwise enlarge it from the form it had earlier. Typically, enlarging initia-
tives occur when the client presents new claims that have not been presented
earlier, suggestions for new witnesses or new evidence.
3. Questioning initiatives, in accordance with their name, question something
in the dispute or its handling, such as a statement presented, the way of proceed-
ing, or an ongoing topic in the discourse. Typical manifestations of question-
ing initiatives include turns such as “is this item really worth discussing?” or “I
don’t see the relevance of this question”. Basically, it could be assumed that the
questioning could lead either to closing the subject or to expanding it with a new
perspective.
4. Contesting initiatives occur when the client contests the statement presented
by the opposing party. Such initiatives are typically marked by clear negations
such as “I was not”, “it is not so” or “it did not happen”. They represent one of
the basic speech types in courtrooms, where contesting has also judicial
relevance.
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5. Alleging, claiming initiatives also come close to one of the basic speech types
in courtrooms, where everything alleged has to be taken into consideration in
the sentence. These initiatives include clear statements in support of some matter
or state of affairs, such as “my statements were not considered in the
partition” or “I did sell the car”. They also come close to explaining initiatives,
defined later, and are sometimes hard to distinguish from them although they
are usually stronger in claiming and taking a stand.
6. Correcting initiatives are those in which the client corrects or reshapes some
detailed what of what is presented, but does not contest or question the state-
ment as a whole. Such initiatives reflect the statements presented earlier either
by others or by the client her/himself. Typical examples include “Sorry, I said it
wrong, it was one thousand”, or “I’m sure you meant June, not July”. The differ-
ence between correcting initiatives and contesting initiatives is that the former
lead to correcting the presented information, whereas the latter leave the par-
ticipants in contest.
7. Explaining, specifying initiatives form a twofold category. On the one hand,
the client explains, describes and rationalizes the events or state of affairs
under dispute, and on the other hand, he or she specifies what has already been
stated. Conceptually, and some times empirically, these subcategories can be sep-
arated, but courtroom discourse contains a lot of turns in which the distinction
is difficult to make. Thus, in order to guarantee the reliability of the category,
the two types of initiative are treated as one. What is common to them is that
they are confined to giving information about the disputed matter. Thus, this
category contains initiatives which the procedural law understands as the client’s
basic task in the proceedings. Examples include “I sold the old car in June and
bought a new one in July”, and “We visited the apartment twice and looked
around very carefully”.
8. Confirming, strengthening initiatives direct either the speaker’s own or an-
other speaker’s statements. Confirmation occurs when the speaker affirms that
the statement is right, for example, “That’s correct”, or strengthens the statement
by giving new definitions or details, such as “As I already said, the car was brand
new”. Some confirming initiatives are produced by repeating one’s own or
another’s turn, sometimes literally. Repeating initiatives were not put in a cate-
gory of their own, because the main reason for repeating a turn was to confirm
the statement.
9. Stating initiatives refer to turns where the client expresses some state of
affairs in a way in which the utterance is “only a statement”, without a well-
defined relation to the subject matter. These initiatives are neutral in purpose,
and the speaker’s intention remains hidden. They do not aim at transforming
the dispute: they do not extend, correct or specify. Examples are difficult to find,
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as their stating and neutral property is revealed specifically in the context in
which they emerge. The following excerpt may serve as an example:
Plaintiff [asking the witness]: Have you had business with X.X.?
Witness: Only seldom.
Plaintiff: But you have had business with him?
Witness: He has bought some books from me. Yes, European History, two
hundred marks.
Judge: Would you mind now telling the court who this X.X is?
Plaintiff: He is her father [refers to the defendant]
Judge: Okay.
Witness: Well, he has just…
Defendant: ## He is 83 years old.
Witness: He just visited the exhibitions and so on. Came around the shop.
We’ve met on those occasions.
In this context, the defendant’s turn (in italics) is a stating initiative in the
sense that it seems to be irrelevant in the local context of the discourse. It might
be supposed that the defendant’s intention was to play down or question the
importance of the fact that the witness knew her father. However, this is only
the researcher’s speculation, especially so since the other participants in the
situation do not give any meaning to the turn either. Thus, stating initiatives
might be defined as initiatives without an explicit intention in relation to the
dispute.
10. Restricting, terminating initiatives are the client’s attempts to restrict or
reduce the issues at hand, or even to terminate the discussion on a specific
topic. Typically, these initiatives follow the form, “That has nothing to do with
this dispute”. They may be contesting or questioning in their tone, but they are
categorized as restricting/terminating when they contain elements of restrict-
ing the dispute.
The ten initiative categories differ from each other according to their rela-
tion to the prevailing topic. Contesting, alleging, correcting, specifying/explain-
ing, confirming and stating initiatives (categories 4–9) maintain the ongoing
topic and do not contain attempts to change it. In this sense, they are the
client’s initiatiory contributions to keep up the flow of the prevailing topic. Even
though the client may contest or correct something presented, he or she
approves the topic and continues it with his or her own turns. Conversely, ex-
panding, enlarging, questioning and restricting/terminating initiatives (catego-
ries 1–3 and 10) endeavor to change the prevailing topic. The first two involve
186
the client suggesting a new topic to discuss; with restricting/terminating initia-
tives, he or she suggests stopping the discussion, but does not necessarily offer
an alternative topic for its continuance. Questioning initiatives basically contain
two alternatives: terminating the topic or opening a new one by enlarging or
expanding.
To sum up, these ten initiative categories form two basic groups: topic-main-
taining and topic-changing categories. On a scale from the most expanding to the
most restricting, the most neutral are in the middle. In this case, the topic-main-
taining initiatives occupy the middle ground, and the topic-changing ones both
of the extremes.
In addition to these ten initiative categories, is a group of “secondary” initi-
atives, where the client verbally asks for the floor in order to initiate something.
These turns and their effects are also looked at.
4 The Effects of the Initiatives
After dividing the initiatives into the ten categories, I shifted the focus to their
apparent effects. Because the emphasis of this study is on the developmental
potential in the lay-professional collaboration and on drawing a picture of the
new ways of being a client in court, the effects of the initiatives could be con-
sidered as significant. The effects of the topic-changing initiatives (categories 1–
3 and 10) are now prioritised and analysed more closely, partly for reasons of
research economy, but mainly because their topic changing nature means that
they are most likely to have effects on the discourse. However, the analyses do
not concentrate only on the extremes, and also take account of the effects of the
topic-maintaining initiatives, although on a more general level.
In her study on medical interviews at a hospital, Lacoste (1981) analyzed not
only the patient’s initiatives, but also the medical responses given to them. She
found that patient initiatives were few, and most of them were likely to be
refuted, either as contrary to the diagnosis or as not worth considering.  She
observed the following typical ways of refusing these initiatives: 1. silence, 2.
formal acquiescence, 3. initiated but not terminated response, 4. response
announced but not given and 5. expressing another initiative rival to the first
(Lacoste 1981, p. 177). The only initiative that received immediate success in the
form of obtaining a response was a request for information to abide by the
prescribed treatment, which belonged to a situation that both the doctor and the
patient had accepted. The other initiatives were in the gray zone: according to
Lacoste (p. 177) they suffered from a confused status which was subject to dis-
agreement. The success of the initiatives in the long run depended on how per-
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sistent the client was, and on his or her interactional ability. There Lacoste em-
phasized the fact that what is more important than intermittent initiatives is the
entire strategy for putting forward one’s point of view.
In my study, the effects of the initiatives are not seen as mere implications
for the interaction, but mainly as implications for the dispute. The interest does
not lie so much in how people react to the client’s initiatives, but rather in what
happens to the dispute.
Here the effects of the client’s topic-changing initiatives are classified into
four different effect categories. Again, each category is briefly defined and illus-
trated with an example.
1. Instead of using Lacoste’s five categories of rejecting an initiative I decid-
ed to take the total bypass of the client’s initiative and rejection without explana-
tions as one category of effects. This category includes situations in which the
client’s turn is ignored by the other participants, and is thus totally passed over.
Rejection without explanation occurs when the client’s initiative is simply and
briefly denied. “Not now” or “We won’t take up this issue now”, as other partic-
ipants’ responses to the client’s initiative, are typical examples of rejections with-
out explanation.
2. The second effect category is called fracture and repair in the process, and
is divided into two sub-groups. The first sub-group includes instances when the
client’s initiative is treated in a smooth way, usually with one word or sentence
by one participant. On these occasions, the initiative has caused a break in the
process, which is then repaired by a short comment before the script is resumed.
This kind of repair work could also be called a smoothing process, and at least
sometimes it may be a question of containing the client’s initiatives in a social-
ly approvable way.
The second sub-group is repair, where the client’s initiative, whether actual-
ly accepted or rejected, calls for explicit discussion about procedure. Unlike the
first category, where the initiatives are rejected without explanation, this cate-
gory includes situations in which, even if rejected, they result in discussion, where
the rules and procedure are reflected upon. For that moment, the proceedings
become transparent for the client her/himself. The initiative may lead to a re-
jection, which is then explained away, for example, “Don’t comment now. Now
we can only ask questions of the witness, but later we can also comment.” It could
also lead to a longer debate on how to proceed. What is relevant is that the cli-
ent’s initiative does not change the topic, but imposes reflection on the possi-
bilities of changing it. This reflection is frequently surrounded by participants’
meta-talk. Here the break that resulted from the client’s initiative is not
smoothed over with an answer, but is taken as an opportunity for reflection and
explicit repair.
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3. The third effect category concerns situations in which the client’s initiative
leads to a change in the topic, supported by the other participants. Such a change
occurs for example, when the client suggests that the disputed paintings should
be evaluated by a professional, and the other participants approve this as a shared
new topic and start to discuss that issue.
4. The fourth effect category can be determined on the level of the whole
court case and its proceedings, when the client’s initiative has effects that go
beyond or at least are intended to go beyond the script of the proceedings: it may
have led to major changes in the proceedings or it may have affected the court
decision. My data only showed an indirect example of effects that went beyond
the script of the proceedings when the client initiated a new way of considering
the dispute. However, this not realized in the hearing, being ignored by the
attorneys during the proceedings. The interview data show however, that it was
considered by the judge when he made his decision, and was also re-evaluated
in the briefs when the parties appealed to the court of appeal.
8.5 Findings: Quantitative Results of the Analysis
The first step in the analysis was to distinguish from all the clients’ turns those
that were incomplete and impossible to analyze. As Table 8.7 shows, the clients
were interrupted by other participants in four out of the six hearings. If the
client frequently participated in the discussion, he or she was also likely to be
interrupted frequently. The proportion of interruptions was relatively similar in
each case at nine, 10 and 15 percent.
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Table 8.7 The Number of Client Turns Interpreted as Initiatives, Responses and
Interrupted Turns
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The interrelationship between the initiatives and the responses varied with-
in the hearings. As the table shows, in the preliminary hearings of Cases 5 and
6, and also in the main hearing of Case 6 – where the principals were not inter-
rogated as witnesses – the number of initiatives was two, three or even four times
bigger than the number of responses. The preliminary hearing in Case 4 was an
exception, the number of initiatives being remarkably smaller than the number
of responses. Responses were also twice as frequent as initiatives in the main
hearing of Case 5, as the principal was herself heard for the purpose of obtain-
ing evidence.
The numbers of initiatives in the different initiative categories in each case
are presented in Table 8.8.
Table 8.8 reveals, firstly, that the cases differed from each other in several
respects. In Case 4, for example, the client took only topic-maintaining initia-
tives, whereas Cases 5 and 6 featured both topic-maintaining and topic-
changing initiatives. Case 6 was particularly rich in explaining and confirming
initiatives, whereas Case 5 was the only one to carry expanding initiatives. This
calls for further study of the initiative profiles in each case, and these will be
returned to later in the analysis.
Secondly, the table shows that the most common type of client initiative was
explaining and specifying which, together with initiatives confirming and
strengthening what had been previously presented, formed the overall majority
of initiatives. However, there were several occurrences in all the initiative
categories. This seems to support the starting point of the analysis – that the role
of the client may be something other than only that of an informant – and lead
to consideration of the qualitative differences between the cases.
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Table 8.8 The Number of Initiatives in Each Case according to the Type of
Initiative Category
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8.6 Client Initiatives and Their Effects in Case 4: “Excuse me. I especially
said…”
1 Introduction and the Overall Profile of the Hearing
Case 4 was a dispute that concerned five principals altogether – a married cou-
ple as the plaintiffs, a divorced couple as the primary defendants and a man as
the secondary defendant. Of these five, one principal – one of the plaintiffs –
was present on the first day of the preliminary hearing. During the hearing, held
in a commodious meeting room, the plaintiff sat next to her attorney, opposite
the defendants’ attorneys and diagonally opposite to the judge and the court
clerk.
For the majority of the time, the plaintiff quietly listened to the proceedings.
Sometimes she whispered something to her attorney. During the six hours of the
hearing her turns were relatively few compared to the other cases in the data,
but compared to proceedings before the procedural reform, they offered tenta-
tive implications for a new, emerging type of client participation. Table 8.9
describes the phases of the hearing in which the client’s initiatives occurred in
Case 4.
Table 8.9 The Number of Client Initiatives in Each Phase of the Hearings
in Case 4
Hearing Phase Number of  
initiatives 
1. Scripting and negotiating the further proceedings - 
2. The plaintiff’s demands and the defendant’s reply - 
3. The grounds for the demands and for the reply 1 
4. The factors having contributed to the damage - 
5. The detailed grounds for the demands and the replies 2 
Preliminary 
hearing 
6. Further planning  1 
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2 The Initiatives during the Proceedings in Case 4
The plaintiff was silent in the first two phases of Case 4. In the third phase, where
the grounds for the demands and responses were presented, she wanted to cor-
rect her attorney’s statement (Excerpt 8.6). In my analysis, this was interpreted
as a correcting initiative.
Excerpt 8.6 Case 4, preliminary hearing
Judge: Do I understand correctly that they had forbidden the installation of
the blower and that the prohibition was not made during the repair work?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: No.
Judge: But the prohibition was made, but it was made because it would
have, the blowing would have caused…
Plaintiff ’s attorney: ## health problems and extra damage.
Plaintiff: Excuse me. I especially said as long as we live in the apartment. So, it
[the blower] cannot be placed there. For this particular reason that it is even
more dangerous.
Plaintiff ’s attorney:  Did this conversation occur in autumn ‘95? Before you
moved away?
Plaintiff: Yes.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Well, yes, excuse me, I said incorrectly that it was at the
beginning of the year 1996. This means that the blower had already been
discussed in autumn ‘95, after the damage had been recognized.
At first, the judge addressed his question to the attorney by naming the prin-
cipals as “they”. When the client noticed the false detail in her attorney’s and the
judge’s discussion, she interrupted with the polite opening “Excuse me”, and then
corrected the false detail concerning the point of time at which the blower was
discussed.  The simple opening nicely reveals the mode of interaction, where the
discourse mainly occurs between the professionals and the client is intervening
as if an outsider. The plaintiff ’s attorney’s last turn in the excerpt also brings out
an interesting aspect of the discourse: the plaintiff is the one to know the facts,
but it seems as if her information needed to be confirmed and re-presented by
the attorney in order to be considered. In the end, the plaintiff ’s initiative was
successful and what she said was taken into account.
The client was again silent in the fourth phase, in which the construction faults
were discussed, but participated more actively in the fifth phase, when the de-
tailed grounds for the demands were laid, than in the other phases. This was
mainly due to the several questions that she was asked during this phase.
Excerpt 8.7 includes several client responses, and thus illustrates the mode of
of  
s 
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interaction. All of the client’s responses in Case 4 were aimed at giving more
detailed information on specific points in the dispute – in this excerpt on the
closets and curtain rods, the inclusion of which in the purchase price was in con-
test.
Excerpt 8.7 Case 4, preliminary hearing
Defendant’s attorney: Perhaps this would be a good moment for me to ask
what Mrs. Vuori’s  personal opinion is about what closets we are now talk-
ing about. What kind of closets are now included… so that we could reach
a more specified (—).
Plaintiff: In the children’s room there were kind of wood-like closets, one
unit.  Then there were also white closets, there were four of them, I’d
remember. They had mirrors in the doors.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: You mean in the bedroom?
Plaintiff: They are bedroom closets.
Defendant’s attorney: How about the hallway?
Plaintiff: There is kind of place in the hallway where you can put outdoor
clothes, a kind of closet with mirrored doors.
Defendant’s attorney: Are there curtain rods in every room? Are we now
talking about the curtain rods in every room? In your opinion?
Plaintiff: There are curtain rods in every room.
Defendant’s attorney: What kind of curtain rods are they, in your opinion?
Plaintiff: Wooden. Curtain rods.
Defendant’s attorney: Are the painted or are they wooden?
Plaintiff: Both.
Defendant’s attorney: How many are there?
Plaintiff: Five.
Defendant’s attorney: This is all that comes to mind?
Plaintiff: Yes.
[A pause of 12 seconds]
Judge: In the hallway, one closet, was that so?
Plaintiff: Uhm.
Judge: In the bedroom?
Plaintiff: In the bedroom there’s a wooden children’s closet.
Judge: And then?
Plaintiff: In the loft, there are, I think I remember, three closets. Three kind
of white closets for clothes.
Judge: Are there mirrors or?
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Plaintiff: Yes, there are mirrors.
Judge: (—) wooden curtain rods?
Plaintiff: Yes, five.
The majority of the client’s turns in Case 4 were answers to other participants’
questions. Of the client’s eighteen responses in the hearing, the episode related
in Excerpt 8.7 contained thirteen. It is clear that many of the responses were
minimal responses. In this sense, the principal seemed to carry out the
traditional role of a lay client in asymmetrical interaction, familiar from previ-
ous studies (Adelswärd & al., 1988; Conley & O’Barr, 1998). What was not so
typical, and could also be seen as problematic from the traditional procedural
point of view, was that most of the questions to the client were posed by the
opposing party’s attorney. Traditionally, the attorneys are not allowed to be in
contact with the opposing party’s principal if she or he has an attorney repre-
senting her or him. The discussion in this hearing, supposed to be an open
discussion between the participants about the relevant items, is thus at the cross-
roads between the old ethical traditions and the new forms of interaction. The
old ethical rules have to be tested and negotiated again in the preliminary hear-
ing. This movement within the gray zone is clear from the defendant’s attorney’s
cautious opening at the beginning of this episode – “Perhaps this would be a
good moment for me to ask” – and the explanation for asking – “so that we could
reach a more specified (—)”.
Later in the same phase, the plaintiff was asked about the child’s insurance.
The answer given to the question had an initiatory aspect, which suggested that
the answer should be interpreted as a specifying initiative (Excerpt 8.8).
Excerpt 8.8 Case 4, preliminary hearing
Defendant’s attorney: On this matter, I would ask when this insurance was
taken?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Do you remember when you took out the insurance?
Plaintiff: It was taken three months before the child was born. According to
the policy conditions.
Defendant’s attorney: On this matter, I state that the insurance existed
before the apartment sale, and it would have been in force in any case, even
without the sale.
In the above excerpt, a minimal response, which seemed to be typical of this
client, would have been the first sentence of her turn. However, she continued
with the addition “According to the policy conditions”. At first, this addition may
sound odd or surprising, but in the legal context it may be seen as the plaintiff ’s
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attempt to resist the defendant’s attorney’s phrasing of the question by justifying
her only possible course of action when taking out the insurance. This addition
is interpreted as an explaining/specifying initiative. As a result of the plaintiff ’s
response and initiative, the defendant’s attorney received the information she
needed in order to go ahead.
The next initiative occurred some minutes later, again in the same phase.
Excerpt 8.9 Case 4, preliminary hearing
Defendant’s attorney: How many days did this move take?
Plaintiff: It took some…you mean altogether? You mean to Viljakuja and
from Viljakuja?
Defendant’s attorney: Yes.
[A pause of 4 seconds]
Plaintiff: Five days.
Defendant’s attorney: In addition to this, the defendants consider high this
demand of 10,000 marks. Even a removal firm does not charge this much
for moving an ordinary private home.
The plaintiff started answering the defendant’s attorney’s question, but then
turned her answer into a specifying question (“You mean altogether?”). Given
the pause of four seconds before the final answer, it appears that the client was
buying more time to think about her response. By using this discursive tool of
asking a question of her own, she could manipulate the time needed for answer-
ing. This initiative is interpreted as an explaining/specifying initiative.
The client expressed her fourth initiative – the last one – in the last phase of
the hearing, in which the next stage of the proceedings was being planned.  In
that connection, the defendant’s attorney expressed a wish to visit the apartment
that was the object of the dispute (Excerpt 8.10). The client did not resist this
idea. The professionals were discussing a suitable time to visit the apartment
when the client intervened by saying what was a suitable time for her. This
initiative is interpreted as an alleging or claiming initiative. It was responded to
by the defendant’s attorney, who accepted the time suggested by the plaintiff.
Excerpt 8.10 Case 4, preliminary hearing
Judge: It isn’t very far away from here, is it? We could arrange it so, as far as
we’re concerned, I mean that we could start the hearing later.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: It won’t take long to take a look at it.
Defendant’s attorney: Is it near here [refers to the court house]?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes. Well, I mean... Is it all right to be there at nine
o’clock?
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Plaintiff: Eight o’clock, you should be there at eight o’clock.
Judge: I beg your pardon?
Defendant’s attorney: Eight o’clock is just fine for us.
What is there to be said about the effects of the client’s initiatives in general?
Since they were all topic-maintaining in nature, success would have meant
getting a response or maintaining the topic, and not being ignored. The client’s
initiatives were immediately responded to (Excerpts 8.6, 8.9 and 8.10), or at least
they contributed to the continuance of the topic (Excerpt 8.8), in all of the
episodes in Case 4. Two of the four initiatives involved the plaintiff interfering
in the discussion between the other participants (Excerpts 8.6 and 8.10), and
were considered and responded to by the others. The other two, excerpts 8.8 and
8.9, grew from client’s responses, and could be considered either as collaborative
efforts to specify the issue or, which is also plausible, as slight resistance to the
opposing party. Whatever the truth, the client’s responses in which the initiatives
arouse contributed to the defendant’s attorney’s arguments.
3 Summary of Case 4
Case 4 could be said to represent the ideal type of client participation expressed
in the preambles of the procedural law. The principal was present at the hear-
ing – although on only one of the three days –, and contributed to the proceed-
ings by giving information about the relevant circumstances, and the court was
able to use its right to ask questions in order to establish the facts. Yet, the
client’s contributions could be considered minor. She mostly gave minimal
responses to the questions she was asked.
However, it is also clear that the legal professionals did not make any effort
to get the client more fully involved. She was asked to answer only restricted
questions on restricted issues which, on the top of everything else, often worked
to the opposing party’s credit. The client was not drawn into the discourse by
the other participants and, as a result, the discourse remained mainly between
the legal professionals. It is interesting to think about what would have happened
if the client had been asked open questions instead of restricted ones, for
example. The most open question was the defendant’s attorney’s first question
in Excerpt 8.7, “What kind of closets are included?” This was also the question
to which the principal was, in a way, compelled to give not only a minimal
response, but also a broader description of the closets, their location and appear-
ance.
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A closer look at the plaintiff ’s initiatives shows that something went beyond
the minimal contributions, although compared to those in the other cases
analyzed, they were cautious and topic-maintaining in nature. The discursive
tools used seemed to be few and modest: excusing the intervention (“Excuse me.
I especially said…”) and asking specifying questions (“you mean altogether?).
The mode of interaction was legal discourse between professionals, obviously
relatively hard for an outsider to get into. Getting into it would have required
strong and effective discursive tools. As discursive tools of that kind were not
available, the plaintiff accepted the role of an outsider.
Case 4 shows that the client may be present in the hearing but does not
necessarily participate in it in a subject-like position. It is an example of “no
man’s land”, or the gray zone in the emerging court practice. The procedural law
introduced the idea of the principals’ participation in establishing their case,
although in a very tentative form. The implementors of the procedural law,
judges, attorneys, and also principals, as a collaborative unit in constructing cases
are now, through their actions, creating ways to effect this rule in practice. The
proceedings in this case were constructed in such a way that the client was not
heard, but she did hear what the other participants said. Unfortunately, the
significance of hearing the others remains hidden, as we do not have interview
data on the plaintiff ’s opinions. Rather than continuing further, the case was
quite surprisingly settled after the extended preliminary hearing. An outcome
like this, raises the question whether simply being present and hearing the
opposing party’s arguments may, in some cases, work for a settlement.
8.7 Client Initiatives and Their Effects in Case 5: “Could it at least be said
that…?”
1 Introduction and the Overall Profile of the Hearings
In Case 5, the dispute mainly concerned one person, the plaintiff.  The defen-
dant was a public corporation, represented in the hearings by the attorney. The
plaintiff was present in all of the hearings. The preliminary hearing was held in
a meeting room and the extended preliminary hearing and the main hearing in
a traditional courtroom. The plaintiff always sat next to her attorney, and
closer to the judge. In the preliminary hearing they sat opposite the defendant’s
attorney, diagonally opposite to the judge and court clerk. The parties sat next
to each other, opposite the judge and court clerk, in the extended preliminary
hearing and the main hearing, which were separated by a short break. Repre-
sentatives of the press were present in all of the hearings.
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Typical of the case was the client’s presence and active participation in the
hearings. The number of her initiatives was relatively high – 33 in the
preliminary hearing and 15 in the main hearing –, her turns were some of the
longest in the data, and the initiatives were diverse.  In the preliminary hearing,
the client expressed expanding initiatives and ironic alleging and confirming
initiatives that were characteristic of this case.
The plaintiff ’s initiatives in different phases of the hearings are described in
Table 8.10.
Table 8.10 The Number of Client Initiatives in Each Phase of the Hearings
in Case 5
2 The Initiatives during the Proceedings in Case 5
From the numerous initiatives the plaintiff expressed in the hearings, one
set and their effects are described as a narrative built around the expanding
Hearing Phase Number of 
initiatives 
1. Starting the proceedings and looking for a possible  
    settlement 
1 
2. The general presentations 1 
3. Checking the demands and the reply - 
4. The grounds for the demand - 
5. The grounds for the reply - 
6. The judge’s specifying questions 8 
7. The disputed and undisputed facts 22 
8. Declaring the evidence the parties will bring to court 1 
Preliminary 
hearing 
9. Arranging the date for the main hearing 3 
10. The proposal for a settlement 1 Extended  
preliminary 
hearing 11. Correcting the minutes of the preliminary hearing 1 
12. Hearing the plaintiff 5 
13. Hearing the witness 7 
Main hearing 
14. The final statements and claims for legal expenses - 
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initiatives and their effects. Case 5 is the only case in my data to include expand-
ing initiatives, and that is why they are of special interest. The most salient fea-
tures of the client’s initiatives are also evident in the narrative.
The possibility of settling the dispute was discussed in the first phase of Case
5. Within the very first minutes of the hearing, the plaintiff had her first turn
commenting on the prerequisites for settlement (Excerpt 8.11).
Excerpt 8.11 Case 5, preliminary hearing
Judge: Well, yeah. Please, go ahead [nods to the plaintiff who gestures with
her hand that she wants to say something]
Plaintiff: I was just thinking that, I mean it appears to me that the main
problem is that the municipality has nobody to decide that we make a
settlement. It would have been feasible to do that long ago. And that’s the
problem, who is the municipality of V? I doubt that you alone could
represent the municipality. It is difficult for you [addresses her speech to
the defendant’s attorney] to say here, “Let’s make a settlement”, because you
have to get a group behind you. But there exists no such person to make
that decision, and that’s why we are in this situation here.
Defendant’s attorney: No, no, of course a decision maker can be found. If I
can’t give the decision right away, it’s only as far away as the nearest
telephone. It is not a problem.
In her first turn, which was interpreted as an expanding initiative in my
analysis because of its strongly conceptualizing nature, the plaintiff introduced
her fundamental ideological standpoint – although here only in an allusive and
rather mysterious form: “Who is the municipality of V?” This specific point in
the initiative was passed by in the discourse, however, as the defendant’s attor-
ney continued on to the practical aspect of finding a person to make a decision.
This represents effect category two, where the fracture in the process caused by
the client’s initiative is smoothed over and the script is returned to.
The plaintiff was mostly silent in phases two to five with the exception of a
few responses and one whispered contesting remark.
The plaintiff elaborated the theme she started in her first initiative in phase
six as shown in Excerpt 8.12.
Excerpt 8.12 Case 5, preliminary hearing
Plaintiff: Yes, Your Honor, just that, well, I have been active, starting with, I
have really made phone calls daily and asked for a day-care place, thinking
that I would get one by a phone call by the twentieth of November.
Defendant’s attorney: What then, what responses did you get then? Have
they responded so …
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Plaintiff: ## It goes just like this, that the officials blame the politicians and
the politicians blame the officials. Certainly nobody said that I would get the
place, but everybody said that it was being worked on. But this walking over
between the officials and the politicians, this is what I have heard.
Judge: Well, yes, this raises the question of what evidence the defendant can
present proving that the plaintiff would have already had the information
in October that she wouldn’t get a place before the twentieth of November.
What is the evidence?
The client’s expanding initiative grew from her response to the defendant’s
attorney. She certainly gave an answer and explained the background to the
situation, but her initiative was interpreted as expanding because it brought a
new perspective to the issue of trying to get day care for the child. By understand-
ing the issue as a more general and communicative problem involving the dif-
ferent actors – the officials and the politicians – in the municipality’s
decision-making process, the client also brought a new perspective to the whole
dispute.
The way in which the client constructed her response was interesting. She
started by interrupting the defendant’s attorney. The first part of the turn, “It
goes precisely so that that the officials blame the politicians and the politicians
blame the officials”, actually bypassed the defendant’s attorney’s question and,
instead, strongly introduced the speaker’s own viewpoint. The second part of the
turn, “Certainly nobody said that I would get the place, but everybody said that
it was being worked on”, was the exact answer to the question asked. This was
followed by the third part, again a personal view of the same issue, “But this
walking over between the officials and the politicians, this is what I have heard”.
It seems as if the client was using the implicit strategy of surrounding her oblig-
atory responses with initiatives, taking advantage of the very questions presented
to her in order to express her own arguments and interpretations. This can be
understood as a specific discursive tool when participating in discourse.
In terms of effects, Excerpt 8.12 is problematic, as it seems to include
elements that fit several categories. The general topic being discussed – the point
of time at which the plaintiff learned the exact date when the day care would
begin – continued. In this sense, the plaintiff ’s contribution maintained the
topic, which the judge continued further. The topic-maintaining element in the
turn was the plaintiff ’s contribution’s most responsive part, her answer to the
defendant’s attorney (“Certainly nobody said…”). What was glossed over was
the plaintiff ’s expanding initiative outlining the dispute in terms of tension
between the officials and the politicians in the municipality. These initiatory
attempts were not taken up by the other participants as potential candidates for
a new topic in the joint discussion. Thus, this expanding initiative is interpret-
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ed as having been bypassed because the expanding elements in the turn were ig-
nored. However, in a communicative or interactive sense, the plaintiff ’s
contribution was not discounted.
In the same phase six, the plaintiff also expressed another kind of expand-
ing initiative, where she employed the concept of anticipation in terms of the
municipality’s actions.
Excerpt 8.13 Case 5, preliminary hearing
Plaintiff: Your Honor, could it at least be said that the municipality was very
late, or that the point at which it began to look for new day care places was all
too late. It is widely known that when the implementation of the law was
brought forward, the municipality believed all the time that the law would not
come into force at all. I was involved in the municipal management group as a
workers’ representative at that time, and it was a clear opinion that the law
wouldn’t come into force. So if the city had started to work toward it then,
there wouldn’t have been such chaos. It seems like you can’t anticipate things,
and when you are forced, you just shirk your duties .
Judge: What does the defendant say to this?
Defendant’s attorney: The fact is that there have been difficulties in arrang-
ing day care and, and that this anticipating…
Judge: ##  Has it been too late?
Defendant’s attorney: It has already been admitted that it was eight days too
late, but…
Judge: ## Yes but I mea-, now we’re talking about on a general level, that is,
is, I mean…
Defendant’s attorney: ## Well, on a general level, there have been difficul-
ties, have been in other municipalities and have been here.
Judge: Ye-es?
Defendant’s attorney: So it’s, it’s …
Judge: ## Is it admitted that…
Defendant’s attorney: …the situation with the queue is… [refers to families
waiting for a day-care place]
Judge: Is it admitted that the municipality thought that the law wouldn’t
come into force?
Defendant’s attorney: I can’t know anybody’s thoughts except my own …
[turn continues]
Here, the plaintiff ’s first turn is interpreted as an expanding initiative, intro-
ducing the new concepts of being late and anticipating. What is interesting is
that the client seemed to be aware of the fact that she was suggesting a new way
of perceiving the dispute. This can be seen in the formulation of the very first
sentence of the excerpt: “Could it at least be said that the municipality was very
late”. The idea that the municipality was not prepared for the situation had been
contested earlier by the opposing party, and now the plaintiff suggested a new
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interpretation that the municipality was late in its preparations. What is note-
worthy is that by using the passive form (“could it be said that”), the plaintiff
seemed to be seeking a joint understanding of the matter.
The effect that the initiative had in the hearing is interpreted as a change in
topic. The judge continued the topic that the plaintiff started in her initiative
by asking an open question addressed to the defendant’s attorney (line 10).
Later on, the judge supported the topic by asking the defendant’s attorney
questions that specified the points made by the plaintiff (lines 13, 16–17, 22, 25–
26). These detailed successive questions and the fact that the judge interrupted
the defendant’s attorney several times, gives the impression that the judge con-
sidered the plaintiff ’s initiative important, and therefore made an effort to clarify
the issue by maintaining the topic.
Phase six also contained another of the characteristic features of Case 5 in
addition to the expanding initiatives. This was the special kind of ironic com-
ment that the plaintiff actively used in putting forward her viewpoints. These
comments are categorized as either alleging/claiming or confirming initiatives
in the analysis.
Excerpt 8.14 Case 5, preliminary hearing
Judge: How many are there who did not get their day-care place in time?
Defendant’s attorney: There were 246 in November-December 1996 who
were compelled to wait, but I can’t say whether it was some days or a week
or longer…
Judge: ## They had to wait, yes…
Defendant’s attorney: …or was it a month, but those who couldn’t get the
day-care place on the day they were entitled to it.
Plaintiff: Which is really many.
Judge (jokingly): Then we’ll get 246 claims for compensation if…
Plaintiff: ## Let’s hope so.
The initiatives here reflect the plaintiff ’s constant effort to follow her own
agenda, not only through systematically explaining her own viewpoints, but also
through sharp, ironic comments stuck into the discourse every now and then.
With her comments, she was strongly expressing her opinion and taking a stance.
For example, she stepped into the discussion when the judge was asking ques-
tions of the defendant’s attorney, and made her comments there. The initiatives
expressed in Excerpt 8.14 are interpreted as alleging/claiming initiatives, as the
client was clearly and strongly asserting her own viewpoint. They could also be
interpreted as a special form of confirming/strengthening initiative, as they were
strengthening the client’s basic views of the experienced wrong.
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The same kinds of initiative that both strengthen a viewpoint and take a stand
on an issue recurred in phase seven. An example is given in Excerpt 8.15.
Excerpt 8.15 Case 5, preliminary hearing
Judge: Then there’s the issue of Kirsti Kuutti here. The defendant has asked
why Kirsti Kuutti who I suppose is your mother…
Plaintiff: Yes.
Judge: Well, then, why were the kids not taken to their grandma’s?
Plaintiff: Yes, quite right.
Judge: Well, yes, now it’s possible to …
Plaintiff: ## I think Kirsti Kuutti would have reason to sue the municipality
here …
Judge: ## Let’s hope not.
Plaintiff: … ## Is it a grandma’s job?
[participants are laughing]
Plaintiff: As a general rule, I think it’s quite absurd and insulting. As such,
that you can even suggest that a grandma should do it. Temporary care is a to-
tally different thing. Even though it’s a question of eight days, it’s a long time
for a sick old person [turn continues]
Here, again, we see the same phenomena: the plaintiff took a stand on the
dispute and supported her viewpoints with ironic comments. She was clearly ir-
ritated by the defendant’s drawing the person of her mother into the dispute.
When the judge repeated the question set out in the statement of defense – “Why
were the kids not taken to their grandma’s”–, the judge received the ironic
answer “Yes, quite right”. This answer was actually not directed to the question
itself, but to the whole idea of even asking it. By saying “yes, quite right”, the
plaintiff actually said “no” (for the use of irony as a means of criticism, see
Ghita 2001 and Weizman 2001). Although linguistically an answer, the turn had
no responsive elements in it. It is consequently interpreted in the analysis as a
strengthening initiative – here in the specific meaning of strengthening some-
one’s own viewpoint.
With his next turn “…now it is possible to…”, the judge encouraged the
plaintiff to explain her viewpoints. She started by taking a stand on the issue:
the grandmother could also sue the municipality. This was immediately followed
by a questioning of the defendant’s idea: “Is it a grandma’s job?”  This rhetori-
cal question was covered by the judge’s laconic but humorous comment “Let’s
hope not”, which was given in response to the suggestion that the grandmother
could sue the municipality. As a result, the participants laughed at the judge’s
comment. After that the plaintiff continued her response to the judge’s original
question of why the children were not taken to their grandmother’s.
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The whole of the plaintiff ’s turn (lines 7–8 and 10) is interpreted as a
questioning initiative in the analysis. It is clear, that the judge’s request for
information encouraged the plaintiff to continue discussing the issue.  This way
of treating the client’s initiative represents the first sub-category of effect
category two, where the fracture in the process it caused is smoothed over and
the script is returned to.
Still within the same phase, the client attempted to restrict what was being
discussed. As the episode takes several pages in the transcript, the long turns are
abridged here. Missing sentences are indicated by (//).
Excerpt 8.16 Case 5, preliminary hearing
Plaintiff: But if I think about it, I mean, in a way this whole question about
my days off is totally irrelevant, because if I worked in the private sector, the
municipality would not even know about my days off. (//) I mean, I think
there’s no point referring to this issue, which should have no relevance. And
when I have my own holidays should not be dependent on the day-care
place. Especially when I agreed with my boss back in May when to have my
holidays. (//)
Some turns later in the discussion, the judge returned to what the plaintiff
said about the irrelevant issue.
Excerpt 8.16 continues
Judge: This is an interesting question, this, uhh, these facts and getting the
facts. It’s interesting in two ways. I don’t know the jurisdiction on that part,
is it quite all right that the defendant’s attorney has been given these facts,
and I don’t want to interfere in that. I think we won’t continue to dispute
that. I think we have dispute enough here. But on the other hand, I don’t
understand the plaintiff ’s thinking that some issues in this dispute should
be covered up, and that it would be tempting fate to open them up when
the other party is the municipality. I suppose some kind of honest decision
is to be sought. (//) I think it’s best for both parties that this is cleared up
and that all these details come out. At least the justice wants the case to be
cleared up thoroughly and has no sympathy with this kind of mentality of
hiding things.
Here the client’s initiative resulted in a reflection by the judge, when he clearly
took a stand on the issue of whether to discuss the holidays or not. The
client’s initiative was in effect rejected, but the rejection was explained and
grounded. This can be seen as a fracture in the process: for a moment, the script
of the proceedings became transparent and defined. Discussion then continued
on the principal question of whether or not the plaintiff should have saved her
holidays and used them when the day care could not be arranged in time, and
on the practical issue of how the plaintiff spent her free days.
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Fractures in the process are interesting especially because of the repair work
that they often seem to trigger. The repair work done by the judge in the
previous excerpt was not only reflective of the script. Whether intended or not,
it had an instructive and educational function, aimed at helping the client to
understand and evaluate the dispute and the proceedings. Repair work may make
the proceedings more transparent to the client when she or he hears the grounds
and explanations. This, in turn, may help him or her to understand the proceed-
ings and its judicial logic better.
In phase eight, when the parties produced the evidence they were going to
present in the main hearing, the plaintiff questioned the relevance of the
opposing party’s witness (Excerpt 8.17).
Excerpt 8.17 Case 5, preliminary hearing
Defendant’s attorney: Another witness is Mette Miettinen, and she is the
day-care expert, children’s day care.
Plaintiff: But she was not the day-care expert at that time, when this issue was
going on, because I also called for her, but she was then the director of the day-
care center of Sepontie.
Defendant’s attorney: She is now the one in the municipality who knows
most about the day-care issues.
Judge: Yes and she obviously knows…
Defendant’s attorney: ## Then and now
Judge: …obviously also at that time…
Defendant’s attorney: ## Yes
Judge: …in any case, even though the tasks are… uhh…
Defendant’s attorney: ## has been forced to become familiar with that as
well.
Judge: Okay. Early in this morning I discussed the main hearing with Koivu
[plaintiff ’s attorney] [continues and shifts to the next phase]
In Excerpt 8.17, what resulted from the questioning initiative was not joint
discussion on the new topic, but only the short repair of a fracture. Just as in
Excerpt 8.16, the plaintiff ’s initiative was factually rejected – instead of being
considered questionable, the witness was regarded as competent – but in the
interaction, the judge and the defendant’s attorney reflected and thereby made
visible the grounds on which the witness could be heard.
Phase 12 was the first phase of the main hearing. The plaintiff was heard in
the role of a witness, and both her own and the defendant’s attorneys addressed
questions to her. She answered the questions posed by her own attorney with
long explanations describing the situation when the day care was being arranged.
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When she began to answer the defendant’s attorney’s questions, an interesting
change occurred (Excerpts 8.18 and 8.19).
Excerpt 8.18 Case 5, main hearing
Defendant’s attorney: When the plaintiff got the information that she was
still in the queue [still waiting for the day-care place], it was probably the
23
rd
 of October, uhh, and if she still thought that on the 20
th
 of November
she would have a place, then why did she contact an attorney?
Plaintiff: Because this is what it especially advises here [refers to the in-
structions for claiming redress]. I did just what the Municipality of V, the
office for social affairs and health, advised me to do. It says here: Instruc-
tions for claiming redress. The person in question can appeal against the
judgment with a claim for redress. Such a claim has to be lodged within the
given period to the division of the municipal board of social welfare and
health. The time limit is fourteen days blah-blah-blah. In other words, I ha-
ve done exactly what I have been advised to do. What else could have I done?
Defendant’s attorney: This means you thought or did you think that the
day-care place would not be arranged on 20th of November, since you hired
anyway, or you reacted quite strongly, I mean it’s probably not usual to hire
an attorney immediately?
Plaintiff: No, but I thought that if I took these actions, I would get a day-
care place starting on 20th November.
Defendant’s attorney: Was this contacting of an attorney influenced by the
fact that you already knew each other?
Plaintiff: Of course it’s easier to contact a person you already know, but I
don’t believe that it influenced me, because I had already before this eight,
no, was it after this brief, already written a letter to the mayor where I said I
would look for legal help to bring this issue to a conclusion.
Defendant’s attorney: In what capacity do you know this Kimmo Koivu?
[refers to the plaintiff ’s attorney]
Plaintiff: What relevance does that have? [laughing]
Judge: That was a good, a good point. I regard that as an irrelevant matter
to some extent. Okay. Please, go ahead.
Defendant’s attorney: Did you discuss these possible claims for redress with
Kimmo Koivu before October, 28
th
 ?
Excerpt 8.18 shows new discursive tools that the plaintiff was implementing
in conducting her case. While in the traditionally suppressed position of a wit-
ness being heard, she introduced a battery of tools such as keeping the
important document concretely in her hands, using reported speech – that is
reading aloud the instructions given by the municipality – and the informal
“blah-blah-blah” expressing her attitude towards the municipality’s written
instructions. This culminated on line 12 with a question in response to the
defendant’s attorney’s original question, “What else could have I done?” The
whole turn of the plaintiff is categorized as a questioning initiative due to its
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strongly questioning mode that was explicated in line 12. Again, a strong ques-
tioning of the defendant’s attorney’s question occurred on line 27. This was an
example of an answer turned into an initiative. The plaintiff dodged the ques-
tion by questioning it, and instead, presented a question of her own. The effect
was that the plaintiff ’s questioning of the issue finished the prevailing topic.
The plaintiff ’s contribution as a witness seems to deviate strongly from the
weak position of the witness in cross-examination, reported for example by
Conley & O’Barr (1998). Their finding was that the use of controlling questions
by the lawyers transforms the cross-examination from a dialogue into a self-
serving monologue. The transcendent linguistic resources available to lawyers
make possible witness resistance likely to be short-lived (Conley & O’Barr, 1998,
pp. 26–27). In Case 5, the plaintiff ’s resistance as a witness appeared to be rather
successful: she succeeded in keeping the examination as a dialogue, and even in
closing one issue.
Excerpt 8.19 Case 5, main hearing
Defendant’s attorney: What if the municipality had had a place for one
child from somewhere further away and for another in a different location,
and it could have been arranged on the 20
th
 of November, what if you had
been offered this kind of alternative?
Plaintiff: I think the municipality should absolutely have some kind of system,
some back-up system so that…
Defendant’s attorney: ## I asked which of these alternatives…
Plaintiff: Certainly it’s human, and I can’t say, because I ‘m old enough to
know that you can’t say how you would act in a certain situation, because
you act surprisingly differently in different situations, but well, uhh, I think
it’s not a question of opposing, because you constantly claim that I should
have arranged the care. You demand all the time that I should have arranged
the time period, and then you refer to the worst alternative as being like this
and the children would have been in temporary care even if I had arranged it.
I don’t understand the relevance of this.
Defendant’s attorney: Nothing to ask.
Judge: All right. I would have called a halt here, if you had not stopped. I
think these last questions on behalf of the defendant were slightly irrele-
vant. Then again, Minna Kuutti forgot that she was now being heard in a
special and not, uhh, in a party’s role, but of course you don’t have to, uhh,
have to be here every day, fortunately, but, well, this kind of, these roles are
not clear, and that’s totally understandable. But now, obviously this hearing
of Minna Kuutti in the artificial role of a witness has finished. I suppose
there’s nothing for either of you to ask. You are allowed to speak, speak in
the role of plaintiff, that, uhh that is not denied, if you want, but in this
role, I mean personally in order to testify, this hearing has now finished.
And after this, we’ll hear the witness nominated by the defendant. Is she
present?
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Here, again, the plaintiff bypassed the question posed by the defendant’s
attorney. At first, instead of answering the question, she expressed her own
alleging/claiming initiative (lines 5–6) by giving her opinion that the munici-
pality should have a back-up system in arranging the day care. When asked again,
she refused to answer (line 8), explained the reasons for her refusal (lines 8–10),
and finally expressed an initiative that questioned the whole setting of the
defendant’s attorney’s question (lines 10–15).
Here is a repetition of her special way of constructing her response, analyzed
for the first time after Excerpt 8.12. At first, the plaintiff again bypassed the
defendant’s attorney’s question and instead strongly introduced her own view-
point. The second part of the turn was the exact answer to the posed question –
although in this case actually a refusal to answer and an explanation for the re-
fusal. This was followed by the third part, again a personal viewpoint on the same
issue, here the questioning of the posed question. The plaintiff seemed to em-
ploy a three-step structure in her responses with an initiative followed by an
answer and again followed by an initiative. Surrounding the answers – that have
to be given in a court setting – with initiatives appears to be an effective
discursive tool for putting forward one’s own viewpoints.
Excerpt 8.19 shows how the judge, in a way, gave a reprimand to the plaintiff
for forgetting her role, but also expressed understanding for the lay person. This
was followed by a rather clear procedural instruction addressed personally to the
plaintiff (lines 24–26). In terms of the effect categories, this was interpreted as
a fracture and repair in the process. The educational function of the repair is
especially evident.
The instructive and educational aspect represents a mode of talk that was
missing in Finnish courtroom hearings in the old proceedings before the reform
(Engeström, 1998). Evidently, the mere presence of clients in the hearings, and
especially their active participation, makes it necessary to explicate the script and
explain the procedures in situations, in which their contributions do not fit the
script, or where the script cannot be adapted to the contributions.
On the whole, the instructive aspect of repair work is important, as it brings
up the issue of learning and developing. On the one hand, it draws attention to
the learning of the client during the court proceedings. What are the possible
means of making the proceedings transparent and understandable to the lay
client, and in that way of promoting the client’s learning in his or her own court
case? On the other hand, the instructive aspect points to the learning by the
legal professionals to handle cases in a new way after the court reform. It seems
evident that the client’s presence and participation in the hearing puts pressure
on the professionals to take note of the lay persons. It teaches the professionals
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to talk in a qualitatively new way, accommodating their talk to the client’s
presence.
An important finding is that the episodes of repair work seemed to be con-
nected to the use of meta-talk. Speakers talking meta-talk are expressing the
practices of interaction in the discussion through words (Engeström R., 1999a,
p. 275). Everyday examples of meta-talk are “I’m sorry to interrupt” and “May I
ask something”. In Excerpt 8.18, for example, the instruction given to the client
involves frequent use of meta-talk:  “You are allowed to speak, speak in the role
of plaintiff, that, uhh that is not denied, if you want, but in this role, I mean per-
sonally in order to testify, this hearing has now finished”.
This coincides with Engeström’s finding that meta-talk was connected to in-
novations of interaction in medical encounters (Engeström R., 1999a, pp. 275–
277, 315–316; 1999b, p. 47)). In this study, the meta-talk seemed to be especial-
ly connected to situations in which the script was reflected upon and repaired.
However, meta-talk is, to some extent, an integral part of the talk in court hear-
ings, where the activity is produced mainly through talk. In the context of court
activity, it is inevitably a tool for planning the proceedings, whether intended
or not. “Next we will discuss the evidence”, or “Do you wish to argue further on
that?” could be examples of meta-talk in the context of court hearings, whereas
statements such as “Next we will help Martha get dressed” or “Do you want to
go for a walk with David?” could be examples of planning work ahead in a con-
text in which the activity is realized through more physical actions, for
example in the care of children’s or the elderly. The special vocabulary of court
hearings supports the idea of meta-talk as an intertwined element in courtroom
talk. Terms such as allege, argue, state, testify, and hear are both judicial and
discursive. They are verbs referring to certain actions with a judicial meaning
and judicial consequences, and also verbs referring to certain ways of talking.
Phase 13 comprises the hearing of the witness in the main hearing. The plain-
tiff returned to the issue with which she was concerned: the contributions of
officials and politicians, and their interrelationship in arranging day care in the
municipality. Her initiatives concerning this issue had been passed over in the
earlier phases, but now she drove her central point home more powerfully – she
questioned the witness by herself (Excerpt 8.20).
Excerpt 8.20 Case 5, main hearing
Plaintiff ’s attorney [after finishing his own questions to the witness]: Your
Honor, Minna Kuutti herself will ask some more questions.
Judge: Please, go ahead.
Plaintiff:  Well, I thought, uhh, at that time I made those phone calls to sever-
al places and, well, many officials said here in our region’s social office that
they had put forward several proposals concerning different possibilities for
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arranging day care, and they had done all they could and even more, but the
politicians had rejected or shelved their proposals.
Witness: That’s absolutely true. There were proposals to employ child-
minders and that’s why the regions had to start to build these “mini-
centers” (a home-like day care for small groups of children; ryhmäperhe-
päivähoitokoti in Finnish) and try to resolve the situation anyway.
Plaintiff: What do you think, do the trustees belong to the municipality?
Witness: Uhh, well yes in the sense that they make these decisions, the final
decisions. But as I said, the regions started to do as I said, but the officials
started to solve the problem in their own way.
Plaintiff: How can you say that the municipality has done everything if one
part of it has acted all the time as a brake on progress?
Witness: Well, in that sense, yes, that’s true. I somehow think myself about
what we have done as officials, because I feel that we have done everything
in this regard.
Plaintiff: But that one part of municipality (—)
Witness: Yes.
In the excerpt, the plaintiff produced four initiatives – four questions to the
witness nominated by the opposing party. The first of them (lines 4–8), which
in its linguistic form was not a question at all, introduced the plaintiff ’s under-
standing of the problem as a conflict in the municipality between the officials
and the politicians. In the context of hearing the witness, this introduction was
collaboratively treated as a question by the plaintiff and the witness, who then
gave her answer. This was followed by the plaintiff ’s new question concerning
whether politicians belonged to the municipality (line 13). Both of these ques-
tions are categorized as expanding initiatives, because with them the plaintiff
contributed a new perspective to the dispute. This was a kind of ideological way
of understanding the dispute and its origins, originally put forward in the
preliminary hearing by the plaintiff and now systematically furthered in the main
hearing in the questioning of the witness. In this context, the plaintiff could
effectively maintain the topic she wanted, because as questioner she was now the
one managing it.
Drew (1992) wrote about “strugglings” for the position of “doing questions”
as a human attempt to get control in conversations. He argued that bearing in
mind the specific preallocation of turns in courtroom examination, there is no
struggling for such a position. The specialized speech-exchange system allocates
the fixed roles of questioner to the attorney and answerer to the witness. The
element of control always lies with the attorney (Drew, 1992, p. 507). In this light,
the plaintiff ’s initiative in asking questions of the witness in Case 5 is
remarkable. When she established the position of questioner, she was momen-
tarily given control over the conversation. In this sense, the plaintiff developed
a strong discursive tool for herself.
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The plaintiff ’s third initiative (lines 17–18) was a questioning of the claim
that the municipality had done everything possible, which had been the pre-
dominant message in the earlier phases of the witness’s testimony. The fourth
initiative (line 22) was a confirming initiative verifying the previous statement.
In the immediate interaction, the plaintiff ’s questions were treated collabo-
ratively by the witness, who gave objective answers to them. Later in the hear-
ing, the discussion between the plaintiff and the witness was not touched upon.
This is surprising because in her testimony, the witness, representing the oppos-
ing party, admitted the assumed tension between the officials and the politicians,
and sympathized with the plaintiff ’s arguments.  However, the long-term effects
of the initiatives were far-reaching.
In order to show the effects of the plaintiff ’s expanding initiatives, it is
necessary to supplement the on-line interaction data from the hearing with the
interview data. The interview data was gathered from different participants at
different points in time before and after the hearings. Again, for purposes of
clarification, it should be said that the plaintiff lost her case in the district court.
She made a complaint to the court of appeal and won her case there. Permis-
sion to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted, and the final judgment,
declared in September 2001, was that the municipality was obliged to compen-
sate the plaintiff for the damage that resulted from the delay in getting day care
for her children.
The judge was interviewed immediately after the main hearing and reflect-
ed on the subject of officials and politicians. At first, he considered the witness’s
testimony from the point of view of decision making (Excerpt 8.21). His
immediate impression was that the issue was important. What he saw as prob-
lematic was that it was not considered worth elaborating by the attorneys.
Excerpt 8.21 Case 5, interview with the judge after the main hearing
Judge: Then came on interesting detail, the importance of which I haven’t
yet pieced together, I mean those contradictions inside the municipality.
Researcher: So, are you referring to the question the plaintiff asked herself?
Judge: Yes. I considered it a good question and it was interesting that it was
put by the plaintiff herself and not her attorney.
Researcher: What did you think about that? Did you interpret it somehow?
Judge: It was a good question, but it remained that. There was no attempt
to contest it. It will have some significance in this case, but I don’t know
how much.//
What was left in my hands, I can’t even tell yet. It was just remained as it
was. The evidence was that the politicians had overruled them, made
adverse decisions, postponed things. This remained as a truth, it may well
be the truth, but nobody ever commented on that. It was the plaintiff ’s
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own point and it was a good point. At least my thoughts went back and
forth at that moment.
In the same interview, the judge also reflected on the testimony in terms of
how the proceedings were conducted, which he determined as “not formal”
(Excerpt 8.22).
Excerpt 8.22 Case 5, Interview with the judge after the main hearing
Researcher: How about this question of the politicians. Should it have ap-
peared somehow earlier?
Judge: Now we get the nucleus of the civil procedure in the sense that if we
think that all the facts and claims should be explicated in the preliminary
hearing. Well, then the witnesses may say whatever and totally new points
may come up. Anything formal doesn’t work at all. It was a detail that just
happened to come up. Procedurally it was problematic that it was not
referred to, even in the final statements, because the plaintiff ’s attorney
obviously did not understand how significant I considered it to be. // I will
comment on that in the decision, even though it was not referred to in the
final statements. You can’t be so formal, or the whole exercise becomes
pointless.
After deciding on the case, the judge reflected on his own way of conducting
the proceedings (Excerpt 8.23). This reflection demonstrates his difficulty in
reaching the decision if everything relevant is not discussed in the hearing. This
points to the central tension in civil procedural law concerning the division of
labor between the judge and the parties: whether to count on the
parties and their abilities to establish the case by themselves, or to actively
participate and interfere (e.g., Laukkanen, 1995). Relatively soon after deciding
the case, the judge seemed tentatively to prefer the latter alternative. He saw it
as “not wrong” if he had interfered and asked for comments.
Excerpt 8.23 Case 5, interview with the judge after the decision was
made
Judge: It would have been this question of the politicians. But when I start-
ed to look at what there was on that issue, there was almost nothing. It was
not at all sufficient. I mean, on the basis of what the witness had said, or
actually she did not said anything, because what happened was that the
plaintiff brought up the issue and the witness then admitted it. Of course
the attorney can’t read my thoughts, but somehow I think he should have
continued on this. Where I possibly blew it, or I don’t know whether I blew
it or not, but what, in hindsight, I could have done differently, would have
been to ask the defendant’s attorney to comment on that statement. // It
would not have been wrong, if I had asked that. That’s what I regret a bit.
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A few months later, in a chance interview, the judge pondered again on the
same issue. What was interesting was that he emphasized the parties’ duties in
their own case, and thus took an opposite side in the procedural dilemma to what
was presented in Excerpt 8:23. Still, he also recognized the tension-laden nature
of the question.
Excerpt 8.24, Case 5, interview with the judge long after the decision
had been made
Judge: It [officials vs. politicians] was a theme that I expected the attorneys
to elaborate on a little. When the witness started to answer, my pencil
stopped for a second, and I thought my oh my, this will get quite exciting.
But it wasn’t taken any further. //
This was again a procedural principle, with which everybody doesn’t totally
agree, but my opinion is that in that situation, even though my pencil
stopped, I could not begin to pump them for more. Come on, this is a civil
matter. It was their job to bring it out. If the theme had come up in the pre-
liminary hearing, then I could have interfered in a different way. //
The preliminary hearing is more like gathering the material, where the
justice also participates, but not in the main hearing. This is what I think
about it. Following this format, I noticed it myself, was a little problematic
in this case, however. You know, it’s the truth that we are always trying to
bring out.
An interesting detail in the previous excerpt is that the judge considered the
theme of politicians vs. officials as not having come up in the preliminary hear-
ing. Yet, my analysis shows that the plaintiff touched upon this theme twice; first
in a very allusive form (Excerpt 8.11), then in a somewhat more articulated
reference to the conflicting roles of officials and politicians (Excerpt 8.12).
Despite the strong discursive means used by the plaintiff – or was it because of
them – the client’s tentative initiatives remain on the sidelines.
When he was interviewed before the main hearing, the plaintiff ’s attorney
explained how he had considered the issue of officials and politicians. The
excerpt shows that he saw it as originating from the plaintiff ’s experiences rather
than as a judicially relevant point.
Excerpt 8.25, Case 5, interview with the plaintiff’s attorney after the
preliminary hearing
Researcher: Is this issue [officials versus politicians] somehow essential
here?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: It is not judicially essential, it has nothing to do with it.
But Minna [the plaintiff] has experienced it in that way, of course, when
she worked in the organs of trust, as a workers’ representative. She has
8 Client Initiatives and Their Effects on Courtroom Interaction 215
come up against it there, and she thinks that it’s also a problem here. She
feels that the officials explain all the problems as being due to the politi-
cians and the politicians explain that they are due to the officials.
In her own interview after the main hearing, the plaintiff explained the ques-
tions she asked of the witness (Excerpt 8.26).
Excerpt 8.26 Case 5, interview with the plaintiff after the main
hearing
Researcher: Then you asked the witness. Why did you yourself ask that
politician thing?
Plaintiff: It was sort of clarification to what Kimmo [her attorney] had
asked. This was exactly what he had been demanding all the time, but he
asked it with regard to money. And I had actually begun to think after the
last hearing, that that’s the way it was. I was always told that we had done
everything and more that we could in the office, but. Then they’re here to
testify that they have done everything. That’s what the defendant’s attorney
tried to prove.
Researcher: So is this the correct interpretation that in the preliminary
hearing, the discussion was mainly about what the officials had done?
Plaintiff: Yes.
Researcher: But you think these things can somehow be distinguished.
Plaintiff: And those who were present here were officials, so of course they
knew better what the officials had done.
Researcher: Then you started to think that this should be more…
Plaintiff: ## In a way one problem here is this official-politician system
altogether.
Researcher: What kind of problem do you mean?
Plaintiff: That, that we are in these situations, and that things don’t work in
the municipality. I mean, on a general level, neither with the handicapped
nor with the day care.
Researcher: Do you remember what made you think about this?
Plaintiff: Maybe it was the defendant’s attorney’s claim versus those phone
calls I made. When she tried to claim all the time that everything had been
done and then you remember that others have said that we have done
everything, but. And then that ‘but’. It’s those ‘but’ people who make the
decisions.
Researcher: Then you wanted to focus on the ‘but’ people. What did the
witness answer to that?
Plaintiff: I think she admitted it. She said that’s the way it is.
Researcher: There was no discussion on the particular decisions [that were
postponed in the municipality], was there?
Plaintiff: No. I focused more on the question of whether the politicians
belong to the municipality. There I got stuck, and I couldn’t, and we had no
facts. You just knew that it was like that. But as to what decisions had been
postponed, I had no facts.
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Excerpt 8.26 confirmed the plaintiff ’s attorney’s idea that the origins of the
plaintiff ’s questions lay in her own experiences. Nonetheless, that was only part
of the truth. The plaintiff did not just recall her personal experiences, she
rather saw that her experiences had some judicial relevance. She explained how
she tried to complement her attorney’s statement, which concentrated on the
money used for day care (lines 4–5). Moreover, she described her thoughts as
she began to understand that, in practice, the officials and the politicians had
different kinds of contributions to make in arranging day care, and that, the
refore, they should be evaluated separately in court. Furthermore, when asked,
she returned to the issue she had herself initiated earlier in the interview – that
they produced no evidence about the actual decisions that had been postponed
by the politicians (lines 32–37).
When interviewed after the decision was declared, the plaintiff strongly crit-
icized the reasoning of the decision in terms of this particular issue. She found
it difficult to understand the decision maker’s thoughts (Excerpt 8.27).
Excerpt 8.27 Case 5, interview with the plaintiff after the main
hearing
Plaintiff [at first reading aloud an excerpt from the decision]: “However, in
terms of the evidence of this detail, the witness’s statement is only general
compared to the extended and detailed list concerning the municipality’s
operations. Thus, the reasonableness cannot be considered otherwise than
presented.” Quite right. This was something I read several times. This just
can’t be true. Does he [the judge] now suppose that [the witness] should
have made a list here, she was there as the municipality’s witness anyway.
This was something… how can anybody even think that if the witness has
prepared a list [of the municipality’s operations] and then she is asked
something [referring to her own questions about politicians], that she
would have an equally relevant list for that question. I didn’t understand
that. This was a totally crazy point in the decision.
In view of the judge’s intention to include the officials versus politicians ques-
tion in his final decision (see Excerpt 8.22), it can be assumed that these
particular sentences were his contribution to the argument. From the point of
view of the client, the statements were too abstract and the judge’s judicial
reasoning remained hidden. That the treatment of the witness’s testimony in the
hearing was insufficient according to the judge did not come across in the
decision.
When she was interviewed after the decision, the plaintiff was also thinking
about how an appeal to the higher court could be prepared (Excerpt 8.28). The
plaintiff was convinced of the significance of the tension within the municipal-
ity. The excerpt also reveals how the plaintiff, as a lay person, seemed to have
adopted the judicial logic of obtaining evidence to support her argument.
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Excerpt 8.28 Case 5, interview with the plaintiff after the main
hearing
Plaintiff: Kimmo and I have to consider how the appeal will be made. We
don’t have to explain a lot, since principally all our arguments were sus-
tained. What could be listed are all the proposals that the city council and
city government had postponed during 1995–1996.  This was one thing
that I thought that could have been done earlier, of course.
Researcher: Does this kind of list exist or can it be made?
Plaintiff: I’m pretty sure there isn’t one, but I wonder if it can be done if
you dig around the old protocols. At work we get a bulletin that includes
issues concerning the social and health-care sector. I think I could try to
dig around and see if I can find anything.
In the final appeal to the court of appeal, the plaintiff did not list the pro-
posals postponed by the politicians, as she planned in the interview. The incom-
prehensible detail in the decision and the officials-vs.-politicians theme were
nevertheless stressed in the appeal. The postponing of decisions by the politi-
cians was, according to the plaintiff, “the main fault, which resulted in the
municipality’s failure to fulfill its obligations.”
In summary, the indirect effects of the particular expanding initiatives in Case
5 – the ones dealing with the officials and politicians in the municipality – can
be assigned the following consequences:
. There was no joint understanding of the significance of the issue among
the participants
. The judge had difficulties in making the decision in this respect, as the
facts that appeared in the witness’s testimony were not argued further by
the parties themselves in the proceedings
. The decision included one detail that was especially incomprehensible to
the client, which was that reason why the witness’s answers could not be
considered more strongly in the verdict was not explicated in
the reasoning behind the decision. The way in which the case was con-
structed by the participants in the proceedings was not evident from the
decision
. The plaintiff and her attorney stressed the issue of officials and politicians
more in the appeal.
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3 Summary of Case 5
Of the cases analyzed, Case 5 most clearly represents a new type of case in which
the origins of the dispute are largely social and political, and where the court is
one means among others of furthering the client’s societal interests. These types
of dispute are pushing the courts to more and much closer involvement in
social issues and their development. They are also disputes over which the
legislation has shifted discretionary power to the courts and the judges who
finally make the judgment in individual cases. Clients’ initiatives, and especial-
ly expanding initiatives, are probably most likely to occur in this kind of
dispute if anywhere. In my data, all the expanding client initiatives occurred in
Case 5.
 All in all, the client’s initiatives in this case were frequent and diverse. All the
initiative categories were represented, except extending initiatives. This finding
challenges the relatively narrow position that the client is given in procedural
law as a source of information (Government Bill 15/1990). Rather than that, it
seems to suggest that the client may work as a participant and collaborator in
establishing the dispute.
As a participant in the discussion, the plaintiff used several discursive tools
in carrying on her initiatives.  I found the following:
. Surrounding her obligatory answers with initiatives by employing a three-
step structure (Excerpts 8.12 and 8.19)
. Putting forward her own viewpoints by means of ironic comments
(Excerpts 8.14 and 8.15)
. Keeping important documents to hand and using reported speech
(Excerpt 8.18)
. Turning answers into questions (Excerpt 8.18)
. Questioning the questions as a witness being heard (Excerpt 8.18)
. Taking the role of an questioner and posing questions to the witness
(Excerpt 8.20)
This list includes tools that are exceptionally powerful and probably rather
unique in the context of court hearings. The position of the witness in a court
hearing has been seen as powerless in the literature (e.g., Conley and O’Barr,
1998; Danet & Bogoch 1984; Messmer, 1997). Without questioning the tradition-
al imbalance between participants in hearings, I would argue that the
picture is not totally black and white. Although seldom used, powerful discur-
sive tools for clients do exist. For example, as Ghita (2001) has stated, the
speaker’s ironic position is always one of superior power. Thus, the client’s use
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of ironic comments in courtroom interaction affects momentarily the balance
of power. The initiatives shown by the plaintiff in Case 5 reveal that the client
may also use effective means and contribute to the shaping of the process
together with the professionals. Even in the position of a witness, the plaintiff
can avoid being dominated.
How should one describe the mode of interaction in Case 5? Typical of the
case was the type of discourse which was quantitatively dominated by the pro-
fessionals but in which the plaintiff made qualitatively strong contributions.
Whereas in Case 4, the plaintiff only occasionally intervened in the discourse
between the professionals, in Case 5, she participated actively, offering a large,
but not exceptional, number of initiatives. What was characteristic of the mode
of interaction was her contribution in the form of expanding initiatives and the
use of strong discursive means.
The plaintiff ’s initiatives resulted in various kinds of effects (Table 8.11).
None of the initiatives was explicitly rejected, although three were bypassed. In
an interactive sense, however, the client was not bypassed. What were bypassed
were the expanding initiatives she expressed in an attempt to understand the
dispute differently. To put it another way: the legal professionals were not ready
to follow the client and re-consider their way of understanding the dispute. The
client’s initiative led to a fracture in the process seven times. A slight majority
of the fractures were repaired by reflecting on the proceedings, the rest by
smoothing them over interactively. These fractures point toward the significant
finding concerning the instructional tools used by the judge. The use of such
tools in the proceedings did not leave the client as an outsider, but rather
offered her the means to understand the judicial logic. This seems to come near
to what Messmer (1997) called for in asking for transparency in proceedings. He
criticizes the fact that the transformation of lay events into judicial cases is hardly
ever transparent. As a result of the different viewpoints given on the same events,
the majority of clients feel that they are not correctly represented before the
courts (Messmer, 1997, pp. 137–139). In Case 5, the instructional tools used by
the judge probably contributed to more transparent proceedings as far as the
client was concerned. For the future development of court proceedings in
district courts, it is important that the educational aspect is not an illusion. Case
5 is a concrete example of how the judge can take advantage of instructional
tools.
The client’s initiatives led to a change in the topic eight times. Yet, it should
be remembered that, with her topic-maintaining initiatives, which were not an-
alyzed here in terms of their effects, the plaintiff was also able to express her
viewpoints.
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The effects of the expanding initiatives in Case 5 are of particular interest.
In the immediate interaction, the consequence of the client’s initiatory questions
to the witness was merely that she succeeded in changing the topic for a while.
These direct effects also provided the basis of the categorization given in Table
8.11. Had the participants started to discuss the issue on the new grounds put
forward by the plaintiff, the whole script of the case would probably have
changed and the dispute would have been understood in a qualitatively new way.
However, the initiatives pushing forward the plaintiff ’s understanding of the case
had indirect consequences, which became visible in the participant interviews.
With her initiatives, she intervened in the proceedings in such a way that
procedural tensions came to the surface. Her contribution made the judge
evaluate the procedural principles: whether to follow the principle of the party
autonomy or to start to establish the facts himself. It was also evident that the
judge carefully considered the perspectives and conceptualizations the client
brought into the case.
Table 8.11 The Effects of the Client’s Initiatives in Case 5
After all, the client’s initiatives did have effects on the script of the proceed-
ings: they caused fractures that had to be repaired and they brought up new
topics to be discussed. It was also evident that the client could freely present her
viewpoints and get herself heard.
Fracture in the process Initiative Rejecting 
without 
explanation, 
bypassing Repair by smoothing 
over 
Repair by 
reflecting 
Change in 
topic 
Going beyond 
the script, 
change in 
understanding 
the dispute  
Expanding 1 1  4  
Extending      
Questioning 3 2 3 4  
Restricting 1  1   
Total 3 3 4 8  
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Excerpt 8.29 Case 5, interview with the plaintiff after the preliminary
hearing
Interviewer: What do you mean? What makes the proceedings hard?
Plaintiff: Maybe it’s a certain insecurity and the fact that I was under the
impression that there are strict rules on how to behave in the courts. As I
don’t necessarily obey the rules of behavior so strictly, I was worried that I
might say the wrong words in the wrong places. I didn’t have the slightest
idea of how to behave there. The situation felt like “oh dear, my stomach is
in knots”.
Interviewer: How did the situation finally work out? How would you
describe the hearing?
Plaintiff: It was in the end an incredibly freewheeling thing.
Interviewer: Were you allowed to say what you wanted?
Plaintiff: I think I was. Maybe I was a bit tense, and of course, when you
think about it afterwards, I would have liked to have been more deliberate
and calmer, and to have considered it more so that I could have talked
more slowly and deliberately. In that situation, I just felt like “Help! Now I
want to say something”, and then I was soon going “yak-yak-yak”.
From the point of view of court clients, the most important finding is that
they can actually influence the proceedings in court cases if they wish. Case 5
proves that, as a result of the court reform and the procedural changes, hear-
ings can now be more open and also allow the client’s participation. In this case,
the client probably employed exceptionally advanced discursive means and
expressed strong expanding initiatives, which may be rare in cases in which the
ideological starting point is not so dominant. However, Case 5 represents a type
of case that will probably become more common in the future. In this sense, it
highlights many future challenges for courts in terms of collaborating with
clients.
8.8 Client Initiatives and Their Effects in Case 6: “I can comment on that”
1 Introduction and the Overall Profile of the Hearings
Case 6 was a combination of two cases: a claim made by the ex-husband and a
counter-claim made by the ex-wife. The ex-husband was present in the prelim-
inary hearing, as well as in the extended preliminary hearing and, directly after
that, in the main hearing. The ex-wife was present in the extended preliminary
hearing and in the main hearing. In fact, the principals were obliged to be present
in the extended preliminary hearing, according to the edict of the judge in the
d 
ng 
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preliminary hearing. All the hearings were held in a meeting room where the
principals sat next to their attorneys, diagonally opposite to the judge and the
court clerk. No outsiders other than myself were present.
Typical of Case 6 was the plaintiff ’s active participation in all the hearings.
The number of his initiatives was extremely high: 129 in the preliminary
hearing, 48 in the extended preliminary hearing and 43 in the main hearing –
220 altogether. The initiatives were diverse and covered all the categories, except
expanding initiatives. Among them, the most frequent categories were explain-
ing and confirming initiatives. The defendant’s initiatives were fewer: there were
23 altogether, most of them explaining or confirming initiatives. The plaintiff ’s
and the defendant’s initiatives in different phases of the hearings are described
in Table 8.12.
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8 Client Initiatives and Their Effects on Courtroom Interaction 223
Table 8.12 The Number of Client Initiatives in Each Phase of the Hearings
in Case 6
Number of initiatives  Hearing Phase 
Plaintiff  Defendant 
1. Possible ways to settle the dispute 1  
2. The plaintiff’s demands, their grounds, and 
the defendant’s reply with its grounds 
79  
3. The defendant’s additional demands and 
the plaintiff’s reply 
11  
4. Negotiating how the evidence will be 
declared and the date for the main hearing 
4  
5. The counter-claim: the plaintiff’s demands, 
their grounds, and the defendant’s reply with 
its grounds 
20  
Preliminary 
hearing 
6. Declaring the evidence and arranging the 
schedule of the further proceedings 
14  
7. Beginning the proceedings, the handling 
and deciding of the application for a cost-free 
trial 
10 2 
8. Specifying and correcting the minutes of the 
preliminary hearing 
6 - 
9. The plaintiff’s demands and the defendant’s 
reply 
28 5 
Extended 
preliminary 
hearing 
10. Declaring the evidence and what will be 
proved with each piece  
4 1 
11. Hearing the executor of the partition of 
the joint property 
13 1 
12. Considering the material brought into the 
court: looking at the paintings 
12 4 
13. Hearing the witnesses 13 8 
Main 
hearing 
14. The final statements and the claims for 
legal expenses 
5 2 
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The first impression of the interaction in Case 6 is that it is reminiscent of
everyday conversation rather than of courtroom interaction. In fact, the case
challenges my methodological starting point, based on Linell’s (1998) ideas: the
simultaneous presence of responsive and initiatory elements in each utterance.
Responsive and initiatory aspects intertwined in such a way that they became
difficult to distinguish. However, a distinction was made in the analysis accord-
ing to the principles described in the section, “What is an initiative”. The result
of the analysis, with its large number of explaining and confirming initiatives,
verifies the first impression regarding the conversation-like nature of the inter-
action. In particular, it was the explaining initiatives, which maintain and
continue the prevailing topic with the client’s own explanations, and the
confirming initiatives, which often support the previous speaker (“Exactly”,
“That’s right”), that contributed to the dialogical, conversation-like interaction.
2 The Initiatives during the Proceedings in Case 6
The possibility of settling the dispute was discussed in the first phase of the
proceedings. The discussion started when the judge referred to the informal
negotiations the parties had had before the preliminary hearing, and wondered
why these bilateral negotiations were not continued.
Excerpt 8:30 Case 6, preliminary hearing
Judge: Did the attorneys consider the attendance of the principals unneces-
sary in the negotiations, or what was the reason why the principals had not
been in contact with each other?
Plaintiff: Well, the matter…
Plaintiff ’s attorney: ## Better to ask the principal himself about that.
Plaintiff: ## I suppose the principals never received the stuff from their at-
torneys in that state. What’s more, the opinions seem to deviate quite a lot.
Judge: Personally, I found that surprising, because last time, when we went
through the figures we noticed that, in the end, there was not that big a dif-
ference in the sums…
Plaintiff: Ye- …
Judge: Concerning this, I would have assumed that...
Plaintiff: ## Well, it was mainly about...
Judge: ##...something had happened.
Plaintiff: Yes, the opposing party offered something like minus one thousand
marks.
Judge: Well, I hope the principals got my message. And I hope that the
attorneys have also explained the various possibilities in the proceedings
and how advantageous they may be to the principals.
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This short episode discussing the settlement introduces a full range of
different kinds of client contributions: initiatives (line 15–16), answers (lines 6–
7) and interrupted turns caused by overlapping speech (lines 4, 11 and 13). In
his response (lines 6–7), the plaintiff gave two reasons why the principals had
not negotiated with each other. The latter reason, that their opinions deviated a
lot, was then elaborated on in his explaining and specifying initiative (line 15–
16). His focus on the deviating opinions was passed over by the judge, who still
seemed to favor a settlement.
As mentioned above, I saw Case 6 as questioning the method used in the
analysis. The virtually indistinguishable conflation of initiatory and responsive
in Excerpt 8:30 is evident. The judge’s turn starting on lines 8–10 and continu-
ing on lines 12 and 14  (“Personally, I found that surprising…”) is typically one
which is not a direct question, but strongly invites the other person to answer
and continue on the same topic. Instead of generating silence, it is more likely
to generate explanations and counter- arguments. Despite this strong invitation,
the plaintiff ’s subsequent turn is not, according to the original definitions,
considered as an answer, but an initiative.
Phase 2 was an extended period of going through the plaintiff ’s demands,
their grounds, the defendant’s reply and its grounds. The plaintiff ’s seven
different demand points were handled one by one. From the numerous initia-
tives he expressed in the hearings, one set and their effects are described as a nar-
rative focusing around two particular themes: “The bills” and “The condition of
the apartment”.
The theme “Bills” concerned the unclear issue of bills that the plaintiff had
paid. He showed a hand-written paper stating that he had paid 1500 Marks to
their gardener, and the ex-wife declared had paid 1000 marks to the telephone
company. An understanding of how these payments should be recognized in
partition was sought in Phase 2.
Excerpt 8:31 Case 6, preliminary hearing
Judge: The next issue in the reply [refers to the defendant’s written reply
given during the written preliminary phase] is this 1000 marks. Does it
have relevance in this matter?
Defendant’s attorney: Yes it does in the sense that Elomaa has stated (—)
that he has paid it with his own property, but this receipt shows that Falck
[the ex-wife] has given him half of the sum. So this should not be sought,
this…
Plaintiff: But in that same…
Plaintiff ’s attorney: ## Please, hold on a second. Where can we find that, if
we can now…
Plaintiff: ## This appendix reveals that, uhh, I have paid an even bigger
amount for her, and it compensates, which means, in reality, I have a credit
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balance according to that receipt.
Judge: This is exactly what I mean. When we chase up these bills, all these
money tubes should be cleared up and one shouldn’t just pick the receipts
that look favorable and then just hope that the opposing party doesn’t…
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes, but…
Plaintiff: It’s obviously on page 18 in your papers
Judge: Of course there’s a limit to what can be handled here, but in terms of
the spouses’, ex-spouses’ relations as a whole, it would be feasible to…
Plaintiff: ## Well it’s now …
Judge: ##…the correct decision…  [inaudible]
Plaintiff: ##…it’s now clear that there were two sums, this phone bill and then
the one for the gardener, and, and they compensate each other. Actually I have
paid, well, more, and I have a credit balance according to that receipt.
Defendant’s attorney: There’s nothing to imply that Falck did not pay the
same 1500 to the gardener.
Plaintiff: Well, this receipt implies that they cancel each other out, so that
these 1000 marks make no difference.
Defendant’s attorney: If, if, well, unless also Falck paid to the gardener 1500
marks.
Plaintiff: But then, then we stretch this to include all the possible bills that
there are in a family.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: ## Well, we’re not stretching anything with these, these
bills, but …but…
Plaintiff: ## That’s just what I mean here, that
Plaintiff ’s attorney: What is the demand that the defendant is now pre-
senting on these grounds?
Excerpt 8:31 again features discourse full of overlapping speech, interruptions
and free sequencing of talk without a given speech order. The plaintiff ’s first
initiative (line 8) was interrupted by his attorney who rejected his turn with his
objection “Please, hold on a second” (line 9). The plaintiff, however, took the
floor again and expressed an explaining initiative (lines 11–13). As a conse-
quence, the judge opened up the issue of what would be the right and feasible
way to gather information on the bills, as he questioned the way they had been
presented to the court (lines 14–16). This could be interpreted as the repair of
a fracture by reflecting the script. The judge’s questioning was passed over by
the plaintiff ’s attorney, who made an attempt to take the floor, and then by the
plaintiff, who specified the page number at hand.
Despite the bypassing, the judge continued his reflection. For his part, he
seemed to make an expanding effort to understand the dispute in a qualitative-
ly new way, as a relation between ex-spouses: “but in terms of the spouses’,
ex-spouses’ relations as a whole, it would be feasible to…” Again, the judge’s turn
was bypassed and overlapped by the plaintiff, who continued explaining his own
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viewpoint. Unfortunately, the continuation of the judge’s turns became inaudi-
ble as a result of the overlapping speech.
The plaintiff continued putting forward his views with explaining initiatives.
He claimed that the defendant’s attorney’s statements about the bills paid by the
defendant just extended the dispute (line 32–33) – contributing in a way that
the judge had just opposed.  This questioning was commented on only by the
plaintiff ’s own attorney, who supported his principal’s idea of not extending the
discussion.
 It appears that there were two competing, mutually questioning scripts in
this particular episode: that of the judge and the defendant’s attorney, who
wished to take into account all the money transactions, and that of the plaintiff
and his attorney, who preferred focusing on the bills already presented. The ex-
istence of the two alternative scripts was not acknowledged openly. Instead, both
the judge and the plaintiff attempted to question the competing script.
Excerpt 8:32 Case 6, preliminary hearing
Plaintiff: Money has not been transferred here, because here we have, uhh,
two approximately the same kind of sums being dealt with in the same
connection…
Judge: ## Yes, and then it’s a different thing that there’s another, another,
uhh, sum, which is, uhh, slightly bigger, and then again at his point-, but
you just said here that you have never paid anything to this gardener.
Plaintiff: ## That’s correct, I haven’t paid, I…
Judge: ## Well, has this 1500 marks also been paid to him by someone else?
Plaintiff: Falck [the ex-wife] has taken care of all the money matters with
the gardener, I have never taken any part in that. And he was hired by Falck,
I don’t even know their payment arrangements, how they were arranged, so
this-
Judge: The contents of this appendix 18 are like this, and there are docu-
ments presented by Elomaa, and this is how the parties explain them.
[a pause of 14 seconds]
Plaintiff: Let’s take another look… there is, you know, it’s  that there’s only my
signature, and this is written by my ex-wife, so, so…
Judge [slightly irritated]: Here we could, as this case will be postponed any-
way, we could order Falck to be present personally at the extended prelimi-
nary hearing, so that these things could be thought about. What was the
case in reality. Well, let’s move on.
My comments about the ambivalence in interpreting the initiatives in Case
6 also apply to Excerpt 8:32. The distinction between the initiatory and the
responsive aspects is problematic, for example, in the judge’s turns in lines 5–6
(“but you just said here that you have never paid anything to this gardener”).
Linguistically, the turn is more a contention than a question, nevertheless
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requiring an answer in a similar way as a question. In the context of the tradi-
tional model of courtroom interaction where the judge asks and the clients
answer, the judge’s turn (in lines 5–6) was not interpreted as a question and, con-
sequently, the plaintiff ’s turn (in line 7) was not interpreted as an answer.
Instead, the plaintiff ’s turn was understood as a confirming initiative, with which
he verified the judge’s correct understanding. This interpretation points to a
development in which the strict order in court, the simple question-answer
structure, is being replaced by more informal and conversation-like discourse.
Questions are not the only means for a judge to clarify things; he or she may also
make claims and statements, which are then contested or confirmed by the other
participants.
Excerpt 8:32 brought to a close the discussion on the bills. The disagreement
on who had paid what remained and no consensus was reached. The judge
summed up the state of affair (lines 13–14) and included the mismatch in the
minutes of the hearing. The plaintiff ’s initiative after a long pause, and the
additional explanation regarding the signatures on the bill (lines 16–17), caused
the judge to make a stronger attempt to “clear up all the money tubes”, as he said
in Excerpt 8:31. He employed a new tool given to him by the new procedural
law. He used his right to order the defendant and, according to the court docu-
ments, the plaintiff of course, to be present in person in the forthcoming hear-
ing (lines 18–21). According to the Code of Judicial Procedure (Chapter 12,
Section 7), “the party may be ordered to appear in court in person, under threat
of a fine, if this is deemed necessary with regard to the clarity of the case.”  In
this situation, the frequent initiatives from the one side seemed to push the judge
to require the presence of the opposing side.
Excerpts 8:31 and 8:32 saw the plaintiff pushing his own advantage in the
adversarial way of traditional litigation. He was persistent in repeating his
explanations, in which he gave his own interpretations of what had happened
and contested the opposing interpretations. Excerpt 8:33 shows how the plain-
tiff also had another role in the hearing, when he worked towards a common
good: he collaborated with the other participants in clarifying the unclear
issues.
Excerpt 8:33 Case 6, preliminary hearing
Judge: Is it, I mean is it…it can’t be the bill mentioned in the answer, this
due date of April, the second, or can it? Or is it the same bill?
Defendant’s attorney: I beg your pardon, the second of April?
Judge: It isn’t the same one we’re talking about now, or is it? At least they
aren’t equivalent in terms of money.
Defendant’s attorney: But there’s interest included.
Plaintiff: There’s interest, yes.
Defendant’s attorney: It also includes interest.
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Plaintiff: It includes late-payment interest.
Judge: Oh, there’s also late-payment interest. That’s how it goes, yes, yes.
Plaintiff: It was paid in May. That’s why it’s 955. And the normal charge is
946. That means there’s nine mark’s interest.
Judge: Okay, okay, that’s, yes, yes. Here in the insurance company’s notice,
they talk about the basic charge…
Plaintiff: ##Yes, that’s right.
Judge: …no penalty is mentioned there. Well, okay, now also this clarifies…
Plaintiff: Yes.
Judge: …the matter, while the sums differ from each other.
Plaintiff: Yes.
Excerpt 8:33 brings out the cooperative aspect in the plaintiff ’s initiatives. The
number of the client’s confirming and explaining initiatives was exceptionally
high in Case 6, and Excerpt 8:33 is a typical example of these initiative
categories. The confirming initiatives (lines 7, 15, 17, 19) are hardly initiatives
in an everyday sense, but in context of the courtroom discourse, they can be seen
as the client’s voluntary attempts to contribute and collaborate in establishing
the case. They are employed as discursive tools for collaborating, and also make
the discourse resemble everyday conversation more than a strictly ordered
trial.
 The collaborative aspect of the plaintiff ’s contributions is also evident in the
next short example.
Excerpt 8:34 Case 6, preliminary hearing
Judge: Well, then on to the next item.
[Pause of 9 seconds]
Plaintiff: That is that loan on the apartment.
Judge: This concerns the loan on the apartment.
This excerpt shows the judge introducing a move to the next item. During
the pause of nine seconds, the judge kept leafing his papers. The plaintiff did
not wait for the judge to continue and make a second move. Against the odds,
the plaintiff was the one to utter the next item on the agenda (defined in the
memo made by the judge), which the judge then confirmed. Here, the introduc-
tion of the new item was jointly constructed by the judge and the plaintiff. The
traditional turns and speech order seem to be in transition in the discourse of
the preliminary hearings, thus implying a new way of talking and negotiating
which differs from traditional courtroom interaction.
Hayden (1987) called attention to differences in the sequencing of speech
turns between Western trials and Indian caste councils. In the traditional
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western courtroom, we find the strict sequencing of talk where overlapping
speech is seen as dysfunctional and obstructive. In the Indian councils, there is
a lot of overlapping and only a few rules for sequencing speakers. Hayden
explains the contrast between strict sequencing and the tolerance of overlap as
a difference in the primary tasks of these two legal institutions. Dispute process-
ing involves two analytically distinct issues. The first is the factual question: what
happened? The second is more normative and evaluative: knowing what hap-
pened, what the result is, or what it is worth (Hayden, 1987,p.  253). Fact find-
ing is the primary task in the western system, whereas the Indian caste councils
focus on evaluating the facts. Whether the legal institution is aiming at estab-
lishing facts or evaluating them in a normative way is important because the
speech actions may vary significantly. Procedures aimed at determining facts are
likely to require more control over the presentation of information than those
that are meant to evaluate the normative value of uncontested facts (ibid., pp.
254–255). It is in this difference, Hayden believes, that underlies the dissimilar-
ity between the orderliness of most Western judicial proceedings and the seem-
ing chaos of Indian caste councils.
To support his hypothesis on speaking-order flexibility in evaluative proceed-
ings, Hayden points to Western court-centered negotiations, such as plea
bargaining, and in general to different kinds of negotiations outside the formal
trial where the speaking turns are not well ordered (p. 263). The task at hand in
the Finnish preliminary hearing includes elements of both fact finding and fact
evaluating. The aim is to establish the facts, but the possibilities of settlement
are also discussed. The latter is more like evaluating the normative value of the
facts – whether or not such an evaluation is based on established facts. The judge
may also make such assessments before the final decision, during the proceed-
ings. It seems that the task at hand in the preliminary hearing is more like the
joint construction of the case, where the finding and normative evaluation of
the value of the facts are part of an intertwined process35. In this process, the dis-
course can be understood as problem-solving talk in which new forms of infor-
mality, less ordered sequencing, and greater tolerance of overlapping speech
emerge.
35
 This kind of double commitment of the participants has been pointed to by Komter (1998)
in regard to Dutch criminal proceedings, where due to the combination of inquisitorial and
adversarial elements in the same procedure, the parties act both as sources of information and
as the defending party. In a similar vein, Engeström & al. (1997) assessed the ‘collaboration
between adversaries’ as necessary to smooth proceedings.
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In Phase 5, the counter-claim presented by the ex-wife became the subject
of the proceedings. Now the crosswise roles and designations may confuse the
reader. To achieve some clarity, I have chosen to refer to the persons according
to their judicial role in the respective phase of the hearing. For example, the
ex-wife who was the defendant in the earlier phases of the hearing, acts now as
the plaintiff. I have inserted clarifying remarks in square brackets to show
whether the person is the ex-husband or the ex-wife.
The condition of the ex-spouses’ apartment – the second of the specific
themes in my narrative – was discussed in this phase. When the former couple
moved apart, their apartment was in a poor state and some things had disap-
peared. In fact, the condition of the apartment was outside the scope of this par-
ticular civil case, but the plaintiff in the counter-claim wanted to use it to sup-
port her response. Excerpt 8:35 shows how the discussion on the apartment start-
ed so as to be continued in later phases of the hearings.
Excerpt 8:35 Case 6, preliminary hearing
Judge: If I ask now the defendant [the ex-husband], so that we can probably
establish that in January, February the defendant took some things away
from the apartment?
Defendant [the ex-husband]: I have taken my own things away.
Judge: Yes, that’s right, yes. There now seems to be some disagreement
about what has been taken away and what has not.
Defendant [the ex-husband]: This process has of course been remarkably
larger. There have been a few reports of an offense concerning housebreaking.
Judge: Yes, so it appears from these documents.
Defendant [the ex-husband]: Of course, if we start to enlarge on  this, we’ll an
extra day for the proceedings.
Plaintiff ’s attorney [the ex-wife’s attorney]: So do you claim that you have
taken away your own things and that the other things have been taken by
somebody else affiliated to the break-ins?
Defendant [the ex-husband]: Yes, I have made two reports of offenses.
Plaintiff ’s attorney [the ex-wife’s attorney]: And reported that the movables
had been taken.
Defendant [the ex-husband]: That’s right.
Excerpt 8:31 shows the ex-husband preferring not to extend the case beyond
the bills that had already been presented. Excerpt 8:35 shows the same tenden-
cy to questioning the extension of the case, but in a dilemmatic way. With his
enlarging initiative he referred to the fact that conflict was actually larger than
the current court case, and to the offense reports he had made (lines 7–8).
The effect of that initiative was that the discussion continued on the substance
– who had taken what from the apartment. He also expressed an initiative
referring to extending the case and simultaneously questioning the enlargement
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(lines 10–11). His questioning was bypassed, however. The discussion in Phase
5 ended with the ex-husband’s stating initiative when he concluded: “Just a lit-
tle bit of stirring and we’ll get something new to litigate”.
It is interesting that when the condition of the apartment was discussed in
the context of the counterclaim, the ex-husband questioned the whole topic as
extending the case. In this phase, the questioning was in line with the judge’s
contributions, who had questioned the counterclaim several times during Phase
5 and asked about the motives. Despite this questioning, the ex-husband still
maintained the topic.
The discussion on the condition of the apartment started again in Phase 6.
When the evidence for the main hearing was presented, a video was named as a
piece of evidence. Again, the ex-husband (here again in the role the defendant)
questioned the topic, but also contested it actively.
Excerpt 8:36 Case 6, preliminary hearing
Defendant [the ex-husband]: The video shows mainly that things were in
different kinds of piles, which were down to the defendant [refers to his
ex-wife], because she and her pals have been there emptying the contents
of the shelves onto the floor and so on. Well, this was also reported to the
police.
Plaintiff ’s attorney [the ex-wife’s attorney]: Yes, there are plenty of them.
Well, as far as I remember, it was the case that, this has to be checked, but I
remember it was the case that the video was recorded as soon as the lock-
smith had opened the door, after Elomaa had moved away, that means that
nobody had entered the apartment.
Defendant [the ex-husband]: ## Yes, yes. Yes I also made a report of an
offense, that all my personal clothes had been stolen. That can also be brought
into the court. Well, I can call these policemen to testify. Now it’s only a ques-
tion of how far we’re going with this soup. Are we really going to dig up the
dirt?
Plaintiff ’s attorney [the ex-wife’s attorney]: We’ll dig it all up.
Defendant’s attorney [the ex-husband’s attorney]: Well, the opposing party
wants the dirt dug up and that suits us of course. But I think some sense of
proportion should prevail here, because the most we are talking about is a
couple of thousand marks, so some sense should prevail.
Judge: Here are the photographs.
Defendant’s attorney [the ex-husband’s attorney]: Actually they could be
looked at. I have seen copies and things …
Judge: If the apartment was left in this condition when Elomaa left, I can
draw my own conclusions. [A pause of 12 seconds] The photographs were
attached to the reply to the original claim.
Defendant [the ex-husband]: Yes, these same photographs  (—) in other
courtrooms.
Defendant’s attorney [the ex-husband’s attorney]:  Hmm, I could probably
now ask Elomaa if the apartment was left in that condition by him, so...
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Plaintiff ’s attorney [the ex-wife’s attorney]: Possibly  (—)
Judge: Well, let’s have it now, is it true that the apartment looked like this?
Defendant [the ex-husband]: A-as I already said, there were people who
came and emptied all the closets and shelves onto the floor and the result
looks like this. And they [refers to his wife and her friends] have themselves
said that they took closets and shelves. And we have the offense reports and
the investigation records, all of which will be taken as evidence if necessary
Judge: But, if now, if the plaintiff in this case [refers to the ex-wife] now
states that on the day she entered the apartment, the locksmith opened the
door. Is it the case that you changed the locks so that no one else could get
in?
Defendant [the ex-husband]: On po-police’s advice, uh, I changed the locks
because, because things had been taken out on several occasions.
Judge: Yes.
Plaintiff ’s attorney [the ex-wife’s attorney]: If I remember right, the locks
were changed three days before Elomaa moved away, if I don’t remem...
Defendant [the ex-husband]: ## Yes, because before th-that when I, it seemed
that the things were disappearing quite fast.
Judge: Was this apartment in the same condition as in the photographs
when you were in possession?
Defendant [the ex-husband]: Yes it was, because  these outsiders had been
and we could call on one of the policemen who came to the apartment to testi-
fy, who said “this is a real mess”.
Judge [clearly displeased]: Well, I don’t know. I urge the parties to consider
seriously if it is worth bringing witnesses to say who has taken what, and all
the videotapes and everything. Try to settle this issue at least. I really mean
it.
Defendant [the ex-husband ]: Uhh.
Judge: Holmberg [refers to the ex-wife’s attorney] should also give this
message to his principal. [pause of 11 seconds]. But, hmm, can we now
proceed so that, now that we have gone through the evidence, the defen-
dant could now consider the necessary counter-evidence.
The ex-husband’s dilemma-like initiatives were even more striking in Excerpt
8:36. In his second turn (lines 11–15), he helped to construct the topic and even
initiated enlargement of the dispute (“Yes I also made a report of an offence, that
all my personal clothes had been stolen. That can also be brought into the court.
Well, I can call these policemen to testify.”). Immediately in the same turn, how-
ever, he questioned the whole issue, this time using a more effective discursive
tool, a direct question (“Now it’s only a question of how far we’re going with
this mess. Are we really going to dig up the dirt?”). This questioning initiative
resulted in a fracture in the process, which was repaired with a short reflection
on the reasonableness of such a dispute. Interestingly, this short period spent
getting close to the nucleus of the conflict, interspersed with metaphors such as
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“digging up the dirt”, was soon over when the participants turned their
attention to the photographs of the apartment.
After that, the ex-husband concentrated more on enlarging the dispute than
on questioning the enlargement. He answered questions directed at him by the
judge, but transformed the answer into an enlarging initiative (lines 33–37 and
51–53). It seems as if such initiatives had a cumulative effect on the judge’s
response: he became irritated and asked the parties to consider whether the
issue was worth disputing at all. This could be interpreted as reflecting on the
script, although in a manner that suggests frustration.
With his response (“Try to settle this issue at least”), the judge clearly made
his opinion clear in a way not traditionally expected in a court hearing. Susan
Philips (1990) criticized the typical characterization of Anglo-American court
trials as ones in which each of the two sides presents its view on relevant events
and then the judge chooses which of the two versions of reality sounds plausi-
ble. In these characterizations, the judge is either invisible, or cast in the role of
the person who must choose absolutely between two sides. Philips (1990, pp.
197–198) challenges both the characterization of the judge’s role and the
characterization of the sequential order in the structuring of conflict manage-
ment in the American trial court. She sees the judge as a third party, mediating
by proposing third positions and arguing actively. She claims that the bulk of
judges’ interactional moves are very much like those of lawyers: they all offer
positions (p. 208). In her arguments, she seems to put a similar emphasis on the
task at hand as Hayden (1987) did. Her findings are valid in terms of dispute
processing where matters of law are being decided and where motions are ruled
upon out of the presence of a jury. When matters of fact are being decided, as
they are in a jury trial, the judge plays a relatively minor role in the structuring
of courtroom speech (Philips 1990, p. 197).
It seems that, after the Finnish procedural reform, the active role of the judge
in conducting the proceedings has changed to become that of a “third party” who
not only makes a decision after the hearings, but who may also comment,
reveal his or her own opinions, question, and argue during the proceedings. This
goes together well with Philips’s finding (1990, p. 209) that judges’ and lawyers’
verbal contributions are very similar in kind, and that it cannot be said that what
distinguishes the judge’s role is the kind of move or use of language he or she
makes compared to lawyers.
The condition of the apartment was taken up again in Phase 9 in the extended
preliminary hearing this time in order to evaluate whether it affected the accom-
modation allowance the plaintiff had claimed for. In Excerpt 8:37, the long
monologues have been abridged.
8 Client Initiatives and Their Effects on Courtroom Interaction 235
Excerpt 8:37 Case 6, extended preliminary hearing
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Veli Elomaa had something… what did you want to say?
Plaintiff: I could say something about the condition of the apartment, what it
meant in practice. Here the situation was such that I filed three offense
reports, because her friends had emptied my apartment.  (//)
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Well, what he is trying to say here is probably that the
opposing party has contributed to the poor condition of the apartment.
Judge: Yes, yes. It was marked down like that.
Defendant’s attorney: Can I answer that?
Judge: I suppose it’s fair to let you answer. We are now discussing the issue,
after all.
Defendant’s attorney: I should say that if someone calls the police and shuts
his family out of their home (//)
Plaintiff: I can comment here that I have followed the instructions of the
police.
Defendant’s attorney: That doesn’t sound credible.
Judge: Credible or not, we’ll go on. I would understand that it is sufficient
to record that the plaintiff states that the condition of the apartment does
not affect the basis or amount of the allowance, and the defendant states
that it does not affect the basis, but it does affect the amount. Well, we’ll
return this issue when the evidence is presented. Then I will decide whether
to allow evidence on the condition of the apartment, or not.
Defendant: Could I …
Judge: ## Point six.
Defendant: ## Just a moment…
Judge: ## The car radio.
Defendant’s attorney: Only a short comment on this…
Defendant: On this mess in the apartment. We only changed the children’s
beds and desks. (//) But he was the one who took the shelves and closets, and
then there was quite a mess.
Judge: Okay. This point is closed. Point number six. The car radio.
In this episode, the plaintiff, in his explaining initiative, told his story about
the condition of the apartment (the beginning of the story is on lines 2–4). His
own description of his personal experience was then converted into legal
language by his attorney (lines 5–6). Later in the episode (lines 16–19), the judge
continued translating the discourse into judicial notes in the minutes.
Since the excerpt includes explaining initiatives expressed by both the plaintiff
and the defendant, it could serve as an example with which to take a closer look
at the effects of topic-maintaining initiatives. The plaintiff ’s first initiative on
lines 2–4 was followed by a comment by his own attorney (lines 5–6) and, after
that, confirmation by the judge (line 7), both of which continued the
prevailing topic. The plaintiff ’s second initiative on lines 13–14 was first followed
by an objection by the opposing party’s attorney and then a concluding com-
ment by the judge, both of which again continued the prevailing topic.
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The defendant’s initiative (the beginning of the turn in lines 27–28) was
similar to the plaintiff ’s first one: she gave her personal account of how she saw
the condition of the apartment and blamed her husband for contributing to the
mess. This initiative was followed by the judge’s short comment aiming to
finish the topic quickly (line 30).
The same initiative-effect structure after both principals’ explaining initia-
tives was present in Excerpt 8:38.
Excerpt 8:38 Case 6, extended preliminary hearing
Plaintiff: And our comment is that these two bills cancel each other out. Then
there’s only this actual telephone bill for 2000 marks. This paper is only about
how you use the money.
Judge: Well, unfortunately your use of money is represented here in some
pieces of paper plus converging viewpoints. This is what the decision has to
be based on.
Plaintiff ’s attorney [jokingly]: We have plenty of papers here [taps the pa-
per pile].
Judge: Okay. Well, defendant has still something [nods and gives floor to
the defendant]
Defendant: Only very briefly, that our, my intention was to continue produc-
ing these pieces of  paper every month, concerning payment for the gardener
and everything, but Elomaa did not agree to pay one dollar, not a half, not a
quarter, nothing, so I paid for the gardener myself. That’s why writing these
pieces of  paper didn’t last long. That’s all.
Judge: Okay. Is point seven now clear?
Again, the plaintiff ’s explaining initiative (lines 1–3) was followed by the
judge’s comment, which still maintained the topic while strongly criticizing the
plaintiff ’s way of conducting the case (lines 4–6). The defendant’s initiative (lines
11–15) was given the floor (line 9) and responded to (line 16) by the judge, who
exhibited a wish to pass the turn on quickly.
If the analysis is extended to cover the plaintiff ’s topic-maintaining initia-
tives in general, it shows that they were quite effective. They were carried
forward either
1. by his own attorney who either continued on the same topic or trans-
lated it into judicial concepts:
Plaintiff: It’s clear if you look at page ten. This is only a list.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: The answer is that he denies receiving that sum, because
it’s only a receipt.
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2. by the judge asking a specifying question:
Plaintiff: After two weeks the motorbike was sold again.
Judge: Was it sold again after two weeks?
3. or by an objection by the opposing party’s attorney followed by a
comment by the judge trying to change the topic or calm down the
situation:
Plaintiff: Usually, when policemen arrive, you tell them something very
approximate.
Defendant’s attorney: Such as six teacups, if I remember correctly.
Judge: Here I’m again tempted to chime in that it’s as if you are only argu-
ing on principle, when you get worked up about whether there were four or
five paintings. The sum of money probably doesn’t mean anything to either
of you. I am amazed. This was again only my comment here.
The defendant’s topic-maintaining initiatives, on the other hand, seemed to
close the subject instead of maintaining it. Her explaining initiatives in Excerpt
8:37 and 8:38 were not followed by questions from the other participants, they
were not supported by the defendant’s attorney’s comments, and neither were
they objected to by the opposing party. They were received and then dealt with
in an impatient manner by the judge.
On the one hand, the judge’s approach seems odd because he specifically or-
dered the defendant to be present and to be heard (see Excerpt 8:32) and
because he stated (Excerpt 8.37, line 9) “We are discussing the issue, after all”.
On the other hand, the defendant seemed to choose her moments for initiating
speech turns poorly, entering the discussion when there appeared already signs
of moving forward to another topic. In Excerpt 8:37, the defendant made her
initiative after the judge had already summarized how the issue under discus-
sion would be recorded in the minutes (lines 16–21) and indicated movement
to another topic with his words “we’ll go on” (line 16). Simultaneously with the
defendant starting her turn, the judge made the shift by introducing the next
point in the agenda “Point six” (line 23). The situation described in Excerpt 8:
38 was the end of closing the issue of the bills, with signs of the topic closure
already in evidence. In line 9, the judge’s word “okay” was intoned with a strong
indication that he was about to finish the topic. The fact that the defendant took
her turn relatively late, at least in the judge’s mind, became clear from the judge’s
words “Well, the defendant has still something”. Similarly, the defendant seemed
to recognize that the topic was about to close (“Only very briefly, that our…”).
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Moreover, it is evident that the defendant and her attorney were not used to
co-operating in court, otherwise the attorney would have supported and accom-
panied his principal in her communicative efforts. He did help her in a small way
to take the floor (Excerpt 8:37, line 26), however.
The marginalization of the defendant was indisputable. Given the fact that
the judge had ordered her to be present, and that she won the case to a large
extent, the ignoring of her initiatives is difficult to explain. Without more sup-
portive data, such as sense-making given in the interview, attributing it to indi-
vidual or gender-based motives could be risky. While lacking any hints from the
judge’s interview, I am not able to clarify the motives behind the judge’s con-
duct. One way to try to understand it is to look at the interplay with the
client from the perspective of the transformation of a dispute.
One of the most well-known studies on the transformation of disputes from
experiences of wrong to a legal case was conducted by Felstiner, Abel and Sarat
(1980-81). They propose a model of three developmental stages – naming,
blaming and claiming – through which disputes pass in their early phases.
Elaborating on this model, Conley and O’Barr (1998) focus their microlinguis-
tic analysis on what actually happens in each stage, and on what events trigger
thedevelopmental transitions. At every stage, the interaction between the injured
party and the ones to whom he or she is telling the story – his or her audience –
transforms the dispute collaboratively. The experienced problem is articulated
in the phases of naming and blaming, and the responsibility assigned –
usually in collaboration with a friendly listener in an informal atmosphere. If
the claiming has resulted in the accused denying his or her responsibility, the
claimant may turn to the legal system which, again, involves retelling the prob-
lems to a new audience. Now the story must be retold to a potentially hostile
opposing party in the professional world of lawyers and judges. There the law
system requires a particular framing of the dispute: the blaming must be explicit
and the claiming monetary (Conley & O’Barr, 1998, pp. 80–90). The product, a
new account of the dispute, is jointly produced by the litigants and the legal
professionals in the courtroom interaction.
Sarat and Felstiner (1995) studied the transformation of disputes in encoun-
ters between divorce lawyers and their clients. In terms of the three-stage
model of the transformation of disputes, the interaction in the lawyer’s office
takes place on a stage where disputes evolve from blaming to claiming. Sarat and
Felstiner found that the transformation of the dispute was a contest between
competing discourses. Whereas clients typically framed disputes in terms
of moral blame and legal rights, lawyers used a variety of linguistic strategies to
recast them as battles over such tangible issues as houses, support payments and
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visitation schedules. The linguistic strategies employed in changing the
focus from moral to tangible issues included offering unsupportive or neutral
responses to clients’ rhetoric about blame, as well as ignoring the morality and
blame by bringing the talk back to the legal process (Sarat & Felstiner, 1995, pp.
30–42).
The strategies mentioned by Sarat and Felstiner are recognizable in Excerpt
8:37 in the courtroom context.  The plaintiff initiated a personal explanation
about the condition of the apartment in lines 2–4, mainly blaming his ex-wife
for making a mess in there. His blame was transformed into a legal statement
by his attorney (lines 5–6) through the legal term “contributing”. Interestingly,
the defendant’s attorney, inconsistently with his professional status, also con-
tinued the discussion in a moralistic and blaming tone against the plaintiff (lines
11–12). The judge then pronounced his conclusion in legal terms, explicitly mak-
ing the transformation from blaming to claiming (lines 16–19). At the end of
the excerpt, the defendant initiated a similar explanation in which she mainly
accused her ex-husband of ruining the apartment. This time, another linguistic
strategy mentioned by Sarat and Felstiner (1995) was employed by the judge:
the defendant’s story was ignored and a new topic was introduced. In a similar
way, the defendant’s accusatory explanation in Excerpt 8:38 was ignored and
bypassed.
The findings of my analysis seem to support the findings and conclusions of
the studies mentioned above (Conley & O’Barr, 1998; Sarat & Felstiner, 1995).
Both the plaintiff ’s and the defendant’s initiatives in Excerpts 8:37 and 8:38
seemed to occur at the “wrong” stage. The blaming tone is expected to be
filtered out, at least in the encounter with the attorney, and transformed into
framed, monetary claims in the court. The professionals involved in Case 6
seemed to have few discursive tools with which to deal with the blaming in the
courtroom. One of these was to try to develop and transform it by assigning it
legal labels, which are more manageable in court. Another was to make person-
al comments on the relevance of blaming, and basically on the whole dispute.
Yet another tool was to ignore and bypass the blaming.
Again, this is a question of learning: of finding new ways and new tools to
interact and communicate in the preliminary hearing. Attorneys also have to
look for fresh ways to work together and communicate with their clients. A
client who is present and active in the hearing changes the traditional flow of
communication between the attorneys and the judge. Interestingly enough, the
phrases used in the course of court proceedings and in court documents to
describe the division of labor between attorney and principal vary according to
the presence or non-presence of the principal. If the attorney appears before the
240
court alone, without the principal, he or she is recorded as representing (or
advocating for) the principal. An attorney who is in court with the principal is
recorded as assisting him or her. According to the dictionary, synonyms of the
verb to assist include to co-operate, to collaborate and to support. Concrete
forms of assistance in the hearings are now under construction. This is a seri-
ous and highly interesting challenge for innovative learning.
From now on, the focus of my analysis will be solely on the effects of the
initiatives.
All the pieces of evidence were presented and negotiated in Phase 10.
Following the new procedural law, all the evidence should concern the disput-
ed issues and nothing extra is admissible. In Excerpt 8:39, the evidence concern-
ing the price of the motorbike is being negotiated.
Excerpt 8:39 Case 6, extended preliminary hearing
Judge: Is this evidence necessary?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: It’s not necessary, especially since it ‘s admitted that the
motorbike was sold for 19 000 marks.
Judge: For that very reason, too. We’ll strike this out.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Let’s strike it out.
Plaintiff: Well, this same ad shows the general level of prices,  they’re around
20 000 marks.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Well, then they’re other motorbikes. This can be
removed.
Plaintiff: Same brand, same age.
Plaintiff: But it can be removed.
Judge: Then, next is the sales agreement for the motorbike.
Here, the plaintiff seemed to disagree with the decision his attorney and the
judge were coming to. He expressed two questioning initiatives in which he
attempted to justify why the newspaper ad should be retained as a piece of
evidence. These initiatives resulted in rejection by his attorney, who merely
repeated the decision to exclude the evidence.
The executor of the partition36 was heard in Phase 11. The plaintiff wanted
to comment on a statement made by her, but was directed not to do so.
36
 With this term I refer to the person (usually an impartial lawyer), appointed by the court,
who carries out the distribution of the matrimonial assets after a divorce.
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Excerpt 8:40 Case 6, main hearing
Executor of the partition: There were three installments, each of 2110 marks.
Isn’t that right?
Plaintiff: Can I comment on this directly?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: No, no comments yet.
Judge: Let’s not comment, just ask, although the executor of the partition is
not a traditional witness like others.
This shows the client’s initiative in commenting on what was said being
rejected by his attorney, and immediately after that the rejection was rational-
ized by the judge. He advised the plaintiff that comments were not appropriate
at that moment, only questions could be asked. The judge’s explanation was:
“although the executor of the partition is not a traditional witness like the
others”. This is, again, an example of a fracture in the process which was repaired
through reflection. The explanation given by the judge was perhaps not very
informative to the clients, but it was rather more understandable to the profes-
sionals. It was also problematic because half an hour earlier, at the end of the
extended preliminary hearing, the judge had asked the principals to consider
whether it was necessary to be present when the witnesses were heard, adding
that “maybe it is good to comment when hearing the witnesses”. This sentence
may have given the parties the wrong idea of the clients’ role in hearing the wit-
nesses.
The instructive and educational aspects of such reflections were discussed in
the analysis of Case 5, and their connection to clients’ learning was pointed out.
Excerpt 8:40 reveals the often incomplete and spontaneous nature of these
reflections. They are not meant to be informative or didactic, yet they serve the
function of making the proceedings more visible to the client.
A reflection with a more didactic emphasis occurred in Phase 13, just before
a witness was called to the hearing room.
Excerpt 8:41 Case 6, main hearing
Judge: It’s been suggested here that the paintings are not the ones that were
in your home.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes, that’s right.
Defendant: We also have pictures of the paintings.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: They should of course have been declared as evidence
in the preliminary hearing. Now they can’t be included anymore, I suppose.
Judge: The pictures?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes, or whatever they may be. I suppose we deal with
the case with the material we have here now.
Judge: Yes. But that doesn’t stop Edelman [refers to the witness] coming
here with the paintings, does it?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Of course not, he’s welcome, that suits us.
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Here the defendant expressed an extending initiative (line 4) when she
referred to the photographs of the paintings as a possible proof of what paint-
ings were at the home. This caused a fracture in the process which was
repaired by the opposing side’s attorney, who contested the idea of including the
photographs but also explained that they should have been declared as evidence
in the preliminary hearing (lines 5–6 and 8–9). Here, again, the plaintiff ’s
attorney’s reply was probably not purposefully didactic, but it served to make
the formal procedure more visible.
In Phase 13, after all the witnesses had been heard, the plaintiff ’s extending
initiatives caused one more fracture in the process (Excerpt 8:42).
Excerpt 8:42 Case 6, main hearing
Judge: Should we take a short break of ten to fifteen minutes before the
final statements?
Plaintiff: What appeared here was that these paintings are without the frames
and here I have Stockmann’s estimate of the value of a 40 cm x 50 cm frame.
What I knew is that these frames were gold-covered wood.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Well.
Plaintiff: I can leave this original here.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: It should have been left in the preliminary hearing
[slams the paper pile with his hand].
Judge: Well it can be...
Plaintiff ’s attorney: ## We’re just making a verbal statement here.
Judge: …It can be stated in the final statement that the witness was talking
about the value of the paintings, but that the total value was then
something else.
As the judge had already closed the subject after hearing the witnesses, the
plaintiff surprisingly again opened up the issue of the value of the paintings. He
said that he had a new estimate (lines 3–5), and also suggested submitting the
estimate to the court, actually as a new piece of evidence (line 7). The initiative
was, at first, rejected by his attorney (lines 8–9), but then the issue was both
smoothed over and reflected upon by the judge (lines 12–14).
3 Summary of Case 6
Case 4 featured a client who complemented the professionals’ discourse. Case 5
introduced a dispute in which attempts to influence the social reality forced the
client to create strong discursive means for expansion. Case 6 showed us a talk-
ative and interactive client who was allowed to speak perhaps surprisingly much.
The discourse seemed to be a far cry from standard courtroom discourse.
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In fact, Case 6 introduced two clients who made differing contributions.
Those of the defendant were quite similar to those of the plaintiff in Case 4,
although slightly more numerous. She expressed one extending initiative in the
hearing, the others being mostly explaining initiatives and confirming initiatives
supporting her attorney. The plaintiff, on the contrary, participated in the hear-
ings very actively and his initiatives were extremely frequent. All of the initia-
tive categories except expanding initiatives were represented, the explaining and
confirming types being the most frequent. Again, his exceptionally active
participation in the hearings challenges the informant position assigned to the
client in procedural law. Whereas Case 5 featured a client who used strong,
expanding initiatives, Case 6 challenged the conventional picture of the law by
introducing a client whose initiatives were frequent. The plaintiff was not only
asked questions, he also contributed himself when he needed to.
Case 6 was a dispute considered futile and pointless by all involved. Even the
parties themselves saw the fruitlessness to some extent, but once the court
process had started, they were engaged in claiming and defending. In general,
the case represents court cases which are usually seen as not belonging to the
courts. The court is seen as an inappropriate and incompetent institution to
handle this kind of dispute in which the problems are only judicial on the
surface.
Given these circumstances, the judge made an effort to get the dispute
settled at the very beginning. When this failed, his intention was to deal with the
troublesome case as quickly and simply as possible. From this point of view, the
traditional script for proceedings in which the client does not talk would have
been the most convenient.
The plaintiff, however, followed the opposite script. The discursive tools that
he employed when participating seemed to be almost the same as those that are
used in everyday conversation. Here lies a clear difference between Cases 5 and
6. In Case 5, the discourse required new, strong discursive tools because it was
not ordinary everyday discourse, and because the plaintiff did not want to
reside in the traditional role of a court client. In Case 6, the mode of interac-
tion resembled everyday discussion and the client could manage with the
discursive tools he was already familiar with. In fact, it seems that everyday talk
itself was the plaintiff ’s tool for participation, as were the strong discursive tools
of the client in Case 5.
When examining the transformation of disputes, Conley and O’Barr (1998)
noted the different speech used in the phases of naming and blaming when the
experienced wrong was explained to co-operative and friendly listeners, com-
pared to the formal, judicial speech used in courtrooms to insensitive or even
hostile listeners. In Case 6, the choice of a strategy of everyday explanations and
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blaming in the courtroom seemed to be, at the same time, both unproductive
and successful. On the one hand, the client’s initiatives were rejected, his talk was
twisted to fit the judicial format, and the judge became frustrated. On the other
hand, the client could take the floor and present his viewpoints relatively often
with his everyday talk. It was not only the interaction data, but also the supple-
mentary interview data that gave support to the idea that the plaintiff succeed-
ed in presenting his own viewpoints.
Excerpt 8.43 Case 6, interview with the plaintiff after the preliminary
hearing
Interviewer: When you held the floor, did you think that you were being
allowed to present…
Plaintiff: ## Of course, there was no problem there. This was informal
discussion, so you could basically explain as much as you wanted.
As in Case 5, the plaintiff in Case 6 was satisfied with the opportunities he
was given to speak. Again, this deviates clearly from the accounts given by
clients involved in proceedings before the reform.
The greatest challenge for the judge and other legal professionals in Case 6
was how to organize the plaintiff ’s rambling speech flow. It seems that the
legal professionals were poorly equipped to manage the client’s speech, and
lacked the tools for constructive control. His words were partly rejected or
bypassed, and partly allowed to flow in a way that seemed to irritate and
frustrate the judge in particular. In order to avoid the frustration, it would
appear to be important to create and implement new tools for managing cases
in a more expansive way. The trend towards more actively participating clients
seems to require tools that help the participants to submit the script of the
proceedings for a joint reconsideration. Embryos of these expanding tools can
be seen in several episodes in which the script was reflected upon and made
explicit to the participants.
At the same time as featuring an unusually active and talkative plaintiff, Case
6 also introduced a defendant who took the position of an outsider, and whose
rare initiatives were bypassed and marginalized. Paradoxically, in addition to
needing more elaborated tools for managing extremely active clients, courts seem
to lack tools for catering to clients’ more tentative contributions.
Unfortunately, the interview data do not give any direct reasons for the
defendant’s retiring and minor contribution in the hearing. One possible expla-
nation may, however, be gleaned from her interview, in which she described her
general aversion to and exhaustion with all the conflicts with her ex-husband.
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Excerpt 8.44 Case 6, interview with the defendant after the
preliminary hearing
Defendant: You asked why I don’t like the hearings. I really don’t like those
occasions. I just stay here at home and look at my kids and think about
them. It’s all about them, about these kids. And those strange people decide
something on the nod. Jani [refers to one of the children] has nightmares,
he wakes up wet, comes to my bed and I just say again and again “Don’t be
afraid, no one is coming to our house”. After all this I think it’s totally ridic-
ulous that I have to sit there [in the court]. All those strangers, how dare
they! They’re just doing their job and they get paid for that.
Interviewer: Are you talking about the attorneys or…?
Defendant: ## All of them. All this rigmarole. Everything.
The effects of the plaintiff ’s initiatives in Case 6 are summed up in Table 8.13.
These initiatives were restricted or bypassed six times. While the effects in Case
5 were more in the form of bypassing than rejecting, there were more rejection
than bypassing in Case 6. The plaintiff ’s initiative led to a fracture in the
process ten times altogether. Seven out of the ten fractures were repaired through
reflection on the proceedings, the rest by being smoothed over interactively. In-
structional tools for explicating the procedure to the client were used not only
by the judge, but also by the plaintiff ’s attorney several times (e.g., Excerpts 8:40
and 8:41). Although more short-run and accidental than in Case 5, the momen-
tary reflections again served, in an embryonic form, an educational function in
the proceedings.
Table 8.13 The Effects of the Plaintiff’s Initiatives in Case 6
Fracture in the process Initiative Rejecting 
without 
explanation, 
bypassing Repair by 
smoothing 
over 
Repair by 
reflecting 
Change  
in topic 
Going beyond 
the script, 
change in 
understanding 
the dispute  
Expanding      
Extending 2  6 5  
Questioning 4 1 1 3  
Restricting  1 1   
Total 6 2 8 8  
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Six initiatives in Case 6 resulted in a new topic. The condition of admission
to that effect category was set relatively low: the client did not have to offer a
totally new topic, and a new point or detail was deemed sufficient if the others
started to follow that instead of the previous topic.
Of the defendant’s two topic-changing initiatives, one was bypassed and the
other one led to a fracture, repaired by reflecting.
The effects of the explaining initiatives are of particular interest in this case
as they were the clients’ most typical way of contributing to the proceedings. The
plaintiff ’s explaining initiatives were likely to be responded to in a way that
maintained the topic, whereas the defendant’s initiatives were more likely to
result in the closure of the topic. This finding suggests a need to create new tools
for interacting and collaborating with clients in hearings.
All in all, the plaintiff in particular was able to influence the flow of the
discussion, and even to modify the topics according to his own interest.  If not
introducing a new topic, he could at least initiate fractures in the process that
had to be repaired. On the other hand, the clients’ initiatives were also rejected
and bypassed, sometimes even in a hostile manner.
Case 6 shows up the tension between different interests in court proceedings.
The interest of the court is to ensure quick, effective and reliable proceedings.
The interest of the client is to be heard, to participate, and to have an impact
on his or her own court proceedings (Tyler, 1990; 1997; Vidmar 1997). With its
high frequency of client participation, Case 6 pushes this tension to its extremes.
As court clients cannot be selected, nor their needs easily altered, developing
interaction in the hearing remains a task for the courts and their judges. Thus
it would appear necessary to develop tools for channeling the interaction in a
constructive way as the number of active clients will probably increase.
8.9 Conclusions
This analysis of client initiatives in courtroom interaction was fruitful in
uncovering their contributions to the hearings. All of the clients in the hearings
conducted after the procedural reform participated in the discussion at least a
few times. This means that, unlike in the proceedings before the reform, all of
the clients who attended the hearings also made some verbal contribution. In
addition to the more traditional situation in which the client mainly comple-
mented the professionals’ talk, numerous and diverse clients’ initiatives were also
found. Thus the clients attempted to expand, extend, question or restrict the
dispute, or to maintain its ongoing course through contesting, alleging, correct-
ing, explaining, confirming and stating. Their initiatives were sometimes rejected
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or bypassed, and sometimes they opened up a new topic in the discussion. Most
often they caused a fracture in the process, which had to be repaired by the pro-
fessionals either by reflecting on the procedure or by smoothing it over. When
explicating the proceedings and procedures, the professionals contributed to
making the court process more visible or transparent for the client, and thus
strengthened the instructive and educational function of the proceedings.
The findings show that clients can use everyday talk in courtroom
interaction, but their talk may be put into a legal format by the professionals.
However, making strong, expansive attempts to change the participants’ under-
standing of the dispute seems to require from the client the employment of
especially advanced discursive tools, such as surrounding the obligatory
responses with initiatives, turning answers into questions, questioning the
presented questions, and addressing questions to the witness.
In the procedural law and its preambles, the task of the principal has been
defined mostly as that of an informant complementing the professionals’ dis-
course if needed – no further elaboration on the role is offered. The findings of
my analysis imply that the principals’ contribution in the hearings is in giving
information, but also much more. The principals may be active participants who
attempt to have an effect on the dispute and its construction during the
proceedings. These findings encourage studies of court hearings as communi-
cative processes where the dispute is transformed from claims to a decision or
settlement.  For the legal professionals this sets a remarkable challenge to learn
from and develop trials as processes where the dispute and the script for the
proceedings are negotiated between the participants.
What kind of picture do the findings draw of the future development of civil
proceedings in courts of law? The zone of proximal development for Finnish
court hearings may be described as a matrix of four fields (Figure 8.1), where
the formality – informality of courtroom interaction is one axis and the client’s
contribution as adaptive or expansive is the other.
The one extreme on the horizontal axis, formal interaction in the hearing, is
detectable in existing studies in which courtroom interaction is typically
described as strictly ordered, its turns carefully sequenced, and the question-
answer structure as predetermined (e.g., Conley & O’Barr, 1998; Hayden, 1987;
Välikoski, 1996). The other extreme on this axis, informal interaction, seems to
violate these traditional rules. Several deviations from the traditional rules were
found in the preliminary hearings of my data. The order of speech turns was not
rigorously controlled by the judge, and the participants took the floor without
asking or being given permission. Overlapping speech and interruptions
occurred frequently. A blurring of the methodological initiative-response
distinction used in the analysis can also be seen as indicating the presence of
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informal, everyday talk where the initiatory and responsive elements are inter-
twined and the border between them hard to define (on the artificiality of the
coding, see Linell, 1998, pp. 178–179).  Equally, the frequent use of “minimal
confirmations” (turns such as “yes”, “that’s right”) contributes to making the
interaction more informal. Especially in Case 6, many of the plaintiff ’s confirm-
ing initiatives were minimal confirmations which are not typical in courtroom
interaction, but assure the understanding of speech and thus make the interac-
tion more fluent.
The vertical axis in Figure 8.1 describing the clients’ contribution on a
general level was derived by applying the criteria I used when categorizing the
clients’ initiatives. Those that merely maintained the prevailing topic are inter-
preted here as adaptive, and those aimed at changing the topic are considered
expansive, expanding initiatives being at the highest extreme.
The client in Case 4 was most adaptive, her initiatives being solely topic-
maintaining. The interaction in the hearing diverged from the most formal
aspects of traditional courtroom interaction but lacked the most informal
elements, such as minimal confirmations and continual overlapping. Case 5 was
similar to Case 4 with regard to the formality of the interaction in the hearing,
but the client’s contribution was expansive, featuring several expanding initia-
tives connected to strong discursive tools.
Figure 8.1 The Zone of Proximal Development in the Finnish Court Hearings
Formal
Adaptive
Informal
Expansive
Traditional
court case
Case 5
Case 4
Case 6
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The clients’ contributions in Case 6 were on the borderline between
adaptive and expansive. The clients mostly adopted the role of an informant with
their numerous explaining initiatives, but also made some attempts to alter the
dispute with topic-changing initiatives. The interaction in the hearing was
strikingly informal.
The cases analyzed illustrate a future characterized by growing activeness
among clients, in both the intensity and quantity of their participation, and a
move towards more informal communication between clients and legal profes-
sionals. Apparently, along with the new civil procedure and new practices in con-
ducting the proceedings, the dialogic and interactive elements in the hearings
have increased, not only among the legal professionals, but also among the cli-
ents. However, it also seems clear that the legal professionals do not yet have new
tools that are sensitive enough to respond to the challenges imposed by
different client and case types. These cases point at least to the need for tools
for mobilizing the client to participate alongside the legal professionals (Case
4), for tools for taking into account the alternative ways of understanding the
dispute expressed by the client (Case 5), and for tools for controlling and
guiding a talkative client in a way that serves both the rational establishing of
the case and the client’s need to be heard (Case 6).
My hypothesis concerning the zone of proximal development (Figure 8.1)
contributes to the more general discussion on expertise in courts by addressing
the division of labor between the clients and the legal professionals in court hear-
ings. The findings of the initiative analysis show that clients are interested in and
capable of contributing to and affecting the dispute resolution, which signals a
potential shift in collaboration between clients and legal professionals.
A qualitatively new kind of collaboration between clients and professional
was outlined by David Tuckett and his colleagues, who interpreted the interac-
tion between doctors and patients as negotiations to which both parties bring
expertise of their own: the doctor’s expertise based on knowledge of medicine
and the client’s expertise based on his or her own experience (Tuckett & al.,
1985). Likewise, Ritva Engeström (1999a; 1999b) analyzed the encounters
between clients and professionals as joint problem solving, where negotiation
aims at combining the knowledge of both. In the process of problem solving in
doctor-patient encounters, the question-answer structure, typical of the clini-
cal interview, collapses and questions such as what knowledge is relevant, and
what issues the patient wishes to include and exclude become negotiable. Simi-
larly, the findings of my initiative analysis support the idea of the court client
employing and developing his or her own expertise when participating in
constructing the case and in negotiating what is important in it.
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My findings also challenge approaches which simply emphasize profession-
als’ power over clients. While certainly subordinated to some extent, the clients
also had their moments of power when they structured the flow of the speech
or examined a witness. The findings strongly suggest that the dichotomy of the
powerful and the powerless is inadequate. Instead of looking for power as
connected to certain institutional roles or practices, we might try to understand
it as being continuously produced in social interaction in a dynamic, fluid, and
contradictory way. What Sarat and Felstiner argue about power in lawyer-
client interaction also holds for courtroom interaction: “Power in lawyer-client
interactions is less stable, predictable and clear-cut than the conventional view
would have us believe. Power is not a ‘thing’ that can be possessed; it is contin-
uously enacted and re-enacted, constituted and reconstituted” (Sarat & Felstin-
er, 1995, p. 22). Like lawyer-client encounters, the activity in court hearings
emerges as “ongoing, varied, changing efforts to negotiate shared understand-
ings” (ibid, p. 144). As Sarat and Felstiner point out, the negotiation of mean-
ing is rarely neat and orderly.
“Conversations are started but often are never completed; agreements are reached,
only to unwind rapidly. In this ambiguity and circularity, drift and delay, and in
the accompanying negotiations of meaning, power is exercised and resisted. The sub-
jects of these negotiations cross the boundaries between law and society and inter-
mix the social world of the client, legal world of divorce, and the nature of profes-
sional services.” (p. 144).
What, then, would be the upper-right field in the four-square matrix
(Figure 8.1) to which the overall constellation of the analyzed cases seems to
point? What would be the expanded practice toward which certain initial
elements seem to emerge in the clients’ initiatives and their effects in the court
hearings? The zone of proximal development appears to offer a way of working
in which the client neither gets marginalized nor dominates the process, but
collaborates as an equal partner with the legal professionals. He or she is both
heard, and hears important aspects that may affect his or her own way of
understanding the case. The judge is given important information and, consid-
ers the client’s own viewpoints of the case and the proceedings.
Developing informal discussion and negotiation appears to be a well-ground-
ed way of working, also stressed in the procedural justice approach.  Messmer
(1997, pp. 154–156) in particular emphasized the communicative nature of
justice and legitimacy: justice is always negotiated and arises as a product of
mutual understanding between parties. Laukkanen (1995, pp. 195, 213–215)
emphasizes discussion and informality as the basis of authority and the origins
of trust in a modern court. Tyler (1990) concluded that the quality of proceed-
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ings and experiences of justice are closely connected to how people obey the law.
Developing interaction in hearings may be of crucial importance if we wish to
influence clients’ compliance and hence also the future workload of the courts
themselves.
New tools and models for courtroom communication are needed for this new
kind of collaboration with clients. Clients are currently responded to by judges
mainly in ways that are situationally and individually determined, and that lack
collective reflection on their accuracy and meaningfulness.
The change that is taking place is emergent. Both the clients and the legal
practitioners at the local level are working in search of new ways to communi-
cate. The initiatives expressed by clients and the ways in which practitioners
respond to these initiatives, sometimes accommodating them, sometimes ignor-
ing them, are evidence of the changes in the activity of district courts. A need
and an opportunity for expansion was signalled in these practices.
The change in the way in which courts work with their clients cannot be
understood only in terms of adapting to the procedural reform. It can also be
understood as an ongoing process of implementation in which learning and
expansion may take place.
This potential expansion would mean re-consideration of the object – the
client and his or her problem – as a collaborative problem-solving unit where
the client is no longer a passive target of court measures but more of a subject-
like partner. It would also mean a new definition of the traditional rules
governing collaboration in courts, including the division of labor and the tools
and models used in court work. This kind of systemic re-orientation cannot be
a task of individual practitioners, however, since it requires collective visualiza-
tion and reflective dialogue within the whole work community of a district court,
and between district courts. The different ways of working with clients are an
important source of expansive learning when put under scrutiny and joint
reflection in the service of collective work redesign.
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9 Settlement as a Window on Change in
Court Activity
9.1 Introduction: Court Activity as a Context for Courtroom Discourse
In the set of four empirical chapters of my dissertation, this final one focuses
on the settling of civil cases inside the courts. In the procedural act of 1993, the
courts were given the obligation to attempt to persuade the parties to settle.
Settlement as an alternative outcome to traditional verdicts is examined in the
analysis as a window on qualitative changes in court activity, informing us about
the developmental dynamics and potential in the courts.
In this chapter, I will suggest that a transition is taking place in the activity
of the lower courts: alongside the traditional idea of finding the material truth,
an alternative understanding is developing in which the outcome of the proceed-
ings appears as a compromise that satisfies both parties.  As far as actual court
cases are concerned, this transition materializes as a gray zone – a tension-
laden and contradictory field of talk and actions. The empirical analysis focus-
es on the particular episodes in the hearings in which a settlement is discussed
or touched upon. The data used was videotaped courtroom interaction support-
ed by interviews with those involved in the videotaped cases.
How, then, can one study and interpret data that record and describe human
interaction and discourse?  I will endeavor to overcome the distinction between
the micro-analysis of legal discourse and the macro-analysis of legal institutions
by introducing the notion of an activity system as a unit of analysis, giving
context and meaning to seemingly random events. In the same connection, I will
evaluate more closely the relationship between discourse and productive
activity, especially in the court setting. Human activity will be studied as
constantly changing through its inner contradictions.
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Traditional Studies of Legal Discourse: An Example of CA
One of the traditions in analyzing legal discourse is conversation analysis (CA).
An example of this approach is given in Atkinson’s article (1992) on informal
court proceedings, in which the topic comes close to the themes of my study.
Atkinson’s basic findings are that the parties may speak relatively freely and
produce non-minimal answers to questions in informal courts, whereas in oth-
er types of court, non-minimal answers attract a hostile or impatient response
by the legal professionals (Atkinson, 1992, pp. 200–204). He shows how small
claims court arbitrators systematically try to display neutrality by avoiding overt
hostility and the kind of affiliation typical of everyday conversation.  He also con-
nects the techniques of displaying neutrality to the role of arbitrator and to the
systemic differences between informal and formal court proceedings (pp. 210–
211).
Atkinson’s article is powerful in showing how the use of recipient markers
and a particular recurring sequence are essential for allowing small claims court
proceedings to be designated as informal. Similarly, it shows how the formality
of other types of court is locally constructed through the participants’ own
actions in the interaction. On this local and situational level, the analysis is
coherent and systematic.
However, the author is more vague in describing the relationships between
the talk and the work of which it is part. He does not acknowledge the different
motives and different logics of traditional court proceedings and the alternative
informal proceedings. Instead, he compares institutional courtroom
interaction to the rules of everyday conversation. Informal justice is taken as a
non-historical and non-problematic phenomenon. Yet, we know that courtroom
conversation is part of the actual proceedings in which the court produces a
certain material outcome, a decision, which is to finish the court case and to say
what is right and legal in this particular case. By giving the verdict in the indi-
vidual case, the court is simultaneously fulfilling its societal task of solving
disputes and maintaining law and order in society. Recently, the practice of
giving the verdict has been challenged by that of negotiating a settlement.
Today, the organization of justice is very much in transition (Heydebrand &
Seron, 1990; Palmer & Roberts, 1998; Zuckerman, 1999). The findings of
different studies concerning procedural justice in formal and informal court
proceedings are not linear, nor do they suggest any self-evident preference
between these two (for example, Vidmar, 1997; Wissler, 1995). How should one
include in the analysis the perspective of productive, socially important, practi-
cal performance?
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The Activity System as a Context
Lave (1988) analyzed the restrictions of current ways of defining contexts.
According to her, the determinist environmental view of contexts as containers
of behavior leaves almost no room for the human construction of novel
contexts. The standard cognitivist view easily excludes the societal and cultural
aspects in its depiction of mental models and cognitive structures as the
context of problem solving and thinking. Various phenomenological and
ethnomethodological analyses, on the other hand, focus on interaction, defin-
ing contexts as social situations or fields of discourse. Contexts are seen as
interpersonal constructions, and often as purely linguistic entities independent
of material practices and socio-economic structures (Lave, 1988).
Engeström (1993) points out that in all the notions of context Lave criticized
is a deep-seated common feature: individual experience is analyzed as if consist-
ing of relatively separate and situational actions, for example conversational
turns. The given objective context is described as something beyond individual
influence, if described at all (Engeström 1993, p. 66). Cultural-historical activi-
ty theory attempts to analyze the relationship of practical actions to the broad-
er cultural, social and physical context of which they are a part. The
approach emphasizes the fact that contexts are constructed by humans and are
not beyond our influence, although not often directly or visibly molded by our
actions. A prolonged and closer look at the legal institution, for example, reveals
a continuously constructed collective activity system (Engeström, 1993; Leont’ev,
1978).
Cole (1996, p. 135) also criticized the definition of context as that which
surrounds, often represented as a set of concentric circles. In these models, the
more inclusive levels are considered to constrain the lower levels. According to
Cole, no unilinear relation or temporal ordering between the event and its
context exists. Instead, context creation is an actively achieved, two-sided pro-
cess, taking place before, after and simultaneously with the event. Referring to
the metaphor of a rope, he describes the relation between the event and its con-
text as a weaving together. The boundaries between the task and its context are
ambiguous and dynamic.
In terms of activity theory, contexts are neither containers – something that
is given and surrounds us – nor situationally created interactive spaces, produced
entirely locally by the participants. The activity system is a self-organizing sys-
tem which creates its own context. It constructs itself locally, but not only by local
means. It makes itself durable by means of mediating artifacts, which we use in
our activity, and which carry history and culture within them (Cole, 1996).
Moreover, as Latour (1996) points out, it is the object and artifacts that make
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human activity durable. In this sense, the activity theoretical approach tran-
scends the limits of many interactional and phenomenological theories that take
the situation as constructed here and now by the participants as the only con-
text.
While activity is a theoretical concept, the activity system is an analytical one
defining the unit of analysis. A model of the activity system was presented in
Figure 5.1. It is used later in this chapter to give context to the situated practic-
es. When the settlement-related discourse in the interaction of a specific case is
analyzed, it is described as an accomplishment of the multiple activity systems
of the court, the attorneys and the clients.37 This is followed by a general analy-
sis of the settling practices from the viewpoint of court activity alone.
Activity systems, for instance different kinds of organizations and institu-
tions, emerge in order to produce goods, services and other outcomes for
customers and users. Studies of talk and communication in some institution or
organization should take into account the fact that “organizations may emerge
through conversations, but they do not emerge for the sake of conversation”
(Engeström, 1999c, p. 170). In this sense, the notion of activity offers a way of
linking communicative events to the contexts in which they occur. In discourse
studies, the utterances and their analysis as such easily become the main
purpose. Analyzing the utterances within the framework of the practical object-
oriented activity helps one to see the wood for the trees.
What, then, is the relationship between practical activity and discourse? Are
they more or less the same phenomenon? One possibility is to make the tricky
questions disappear by proclaiming that speech actions and physical actions are
essentially similar discursive practices. However, it may be more useful to
assume that there are different types of “distances” between practical activity and
discourse (Engeström, 1999c, p. 171). Phone calls between friends, for example,
would represent one end of the spectrum, where talk and practical activity seem
entirely divorced. Most activities stay in the middle of the spectrum, where prac-
tical activity is accompanied and complemented by talk. At the other end are
cases in which practical activity and discourse seem to merge and to become al-
most the same, as in the auctioneer’s work, for example. Practices in legal
proceedings come close to this: a court case is, to a great extent, conducted
through talk, argumentation and negotiation. The practical activity of legal
professionals in the court setting is mainly accomplished through talk and text.
37
 Attorneys in Finland are not officers of the court in the same sense as in the USA, for
example. Due to their more separate role, they are treated as a separate activity system in my
analyses.
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Methodologically, this means that discursive data become the main source
of information in studying court proceedings and the work of judges. Besides
the recorded data concerning the talk in interaction, the gazes, gestures and
motor movements of the participants may also offer significant information
about the proceedings (Goodwin, 1981). Yet, even if talk in the courtroom
provides the main empirical data, putting emphasis on the productive and
practical aspects of the activity invites the employment of complementary
sources, such as interviews and participant accounts, court documents produced
during the proceedings, and historical data.
9.2 Court Work Activity in Transition
The activity system model represents the ideal type of any activity system, but
does not yet reveal how the elements and structure of the activity change and
evolve in the course of time. When concrete data is analyzed, the elements of
the activity system and the relationships between them do not appear stable and
clear-cut, but the theory rather emphasizes the constantly evolving character of
concrete systems. Troubles, tensions and disturbances in everyday practices
belong to the nature of such systems and are, in fact, potential indicators of
change and development within the one in question. The theoretical tool for
making sense of empirically observable disturbances is the concept of contra-
diction. Contradictions are understood as the basic mechanism of development
and change. They are not accidental problems or conflicts, but systemic tensions
between and within the elements of the activity system.
Methodologically, the focus on change and development in activity systems,
rather than on stability, promotes the building of “windows” onto the ongoing
changes in the activity. Analysis of disturbance-related actions or turns in
interaction offers an opportunity to ask, “what dynamics and possibilities of
change and development are involved in this action?” (Engeström, 1999, p.180).
One manifestation of the ongoing change in the activity of Finnish district
courts is in the settlement reached as an alternative solution to the dispute. This
way of settling disputes is a relatively new practice here, introduced as a possi-
ble alternative to traditional adjudication in the procedural court reform of 1993.
Even before that, there was a clause in the Code of Judicial Procedure guiding
the judge to persuade the parties to settle, but this was seldom applied in
practice. Current norms state that “the court shall endeavor to persuade the par-
ties to settle the case and, under its own discretion, present its suggestions for
an amiable resolution of the case in order to further the settlement” (Code of
Judicial Procedure, 5:26). Negotiations leading to settlement most likely take
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place in the context of a preliminary hearing, the interaction in and physical set-
ting of which are illustrated in Figure 9.1 (for the structure of the new
proceedings, see Chapter 2.2).
Since 1993, judges have begun to follow the new rules and to create a new
practice and legal culture where they can, instead of giving a verdict, negotiate
a settlement with the parties. This change is neither technical nor judicial, but
cultural and practical: it requires a shift in the traditional way of thinking and
of conducting the proceedings (Laukkanen, 1995; Virolainen, 1988). The
motive for adjudication is to make the right decision according to the law, where-
as the motive for settling the dispute is to find an outcome that satisfies both
parties.
Figure 9.1  The Physical Setting of a Preliminary Hearing
Literature on alternative dispute resolution has stressed the differences between
traditional litigation and alternative forms. In a wider philosophical context, the
two forms of conflict resolution could be viewed as representatives of two types
of social order (Nader, 1969). Systems of social control vary from governmen-
tal third-party control on the basis of legal rules and systems to “order without
law”, where people govern themselves according to informal rules and contracts.
The interplay between informal social control and legal systems is an overarch-
ing topic in social and legal sciences (see for example, Ellickson, 1991; Black,
1989).
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Pia Letto-Vanamo (2001, p. 39) refers to the historical alternation of differ-
ent forms of social control in Finland. Nowadays, we tend to view settlement as
a new alternative to counteract the defects of contemporary litigation, which we
now understand as the standard. A longer perspective reveals, however, that what
we regard as normal is merely one phase in the history of court systems. Litiga-
tion relates to the modern understanding of justice and decision making, and
settlement and alternative dispute resolution to post-modern understanding. Yet,
settlement was also the predominant form of conflict resolution in pre-
modern forms, understood as collective justice among local communities,
oriented to verbal communication instead of normative texts, and negotiated in-
stead of ordered (Letto-Vanamo, 2001, pp. 57–58).
The current interest in alternative forms of dispute resolution has arisen
mainly from two sources. On the one hand, settlement has been viewed as a way
to improve the quality of conflict resolution through proceedings that enable the
parties to maintain their relationship and continue possible co-operation. On
the other hand, it has also represented a means of rationalizing and streamlin-
ing court proceedings. While settlements have been appreciated for their
significance in maintaining the self-control of the parties, the discussion has
often been driven by criticism of traditional litigation and by a search for new
alternatives.
Recent developments in western legal systems have nevertheless been inter-
preted as a process in which the forms that originally substituted governmental
dispute resolution have become a part of the governmental system itself, and of
its technocratic efforts to cut costs and rationalize (Heydebrand & Seron, 1990;
Palmer & Roberts, 1998).
From the practitioners’ point of view, the essential question is how the logi-
cally different motives of traditional adjudication and the search for compro-
mise can be combined in the everyday work practices of courts. The first expe-
riences of making a settlement raised a number of questions in debates in
Finnish legal journals (see Haavisto, 2001). Is the main purpose of the civil pro-
ceedings to give a verdict or to find a compromise? Does the content of a settle-
ment have to correspond to the materially correct decision? If a judge tries to
settle the case but fails, can he or she still give a verdict? Can promoting
settlements and giving verdicts be tasks of one and the same institution? These
questions are important to practicing judges who have to resolve them in their
everyday actions while working on cases. At the same time, they lead to more
theoretical issues concerning the borderline between the two different forms of
social control within one organization.
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A Shift from Material Truth towards Negotiated Justice
My hypothesis is that, in Finnish litigation, there is an ongoing transition from
the traditional idea of material truth and a substantially correct decision towards
a more pragmatic and relative idea of seeking a negotiable compromise. Behind
the key principles of orality, immediacy and concentration, and the new
practices in the preliminary hearings, lies one of the most fundamental
changes which is probably the alternative to make a settlement, and which
strongly questions the previously governing idea of material truth in a case. This
possible shift is depicted in Figure 9.2.
Figure 9.2 The Shift from Material Truth towards Negotiated Justice
In practice, such a transition is never linear from one pure form of activity
to another. On the contrary, the transition is complex, hard to predict and not
totally controlled. In the middle of the continuum emerges a “gray zone” of prac-
tices with tensions, disturbances and innovations38. Typical of the gray zone is
the intertwining of old and new practices and logics. My hypothesis does not
claim that searching for substantially correct decisions could be replaced by ne-
gotiated compromises. Rather, the shift seems to indicate that various layers, and
thus various and alternative practices, are emerging in dispute resolution.
38
 Ellickson (1991, p. 131) describes hybrid systems of social control, which are combinations
of different kinds of controlling rules and sanctions. For example, a judge may use state
enforcement to enforce the decision in a case, but personal ethics – not governmental laws – in
making it. The idea of the gray zone, in which different logics and practices are combined is in
tune with the notion of hybrid systems. However, the gray zone emphasizes the transitory,
developing nature of practices.
The idea of material 
truth and a correct 
decision –
"finding the guilty”
The gray zone –
the transitory area of
contradictory ideas
and practices
The idea of negotiated 
justice and pragmatic 
compromise
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The ongoing transition – the historical layers and the possible shift between
them – forms the zone of proximal development in court work (on the notion
of the zone of proximal development, see Engeström, 1987). It suggests a
potential developmental transition from one historical form of activity towards
another, in which the object of the activity changes. A corresponding develop-
mental hypothesis concerning problem solving in medical encounters was put
forward by Ritva Engeström (1999a, p. 99). As she points out, the meaning of
this kind of hypothesis is to serve as a framework for interpreting the empirical
observations, and to describe the activity as an ongoing historical process with
a past and a future (pp. 99, 101).
The gray zone in Figure 9.2 refers to the concrete practices that need to be
learned and created when moving on in the zone of proximal development. It
refers to the undefined and unexpected situations in the daily encounters
between the courts and their clients, which constantly bring forth developmen-
tal tensions of their own, requiring concrete solutions.
Placing settlement in the gray zone helps us to understand it as an impor-
tant learning challenge, requiring the creation of and experimentation with new
ways of working. One problematic question concerns what the clients expect
from the court system - judicially justified decisions or negotiated compromise?
Traditional adjudication and aiming at the correct decision are, as is well known,
expensive, slow and often inconvenient for the client. On the other hand,
clients may feel suspicious about settlement, and prefer the traditional idea of
“finding the guilty” to dealing with compromise. This is closely connected to the
debate on the advantages and disadvantages of alternative dispute resolution (see
for example, Tyler, 1997; Vidmar, 1997; Menkel-Meadow, 1991; Lind & al., 1990;
Kressel & Pruitt, 1989; McEwen & Maiman, 1984).  Settlement appears as one
way to address problematic issues concerning what the clients expect from the
court system, and how to find new ways of responding to their expectations and
communicating with them.
Settlement as a new rule to be implemented offers a good opportunity to
study the developmental potential of court work because systemic contradictions
are likely to become manifest in settlement negotiations. This brings us back to
the fundamental question about change, already dealt with in previous chapters.
Is the development toward favoring settlement a cosmetic change, consisting of
rationalization efforts (Heydebrand & Seron, 1990), or does it also include at-
tempts to offer qualitatively different legal services to citizens and to contrib-
ute to fundamental changes in the court system (Palmer & Roberts, 1998)?
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Traditionally, administrative rationality has dictated the implementation of
a reform as occurring from the top down; from the plans made in the adminis-
tration to the actual implementation by the practitioners in everyday work (for
a more detailed discussion on implementation, see Chapter 3). In practice,
changes are never readymade for the practitioners, not even when they are
ordained by legislation. Nationwide changes in civil procedure are interpreted
and constructed in the activity of participants in actual local court practices. The
change is not given in the beginning, it is defined and made visible by the prac-
titioners themselves. This perspective calls for discovering the initiation of
change by studying actual work processes. The present analysis is an attempt to
give a more specific and concrete shape to the developments taking place, and
to study how the implementation of procedural rules concerning settlement take
shape in everyday work on specific cases.
9.3 Cases and Data
The analysis presented in this chapter is based on the cases that represent the
reformed civil proceedings (Cases 4, 5 and 6). The data was gathered in 1997 and
1998 and consists of videotaped or audiotaped preliminary hearings and inter-
views with the clients. A brief introduction to each case is given at the
beginning of the respective section. The cases are introduced in more detail in
Chapter 5.
The focus of the analysis is on the sequences of interaction in the prelimi-
nary hearings in which the settlement is discussed or touched upon39. Thus, the
empirical unit of analysis is an episode which relates to settling the dispute.
Following the method suggested by Ritva Engeström (1999a, pp. 135–137), the
episodes were defined on the basis of the topic and the collective construction
of the discourse. First, the topic of the episode had to be oriented towards the
issue of settlement. Settlement, or more often, the possibility of settlement, was
either discussed explicitly or touched upon indirectly, for example through the
questioning of traditional adjudication (see Case 6). Secondly, the discourse ori-
ented towards settlement had to be produced collaboratively by at least two par-
ticipants. Thus, the accidental mentioning of it in an individual turn, which did
not become the topic of the participants’ discourse, was not considered a settle-
ment-related episode.
39
 In this analysis, the focus is only on the preliminary hearings, since attempts to reach a
settlement are most likely to take place there. However, in Case 5, a proposal for a settlement
was also made by the judge in the main hearing. This episode is not included here.
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9.4 Three Discourses on Settlement
I will begin by presenting one episode from the data representing the proceed-
ings before the procedural reform of 1993.  This episode is the only one in the
old hearings which dealt with the possibility of settlement.
Excerpt 9.1 Case 2 (Cancellation of an employment contract) 3
rd
hearing, August 1990,
Judge: Well you have tried to reach a settlement, wouldn’t you say?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Well, Your Honor, unfortunately we have not.
Judge: Was there any serious effort?
Plaintiff ’s attorney [slightly laughing]: Well, not really a serious effort. The
gap is so wide, from zero to what is being claimed.
Judge: I see.
When interviewed, the plaintiff ’s attorney interpreted the judge’s question
as “just a remark thrown in the air”. The discourse in the episode seems to vali-
date his observation that the question was not meant to be the beginning of
serious negotiation on settling the dispute in court. As the only episode related
to settling the dispute in all of the pre-reform data, it also provides evidence for
the claim that the paragraph of the 1734 Procedural Code concerning settlement
(Chapter 20 section 2) was a dead letter.
Next, I will introduce excerpts from three different civil court cases handled
in the Vantaa District Court in 1997 and 1998. As the Code of Judicial Proce-
dure presupposes, the possibility for settlement was discussed in all the observed
proceedings. The point of time at which it was taken up varied from the very
beginning to the end of the proceedings.
Case 4: “If you end up with a settlement, we also welcome that solution”
Case 4 was about construction defects, dampness damage and mildew problems
in the plaintiffs’ apartment. A family had bought an apartment from another
family some years previously. Now the first family wanted to revoke the contract
or, alternatively, obtain a reduction in the purchase price and receive compen-
sation. The sellers of the apartment claimed that they were unaware of any
construction defects and, on the contrary, accused the plaintiffs of having
contributed to the damage themselves. The case was expanded when the defen-
dants summoned to court the person from whom they in turn had bought the
apartment. These two cases were handled together in the proceedings.
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Case 4 was dealt with in the district court between October 1995 and June
1997. There was an exceptionally long written preliminary phase, during which
the parties argued by writing briefs. The two-day preliminary hearing was held
in January 1997, and a postponed preliminary hearing of one day in May 1997.
Three days were reserved for the main hearing in September 1997, but the case
was settled in June 1997 in the course of negotiations between the attorneys. The
appended case [hereafter Case B] between the sellers of the apartment and the
person from whom they had originally bought it, was settled in April, also
through the efforts of the attorneys. In the hearings, in addition to the district
court judge and the court clerk, the attorneys of all the parties were present. The
plaintiff was present in court for one day in the course of the preliminary
hearing.
The issue of settlement was mentioned every now and then during the
proceedings, often introduced by the defendant’s attorney, but it seemed unlikely
because the parties disagreed about almost all the details in the case. In contrast
to the other preliminary hearings in my data, this one started with a script
explicated by the chair (see Chapter 7). In this script, settlement was not
scheduled for discussion at the beginning of the hearing, but the possibility
arouse unexpectedly at the very end when the judge was in the act of finishing
the proceedings. The following excerpt was part of that episode.
Excerpt 9.2 Case 4, postponed preliminary hearing, May 1997
Judge: Yep. Thank you.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Thank you. [intending to stand up]
Defendant’s attorney: Will the court make a proposal for settlement in this
case?
Judge: That was quite a surprising move! [laughing] I exactly didn’t expect
it!
Defendant’ attorney: I mean, we’ve now gone through it thoroughly from all
angles.
Judge: [becoming serious] Yes, well. You mean a proposal for a settlement
by the court?
Defendant’s attorney: Uh-huh
Judge: Well, we’ve talked a lot about the possibility of a settlement, but
making a proposal is (...) but of course, if the parties ask for a proposal.
Now, one party has asked for it, will the other one also [wipes his knees
with his hand for 3 seconds.] Then, another question is the character of the
case and that sort of thing. I’d think this depends so much on the evidence
you’re going to present, so I won’t make a proposal [looking at the
defendant’s attorney and shaking his head]. You know what the evidence
will be, I don’t. Where does it lead? You both know that what is ahead [re-
fers to the main hearing] will have its price. The plaintiffs take the risk of
having to pay all the trial costs if they lose. Well I don’t know, are you both
insured for your legal expenses according to the old conditions?
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Plaintiff ’s attorney: No.
Defendant’s attorney: Whether old or new, in this kind of case, it doesn’t
help.
Judge:  I see, you mean the maximum limits for compensation are exceeded.
But as I said, I won’t make any proposal in the sense that the law intends. If
you’re willing to discuss it, I can help in several ways. But are there precon-
ditions for that [gestures by turning his palms up and then down again]?
The claims seem to be quite far apart, when everything is contested.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: The principals should definitely be present then.
Judge: But do you yourselves still see any realistic preconditions? As far as I
know, you have tried to settle.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: We have tried and we’re still quite far apart.
Defendant’s attorney: In this new situation, I have difficulties explaining to
my principals why they should pay anything at all.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Uh-huh.
Judge: That is something you both have to consider.
Defendant’s attorney: In principle, both of us as attorneys know how the
land lies in the purchase of shares, in terms of fault and in what the
compensation for a purchase price is and what it requires.
Judge: This remains open and, primarily, the principals are the ones to
decide on this, but we could look into this a little [leads to a discussion on
the precedents of the Supreme Court concerning construction disputes].
Judge: Going through this kind of consideration you will get the idea [on
how to proceed], and you are sitting on the evidence. You may have an idea
where this is leading, I don’t. This case depends on the evidence you are
going to present. But if you end up with a settlement, we also welcome that
solution.
Defendant’s attorney: If we can’t draw up a settlement in this kind of case,
we would be very lousy attorneys.
At the beginning of the episode, the defendant’s attorney’s question about a
settlement surprised the chair, who was oriented to finishing the session (lines
3–4). The participants had an intensive and long preliminary hearing behind
them, aimed at getting the judicial facts and disputed details clarified so that the
correct decision would emerge. In this connection, the question was “quite a
surprising move”, as the chair expressed it.
The chair’s conduct in Case 4 was ambiguous. On the one hand, he seemed
to be seeking the substantially correct decision. In lines 16–17, and again in lines
47–48, he reiterated that the case depended on the evidence the parties were go-
ing to present. He did not know the contents of the evidence and, therefore, con-
sidered it impossible to make suggestions for a settlement. On this basis, the chair
could be regarded as representing a way of working in which ideas of
material truth and correct decisions are predominant. On the other hand, he left
the door open for a settlement to be negotiated by the parties themselves and,
in fact, encouraged them to consider carefully their chances of success in the case.
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He also warned them of the cost and burden of the impending main
hearing (lines 19–20). While preferring to hear the evidence rather than give the
proposal for a settlement, he still encouraged the parties to consider a settlement.
The simultaneous presence of these two contradictory ideas was most visible in
his successive turns “But as I said, I won’t make any proposal in the sense that
the law intends” (line 27) and “If you’re willing to discuss it, I can help in sever-
al ways” (lines 27–28).
If this situation is considered in terms of an activity system (presented in Fig-
ure 9.1), it seems that the judge constructed a division of labor between the par-
ticipants: the chair himself was the one to receive the evidence; the parties were
the ones to negotiate the settlement. However, this division of labor
appeared not totally unified or coherent, as the judge himself deviated from it
in his turn: “If you’re willing to discuss it, I can help in several ways.” It remains
open in the discourse, what this help might have meant in practice.
The chair’s trust in the parties’ initiative in seeking settlement was in line with
the attempts of the defendant’s attorney. Her comments during the proceedings
and her appeals to postpone the hearings in order to settle the case reveal a way
of working which strongly favors settlement as an outcome. Her last turn on lines
50–51 also reflects the same preference. Although she did ask the court for a set-
tlement proposal, she, as indicated in the same turn, clearly considered the set-
tling of the dispute as the attorneys’ prerogative, not as a business of the
principals themselves. Unlike the defendant’s attorney, the plaintiff ’s attorney
seemed to underline the role of the principals in reaching a settlement (line 31).
The principals in Case 4 were not present when settlement was discussed, and
there were few references to them. This may have been due to the fact that they
were absent, but may also be connected to the habit among legal professionals
of constructing the case in terms of the division of labor between them alone.
Case 5: “Do the parties need a judicially justified decision?”
Case 5 was referred to in Finnish newspapers as “a mother vs. the city of V”,
wherein the mother claimed compensation from the city for its failure to pro-
vide municipal day care for her children on the day the family needed it.
According to the plaintiff, this was against the law that stipulates every child’s
right to municipal day care on the day it is required.
The preliminary hearing was arranged at the beginning of December 1997,
and the postponed preliminary hearing together with the main hearing at the
end of December 1997. Present in these sessions were the district court judge
chairing the proceedings, the court clerk taking the minutes in the preliminary
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hearing and recording the witnesses’ testimonies in the main hearing, the court
trainee observing the judge’s conduct, the plaintiff, the plaintiff ’s attorney and
the lawyer working for the city as the defendant’s attorney. Furthermore, one
representative of the press was present.
The district court judge started the preliminary hearing by sounding out the
parties to determine whether they were looking for a settlement or a judicially
justified decision. The following excerpt is from the first part of that discussion.
Excerpt 9.3 Case 5, preliminary hearing, December 1997
Judge: I‘d like to ask whether there is any chance for a settlement in this
dispute. The plaintiff is is no way compelled to tell us what this case is all
about, or what kind of motives lie behind it, but one just can’t help getting
the impression that this is a matter of principle. Could it be possible for the
plaintiff and the defendant to accept symbolic compensation? The defen-
dant would agree to having acted in an erroneous manner, and the plaintiff
would be compensated by a lesser sum, that is less than what is demanded
in the plaint. What kind of thoughts does this provoke?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Your Honor, I don’t believe that the amount demanded
will be instrumental in ruining the defendant financially. We had negotia-
tions a year ago, but the defendant’s attitude has been that they have not
done anything wrong and that they are not liable for any damages. True
enough, whether the defendant has done wrong or right is mainly a matter
of principle, and I don’t think the defendant’s attitude will change if the
sum is one thousand marks higher or lower.
Judge: Is the defendant ready to opt for a settlement and then accept the
fact that there is no judicial examination in this case?
Defendant’s attorney: Would it be possible to get the court’s suggestion for a
settlement?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Well, that of course depends on whether the defendant
admits to having acted in an erroneous way and, thus far, the defendant has
not admitted that.
Judge: Well, yeah. Please, go ahead [nods to the plaintiff who gestures with
her hand that she wants to say something]
Plaintiff: I was just thinking that, I mean it appears to me that the main
problem is that the municipality has nobody to decide that we make a
settlement. It would have been feasible to do that long ago. And that’s the
problem, who is the municipality of V? I doubt that you alone could repre-
sent the municipality. It is difficult for you [addresses her speech to the
defendant’s attorney] to say here, “Let’s make a settlement”, because you
have to get a group behind you. But there exists no such person to make
that decision, and that’s why we are in this situation here.
Defendant’s attorney: No, no, of course a decision maker can be found. If I
can’t give the decision right away, it’s only as far away as the nearest tele-
phone. It is not a problem.
Judge: I am not prepared to make any suggestions, but I think we could
formulate the question in this way. Do the parties here need a judicially
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justified decision, which means a verdict? Or will a settlement do, which,
on the contrary, would mean that the defendant would pay compensation
with no further justification by the court. Do the parties need a judicially
reasoned decision? That’s what this is all about, in my opinion.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: As far as we are concerned, there is no need for a
reasoned decision. The opportunity to pay was also offered to the defen-
dant earlier, and we’re still ready to let the defendant pay that amount
without a court decision.
Judge: And what does the defendant say to that?
Defendant’s attorney: Presumably, the point of departure has been that the
case will be finally decided in court as judicially grounded.
Judge: This means that the plaintiff does not have that kind of need, but the
defendant does.
Unlike in the two other cases, the judge in Case 5 explicitly raised the ques-
tion about settling the dispute (lines 4–8). The preliminary hearing started with
the charting of the different alternatives to resolve the case, and of the clients’
needs in regard to the outcome. Whereas in Case 4, the judge at the same time
favored adjudication and still questioned its feasibility for the parties, in Case 5
he posed the question to the parties themselves, in terms of the kind of needs
they had (lines 37–41). This attempt was innovative and indicated a shift in
which the settlement and the verdict appeared as alternative outcomes, subject
to negotiation.
However, a closer reading of the episode reveals the relatively restricted
character of the understanding and working model concerning settlement.
According to the judge, settlement would consist of symbolic monetary com-
pensation for the plaintiff and the defendant’s admission of having acted in an
erroneous way (lines 5–7). Although the judge openly looked at the possibili-
ties to settle, and listened to the clients’ needs, at the same time, he constructed
the content of the settlement by himself, not in collaboration with the clients.
Would it have made any difference if the parties had chosen an alternative in
which the settlement consisted of monetary compensation together with a state-
ment it did not imply whether the defendant has acted inappropriately or not?
Studies of alternative dispute resolution have emphasized flexible and case-
specific settlements. For example, Strier (1996, p. 279) observed that forms of
remedies are few and pre-determined, mainly restricted to monetary remedies,
arguing that, “ when the actual needs of the parties are ascertained – rather than
converted by the attorneys to impersonal demands for money and/or an injunc-
tion – the possible means to mutually acceptable and ultimately more satisfy-
ing dispute resolution rise dramatically.” The fact that Case 5 concerns a matter
of principle strengthens the idea that a satisfactory settlement could not have
been solely monetary compensation. The case challenges us to contemplate the
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conditions for a possible “developmental settlement”: instead of money, the
defendant could have invited the plaintiff to negotiation and offered her the
chance to use her insights in developing municipal decision making and servic-
es that produce a better match to clients’ needs.
The principals were strongly in the forefront throughout. The plaintiff was
present in the preliminary hearing and participated actively (lines 25–32). The
dialogue also includes several references to the principals as the plaintiff and the
defendant.
Case 6: “I would like to know how seriously settlement was being sought”
Case 6 concerned a previously married couple contesting the partition of their
joint property. The ex-husband wanted a higher evaluation of a few  specific
items (e.g., a motorbike, winter tires for a car, five paintings), whereas the ex-
wife claimed for the restoration of specific items that had been ordered into her
possession (e.g., small statues, a sofa, a wok), but which she had never
received from her ex-husband. The claim of the ex-husband was decided by a
verdict, but the ex-wife’s claim for restoration was settled after the preliminary
hearing.
The preliminary hearing was arranged in February 1998, and the postponed
preliminary hearing, together with the main hearing, at the beginning of April
1998. Those present in the sessions were the district court judge chairing the
proceedings, the court clerk taking the minutes in the preliminary hearing and
recording the witnesses’ testimonies in the main hearing, the ex-husband as the
plaintiff, the plaintiff ’s attorney and the defendant’s attorney. The ex-wife as the
defendant was present in the postponed preliminary hearing and the main hear-
ing. What was exceptional in the proceedings was that before the preliminary
hearing, after the parties had argued in a written form, the district court judge
arranged an informal, voluntary meeting, the aim of which was to get the
parties to settle the dispute. His idea was to negotiate with the attorneys in a
professional manner, and to try to find ways of settling the dispute or, at least,
some aspects of it. The plaintiff insisted on joining the meeting and, according
to the judge, the meeting therefore did not achieve its aims.
When interviewed the judge said that he had been informed before the
hearing that no settlement had been reached. He started the hearing by posing
questions about how the parties had tried to settle the dispute. The next excerpt
if from the first minutes of the preliminary hearing, when settlement was
being discussed.
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Excerpt 9.4 Case 6, preliminary hearing, February 1998
Judge: In November [refers to the informal meeting], we looked at this case
in the same composition in order to get some parts of the dispute settled.
Then I was informed that nothing concrete had been achieved. This is still
the state of affairs, I guess. I would like to know how seriously settlement
was being sought and how it was attempted in practice. Were the principals
in touch with each other at all, or was all this just between the attorneys?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Yes.
Judge: Did the attorneys consider the attendance of the principals unneces-
sary in the negotiations, or what was the reason why the principals had not
been in contact with each other?
Plaintiff: Well the matter...
Plaintiff ’s attorney: ## Better to ask the principal himself about that.
Plaintiff: ## I suppose the principals never received the stuff from their
attorneys in that state. What’s more, the opinions seem to deviate quite a
lot.
Judge: Personally, I found that surprising, because last time, when we went
through the figures we noticed that, in the end, there was not that big a
difference in the sums.
Plaintiff: Ye…
Judge: Concerning this, I would have assumed that...
Plaintiff: ## Well, it was mainly about...
Judge: ...something had happened.
Plaintiff: Yes, the opposing party offered something like minus one thou-
sand marks.
Judge: Well, I hope the principals got my message. And I hope that the
attorneys have also explained the various possibilities in the proceedings
and how advantageous they may be to the principals.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: As far as explaining these things goes, since the chair is
now asking about this, so as not to leave anything unclear: There has been
precise correspondence which I gave to my principal. We calculated all this
very carefully, it was not just talking over the telephone like “we won’t
accept their offer”.  I think we’ve at least tried to settle the case.
Judge: When we went through this case, it became clear that it was not so
much about the law as about mathematics. Let’s say I was a little surprised
at the fact that nothing could be taken away. But it doesn’t matter. Let’s go
through it now.
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Here, “what is the case” was actually being negotiated. The judge made no
division of labor between the participants but discussed whether or not the case
was valid for a civil procedure: “not so much about the law as about mathemat-
ics”.
The plaintiff ’s attorney showed surprise by commenting on the judge’s
exhortation to the attorneys to explain the different alternatives to their princi-
pals: “As far as explaining these things goes, since the chair is now asking about
this “.  This kind of meta-talk seems to indicate the “gray zone” here, the con-
fusing area in which the new practices and interpretations are questioned and
tested.
As the trial proceeded, the pressure to control the ramblings increased. The
judge strongly questioned the feasibility of traditional litigation in regards to this
case.
Excerpt 9.5 Case 6, preliminary hearing, February 1998
Judge: These items are in the possession of one of you, or alternatively they
are in the possession of some third party. Or they have vanished and so
aren’t possessed by anybody. Is this issue really worth taking so far? That’s
what I’m asking.
Defendant: When I worked out the current value of these items, it was
about three hundred marks.
Judge: Well, that’s something the plaintiff disagrees with.
Defendant’s attorney: I’d say that concerning the features of the case (…),
but let’s let the plaintiff say something about this, too.
Judge: Well I’m just asking whether it’s worth it in this case to bring in two
or three witnesses, and to bring in evidence that would prove where the
items actually are?
Defendant’s attorney: For us it would have been simple to accept this judg-
ment granting affirmative relief. The execution officer would have arrived
and said  “Give me the items.” He [refers to his principal] would have said:
“I don’t have them.” The execution officer would have said: “Thank you.
Goodbye.”
Judge: That’s why I specified that, I mean what [a pause of 7 seconds]. What
is the ultimate aim of the plaintiff? Was this claim taken out only because
of the contesting of the partition?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: I cannot know what is the ultimate aim of my principal,
but as far as I understand, she has the right to get these items into her
possession, but the defendant has not delivered them.
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Judge: That of course is her basic right. That of course is completely true.
But I suppose that the attorney understands that even if the claim succeeds,
it doesn’t necessarily mean that the items will actually be returned. In that
sense, I just mean that I suppose these are not such crucial items that they
are worth fighting in a dyed-in-the-wool way. But of course, the field is
open for the parties. And the court is obliged to give its verdict on the basis
of the evidence. [continues]
Thus, the judge directly asked what was the motive behind the counter-claim,
why it was taken out. The tension between the substantially correct decision and
the settlement was crystallized in the judge’s final turn. Having the items
returned was the right of the plaintiff, but were they worth such a stubborn fight?
The questions posed by the judge were important and they could have served
as a basis for a re-definition of the case. It seems, however, that the
other participants did not consider them an invitation to open reflection on the
possibility of a settlement. At the end of the episode, the judge strongly urged
the parties once more to consider the possibility of a settlement.
Excerpt 9.6 Case 6, preliminary hearing, February 1998
Judge: Well, I don’t know. I urge the parties to consider seriously if it is
worth bringing witnesses to say who has taken what, and all the videotapes
and everything. Try to settle this issue at least. I really mean it.
Whereas the chair in Case 4 asked the parties themselves to reflect on whether
a settlement would be more advantageous than a verdict, in Case 6, the chair
made it known that he himself favored settlement. In this sense, he seemed
strongly to prefer the emerging idea of feasible and pragmatic compromise to
the traditional idea of finding a substantially correct decision. He also had a
relatively strong way of explicating his preferences40.
In this case, the judge’s explicit preference for settlement seemed to be
partially successful, as the counter-claim taken by the ex-wife was settled soon
after the preliminary hearing in negotiation between the attorneys. As they said
in their interviews, the attorneys considered the judge’s clear suggestions to settle
the main impetus for the defendant withdrawing the case from court.
40 
An interesting feature of the discourse was the plentiful use of the pronoun “I”. For example,
in Excerpt 9.4, the chair used the pronoun “I” eight times, often in a relatively strong manner,
as in  “I hope”, “I would have assumed”, “I was a little surprised”. This kind of highly personal
and informal speech is not typically expected in the court setting. The frequent use of the
pronoun “I” may implicate the gray zone. Everyday routines in the gray zone are still missing,
so there is no established language or speech genres of settlement on which judges could rely.
The personified way of talking may also be connected to the change in judicial roles, thus
corresponding to Philips’s (1990) finding of “the judge as a third party”, whose use of language
does not especially differ from that of others in the hearing.
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Interview with the plaintiff’s attorney after the main hearing
Interviewer: Why was this counter-claim resolved in the way that the
opposing party withdrew their case and paid you some compensation?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: I guess it was because the opposing party believed the
judge as soon as he flared up a little.
Interview with the defendant’s attorney after the decision
Interviewer: How do you see it, did the court have any influence on reach-
ing settlement in your case?
Defendant’s attorney: Yes, yes, I got the impression that it was better to stop
the case. I mean, I got a pretty strong message that we should now try to
reach a settlement.
Interviewer: Where did you get that impression?
Defendant’s attorney: Just from the judge.
Interviewer: Did he say so directly?
Defendant’s attorney: Pretty directly, I think!
Interviewer: If I remember right he said something like “Think once more
about settlement” and “Is this worth arguing about?”
Defendant’s attorney: I remember he used the exact words “I urge the
parties to consider seriously, whether this case should be settled” [laughs].
At least I would interpret that as he means what he says.
On the whole, the proceedings in Case 6 appeared mostly as balancing in the
gray zone between traditional adjudication and settlement. On the adjudication
side, the discourse included exceptionally frequent questioning and personal
viewpoints of the judge, and also attempts at reflection on the script. For a
process aiming at a settlement, the discourse concentrated exceptionally
strictly on the rules of civil procedure, claims presented and the evidence to be
given.
Case 6 represents a civil case which profoundly challenges the search for
material truth. When the judge’s informal attempt to settle failed, the pressures
to conclude this complicated and rambling case grew in the preliminary
hearing. The judge’s means of promoting settlement included questions and
comments concerning such negotiations, suggestions to settle, and the
questioning of the litigation. On the one hand, some of the means were destruc-
tive and resulted from the judge’s frustration with the adjudication. On the other
hand, he also raised the issue of motive and the script for the proceedings. Since
discussion about motive and possible elements for compromise did not
develop in the hearing, the responsibility for promoting compromise was left to
the parties to be negotiated outside the court.
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What would have been an expansive solution to the contradictions in the gray
zone? It seems evident that the court alone was unable to resolve the conflict
between the ex-spouses. A holistic problem solving and overall treatment
-centered approach are examples of an expanded vision of meliorating disputes,
suggested by Strier (1996, p. 275). Furthermore, it seems clear that multi-
professional collaboration is also needed in expansive services in the future. This
means that boundary crossing between courts and other professional groups and
organizations will be crucial.
The principals were strongly in the forefront of the discourse. They were
present in the proceedings and participated in the dialogue, which included
several references to them. This may reflect not only the presence of the princi-
pals, but the way the case was constructed in the discourse.
9.5 Settlements from the Clients’ Viewpoint
Paradoxically, Cases 5 and 6, in which the judges were sympathetic to the idea
of a settlement, ended up with traditional decisions, and Case 4, in which the
chair did not contribute to efforts to settle, ended up with a settlement. The
discussion thus far, has focused on how the chairs and parties dealt with the
issue of settlement in the preliminary hearings. How, then, did the clients feel
about their disputes being settled? What kind of implications did such settle-
ments have?
I will take a closer look at the two sets of settlements reached in Case 4. The
data here are the interviews with the principals after the case had been settled.
As mentioned earlier, Case 4 was, in reality, two cases, both of which were
settled: the first one was between the original plaintiffs and defendants –
settled in June 1997 – and the second one between the defendants in the first
case, here the plaintiffs, and the second defendant, who had originally sold the
apartment to the defendants in the first case – settled in April 1997. The plain-
tiffs in the first case were Mrs. and Mr. Vuori, and the defendants Mr. and Mrs.
Laakso. The defendant in the second case was Mr. Aho.
The defendants were satisfied with the compromise reached over the first
claim – settled by the attorneys – but still astonished at the surprising outcome.
After the various claims and contested proceedings, they could not explain how
the case had been settled.
Excerpt 9.7 Interview with the plaintiffs in the first case, September
1997
Mrs. Laakso: It’s quite interesting why they agreed, I mean, at first their
claims were just unbelievable. In the end they still demanded 200,000
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marks and then the other one offers 10,000 [refers to their own offer to the
other party], I think that’s quite incomprehensible. It’s really a small sum of
money, and we find it amazing.
As far as the second claim was concerned, the defendant, Mr. Aho, recalled
in his interview how he had considered the circumstances and wanted to find a
middle ground. He put himself in the position of the opposing party and
offered a fair and reasonable solution, a friendly gesture, to Mrs. and Mr. Laak-
so. Surprisingly, Mr. Aho’s interview revealed a disturbance in the settling pro-
cess: the Laaksos had not paid the agreed amount to Mr. Aho’s bank account by
the appointed time. He was wondering whether the Laaksos had been
informed at all about the settlement.
Excerpt 9.8: Interview with the defendant in the second case, May
1997
Interviewer: Well, you reached some kind of settlement with the Laaksos
here?
Mr Aho: I don’t know whether the Laaksos even know that the case has
been settled and that I will walk away from it if I get 5,000 marks. I saw that
the Laaksos are nice young people, I don’t have anything against them. A
couple with children. This case caused me a loss of about 10,000 marks,
and I will be satisfied with 5,000 marks. The sum should have been credited
to my bank account by the first of April, but it isn’t there yet [May 4th]. I
don’t think their lawyer has even informed them that they should pay this
sum.
The interview with Mr. and Mrs. Laakso revealed a gap in the information
flow between the parties. They had been informed about the settling of the case,
but their intention was not to pay the sum.
Excerpt 9.9 Interview with the plaintiffs in the second case,
September 1997
Mr. Laakso: It’s crazy, I’m trying to arrange it so that the sum doesn’t have
to be paid. I think it’s sort of wrong that we have to bear all the costs.
Mr. and Mrs. Laakso had, at first, agreed to the settlement, but had afterwards
begun to wonder whether this agreement was just and fair to them. They
considered themselves in an unfair position, and Mrs. Laakso found it especial-
ly difficult to understand why they were liable to compensate Mr. Aho.
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Excerpt 9.10 Interview with the plaintiffs in the second case,
September 1997
Interviewer: How was this case with Aho to be settled? Who negotiated the
agreement?
Mr. Laakso: One morning, our lawyer called us and told us the case had
taken such a turn that it was no use keeping Aho involved. It would only
mean extra expenses. I was still half asleep and just said okay, let’s do that.
My only thought was that the loser pays all, but at the moment we are
paying it all.
Mrs. Laakso: I thought it was stupid, I was really angry. It makes no sense
that we have to pay in both directions
41
.
Mr. Laakso: That’s true, both directions.
Mrs. Laakso: Everybody is being charged by their lawyers, so why do we also
have to pay other peoples’ bills, that’s something I can’t understand. I don’t
see why we have to pay Aho, I think it’s weird. I don’t know whether it’s ac-
cording to the law or what.
Mr. Laakso: Well, Aho felt that he was dragged into this case without reason
and he is trying to get some compensation for the money he’s lost.
Mrs. Laakso: Well, he sold the apartment to us just as we sold it. He is guilty
in a similar way, if we are guilty.
Mr. Laakso: That’s exactly why I’ll try to arrange it so that we don’t have to
pay him.
The principals in Case 4 thus showed ignorance of several key questions in
the process after the settlement had been reached. Why did the other party
accept the compromise? Did the other party know that the case had been
settled? Why did they find themselves as the party who had to pay? A real
problem also emerged: Mr. Aho did not get the promised payment by the
appointed time.
As the settlements in Case 4 were negotiated between the lawyers, the prin-
cipals were left outside of the process. Mr. Aho saw the settlement as a friendly
gesture to the “nice young people”, but the Laaksos could not decide whether it
was justified or not. Their viewpoints did not converge, because the settlement
was not prepared in interaction with the principals. As the principals did not
participate in the negotiation or the legal process, they presumably did not
perceive them either as fair or legitimate (see Tyler, 1990; 1997). The settling
process and the grounds for the settlement remained unclear and unknown to
them with the consequence that one of the parties did not fulfil the contract.
41
 Mrs. and Mr. Laakso had also made an agreement in the first case of Case 4, where they
promised to pay the plaintiff. Thus, they were the ones to pay in both cases.
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Settling disputes between lawyers alone reflects the old way of working in
which the substantially correct decision and material truth could – at least in
principle – be pursued without the presence of the clients themselves. In fact,
their presence was and still is often regarded as undesirable or risky by the
attorneys.  If the way of solving disputes is to negotiate a pragmatic solution,
the necessary interaction seems to demand the presence of the principals. It
seems that Case 4 can be placed in the middle area between the two practices
described on the continuum in Figure 9.3, carrying elements of both. The ten-
sion between the contradictory elements was expressed in the form of several
open questions posed by the principals, and as an actual disturbance in the
settling process.
Assessing the settlement in the interview, Mrs. Laakso used expressions such
as “according to the law” and “guilty”.  Conceptually, these expressions are more
connected to traditional adjudication and verdicts than to the settling of disputes.
The tension between ideas of material truth and negotiated compromise was
visible and concrete in the client’s talk. Obviously, the tension between the dif-
ferent ideas of dispute resolution is crucial not only among legal practitioners,
but also among citizens. It is not self-evident that the clients of the court sys-
tem are ready for the shift towards negotiated outcomes, or that they are eager
to find out who is right and who is wrong. It is more likely that in the same cli-
ents’ accounts will simultaneously express both orientations, as “Am I right or
am I wrong?”, as well as “Let’s find some feasible solution.”
9.6 Conclusions
The context of the courtroom discourse has been understood in my analysis as
the activity system of the court. This constantly evolving activity system has been
the unit of analysis giving context and meaning to events in the legal process and
to the turns in the courtroom discourse.
For example, the data in Case 4, comprising the settlement-related discourse
in the court proceedings and in the interviews with the clients suggested that,
in this particular court case, the settlement contract did not materialize in prac-
tice, and the principals were ignorant of several key issues afterwards. Why did
the settlement remain problematic? Possible explanations may be found in
contradictions within and between the activity systems involved in the case.
Figure 9.3 shows some possible explanations.
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 To start with, there was a primary contradiction within the court case which
formed the common object of the multiple activity systems: the object appeared
both as the correct decision and as negotiated compromise (tension A in Figure
9.3).
As far as the chair was concerned, the rules governing the proceedings
represented an internal dilemma (tension B in Figure 9.3). On the one hand, he
wanted the case to be decided “according to the law”, on the basis of the evidence,
but on the other hand, he encouraged the parties to consider a settlement (see
Excerpt 9.2).
The chair’s ambivalent orientation to the alternative rules resulted in a
specific division of labor in the case. The discourse revealed a clear distinction
between receiving the evidence as a task belonging to the judge and making the
settlement as a task belonging to the attorneys (see Excerpt 9.2). The division
of labor appeared as a means of making sense of or rationalizing the unfamil-
iar gray zone, but in practice it meant that the chair left the responsibility for
finding a settlement largely in the hands of the parties themselves, thus
moving it outside the court’s activity system (tension C in Figure 9.3).
The attorneys’ orientations to the division of labor between their clients and
themselves varied.  The plaintiff ’s attorney thought that the principals should
definitely be present if settlement was being attempted through the conduct of
the chair. The defendant’s attorney kept her principals more in the background
and seemed to think that the negotiations belonged to the legal professionals (see
Excerpt 9.2). The tension between these orientations (tension D in Figure 9.3)
eliminated the principals from participating in the settlement process.
The principals’ mental models also differed from each other. The defendants
in the first case were looking for someone responsible for paying the costs (see
Excerpt 9.9), while the defendant in the second case was looking for a feasible
outcome which would be easiest for everybody (see Excerpt 9.8). The tension
between these models (tension E in Figure 9.3) left the settlement superficial and
made the outcome of the process seem strange to the Laaksos (see Excerpts 9.8,
9.9 and 9.10).
Furthermore, the defendants’ attorney’s mental models differed from those
of her principals. She advised her principals to accept settlement, but the prin-
cipals did not understand why (Excerpt 9.10). The tension between these mod-
els (tension F in Figure 9.3), again, left the settlement in the air and unsatisfac-
tory for the Laaksos.
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Figure 9.3 Contradictions of the Activity Systems in Case 4
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TOOLS
Mental models favoring settlement
vs.  mental models favoring  
the finding of the quilty parties
SUBJECT
The judge
RULES
The verdict depends
on the evidence 
vs. a settlement is also possible
OBJECT
DIVISION OF LABOR
The judge receives the evidence, 
the attorneys negotiate 
the settlement
Verdict
Settlement
1
4
3
2
These findings on the tensions and actual disturbances in the situated
practices of multiple actors indicate the possible generalization of certain
contradictions from the perspective of court activity. On the basis of the
model of an activity system introduced in Figure 5.1, the contradictions can be
elaborated as presented in Figure 9.4. In the preliminary hearings, when the
possibility of settlement is discussed, the object of the activity changes, at least
temporarily, from verdict to settlement. This transformation constitutes the
object as internally contradictory (contradiction 1).  Despite the transformation
of the object, the tools, the rules and the division of labor are in part typical of
traditional adjudication, and in part oriented to the possibility of a settlement,
causing several contradictions within the activity system (contradiction 2, 3 and
4). Tools, such as the implicit mental models of the clients and the attorneys,
which partly favored settlement and partly relied on finding the guilty parties,
made the settlement incomprehensible to the clients and endangered its execu-
tion (contradiction 2). The rules that partly ordered the verdict to be tradition-
ally dependent on the evidence and partly left the door open for settlement
transferred the settlement from the court to the attorneys (contradiction 3). The
division of labor, according to which negotiating the settlement was defined as
a task of the attorneys, actually left both the judge and the clients out of it
(contradiction 4).
Figure 9.4 Contradictions from the Perspective of Court Activity
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I will now return in my interpretation of the possible change and develop-
ment in court practices to my hypothesis concerning the shift from the idea of
material truth towards the idea of a negotiable solution, presented in Figure 9.2.
Each analyzed case can be positioned in the figure with regard to what kind of
dispute resolution it supported. Table 9.1 connects the dispute resolution ideas
with the empirical findings of the cases.
All the cases analyzed include elements of both the idea of the material truth
and a substantially correct decision, and of the idea of negotiated justice and a
feasible outcome, representing historical layers in the activity of dispute reso-
lution in courts. The settlement practices in all the cases could be interpreted
as moving in the gray zone where there are no ready-made answers to questions,
and where the activity is constantly evolving. Change is a zone to be construct-
ed by the practitioners themselves, not a linear development from one pre-fixed
practice to another. It consists of simultaneously existing elements, however
contradictory they may be to one another. The ideas of material truth and
negotiated compromise exist as intertwined in the interaction of the preliminary
hearings.
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Table 9.1 The Gray Zone in the Light of the Empirical Findings
The analysis of court practices gives clues about the developmental poten-
tial in the activity system. Here it shows that questions such as “Who are
supposed to negotiate?” and “How should we define a settlement?” are at the core
of the development of new practices. The excerpts presented show that the
issue of settling the dispute is entering into the hearings, in which there emerged
no established settling practices or routines, but only tentative and contradic-
tory attempts to start the negotiation process. The attorneys were both
pushing their clients to join the proceedings and pulling them aside from the
dialogue; the principals had contradictory orientations to the proceedings and
 
THE GRAY ZONE  – 
THE TRANSITORY AREA OF CONTRADICTORY IDEAS AND PRACTICES 
 
 The idea of material truth and the 
correct  decision – “finding the 
guilty parties” 
The idea of negotiated justice and 
pragmatic compromise 
Case 4 The chair considers the decision to 
depend on the evidence and does 
not make a proposal for settlement 
 
 
The defendants in the first case 
wonder if the settlement is 
according to the law: “He is guilty if 
we are guilty” 
The chair asks the parties to consider 
whether it really is advantageous to 
go ahead with the main trial and 
decide the case by verdict 
 
The defendant in the second case 
makes a compromise 
Case 5 The chair asks if the parties need a 
justified decision 
The chair asks if a settlement would 
satisfy the parties’ needs 
Case 6 The chair follows the procedures of 
adjudication; establishes the facts 
and  receives the evidence 
 
The plaintiff’s attorney is surprised 
about the chair’s questions 
concerning the settling of the 
dispute 
The chair arranges an informal 
meeting in order to settle the case 
 
 
The chair expresses on several 
occasions his preference for the 
parties to settle 
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their outcomes; the chairs constructed the issue of settlement in different ways
in order to make sense of a novel and contradictory phenomenon.
The findings also support the idea of implementation as a learning process
in which the models and working practices are not predetermined but have to
be locally created. The judges’ differing attempts to get the parties to settle were
a far cry from implementing a pre-given model of “how to settle a dispute”. The
episodes analyzed reveal the whole issue of settling disputes in courts as a
contradictory and tension-laden area. Communicative models and rules of
collaboration for the emerging practices have to be developed and adopted by
the practitioners themselves. This will constitute one of the major learning
challenges in the future, not only for individual judges but especially for local
courts as organizations developing their own work. The understanding that
individually implemented procedural rules lead to individually determined
idiosyncratic interaction with clients emphasizes the importance of shared
reflection among court organizations on the differing work practices of their
individual judges as a source of collective learning and evolving work patterns.
The findings also give support to the working hypothesis, presented in
Chapter 4, that change should be approached as gradual and consisting of small
steps, but still as at least potentially expansive. The judges’ efforts at promoting
settlement may appear as fumbling attempts to look for an alternative to the
traditional verdict. They could indeed be criticized for having nothing to do with
streamlining the procedure or especially, with giving the parties the chance to
continue their relationship after a satisfactory compromise. Yet, it is evident that
the judges’ efforts differed qualitatively from those in the proceedings before the
reform. Thus, they seem to represent stepwise and gradual change toward some-
thing radically new. Apparently, the change is both cosmetic and potentially ex-
pansive at the same time.
Where, then, does the expansive potential in the settling of the disputes
reside? The findings indicating the clients’ non-active role and marginality when
discussing possible settlement, as well as the actual disturbances connected to
their not being present in the negotiations (see Figure 9.3), seem to point to the
importance of the client as an active participant in defining a settlement. Tyler
(1997, pp. 887–889) argued that the participation of the clients and their being
heard is the most central element in experiencing proceedings as legitimate and
fair. It is not only what the client says in the hearing, but also what he or she
hears, that is relevant. The parties usually assume that justice is on their side.
When there is a settlement, it is necessary that they are ready to be resilient and
to change their conceptions. Compromise can be negotiated when the parties
understand that the case has two sides. The perception of the other side is
lacking when the clients are not present in the negotiation process.
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In line with findings of the procedural-justice approach, my observations
seem to indicate that the expansive potential in settling disputes resides in the
possibility to work on settlements in collaboration with the clients. As Arponen
(1999, p. 295) stated, “We should improve the courts’ capability to encourage the
clients to understand their own needs, and how these needs can be satisfied with
the customized services offered by the court.” (translation V.H.). Customization
as a novel way of organizing court services requires a new way of  working, based
on negotiation, in which judicial expertise is integrated with the clients’
knowledge and specific needs.
Producing goods and services in collaboration with the client is a new and
emerging form of production. Victor and Boynton (1998) call such production
co-configuration. From the perspective of Finnish district courts, the crucial
aspect of co-configuration is that the client participates in the production of the
services as a partner in collaboration with the producer. Negotiations about
settlement resemble the process in which the service is co-configured to fit the
client’s needs, described by Victor & Boynton (1998), as well as Engeström,
Engeström & Vähäaho (1999).
Producing settlements through customized services and negotiation,
representing the zone of proximal development in courts, also challenges the
traditional understanding of judicial expertise as the individual property of
expert professionals. Instead, it strongly favors the understanding of expertise
as a collaborative accomplishment of both legal professionals and lay clients,
taking place in interaction in which the different aspects of client conflict are
negotiated and resolved.
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10 Conclusions
This study has opened several windows onto emerging changes in the activity
of courts. Situated practices of courtroom interaction were studied in order to
understand the dynamics of change and the developmental potential in court
work. At the time of the second round of data collection in 1996–1998, the
implementation of the 1993 reformed civil procedure was still going on at the
local level. The legal practitioners, between their everyday duties in conducting
the proceedings, were trying to make sense of the novel phenomena introduced
in the reform.
In the following, I will first sum up the main findings in the four empirical
analyses as answers to the empirical research questions. I will define the spear-
heads of future development as well as the possible tensions in the zone of
proximal development, and consider the new tools that are emerging. Finally, I
will discuss what the empirical findings tell us about the theoretical research
questions.
10.1 Empirical Research Questions
In Chapter 4, I set out the empirical research problems for the study and
formulated them as follows.
1. How has the interaction and communication in the hearings changed?
2. How has the participation of principals in the hearings changed?
What kind of contributions do the clients make in the hearings and
what kind of effects do the contributions have?
3. How do the judges promote settlement during the proceedings, and
what kind of attempts to reach settlement are made?
Research Problem 1 was the focus in Chapter 6, which introduced an explor-
atory attempt to identify the possible changes in courtroom discourse with the
implementation of the procedural reform, and in Chapter 7, which compared
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the local construction of a script for the proceedings before and after the reform.
Chapters 8 and 9 did not focus on changes in courtroom interaction, as they did
not include the comparative setting, but they still gave information about the
discursive features of the reformed proceedings.
Research Problem 2 was addressed in Chapter 8, which focused on clients’
initiatives in their attempts to contribute to the handling of the case. Research
Problem 3 was considered in Chapter 9, in which different practices of reach-
ing settlement were examined.
10.2 Summary of the Empirical Findings
Chapter 6 compared hearings in two court cases – one before the procedural
reform and one after – and looked for possible shifts in courtroom discourse be-
tween the hearings that would indicate potential change in court activity. A
change in the discourse from a formal monologue to a more informal dialogue
was indeed identified. The amount of dialogical speech and reciprocal, informal
interaction increased to replace the reading aloud of briefs. The same
increase was also distinguishable in the other cases after the reform, observed
in the excerpts presented in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. Along with the increased dia-
logue, the construction of the case seemed to become more like a shared and col-
laborative effort. The notion of a shift in courtroom discourse was also supported
by findings concerning changes in distributing the production of the minutes
among the participants, in the addressivity of speech turns, and in the ways in
which the attorneys used the form of address, “Your Honor”. These identified
changes preliminarily suggested that some kind of change evidently was and is
taking place in court activity.
Chapter 7 continued the elaboration of the object in court work from the
activity-theoretical perspective, initiated in Chapter 6. Focusing on the local
construction of the script in court proceedings, the chapter concentrated on one
aspect of the object of court work, namely the conducting of the proceedings.
A comparison of pre- and post-reform proceedings indicated a radical change
in the dynamics of local scripting. To replace the individual determination of
the script in the old proceedings the new proceedings featured a more informal,
negotiation-like dialogue between those involved. This new way of scripting was
modeled (Figure 7.3) in terms of particular, joint actions that constructed, tried,
and maintained the script by reflecting on it and by using meta-talk. A differ-
ent logic in the search for legitimacy was identified, and tensions between the
uncontrolled and controlled nature of the proceedings were pinpointed.
The local construction and testing of the script supported the hypothesis that
change and implementation reflect local interpretation of the reformed norms.
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The analysis revealed the distributed nature of expertise in courts, shared
horizontally between the participants. The emerging collaborative expertise was
restricted to the legal professionals, however.
Chapter 8 introduced a new dimension to the object of court work by focus-
ing on the client’s contribution in constructing a case. The analysis of client
initiatives in the hearings revealed that the clients were not merely informants
as defined in the new Procedural Code, but rather appeared as participants who
may have tried in many ways to affect the proceedings and the construction of
their case. Most importantly, it also showed evidence of expanding initiatives.
This was a far cry from the client’s marginal position and silence in the old
system. It was also clear that client initiatives did have an effect on the proceed-
ings. Although sometimes rejected or bypassed, they most often succeeded in
changing the topic, or at least in causing a fracture to the expected flow.
The cases analyzed projected a future characterized by growing activeness
among clients, in both the intensity and quantity of their participation, and a
move towards more informal communication between clients and legal profes-
sionals (Figure 8.1). However, it also seems clear that the legal professionals do
not yet have new tools that are sensitive enough to take up the challenges posed
by different client and case types. The findings in Chapter 8 contribute to our
understanding of expertise in courts by addressing the division of labor between
the clients and the legal professionals in the hearings, and by signaling a poten-
tial shift in the collaboration between clients and legal professionals.
The object of the court work was approached from another new perspective
in Chapter 9, when settlement was selected as the focus of the analysis. Settle-
ment as a new possible outcome of the proceedings indicated a change that was
described as an ongoing transition from the traditional idea of material truth
and a substantially correct decision towards the more pragmatic and relative idea
of seeking a negotiable compromise (Figure 9.2). Practices of making a settle-
ment appeared as varied and often contradictory, individually-determined
patterns. Judges’ practices included discussing the possibilities of settlement and
the constraints involved (Case 4), sounding out the parties’ needs in regard to
the outcome (Case 5), and questions, comments and suggestions concerning
settlement (Case 6). Their need for new concrete tools was apparent. Their
efforts at promoting settlement appeared as tentative attempts to look for an
alternative to the traditional verdict, but mainly built on the premises of the old
way of working. The gray area in making settlements, characterized by the
intertwining of the old and the new work practices, disclosed the developmen-
tal potential of change involving concrete learning challenges for legal profes-
sionals. The analysis showed that questions such as “Who are supposed to
negotiate?” and “How should we define a settlement?” are at the core of the
development of the new practices.
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10.3 Theoretical Research Questions
The findings of the empirical analyses will throw light on the more theoretical
questions concerning change and expansion in courts, and contribute to broader
questions of organizational change and learning. The theoretical research
questions were formulated as follows.
4. What do the findings of the empirical analyses tell us about the zone of
proximal development and its potential expansion in courts?
What does this developmental potential tell us about the
transformation of expertise in professional work?
5. How do change and learning appear on the basis of the implementation
of a legal reform? What do the changes in court proceedings and court
practices tell us about organizational change and learning?
Both theoretical research questions were touched upon in conclusions drawn
in each empirical chapter.  Research Problem 4 was brought up more thoroughly
in Chapter 7, which concerned the local scripting of the proceedings, and in
Chapter 8, which concerned clients’ initiatives in the hearings, as these findings
highlighted in concrete terms the zone of proximal development in court work,
and thus indicated a potential shift in legal expertise. Research Problem 5 was
addressed in Chapter 6, which introduced the first findings concerning the
nature of change in court work. The topic was elaborated in the following
chapters, and especially in Chapter 9 which continued the discussion on the
cosmetic and fundamental nature of change and of required learning.
The expansive potential and zone of proximal development in court work will
be discussed in section 10.4, in which the implications for our understanding
of expertise will also be addressed (Research Problem 4). Section 10.5 will sum-
marize what the findings of this study tell us about change and learning in the
implementation of court reform (Research Problem 5).
10.4 Spearheads of Development
The most crucial elements in the zone of proximal development of activity in
Finnish district courts can be described as spearheads that pinpoint the
developmental potential and learning challenges in court work. At the same time,
they are the source of disturbances and tensions in work practices, thus imply-
ing developmental contradictions. This is depicted in Figure 10.1 in a four-square
matrix, in which the formal – informal character of courtroom discourse forms
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the horizontal axis, and the controlled/restricted – uncontrolled/unrestricted
character of the interaction forms the vertical axis.
The findings of the empirical analyses of this study suggest that the active
control of the proceedings by the judge and the informal collaboration and
negotiation-like discussion between the participants together form one of spear-
heads of future development (Arrow 1 in Figure 10.1). The findings in
Chapters 6 and 7 in particular indicated an emerging shift towards more
dialogical and informal courtroom discourse, joint construction of the case, and
more active and controlled conducting of the courtroom discourse by the judge.
Figure 10.1 Spearheads of Development
The second spearhead seems to be the new role of the client in the hearings
(Arrow 2 in Figure 10.1). The analysis of client initiatives and their effects
(presented in Chapter 8) indicate an emerging shift towards a more active and
participatory role for clients in establishing the case. Expanding initiatives seem
to offer significant potential for a new kind of collaboration between clients and
the legal professionals, and for clients to adopt a more subject-like position in
their own cases.
Settlement as an outcome of civil proceedings clearly forms the third spear-
head of development (Arrow 3 in Figure 10.1). The possibility of negotiating a
Formal
Uncontrolled/
unrestricted
Informal
Controlled/
restricted Controlled 
and informal
(1)  hearings   
Clients’ 
(2)  expanding 
initiatives
(3)  Settlements
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settlement rather than giving a verdict indicates a radically new way of working
with clients and cases, which transforms not only the outcome but also the pro-
cess of dispute resolution. The findings in Chapter 9 suggest that working
towards settlement paves the way for a new type of collaboration in which the
settlement is co-configured by the client and the court as partners in produc-
ing the service.
A personal view of the developmental potential included in settlements was
given by a judge from Tampere District Court, Jukka Peltonen, in an unpublished
paper given to a committee on developing the court system, in which he out-
lined the future developments in district courts.
“The approval that originates from a settlement reached in legitimate proceedings,
renders positive feedback to the court and to the whole justice system. For citizens,
settlement includes an idea which will probably interest them more and more in the
future – the possibility to personally participate in and contribute concretely to the
handling of the case, and maybe even to the decision. For judges, settlement repre-
sents a completely new way of working, as it means establishing the case in collabo-
ration with the parties. In this sense, we can already catch in settlement a glimmer
of the possible future role of the judge, which I personally consider most desirable.”
(Jukka Peltonen, unpublished paper given at a committee meeting, translation V.H.)
Figure 10.1 depicts the zone of proximal development in the context of
dispute resolution in courts as an area of emerging, qualitatively new work
practices among which actively controlled and informal courtroom discourse,
the expansive contributions of the clients and settlements serve as spearheads
of development directing possible expansion in the future. According to
Engeström’s (1987) definition presented in Chapter 3, the zone of proximal
development in civil proceedings can be defined as the distance between the
everyday actions of individual judges and the new form of dispute resolution
that could be collectively generated as a solution to the tensions embedded in
everyday actions. The crucial new elements determined here as spearheads of
development signal the specific sources of the full expansive potential in court
work, and address the areas in which collective efforts to create new practices
and new tools are required.
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Contradictions in the Zone of Proximal Development
The zone of proximal development, in accordance with its name, represents a
moving area of possible development rather than a unilinear direction of change.
For this reason, the zone depicted in Figure 10.1 was presented as an area which
points in a certain direction, denoted in the empirical findings of this study, but
which at the same time moves in other directions as well. Its unfixed nature
results in the developmental tensions and contradictory elements found in
dispute resolution in courts.
The most salient contradiction becomes apparent when the models that
envisioned the potential development in Figures 7.4 and 8.14 are compared. The
matrix in Figure 7.4 shows that the new proceedings rely on informal and con-
trolled /restricted discourse between the court and the attorneys in the hearings
as a means to legitimize the process and the search for material truth. Figure 8.14,
on the other hand, portrays a future characterized by growing activeness among
clients, in both the intensity and quantity of their participation, and a move
toward more and more informal communication between clients and legal pro-
fessionals.
The increasing informality brought into the hearings through the active par-
ticipation and contributions of clients is likely to clash with the methods used
to legitimize the proceedings by actively controlling and restricting the interac-
tion (arrow A in Figure 10.2). Giving the client the opportunity to participate
in a preliminary hearing based on informal discussion is contradictory and dif-
ficult to arrange under the rules controlling and restricting the discourse.
Some symptoms of this clash were seen in the analysis presented in Chapter
7 as pressure to move from controlled and restricted towards more uncontrolled
and unrestricted discourse. Concrete attempts to twist the script of the new
Procedural Code, and to shift from controlled to uncontrolled proceedings, were
made by the attorneys. Similarly, the actual course of the proceedings in the
observed case – the first preliminary hearing and the extended preliminary hear-
ing three months later – was an expression of this pressure and of the actual tran-
sition from restricted to more unrestricted discourse. That the clash was visible
in a hearing taking place only between legal professionals suggests that it would
be sharper in a hearing in which clients were taking part.
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Figure 10.2 Contradictions in the Zone of Proximal Development
As I mentioned in the concluding paragraphs of Chapter 7, the controlled
and restricted nature of the preliminary hearing in the new procedure has been
largely discussed among judicial professionals and scholars. My findings
coincide with more general observations suggesting that the idea of a single pre-
liminary hearing is not functioning as the Procedural Code intended, and that
in practice there seem to be pressures to loosen the restricted discourse by
arranging further preliminary hearings. The increased legal costs and weakened
access to justice, especially among citizens with average incomes, have intensi-
fied the debate on the feasibility of the new procedure. On the one hand, it has
been stated that the rigidity and restricted interaction represent a threat and a
disadvantage in the new system. On the other hand, it has been argued that the
discussion in the preliminary hearing should be restricted even more in order
to make the idea of controlled and restricted preliminary hearings work
properly. The biggest problem and the main deviation from the intended pro-
cedure is that issues have been shifted to the preliminary hearing that should not
be discussed until the main hearing. The preliminary hearing has actually be-
come the “main hearing” and the new proceedings are “front-loaded” (see e.g.,
Riita-asiain oikeudenkäyntimenettelyn kehittäminen, 1998).
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It could now be concluded that arranging the hearings in a fluent way
involves problems that are likely to become aggravated if clients activate their
participation in the future and demand a more subject-like position in the
hearings. There have been attempts in judicial debate to ameliorate problems by
reverting to the uncontrolled discussion that was characteristic of the old pro-
ceedings or by suggesting a more orthodox reading of the Procedural Code with
its strict phasing.
The problem with the first suggestion is the danger of returning not only to
the less controlled presentation of arguments, but also to unorganized, undirect-
ed proceedings that easily begin to flow without direction. The problem with the
second one is that the Procedural Code seems to be insensitive to the perplex-
ing, dispersed and sometimes verbose character of human communication and
interaction, and that it itself is internally contradictory in terms of its
objectives.
Chapter 5 in the Code of Judicial Procedure postulates that it has to be
established in the preliminary hearing what the parties are claiming for, what
are the grounds for their claims and what issues are being disputed. This is not
just a judicial-technical exercise. These actions of establishing a case occur
through human communication and interaction, which is often intricate and
time-consuming by nature. It seems that, according to the Procedural Code, a
simple and swift review allows quick passage to the main hearing. The special
meeting rooms in the new courthouses, which may be reserved for preliminary
hearings, were supplied to support informal, intimate discussion between the
participants. At the same time, however, the Procedural Code assumes the
discussion in the preliminary hearings to be only a cursory run-through of the
disputed claims.
The main hearing is determined as an event in which the client should be
heard. Such hearings are normally arranged in traditional courtrooms that are
more suitable for formal presentations than for informal dialogue. Again, it
seems that hearing the client is regarded as a judicial-technical exercise, rather
than as dialogical communication in which the client listens and is heard.
Moreover, the Procedural Code ordains that the possibilities for settlement
shall be cleared up in the preliminary hearing. Here technical preparation of the
case is not enough – also undisturbed negotiation about it and about the
client’s needs is required.
Two related and somewhat less pronounced tensions can be added to this
most salient contradiction. These are the tensions between the formal and
informal elements of the hearings, and between controlled and uncontrolled
proceedings as opposite means of legitimation.
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The talk of legal professionals, which is intrinsically formal at least to some
extent, meets with the talk of lay clients, which is necessarily informal, in the
interactive encounters within the court institution. The different voices repre-
sented by the activity systems of the court, the attorneys and the clients
converge in the hearings. The tension between their formal and informal
nature (arrow B in Figure 10.2) appears as a deep-rooted tension in the work
of courts, and possibly as a basic dilemma of institutional discourse in general.
Formal patterns of courtroom discourse related to the formal authority of
the judge have been traditionally regarded as the foundation of the court’s
neutrality and impartiality. A recent book of recollections from previous city and
circuit courts (Hatakka & Nirkko, 2000) shows chief justices and senior judges
as distant, authoritative persons who required respectful manners and the
observance of formalities in the interaction. Keeping the interaction in the
hearing formal and immune to criticism was seen to ensure independent pro-
ceedings.
At the present time, the logic of attaining impartial and trustworthy proceed-
ings seems to have changed and the importance of informal communication in
producing trust has been recognized. According to Laukkanen (1995, p. 214),
informal discussion and the active conducting of proceedings is the basis of
authority in the modern court. An active judge who discusses and participates
raises trust among the clients. The same idea is supported by Tyler (1997), who
found that disputants’ assessments of court trustworthiness are an important
factor affecting judgments about the fairness of procedures. He argues (ibid., pp.
889–891) that the basis of authoritativeness is changing from neutrality-based
to trust-based. He further suggests that neutrality-based authority, built on signs
of professionalism such as the even-handed application of the rules, a lack of bias
and the use of procedures, is less attractive to the public. People rather focus on
the morality and benevolence of the authority with which they are personally
dealing. This leads to an interest in knowing the authority in question, and thus
encourages personal connections between citizens and authorities. As a conse-
quence, authorities need to create their own legitimacy on an individual basis.
They cannot completely rely on the general legitimacy which their office gives
them.
The tension between formal and informal discourse in the hearings also
materializes in the transformation process of the dispute from the grievances
experienced to judicially specified plaints. The experiences of individuals are
translated into another form in the judicial process before they can become
legal issues and before they can be processed through the legal system. This trans-
formation is simultaneously a shift from the informal to the formal conceptu-
alization of a dispute.
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The problems with formal discourse and the legal conceptualization of
disputes are those acknowledged in the criticism against adjudication: parties
have little control over the process and often find it incomprehensible. Issues are
framed in legal language rather than in terms of how they are experienced by
the parties involved. What is dilemmatic is that, at the same time, the legal con-
ceptualization is a way of categorizing the problem, and thus a way of
systematizing the process and standardizing the decisions.
The tension between the controlled/restricted and uncontrolled/unrestrict-
ed discourse in the hearings (arrow C in Figure 10.2) appears as an expression
of the two alternative logics that have been used to legitimate the proceedings.
In its extreme forms, the first one assumes that the truth will emerge in free and
unlimited communication, the second that it will evolve in communication that
is regulated and rationalized by procedures. The dilemma in terms of the prac-
tical conducting of the cases is that the first easily leads to unorganized proceed-
ings which drift out of control, whereas the second one may well result in
proceedings in which the clients become outsiders and experience a sense of
disenfranchisement.
From the historical point of view it is interesting to note that the substance
of control has changed in recent decades. The control exercised by previous chief
justices was described in a recent book based on the recollection of court work-
ers (Hatakka & Nirkko, 2000). In his contribution entitled “Learning manage-
ment skills in a circuit court”, Ari Heiniö (ibid., pp. 51–57) described his expe-
riences as a court trainee and gave a vivid illustration of the way in which a chief
justice worked on cases at the turn of  the 1970s. At that time, the equipment
and furniture in the court were ascetic. No ballpoint pens were allowed, and ink
bottles were just being replaced by pens with refills.  The chief justice lived in
an apartment attached to the court. He worked hard, including during the week-
ends and late in the evening, except on Wednesdays when he went home at 9.30
pm to see Peyton Place on TV. He smoked his pipe, even in the hearings, but
did not allow anyone else to do the same. He was also insistent on finding out
the truth. He might refer to facts that the parties had not presented at all in his
decisions on civil matters, and thus acted as an inquisitorial judge. He also
emphasized the local nature of the circuit courts. When he felt that it was time
the reckless driving of youngsters on the “main street” of the hamlet should be
stopped, he began to hand out sentences of one month’s imprisonment for
endangerment of traffic. As the author wrote, “it was the end of the play” (ibid.,
pp. 55–56).
This shows how the judge controlled the work in court, the behavior of the
parties in the hearing, and also the local community. On the one hand, the
control of those days was undoubtedly formal authority that belonged to the
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status of chief justice, or sometimes even arbitrariness.  On the other hand, it
also facilitated the constructive control of the proceedings and of the local com-
munity.
The era of chief justices and their often rather coercive control was followed
by a period of uncontrolled proceedings and non-active judges, which persist-
ed until the implementation of the procedural reform. Nowadays, activity and
control are required from the judges, but it is not self-evident of what this new
control over the proceedings is comprised.  Since this new position of the judge
with active control cannot be derived from the traditional autocratic chief
justices, a new basis of control needs to be created. It is exactly on this issue that
viewpoints on control differ in their emphasis on either controlled and restricted
discourse or on more uncontrolled and unrestricted discourse as the way of
legitimating the proceedings and finding the truth.
One way of reconciling opposing views on the effects of courtroom control
as merely good or bad for the final outcome is to look for the types of control-
ling rules and conceptualize the possible differences more precisely. Adler and
Borys (1996) developed a theory of how employees distinguish good from bad
rules, and suggested a distinction between two types of bureaucracy: coercive
and enabling.
The authors (ibid., pp. 70–74) describe coercive procedures as those in which
any deviation from the standard procedure is seen as suspect, and which do not
help the workers to determine whether the process is operating well or to navi-
gate the inevitable troubled waters of the work process. Coercive procedures are
not aimed at guiding the workers’ efforts as much as sanctioning punishment
in case of deviation. They rely on strictly partitioned tasks and the strict main-
tenance of borders. Coercive procedure manuals define the specific sequence of
steps to be followed in some detail, and forces workers to ask for approval for
skipping those they consider unnecessary.
Enabling procedures, in contrast, facilitate responses to work contingencies,
and consider breakdowns and their repair signaling problems in the procedures,
and thus an opportunity for improvement. They provide users with a view of
the processes and an understanding of the rationale behind the rules. They are
designed to afford the workers an understanding of how their own tasks fit into
the whole. Enabling procedure manuals assume that deviations are not only risks,
but also learning opportunities, and encourage the specifying of alternative pro-
cesses to replace the failed ones.
The tensions described above illustrate the dilemmas encountered in devel-
oping court practices, in which opposing requirements intersect. Emerging tools
that may incorporate the potential for mastering these dilemmas are summed
up in the following section.
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Emerging New Tools
The findings of this study imply that it is not only the implementation of the
court reform as such, but also the emerging new pattern of work that needs to
be constructed as a collective and collaborative effort among practitioners. The
empirical analyses reported on the work practices involved in conducting the
proceedings, in working with the clients, and in making settlements that,
although more collaborative and joint than before, still rested on individually
determined manners and tools.
As I argued in Chapter 2, the new Procedural Code was weak in offering
concrete tools and models for the practitioners to start with. As a result, judges
employ their own working models, which may accidentally be adopted by
colleagues in the same workplace. This is a slow and ineffective way to go about
the implementation of the reform. The individual working models and tools,
nevertheless, effectively serve to improve court practices if they are considered
a source of collective reflection and developing effort in the organization.
Exposing the judges’ differing working models to joint examination opens up
the opportunity to consider and facilitate not only well-functioning practices and
tools, but also the desired direction of development. Likewise, the contradictions
in developing court work require collective rather than individual efforts.
Characteristic of a tool is that it is relatively durable (its production and use
can be preserved and it has some stability over time), replicable (it is not too
problem-specific to be used only once for a singular problem), and transmitta-
ble (other individuals or groups can adopt its production and use) (see e.g.,
Wartofsky, 1979, p. 203). As tools often embody what is stable in work practic-
es, Leont’ev (1978) described them as something in which the work practices and
operations crystallize (see also Keller & Keller 1996). My empirical analyses
revealed several emerging instruments that the judges at least tentatively
employed when conducting proceedings. These were (1) tools related to the
script of the proceedings, (2) tools related to the client, and (3) tools related to
the settlement. Figure 10.3 shows the tools inserted into the matrix illustrating
the spearheads of development and the contradictions in the zone of proximal
development.
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Figure 10.3 Emerging New Tools
One tool related to the script of the proceedings was meta-talk, which was
employed for the construction of and reflection on the local script. Excerpt 7.11
in Chapter 7 showed how the judge formulated the script for the proceedings
by using meta-talk to outline concretely how he expected to trial to proceed
(“You could talk about the defects and their relevance maybe”, “We’ll go through
them all separately, point by point, and find out what they’re all about”).
Excerpts 7.15 and 7.17 were examples of episodes in which the participants
employed meta-talk in keeping the procedure in line and in reflecting on it (“We
have not yet taken up the defects”, “All that matters is what is presented here oral-
ly”, “Have we now progressed so far that we can go on to the alleged construc-
tion defects…?”).
When interviewed the judge who employed meta-talk in making the script
explicit also elaborated the idea of moving from explicit towards more collabo-
rative scripting together with the other participants, which would undoubtedly
necessitate more conscious use of meta-talk. Scripting the proceedings is con-
nected to the active controlling of them and to the interaction in the hearings,
which is the very same area in which the most salient contradiction was recog-
nized. The tension-laden zone in which the need for informal and open com-
munication collides with the need for controlling the interaction is clearly where
concrete models are needed for creating practices that both restrict and enable.
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The special character of the tools required for active control is that they should
at the same time restrict the informal interaction to the disciplined handling of
the case under the control of the court, while still enabling joint reflection on
the procedure, collaborative repair of possible deviations and collective efforts
in keeping the procedures in line.
A tool related to the client was instructional talk. When working in immedi-
ate contact with the clients, the judges used it as a special tool for explicating
court-specific rules and behavior to lay people. For example, in Excerpt 7.11, the
judge used instructional talk purposefully when he explained how the proceed-
ings would progress and why it was important for the client to be present at the
hearing. In Excerpt 7.15, the judge explained the procedural law to the attorneys.
Further on, Excerpts 8.19, 8.41 and 8.42, in which the legal professionals ex-
plained the way of working in the hearings, included elements of instructional
talk, in a more or less systematic and intentional form.
 It seems that instructional talk is a tool worth further refinement and pur-
poseful utilization, as it may turn out to be important in making the hearings
more visible and comprehensible for the clients, and thus also more legitimate
and trusted. The lack of concrete discursive tools was evident in the systematic
directing of the clients and in informing them about the way of working in
courts. The tools for encouraging clients to participate in the hearing on the one
hand, and for controlling their rambling speech on the other, were recognized
in my analysis as potential areas for development.
Tools related to settlement seemed to be mainly questions and suggestions
concerning the possibility of a settlement. Examples of questions used by the
judges for eliciting information on such a possibility, or for sounding out the
parties’ needs, included, “Are you both insured for you legal expenses according
to the old kind of conditions?” and “But do you yourselves still see any realistic
preconditions?” (Excerpt 9. 2), “Is it possible for the plaintiff and the defendant
to accept symbolic compensation?” and “Do the parties need a judicially rea-
soned decision?” (Excerpt 9.3), and “Were the principals in touch with each other
at all, or was all this just between the attorneys?” (Excerpt 9.4). Questions were
also used for more provocative probing about the dispute and litigation, and
seemed to contain advice to reconsider the settlement. Examples can be found
in Excerpt 9.5 (e.g., “Is this issue really worth taking so far?” and “Was this claim
taken out only because of the contesting of the partition?”).
The judges’ suggestions concerning settlement were more like explicit
recommendations to consider it once more: “Try to settle this issue at least”
(Excerpt 9.6). They also seemed to take the form of more neutral advice to go
on with the negotiations (“That is something you both have to consider” in
Excerpt 9.2), or a suggestion for a possible starting point for settlement, such
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as in Excerpt 9.3 (“The defendant would agree to having acted in an erroneous
manner, and the plaintiff would be compensated by a lesser sum”).
The tools related to the script of the proceedings, the client and the settle-
ment were far from being durable and established, and were rather emergent and
tentative. This suggests that tools are not only stable and structural, but may also
be subject to constant reconsideration and reformulation. These emergent tools
had been developed and adopted by the practitioners themselves. The
notion that individually developed models lead to individually determined
idiosyncratic behavior highlights the importance of systematic, collective efforts
to construct concrete tools for new work practices.
The Transformation of Expertise
The research question concerning the zone of proximal development in court
work led to the further question of what this developmental potential tells us
about the transformation of expertise in professional work. Issues such as who
the actors are who work with court cases, how collaboration between them
emerges, and what kind of expertise is involved, also came to light in the em-
pirical analyses. The clients’ contributions in the hearings now include elements
of a subject-like position, the legal professionals construct cases in ways which
are more collaborative and dialogical than before, and the court’s expertise is
directed not only at giving verdicts, but also at helping the parties to reach a set-
tlement. This seems to indicate a shift towards collaborative expertise, understood
as an accomplishment of multiple interacting activity systems that face and shape
qualitative transformations and reorganization. The activity systems of the court,
the attorneys and the clients, face the major challenge of producing novel solu-
tions incorporating interaction and collaboration in establishing cases and in
reaching settlement.
It seems that the developmental potential in court work, described above in
terms of spearheads for the future, indicates a new type of expertise, which
resembles the expertise invoked in the work that Victor and Boynton (1998) call
co-configuration. The typical features of co-configuration that are detectable in
emerging court work include the necessity to adjust the services to the client’s
needs, the involvement of several actors, the significant contribution of the
client as a partner in producing the service, and the “customer-intelligent”
products that adapt to the client’s changing needs. First and foremost, settlement
seems to be a phenomenon that the concept of co-configuration helps to put into
context in terms of the apparent transformation of expertise. In negotiations on
settlement, the user and the producer – the client and the court – in collabora-
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tion and on the basis of mutual dialogue, customize the settlement to fit the cli-
ent’s needs. The client’s participation in the process is of crucial importance: the
empirical analysis revealed how the co-configuration collapsed when the client
was not personally involved in the negotiation process.
Co-configuration requires dialogue as a new form of communication through
which all the participants are involved in negotiating the object of their joint
effort (for instance, a verdict or a settlement), how they are going to proceed
(what is the script that they will follow), and the division of labor between the
them (for instance, what is the role of the client).
The negotiation that is elementary here could be understood as a new,
potential source of learning in the context of court proceedings. Palmer and Rob-
erts (1998, p. 70) point out that negotiation is not just about “bargaining”, but
it is primarily a process of information exchange and learning. Learning is em-
bedded in the cyclical process of the repetitive exchange of information
between the parties, assessment of this, and the resulting adjustments to expec-
tations and preferences. The potential for a new kind of learning and expansion
in dispute resolution is also being assessed in recent attempts to promote the idea
of transformative justice (Law Commission of Canada, 1999). This focuses on
the developmental potential inherent in all conflicts, and uses the substance of
the conflict as a means of exploring options that are not only acceptable, but that
also develop and strengthen the relationships among those involved. On the
whole, understanding court proceedings as a learning process among those
involved is a new area in the field of learning and the development of expertise,
about which we know only a little.
An essential element of co-configuration is the lay knowledge that the
client brings to the process. In my analysis, client expertise appeared not only
as knowledge of their case, but also as ideas and preferences concerning how the
case was being constructed, and as expansive suggestions on how it should be
understood. The emergence of this lay expertise that is apparently finding its way
to civil proceedings paves the way for the potential merging of professional and
lay expertise, which in itself is full of tensions and constraints.
Tuckett & al. (1985) recognized the tension-laden collaboration between pro-
fessionals and lay persons when reporting on communication failures in doc-
tor-patient encounters. Doctors and patients did not manage to achieve a dia-
logue in which ideas could be shared. The doctors did not encourage the patients
to present their views, and often inhibited them from doing so. The patients also
often limited their communication and did not make it easy for the doctors to
achieve a dialogue. In short, the patients were not treated like competent experts
in their own health care (ibid., p. 211).
302
The authors (ibid. pp. 211–212) considered the fact that the consultations did
not provide the patients with the opportunity to make decisions based on the
biomedical knowledge given to them by their doctors, an important
shortcoming with disadvantageous implications. Their argument follows the one
presented within the procedural-justice approach (e.g., Tyler, 1990; 1997) on the
interrelation between clients’ experiences of fairness and compliance: “Patients
will be less likely to be well motivated and more likely to ignore advice, vary
treatment and, therefore, waste resources of time and money.” (Tuckett & al.,
1985, p. 211).
Thus far, the client’s satisfaction with the product or service in itself has been
acknowledged in co-configuration (Victor & Boynton, 1995, p.196). Interpret-
ing negotiations on settlement in this kind of framework introduces a new
perspective: the importance of the co-configuration process itself for client
satisfaction. Transferring the findings of the procedural-justice approach to this
context suggests that the way in which the product is configured, and how the
negotiations to adapt the product to the clients’ needs are conducted, are of
crucial importance to the client’s satisfaction with and commitment to the
product.
On the other hand, co-configuration appears as a way of producing goods
and services that lays the ground for the client’s experience of trust and fairness.
Configuring products in a dialogue, in which the client works as a partner in
collaboration with the professionals, resembles the factors that studies on pro-
cedural justice have found to enhance client satisfaction and their acknowledge-
ment of the procedures as fair: the opportunity to express their views to the de-
cision makers, to participate in the discussion of the case, and to be taken
seriously and treated with dignity (Tyler, 1997).
10.5 Implementation of Court Reform as Change and Learning
The findings of my empirical analyses support the hypothesis concerning tran-
sition in court work, which was outlined with the help of the developmental
spearheads and contradictions and the emerging new tools described in the
previous section. What, then, do these findings tell us about change and learn-
ing in the implementation of legal reform?
To begin with, the findings suggest that the implementation of a court
reform cannot be adequately understood as the mere adoption of top-down
rules. Further, they imply that implementation is not solely a process of adjust-
ing the reform to local needs. What they do support is an alternative or com-
plementary view on implementation as a learning process, in which the new rules
are interpreted, shaped and enriched when applied in practice. The methods used
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in this study revealed in a powerful way how the implementation of a reform
takes place as an incremental process, in which the possible and  alternative ways
of working unfold as the concrete cases are dealt with in everyday practices.
The need for the local construction of a script for the proceedings and the
actual deviations from the script that the procedural law intends (Chapter 7),
the clients’ active participation that took them out of the role of informant giv-
en to them in the procedural law (Chapter 8), and the clear differences in the
judges’ practices in reaching a settlement (Chapter 9) are examples of my find-
ings that require going beyond the top-down perspective on implementation.
They clearly illustrate that the rules set out in the legislation are not carried out
by the practitioners exactly in the way that was intended by the legislators. The
analyses that concentrated on the local, changing and contradictory elements in
court practices revealed that the top-down procedural rules were interpreted and
given content by the practitioners themselves when working with the actual
cases. The principles given in the legislation have to be concretized through
local interpretations and constructions of the necessary tools, norms and prac-
tices. The process of implementation, in which the law is shaped, determined and
altered by the actual implementors, has already been recognized in recent
studies on implementation. For example, Yanow (1996, p. 222) acknowledged
policy implementation as the social construction of reality and viewed it as an
iterative and interactive process of meaning making through interpretation. My
contribution to the theorizing of implementation is to view it as a learning pro-
cess with significant potential for expansion in court work. What is essential is to
look for the new that goes beyond the pre-set objectives and pre-given models.
The major expansive potential lies within the small and gradual changes that
take place in court practices during implementation. From the outside, these
changes may appear accidental or trivial, but they incorporate the potential for
the deep-seated transformation and reorganization of court work. What I have
called spearheads of development are the very same elements that may direct the
development in courts most radically.
The informal discourse in the hearings challenges the idea of dispute reso-
lution as exclusively judicially-determined problem solving, and includes the
potential for conducting proceedings in which the client does not experience a
discrepancy between the problem that bothers him or her and the judicial treat-
ment of it. The clients’ contributions in the hearings, especially their expand-
ing initiatives offering new ways of interpreting the case, challenge the traditional
understanding of expertise in courts and invoke questions concerning the kind
of expertise the client brings into the hearings, and whose expertise is needed
in reaching a satisfactory outcome. Settlement questions the solid foundation
of civil courts in their pursuit of material truth.
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Informal hearings, clients’ expanding initiatives and settlement may be seen
as a “Trojan horse” forcing an entry into the nucleus of the court system. Once
inside, they could fundamentally change our understanding of what justice is,
of how fairness and legitimacy are produced, and of who are involved. Every time
they occur, they make visible the constraints of court work and question its
motive. Simultaneously, they offer the possibility for expansion by giving a
chance to move above and beyond the constraints.
The nature of some of the new court practices as capsules of potential
expansion, or as a “Trojan horse”, is especially evident in terms of settlement.
In terms of the elements of an activity system, settlement can be considered a
tool in the sense that it serves as a means for solving the dispute more quickly
and cutting the proceedings short. Basically, it looks like a convenient technical
instrument for avoiding the complex and time-consuming work of establishing
the facts and giving a verdict. At the same time, it “smuggles” in a completely
new notion of what justice is, and changes the object of court activity.
This implies that, at times, a tool is more like “a tool in disguise” – something
that in fact represents a radically different object. Settlement can be
conceived of as a technical tool for rationalizing the proceedings, and many
judges obviously use it for that purpose. Whether they wanted to or not, they
simultaneously started to work with a new object and to unfold the potential
expansion in court work.
The metaphor of “a Trojan horse” turns the traditional idea of court reform
upside down. A reform is not an end product of a legislative planning process,
that only needs to be put into practice, but it is rather the beginning of a
developmental process in which the court activity itself may transform and
expand. This process of expansion can radically alter our understanding of what
justice is and what courts stand for.
Studies in the field of organizational change and learning have distinguished
two opposing approaches to organizational change (e.g., Beer & Nohria, 2000).
The first one views change as planned and programmatic. Top-down leadership,
excluding the participation of teams and employees, emphasizes the strategic
decisions first made by the leader. According to the second approach, change
emerges, is less planned, and occurs without pre-given blueprints. Participation
and collaboration, rather than top-down orders, are seen as vital to ensure long-
term performance improvement.
These two approaches embrace the very same questions that have been tack-
led in this study: does change come from the top down or the bottom up, is it
once-and-for-all or a series of small improvements, and most interestingly, is it
planned or emergent?
10 Conclusions 305
The findings and conclusions of this study seem to encourage the laying aside
of the idea of organizational change as merely forceful breakthroughs dictated
from above, and the recognition that it is also gradual, often consisting of small
but interconnected alterations and adjustments from below. What is essential to
our understanding of organizational change is the evolving texture of these
gradual changes. Giving support to my working hypothesis on change (Chap-
ter 4), the results of my study indicate that these gradual and small alterations
in everyday work practices may conflate to contribute to a radical sea-change
in producing court services. When it materializes, this sea-change will influence
the whole network of activity systems connected to dispute resolution in courts.
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11 Reflections on the Research Process
Qualitative research relying on fieldwork raises questions regarding the collec-
tion and validity of the data. Any evaluation of a qualitative study, presupposes
the integration of the researcher into the organizational setting of those
observed, since the quality of the data depends very much on the cooperation
and trust obtained in the field. Recent studies have pointed out the importance
of reflection of the ethnographer’s position and relation to the field (e.g.,
Emerson, 2001). In the following reflection on my research process I will
connect issues to do with conducting fieldwork with issues of validity.
The current qualitative research wave has questioned the traditional way of
validating knowledge against the objective reality (Altheide & Johnson, 1998;
Emerson, 2001; Kvale 1995). Instead, knowledge is considered contextual and
validity is also related to the responses of the audience. Bloor (2001) has
suggested that the two main techniques considered alternative methods of
validation in recent qualitative research – triangulation (using different data-col-
lection methods on the same research object) and member validation (compar-
ing the analyst’s findings with the understanding of those being studied) – can-
not be regarded as tests of research findings. Pointing to the problems of
corroboration and comparison in validating techniques, he argues that there can
be no tests of validity. “Neither technique can validate findings, but both
techniques can be said to be relevant to the issues of validity, insofar as both tech-
niques may yield data which throw fresh light on the investigation and which
provide a spur for deeper and richer analyses.” (ibid., p.395). Validation tech-
niques thus seem to best serve as opportunities for rather than as a test of
reflexive elaboration.
I will utilize Kvale’s (1995) conceptions of validity in qualitative research as
a means of organizing my reflections on the research process. Kvale treats
validity as an expression of craftsmanship and extends the concept to incorpo-
rate communicative and pragmatic aspects42.  I will conclude the study by
42
 Kvale’s (1995) notion of craftsmanship has similarities with what Bloor (2001) calls triangu-
lation, and the notion of communicative validity resembles member validation.
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assessing its contribution to activity-theoretical and socio-legal research and to
the study of implementation and organizational change, as well as its relevance
to legal practitioners working within the court system.
An Overview of the Research Process
My study, which was based on a before-after design around the court reform,
started in 1990 and ended in 1998 when the second round of data collection was
finished.  I have maintained contact with my research site and visit it every now
and then. My position as a researcher in relation to the research site has altered
over the years. The first three years of the developmental project (1990–1992)
were years of intensive fieldwork and systematic interventions organized by our
research group. After that, my role changed to that of the individual researcher
collecting data. The data, however, was used to support the court personnel in
their own developmental efforts.
The specialty of my research lies in the exceptionally long time-span of the
fieldwork and the gathering of comparable data before and after the court
reform. My knowledge of the time before the reform is not based on accounts
and recollections given by current workers, but on the actual court proceedings
of that time.
The developmental research project in Vantaa District Court started with
intensive fieldwork. In addition to collecting data by observing court proceed-
ings and conducting an extensive number of interviews, I spent a lot of time
making ethnographic observations in the field. In those three years of ethno-
graphic study I gained a considerable knowledge of court work and civil pro-
ceedings, while maintaining the status of a researcher with free access to events
and the confidence of the subjects. The second round of data collection in 1996–
1998 were years of picking the fruits of work already done, and I was able to carry
out data collection in a more focused and systematic way.
My own knowledge of court work and civil procedure increased during the
process. I was a complete newcomer when I began, and I had difficulties even
distinguishing civil cases from criminal cases. The practitioners in the field were
my teachers. The extensive discussions – both informal ones and those that took
place in the context of the interviews – with practitioners representing differ-
ent viewpoints and different positions in the court system were my most fruit-
ful source of knowledge. In 1991, I also had some training in conducting
proceedings, in the form of a five-day seminar for judges organized by the
Ministry of Justice.
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When I started my doctoral studies in 1995 and revisited my research site after
a two-years break, it was not at all clear where I should put my focus.
Having made my first observations, I was prepared to consider the wider
ethnography of change. This would have included observing changes in
collaboration between court personnel, and in the division of labor, and would
have required data collection on different forms of cooperation, such as
meetings and collaboration between judges and court clerks. I started the data
collection with these issues in mind, but it soon became clear that the most
important changes had taken place in the organization of the court hearings. I
wrote my research plan to cover changes both in the court proceedings and in
the collaboration within Vantaa District Court, but soon became convinced that
it would be most fruitful to concentrate on the changes in the civil proceedings.
Integration and Obtaining Trust
When the development and research project started in Vantaa District Court in
1990, I felt that some of the personnel were suspicious about our objectives as
researchers and about the significance of the project. Since the Ministry of
Justice was funding it, I assumed that some of the workers may have wondered
for whom we were working and reporting the results. We planned to interview
all of the judges and some of the office workers, but some of our informants sug-
gested that we should interview the whole office personnel in order to give a
more realistic picture of our research to everybody and to get us in contact with
every worker at the court. Following this advice was probably wise. I think the
interviews were useful, not only in giving a multi-voiced description of how
things worked in the district court, but also in building up trust in our research
project.
At first, the judges were clearly uncertain about how to regard and co-
operate with us. They were used to maintaining formal relationships with
people in their work, and they kept their distance and kept up the formalities
when collaborating with us. When we observed a court hearing for the first time,
the judge did not allow us to enter the courtroom through the back door in
advance with the court workers, but directed us to the waiting area and called
us in over the public-address system: “Researchers from Helsinki University,
courtroom number two”. The first copies of court documents that we asked for
were supplied with the judge’s signature and the typewritten text: “For the
researchers from Helsinki University. Free of charge.”
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My regular visits to the courthouse and frequent contacts with the workers
there intensified my integration into the organizational setting. I received an
electronic key that enabled me to move freely inside the courthouse, I was
given my own mail box, I had my lunch and coffee breaks with the court
workers, and I was invited to the parties they organized. I was also given a nick-
name when they jokingly referred to me as their “Honorary notary”. I interpreted
all this as signs denoting trust and mutual respect, and it gave me confidence in
the data.
In Chapter 5, I described how the interviews with those involved in the hear-
ings were conducted, and I preliminarily assessed the information produced in
them. Obtaining trust in interviews is essential in order to elicit responses from
the interviewees, and especially responses that are more than just self-evident
facts and trivialities, already known in the work community and easy to impart
to someone not trusted. On some occasions, the interviewees made explicit their
own opinions of being interviewed, or indirectly showed their willingness to
contribute to the study. Comments on the usefulness and on the appeal of the
study could also be interpreted as signs of the high quality of the data.
Case 5, interview with the judge after the preliminary hearing in
December 1997
Judge: While I have been talking here with you my thoughts have become
clarified. This was not a waste of time.
Case 1, interview with plaintiff’s attorney after the decision in May
1991
Researcher: Do you still have something on your mind concerning the pro-
ceedings or the decision?
Plaintiff ’s attorney: Well, we have now thrashed out this case. I have noth-
ing else on my mind, only that it would be very interesting sometimes to
kind of hear an outsider’s perspective on these issues.
Later on:
Researcher: Thank you for this pleasant cooperation.
Plaintiff ’s attorney: My pleasure. This has been most interesting for me, too.
Case 6, interview with the defendant’s attorney after the decision in
June 1998
Defendant’s attorney: If you still have something to ask, you can always give
me a call and then we’ll take a look.
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Reflections on the Validity of the Research
The quality of craftsmanship in an investigation includes continually checking,
questioning and theoretically interpreting the findings. Validating means
quality control throughout the stages of knowledge production rather than an
inspection of the validity at the end of the research process (Kvale, 1995). In the
present study, multiple data sources and data-gathering methods provided a basis
for continuous checking and weighing up of the evidence. The relevance of the
research problems and interests was evaluated during the different phases of
fieldwork and analysis. This required close and continuous interaction with the
informants.
My examination of change and development in court activity had its start-
ing point in activity theory with the assumption that a fundamental change in
a particular activity necessarily requires a change in the object of that work; the
object here being understood in its dual nature as the process from the raw
material to the meaningful outcome. My working hypotheses on the nature of
implementation, change and learning (Chapter 4), and on the possible shift in
court work (Chapter 9), made explicit my theoretical point of view from which
I worked with the data.
In my empirical analyses, attention was focused on how the object is
constructed in the court process. In this sense, one could say the change in court
activity was operationalized as changes in the construction of the object.
Several windows onto this object construction were opened through my study
of courtroom interaction in terms of scripting the proceedings, clients’ contri-
butions, and settlements.
The frequent use of excerpts from authentic interaction is a solution that
offers the reader the possibility to evaluate the preciseness of my observations
and to see the data on which the interpretations are based.
According to Kvale (ibid.), communicative validity involves testing the
validity of knowledge claims in a dialogue. Valid knowledge is not merely
obtained by approximations to a given social reality. It also involves conversa-
tion about the social reality, and what is a valid observation is decided through
the argumentation of the participants. Valid knowledge claims are established
in discourse through which the results of a study come to be viewed as sufficient-
ly trustworthy for other investigators to rely upon in their own work.
In this study, the dialogue between the researcher and the practitioners in the
field was built into the research process. Different forms of dialogue concern-
ing my analyses and preliminary findings were set up, including (1) interviews,
(2) informal discussions on my observations and preliminary interpretations,
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and (3) meetings and seminar days in which I presented selected pieces of
videotaped data and my preliminary findings. These events were planned in
collaboration with some of the district court judges, and they were aimed at
enabling the workers to reflect on their own practices.
The researchers interpretations were discussed in all of these forms of
dialogue, and this provided opportunities to evaluate their validity from the
practitioners’ perspective while I was still working with the data. Dialogue with
practitioners from different organizational positions within and outside the
court was also an important source of validation. One special, solitary form of
dialogue was writing an article together with the court clerks for the newsletter
of the Ministry of Justice. The article was entitled “The bold and the beautiful”
(Heikkinen & al., 1992), and it described the pioneering work of court clerks in
the hearings and their efforts in developing that work. Outlining the content of
the article together in one meeting was a good opportunity for the clerks to
articulate their differing working practices, to reflect on them and to differenti-
ate the needs for changing them.
Writing articles about my research during the research process also served
as a means of enhancing the communicative validity of my findings. These
articles were written in Finnish and, since they were published in legal journals,
they were directed to legal practitioners working with court cases. The feedback
I received helped me consider current issues in the court system. It also gave me
some hints concerning the zone of proximal development in court  activity. One
indication of the positive feedback from the court system was my appointment
as a member of a Government Committee designing guidelines for the future
development of the court system.
In the pragmatic validation of a knowledge claim, justification expands to
application. Pragmatic validity goes beyond communicative validity, as it
represents a stronger knowledge claim than mere agreement through dialogue
(Kvale, 1995). It focuses on the relevance of the interpretations for instigating
change.  In the present study, the starting point of the research was that the
researcher’s interest coincided with the practical problems faced by those
involved in the cases. The practical relevance of the study was articulated in the
willingness of the workers of Vantaa District Court to build their efforts to
improve the civil proceedings on the videotaped working situations and
participants’ accounts that my study could offer them. The importance of this
kind of mirror, set up by the researcher to reflect current problems and distur-
bances, was assessed by the chief justice when wrapping up one of the seminar
days.
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Seminar on civil proceedings, December 1997
Chief justice: When we began this seminar we talked over the conditions for
its success, and we found that one condition was that we could discuss and
were open-minded. At least I feel that this has been extremely useful, and
for a long time, the discussion has been really open and constructive. We
have now really seen the work practices of each other and we must have
learned something, and everybody can reflect these lessons in his or her
own practices. I think these seminars could be held more often.
Contributions of the Study to the Intersecting Research Approaches
My study was an attempt to apply the activity-theoretical approach in the realm
of court work, thus offering a new context for scholars interested in activity
theory and its applications in different fields of social practice. With its concen-
tration on the implementation of court reform on the very local level of one
district court and its everyday practices, the study focuses the limelight on the
local actors and gives them a voice. In this sense, it counters the view of indi-
viduals merely as subject to structural power, or in the case of implementation,
as targets of policies (Yanow, 1996, p. 232). In particular, the contribution of this
study was to make visible the viewpoint of the court client and his or her
actions in the hearings.
The most challenging research effort for me in terms of activity theory was
to create a method for elaborating the activity of the clients, the object of the
court work itself. The development and testing of this method of analyzing
clients’ contributions in constructing the case was reported in Chapter 8. In
order to capture the user perspective on courtroom interaction, I used the
notion of initiative and developed a method of initiative analysis. This method
proved to be a powerful tool in analyzing the various and differing forms of
client contributions in an elaborated way. It was also sensitive enough to detect
fragile client initiatives, which could easily be bypassed as irrelevant or accidental.
Furthermore, the method was not restricted to client initiatives, but also served
in the analysis of their effects and the responses given by the legal profession-
als.
The notion of initiative and the method for analyzing initiatives and their
effects were used in an attempt to develop an intermediate tool for analyzing and
understanding situated practices and discourse from the viewpoint of construct-
ing the object. The special challenge in the analysis was to define the
criteria for a client’s initiative in relation to his or her other verbal contributions.
This definition incorporated knowledge of the initiatory and responsive
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elements in speech turns (Linell, 1998) and knowledge of the history of
the client’s position in the hearings. The developed method was valuable in
bringing in user perspective on courts, and in making visible the client’s
contribution in constructing the case. It also helped me to recognize the judges’
problems and lack of necessary discursive tools in working in direct contact with
the clients. In this respect, the analysis contributes to the understanding of col-
laborative expertise and boundary crossing across different activity systems,
which is currently a theoretical and methodological challenge in many studies
on multi-actor collaboration. The method was also crucial in showing what kinds
of learning challenges and potential for the change and transformation of
expertise are included in face-to-face communication with clients.
With its activity-theoretical approach to reform in the court system and in
dispute resolution, my study brings a novel and alternative perspective to socio-
legal studies on courts. Using the theoretical concept of activity, I tried to over-
come the dichotomy between agency and structure, in much the same way as is
currently being called for by scholars welcoming cultural studies of law as a
promising interdisciplinary approach to tackling law-related phenomena
(Sarat & Simon, 2001). With its emphasis on the historical aspect of change and
development in courts as well as on the situational aspect of the construction
of everyday court proceedings, the present study largely complies with Silbey’s
(1992) description of cultural studies as treating consciousness as historical and
situational, and shifting attention to the constitution and operation of social
structure in historically specific situations. It also endorses Sarat & Simon’s
(2001) remark that legal meanings are not invented and communicated in a
unidirectional process, in which actors appear as inert recipients of the law’s
external pressures. Litigants, clients and others deploy and use meanings and
“press their understandings in and on law, and, in doing so, invite adaptation
and change in legal practices.” (ibid., p. 20).
As a contribution to efforts to forge a new interdisciplinary synthesis,
cultural studies of law, the present study introduced the methodology of
cultural-historical activity theory (e.g., Engeström, Miettinen & Punamäki,
1999). Local activities are simultaneously unique and general, momentary and
durable, in that general cultural means – for instance, artifacts, rules, and divi-
sion of labor – created by previous generations are used in solving the problems
in unique situations.
In the context of Finnish court-related studies, this study is the first one to
introduce authentic data on actual courtroom interaction. It also gives an over-
view of the “grass-roots” implementation of the procedural reform by analyz-
ing how it is being carried out when concrete cases are established and
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decided. With its longitudinal design covering the time before and after the
reform, it also captures an eight-year period in the history of Finnish lower
courts.
My study contributes to research on policy implementation in presenting
implementation as a learning process with the potential for expansive transfor-
mation. The use of qualitative data on the local conducting of everyday court
work showed how the reform was implemented in the actual practices of estab-
lishing the cases. In this sense, the method complies with the notion of giving
full weight to the interpreted meanings of the implementors as well as to the dif-
ferences in interpretation (Yanow, 1996, p. 222). Rather than framing the study
in terms of legislative intent, and comparing agency outputs or outcomes to the
intentions of the legislation, I looked at how the new procedural laws were con-
structed in local practice. The study thus offers an alternative view on
implementation, not as the final phase of a legislative process, but rather as an
overture for a change process which can fundamentally transform the activity
of the implementors.
As far as studies on organizational change and learning are concerned, this
study theorized change as both fundamental and incremental at the same time.
It suggested understanding change as stepwise and gradual, but still including
the potential for fundamental transformation and expansion. My analysis of
court work explored change in an area that is traditionally regarded as stable and
unchangeable. Positioning the research in a before-and-after setting and con-
centrating on the micro-level analysis of situational and local interaction in court
proceedings, also made it possible to trace emergent and deliberate change, and
to grasp its fragile seeds.
The Contribution of the Study for Court Practitioners
One important aim of this study was to produce knowledge that is radically
local, and thus applicable to the practitioners working on court cases.  In an
attempt to grasp the changing and contradictory features of the work, I did not
even try to offer statistically conclusive facts, but rather aimed at formulating
working hypotheses on the possible development of the activity in question. The
hypotheses offered a researcher’s viewpoint on development that can be tested,
experimented with and modified by the practitioners themselves. This kind of
knowledge can serve the needs of practitioners in their own developmental
efforts, and still be scientifically regarded as theoretical, systematic and critical.
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I hope this study will give legal practitioners ideas that are testable and
empirically useful. My outlines of the potential development and expansion in
court work in particular might serve as one starting point for a critical discus-
sion on what kind of courts we would like and how they should serve us in our
legal problems in the future. Much in line with Kvale’s (1995) suggestions of
sifting the focus from mapping the social world as it is to what it could be, in
addition to “telling it like it is”, I have also concentrated on “telling it as it might
become”.
Lately, the success or failure of the procedural reform in civil cases has been
assessed in public. High legal costs and the complexity of the new rules have been
acknowledged as the main failings of the new system (e.g., Hallberg, 2001, pp.
38, 78). Although these questions are at the very nucleus of assessing the
activity of the lower courts, and they evidently seem to indicate deficiencies in
court work, I nevertheless solicited another viewpoint, more oriented to the fu-
ture. The emphasis of my study has been on what is potential and promising in
current court work, and on the expansion that appears accessible in the light of
current practice. Observed disturbances or contradictions have been interpret-
ed as sources of change and expansion. Berman (2001, p. 99) noted a move in
law and society scholarship away from “a legal-realist-inspired reform agenda”
toward a focus on law as a pervasive and inescapable force in defining
social relations. He criticized the recent tendency in socio-legal studies of
seeing power and domination everywhere, and argued that relentlessly critical
researchers lead us to despair of the prospects of development. He advocated
sympathetic rather than suspicious reading, and the emphasizing of “what is
worthwhile in the efforts of people to construct ideas, systems or principles,
flawed though they might be.” (ibid., p. 101). Instead of overall skepticism and
suspicion, he encourages research that tells stories of noble efforts, optimism and
hope. A less suspicious story might actually be more effective in achieving
reform.
Emphasizing the user perspective on courts – the role of the clients and the
recognition of their needs and problems – does not denote devaluing or super-
seding judicial knowledge and expertise. On the contrary, I wish to highlight the
judge’s role in translating and solving people’s judicial problems. The impend-
ing pressure to settle disputes, and clients’ emerging needs to be involved in and
discuss the dispute as they have experienced it, nevertheless, require new ways
of organizing services based on the judge’s special knowledge, such as the use
of new artifacts, new solutions concerning division of labor, and a new kind of
boundary-crossing collaboration between judges and other experts. The service
and counseling given by the court has always been recognized as problematic
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among legal practitioners, and as a threat to neutrality.  The findings of this study
suggest a new content of counseling in courts. In its new form, counseling could
include endeavors to help the client to understand his or her problem in terms
of recognizing what is judicial in it, and thus resolvable through judicial dispute
resolution. This emphasizes the instructional function of court proceedings and,
respectively, opportunities of learning through negotiation.
The final words have not been said about the implementation of the
Finnish procedural reform in civil courts. The process is still going on. The em-
phasis has largely been on how extensively judges and attorneys have absorbed
the new Procedural Code. It could be fruitful to shift the focus from the inter-
nalization of the new rules to their externalization: how the local actors and court
communities use the Procedural Code to carry out their daily activities with the
cases, and how they could further cultivate and sweeten the procedures. Culti-
vating the procedures to fit better the needs of both clients and courts
requires the building up of novel ways of developing court practices. Instead of,
or in addition to, nationwide training campaigns, new forms of local develop-
mental efforts and attempts at networking are needed. Novel types of collabo-
ration between judges and attorneys in terms of joint learning about civil pro-
ceedings, developmental co-projects involving several district courts, and
developmental work in which the client’s perspective is also represented, serve
as examples of open-minded solutions, which could be organized and reported
by the Ministry of Justice.
Laukkanen (1995, p. 2) introduced a metaphor in which the procedural rules
are compared with the rules of chess. The rules of chess are not changed easily.
The rules of civil proceedings changed remarkably with the 1993 reform. What
is special and different from chess is that, in procedural law, a change in the rules
of the game also changes the objectives of the game. A player in procedural law
typically has to conclude from the rules whether the objective of the game has
changed or not. Laukkanen’s comparison provides an insight into the fuzziness
of the procedural reform, and illustrates the dire need for interpretation from
the practitioner’s point of view.
Engeström (1990, pp. 193–194) referred to the necessity for an overall
perspective that gives a framework to separate renewals and innovations.
Presenting such frameworks that configure the future development of the whole
activity system requires tools that Engeström calls “where to” artifacts, and which
Wartofsky (1979, pp. 207–209) considers tertiary artifacts, used in imagining and
constructing possible worlds irrespective of practical constraints. Their impor-
tance is in their motivational power and potential for subjectification among the
participating practitioners. This includes an important lesson in regard to the
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implementation of the court reform and the logic of the procedural law in
general: demanding new rules are hard to accept and implement when an over-
all vision of the future form of the activity system – introduced with the help
of the “where to” artifact – is missing (see Engeström, 1990, p. 194).
The implications of the missing “where to” artifacts in the procedural law
have to be considered. One the one hand, more legislative effort could be put
into conveying to the implementors a careful analysis of the overall future
development that is being pursued through the change in the procedure. On the
other hand, there seems to be an ever stronger emphasis on the significance of
local learning and the collective efforts of the legal practitioners themselves in
constructing the future of their own activity. This doctoral thesis may serve as a
necessary “where to” artifact in these efforts helping to elaborate the possible and
desired alternatives of the future development of courts.
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Appendix 1
Case 6 – Contesting the partition of joint property
An agenda for the plaintiff’s interview after the preliminary hearing
February 1998
1. Tell me about your side of the story: What is this case all about?
2. What has happened in this case so far? Do you have other cases pending right
now?
3. What happened in the informal hearing in November? Why was it arranged?
4. Your case was brought before the court last June. What has happened after that
in the process?
5. What kind of contacts have you had with your attorney? How often do you
meet? How do you feel he is pleading your cause? Did you find it necessary to
have an attorney? How did you come to hire this attorney?
6. What’s the reason for your presence in the preliminary hearing?
7. Are you familiar with the procedure in civil hearings? Has your attorney
informed you about the proceedings? What is the meaning of the preliminary
hearing in the entire process?
8. How did you find the judge’s way of handling the case in the hearing? Was it
active or passive? How would you describe the discussion that took place in the
hearing? The judge advised you to consider whether certain details were worth
fighting to the end – how did you receive his request? Did you feel that the judge
lost his temper a bit?
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9. Why do you think the judge obliged you and the defendant to be present in
the extended preliminary hearing?
10. Why did the judge ask about your efforts in reaching a settlement?
11. What did you think when the judge wished to see all the money transactions
and not just individual bills? What about the judge’s remarks about fair play and
gentlemanliness?
12. Every now and then, you and your lawyer seemed to negotiate on which of
you would take the floor. Had you agreed beforehand on a division of labor?
13. Was it easy or difficult for you to understand the judicial details of the
discussion? (for example, whether the defendant made a plea of trial or not,
whether the cause of action was material or procedural, or whether the defen-
dant’s claims should be rejected or dismissed without prejudice)
14. Which one do you prefer: to handle all the problems and unfinished busi-
ness between your ex-wife and yourself, or to stick to the claims pertaining to
the case, only? Is this the last court case between you and your wife?
15. Do you know the composition of the court in the main hearing, if the case
proceeds that far?
16. Do you find a settlement feasible in this case? What could be the court’s role
in reaching a settlement?
17. How do you assess the strategy of the adversary in this case – “what’s the
name of the ball game”?  How does the defendant’s lawyer fight their case? Have
you had any collaboration with the adverse party?
18. Do you anticipate the final decision in this case?
19. What importance does the time and money spend in the case have for you?
20. What kind of an understanding have you formed about the courts handling
this type of cases? In your regard, how do the district courts work today?
21. You told me earlier that you had turned to the parliamentary ombudsman.
On what matter was that?
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